n McNabb, Tyler Dalton (2016) Closing Pandora's box: a defence of Alvin Plantinga's Epistemology of Religious Belief. PhD thesis. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/7587/ Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the Author The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the Author When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given Glasgow Theses Service http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ [email protected] Closing Pandora’s Box: A Defence of Alvin Plantinga’s Epistemology of Religious Belief Tyler Dalton McNabb BA, MA Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of PhD School of Humanities College of Arts University of Glasgow June 2016 © Tyler Dalton McNabb 2016 i To Eden, Elijah, and Ezra May the content contained within this work aid you in the development of your faith. Autumn Priscilla May God grant us many more years and many more adventures. The City of Glasgow May you flourish by the preaching of His Word and the praising of His Name. John 14:6 Jesus said to him, ‘I am the way, and the truth, and the life. No one comes to the Father except through me.’ ii ABSTRACT CLOSING PANDORA’S BOX: A DEFENCE OF ALVIN PLANTINGA’S EPISTEMOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF I argue (1) that Alvin Plantinga’s theory of warrant is plausible and (2) that, contrary to the Pandora’s Box objection, there are certain serious world religions that cannot successfully use Plantinga’s epistemology to demonstrate that their beliefs could be warranted in the same way that Christian belief can be warranted. In arguing for (1), I deploy Ernest Sosa’s Swampman case to show that Plantinga’s proper function condition is a necessary condition for warrant. I then engage three objections to Plantinga’s theory of warrant, each of which attempts to demonstrate that his conditions for warrant are neither necessary nor sufficient. Having defended the plausibility of Plantinga’s theory of warrant, I present and expand his key arguments to the effect that naturalism cannot make use of it. These arguments provide the conceptual tools that are needed to argue for (2): that there are certain world religions that cannot legitimately use Plantinga’s theory of warrant to demonstrate that their beliefs could be warranted in the same way that Christian belief can be warranted. Tyler Dalton McNabb Advisors: Victoria Harrison and Adam Rieger School of Humanities iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .viii Chapter 1. ALVIN PLANTINGA AND HIS THEORY OF WARRANT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 1.0 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 1.1 Warrant: The Current Debate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 1.2 Warrant and Proper Function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 1.3 Perception. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1.4 Testimony. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 1.5 Warranted Christian Belief. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 1.6 Warranted Theistic and Christian Belief. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 1.7 Objections to Plantinga’s Religious Epistemology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 1.8 Evidential Argument From Evil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 1.9 The Problem of Religious Diversity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 1.10 Religious Belief Are Not Properly Basic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 1.11 The Great Pumpkin Objection(s). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 1.12 The Pandora’s Box Objection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23 2. THE PLAUSIBILITY OF ALVIN PLANTINGA’S THEORY OF WARRANT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28 2.0 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 2.1 Sosa’s Swampan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 2.2 The Gambling Demon Scenario. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 2.3 Nozick’s Truth-Tracking Account. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 iv 2.4 Holographic Demons, Clairvoyant Subjects, and Epistemic Closure. . . . . . . . . . . . .36 2.5 Cartesian Truth-Tracking. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 2.6 Epistemic Environment Condition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 2.7 The Truth-Aimed Condition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 2.8 Plantinga’s Theory Getterized?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44 2.9 BonJour, Norman, and Clairvoyance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 2.10 Warrant-as-Proper Function and its Need to Presuppose Internalism. . . . . . . . . . . .49 2.11 Clarifying Internal Irrationality and the Design Plan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 2.12 Objections and Replies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 2.13 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55 3. CLOSING PANDORA’S BOX: NATURALISM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 3.0 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56 3.1 What is Naturalism?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 3.2 Naturalistic Attempts At Proper Function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58 3.3 Non-Theistic Evolutionary Accounts of Proper Function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59 3.4 Non-Evolutionary and Non-Theistic Accounts of Proper Function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 3.5 Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism (EAAN). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 3.6 A Reformational View on Paul. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66 3.7 Naturalism and its Current Endeavour in Metaphysics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72 3.8 A New Perspective on Paul. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75 3.9 Natural Selection, Deism, and Naturalism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 3.10 XX Pills and Undercutting Defeaters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 3.11 The Evolutionary Argument Against Metaphysical Beliefs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78 3.12 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79 4. CLOSING PANDORA’S BOX: HINDUISM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80 v 4.0 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80 4.1 A Brief Biography of Shankara. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .82 4.2 Shankara’s Philosophy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 4.3 Advaita Vedanata and the Proper Function Condition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 4.4 Advaita Vedanta and the Truth-Aimed Condition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 4.5 The Preconditions of Warrant and Advaita Vedanta. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .89 4.6 The System of Kapila. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 4.7 Samkhya and Warrant-As-Proper Function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 4.8 Samkhya and the Proper Function Condition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 4.9 Samkhya and the Preconditions for Warrant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .97 4.10 Samkhya and the Truth-Aimed Condition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 4.11 Possible Responses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 4.12 Conclusion. . . . . … . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 5. CLOSING PANDORA’S BOX: BUDDHISM AND NEO-CONFUCIANISM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 5.0 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .104 5.1 Buddhism 101. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 5.2 Different Traditions of Buddhist Thought. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .106 5.3 The Middle Way Tradition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 5.4 Enlightenment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 5.5 Nagarjuna’s Epistemology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 5.6 Warranted Middle Way?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .114 5.7 Confucianism 101. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 5.8 Neo-Confucianism: The Metaphysics of The Learning of the Mind Tradition. . . . 118 5.9 Wang Yangming’s Epistemology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 vi 5.10 Warranted Neo-Confucianism?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .120 5.11 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .122 6. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF CLOSING PANDORA’S BOX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .124 6.0 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .124 6.1 Pluralism, Plantinga, and the Problem of Religious Disagreement. . . . . . . . . . . . . .126 6.2 Suggested Work for the Future. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 6.3 Does Reformed epistemology Rise or Fall with Proper Functionalism?. . . . . . . . . 129 6.4 Internalism: Classical Foundationalism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 6.5 Internalism: Phenomenal Conservatism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 6.6 Externalist Theories of Justification: Reliabilism and Virtue Reliabilism. . . . . . . . 133 6.7 Benefits of using a Proper Functionalist Theory of Warrant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 6.8 Tien’s Trouble and the Steadfast View. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .136 6.9 Objective Probability and Religious Diversity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140 6.10 Final Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 APPENDIX I: A DEATER FOR ISLAMIC BELIEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 A1.0 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .143 A1.1 Islam 101. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 A1.2 Islam and Proper Function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 A1.3 Islam, the Truth-Aimed Condition, and Undercutting Defeaters. . . . . . . . . . . . . .148 A1.4 Reply. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .152 A1.5 Tu quoque and Christian Belief. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 A1.6 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 APPENDIX 2: CATHOLOCISM AND PLANTIGIAN EPISTEMOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 vii A2.0 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 A2.1 Plantinga Meets Aquinas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 A2.2 God as a Precondition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .161 A2.3 Aquinas and His Reformed Epistemology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162 A2.4 Balthasar and Reformed Epistemology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 A2.5 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168 viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS My hope is that this thesis will contribute to several projects. First and foremost, I take my thesis to be a work aimed at furthering the project of reformed epistemology. The Pandora’s Box Objection is luckily for me, an objection that really has not been responded to. I say luckily because I’m not sure how I would be able to contribute to the literature pertaining to reformed epistemology if I hadn’t stumbled across this objection. Secondly, my work should be seen as a defence of proper functionalism. This can be seen primarily in Chapter two. Lastly, this project should be seen as a comparative study of Eastern religious philosophies. Overall, I think my thesis will contribute uniquely to each of these fields. Contributing uniquely to a field can hardly be done alone. First, I want to thank my wife whose encouragement, support, and motivation aided me greatly in the completion of this project. Words can’t describe the blessings that she has been to my life and my work. Of course, with thanking my wife, I must also thank my children for allowing daddy to work so many hours on this project. Coming home to their loving smiles and warm greetings was a constant reminder of God’s presence in my life. On a similar note, I want to thank other members of my family such as my parents, Rodney and Michelle, for their love and generosity towards me during this time. My trips home refreshed me from my work and they renewed my focus. I would also like to thank Max Andrews for his friendship and comradery during my stay in Scotland. I am not sure how I would be sane during my time in Scotland if he wasn’t there. This acknowledgement wouldn’t be complete without thanking my supervisors, Victoria Harrison, Martin Smith, and Adam Rieger. They read and reread the chapters in this thesis countless times. This project wouldn’t be what it is without them (in fact, it might not even be recognizable without them!). I can’t say enough on how grateful I am to have had them as my supervisors. I especially want to thank Victoria. I came to Glasgow primarily because of her expertise and she never let me down. I’m sure at times I pained her with sloppy writing and inarticulate ideas, but she stood by with patience and helped me. I am deeply indebted to her for her work and her mentorship.