Journal of Ethnobiology 129-158 Winter 2000 20(2): MAYA KNOWLEDGE AND WARS "SCIENCE // ANDERSON N. E. Department Anthropology of University Riverside California, of CA 92521-0418 Riverside, — ABSTRACT. Knowledge humans knowing succeed socially constructed, yet in is // a great deal about their environments. Recent debates over the nature of "science involve extreme positions, from claims that science arbitrary to claims that all is science somehow a privileged body of truth. Something may be learned by is considering the biological knowledge of a very different culture with a long record Maya of high civilization. Yucatec ethnobiology agrees with contemporary many them almost highly international biological science in respects, all of specific, many pragmatic and observational. differs in other respects, most of them highly It One may common inferential and cosmological. tentatively conclude that observation of everyday matters more directly affected by interaction with the is nonhuman environment than abstract deductive reasoning, but that social factors is operate at levels. all Key words: Yucatec Maya, ethnoornithology, science wars, philosophy of science, Yucatan Peninsula — + RESUMEN. humanos El El conocimiento es una construccion social, pero los pueden mucho aprender ce sus alrededores. Discursos recientes sobre "ciencia" incluyen posiciones extremes; algunos proponen que "ciencia" es arbitrario, otros m mucho proponen que "ciencia" es verdad absoluto. Seria posible conocer si muy investiguemos conocimiento biologico de una cultura, diferente, con una el historia larga de alta civilizacion. El conocimiento etnobiologico de los Yucatecos conforme, mas o menos, con sciencia contempordnea intemacional, especialmente la en detallas derivadas de la experiencia pragmatica. Pero, el es deferente en otros — respectos los que derivan de cosmovision o de inferencia logical. Se puede concluir tentativamente que observacion de fenomenos concretas es mas afectada por la la interaccion con el medio ambiente que por el razon deductive, pero que factores pensamiento en sociales influyen el todos niveles. RESUME. hommes -La connaissance construee socialement, mais, est aussi, les En apprendrent beaucoup de leurs environs. debats reciens sous nature de les la "science" y a positions extremes. Les uns propose que "science" est des chose il propose que arbitraires; les autres "science" est la verite absolue. C'est possible a savoir plus de ces choses, en considerant la connaissance biologique d'un culture — un que une "longue duree" Maya different culture tient Les yucateque civilisee. possedent un systeme biologique que ressemble de a celui science la contemporaine. La plupart des ressemblances existent en domaines d'observation pragmatique et quotidienne. Les differences (ou, selon Derrida, "differances") sont On ou des choses logicales cosmologiques. peut concluir, tentativement, que la phenomenes observation de concretes est plus afectee par I'interaction avec I'environment que le raison logical, mais les influences sociales existent en touts niveaux. — ANDERSON No. 2 Vol. 20, 130 WARS SCIENCE and value Anthropology has recently seen debates concerning the nature of "science." These debates are part of a wider challenge to canons of truth, of liter- ary quality, and indeed of all those matters that anthropologists regard as part of culture. As frequent in academic conflicts, the debate over "science" has quickly is who most escalated, with the most famous participants being those take the ex- treme positions. This has led to the term "science wars" (see the excellent account Hacking However, there are serious questions under the rhetoric. Lead- in 1999). — ing philosophers of science disagree profoundly though, of course, less — media and profoundly than the extremists of the semi-popular over the nature practice of science. summarize even obviously impossible to this debate here, at a superficial It is makes knowledge the present merely a small contribution to the base level; article how much on that underlies one aspect of the controversy, the debate of science — more in this article, specifically the classification of living things is social how much construction, and based on a reality out there in the world. is Thomas Loosely arrayed on one side are those such as Imre Lakatos (1976), Kuhn who Ian Hacking and Paul Feyerabend hold various (1962), (1999), (1987), They positions that give social construction a large role in scientific practice. are Kuhn not a uniform group. sees the social organization of science as structuring the quest for truth, but not ready to write off either the search or the goal as is Kuhn hopeless. (In spite of certain claims to the contrary, clearly states that he regards some paradigms as more correct than others, and he sees progress in sci- who ence over time.) Hacking, also, explicitly distances himself from those see "science" as the construction of arbitrary nonsense, though he sees social con- important and sometimes struction as overriding the Feyerabend seems truth. to more hold a radical position, at least for debating purposes; he appears to see no more science as a social belief system, believable on the face of than witch- it or flying-saucer craft lore. — who There are those think following Foucault but going 1971) be- (e.g. far yond anything Foucault said— we know actually that, since cannot external truth, of the claims of science must be and must be made simply keep all false, to in elites was power, as "truth" constructed in Orwell's 1984 (Orwell 1948). This the "vul- is gar Marxist" version of Marx' claims about expanded religion, to cover the field many "new people "20^^ that see as the religion" of century" people (on these Hacking matters see 1999). This position depends on an inconsistency: people are seen to be living in a completely world solipsistic in relation to the natural environment, yet have a to grasp perfect of the realities of interpersonal power. Thus, this position, like other and radically "culturological" culture-essentializing positions anthropology, in is deeply incoherent. People are hypothesized have to a mystical, virtually perfect grasp of their culture, such that insiders participate in a perfect unity that un- is fathomable outsiders—yet somehow to this perfect learning does not extend to any phenomena other than and somehow social or cultural ones, the visiting eth- way nographer has no of contacting that mystic participation. The natural world. JOURNAL OF ETHNOBIOLOGY Winter 2000 131 apprehended in particular, only via this mystically absorbed cultural percep- is who tion. The individual humans are so superbly good at learning from their elders are incapable of learning from their observations. Arrayed on number who the other side are a of philosophers see science as a — way of getting at real truth about the environment an enterprise that can be sub- when verted or mistaken, but, done right, gives us pragmatically consistent and useful data. Leaders of this general view include Philip Kitcher (1985, 1993), Larry Laudan many Alexander Rosenberg Lewis Wolpert and more, (1996), (1992), (1993), These too are a diverse lot, but they all agree that science is a search that produces more and game ever accurate data theories, not just a social that produces ever more complex arbitrary representations. However, and have abandoned notably, all these writers the naive positivist No positions so popular in the early 20*^ century. current philosopher of science am (so far as aware) continues to defend the near-religious regard for ''covering I and dominated and laws," "falsification," "objectivity" that science, confined in it much narrow through midcentury Hacking and channels, of the Ian Philip Kitcher provide especially sober and thoughtful critiques of this position (rather unfairly who blamed on Karl Popper, advocated such procedures but was not so naive as Hacking Laudan to think they defined science; see 1999; 1996). all may remembered be that Francis Bacon, in his original definitions of the It scientific enterprise, was not only aware of these problems but was more sensi- all them some modern He tive to than are philosophers. defined the — observation-experiment method and warned his readers of the "Four Idols" the — we now would biases "social construction" or "cultural baggage" that can call unwary and unaware blind the (Bacon 1901, orig. 16*^^ cent.). As noted above. Hacking, in the most recent salvo in the long and confusing somewhat "science wars," concludes that science socially constructed, some- is me what seems be an factual (1999:99). This to to rather evasion. The present paper obviously cannot even begin to summarize the literature on merely makes 100% science wars." a single point: science socially con- It is structed, but usually an accurate representation of the world in spite of that. Maya Evidence supplied from a comparison of and biological classifications of is Maya taxonomy maps birds. ornithological fairly well onto biological taxonomy, Maya but there are major differences. This disproves both simple realism (the see the natural distinctions just as the biologists do) and extreme social construction- Maya ism system must be from (the totally different the biologists', since the societies are so different). What has been missed, in the "science wars," the fact that society does not is wrong. To say something necessarily get things socially constructed not say is to is inaccurate. After people have to learn their social constructions from each it is all, why through other. If they can learn their culture interaction, can they (and, thus, their culture) not learn about the envirorunent from interaction, and then teach each other in further interpersonal interactions? Anthropologists have turned their ethnographic gazes onto the actual prac- tice of science in dozens of societies. Beginning with traditional small-scale societies, they have expanded gaze encompass modern their to laboratories. Particularly noteworthy impact on work Laura Nader and for the intellectual field the of its is ANDERSON No. 2 Vol. 20, 132 movers on (Nader Nader has long encouraged research the her associates 1996). Her group has thus stud- and contemporary including shapers of society, scientists. ied modern laboratories and university halls, often comparing them with her own alternative study area, the highland Zapotec world, which has its science Nader (Gonzalez 1998; 1996). some has provided very thoughtful insights Roberto Gonzalez, in particular, He into Zapotec traditional agricultural science. sees as definitely a science (tak- it — He "assumptions" ing "science" in sense #1, below). analyzes in terms of folk it — He shows theories that hold together a body of empirical, pragmatic knowledge. modem work that these like the theories of international science: they are basic, from and used generate largely counterintuitive ideas, extracted experience, to new and and Some them highly ques- practices to explain justify old ones. of are modem some but assumptions tionable, so are of science. nonwestem dawn Serious studies of science go back to the of anthropology. One Frank Cushing's researches on Zuni agriculture and food, not pub- recalls lished in book form until 1920 (Gushing 1920) but carried out in the early 1870s. Malinowski produced (Malinowski did also classic studies in this area 1935), as A Raymond his students such as Firth and Audrey Richards (1957) (1948). self- movement among conscious to study "ethnoscience" arose in the 1940s, largely late Murdock students of George working Oceania (Goodenough at Yale, in 1953; Many ConJdin Frake seem 1962; 1980). of the earlier ethnoscience studies to the contemporary anthropologist rather naively and paying positivistic formalistic, such rather little attention to ideas as did not well into a "Western" scientific fit framework. was somewhat Ironically, this not true of Cushing's to a lesser (or, extent, Malinowski's) work, which should have served examples. as Maya Closer to the area of this paper, Scott Atran (1999) has analyzed Itza from "folkbiology" a similar point of view, analyzing knowledge and linguistic its recognition. any body In case, this large of research established "ethnoscience" or "folk science" as something to study. Ethnographers came knowledge to see traditional worthy as of serious, detailed attention. They were exhorted understand in to its it own terms ("emically"), rather than merely comparing unfavorably) (usually it with "Western" science. In spite of rearguard action by opposing scholars like Marvin Harris (1968), studies of traditional knowledge grew and flourished apace. seems only natural— coming— It in fact, surprisingly long in that ethnographers should turn on their attention contemporary university laboratories. SCIENCE This Much igainst the question of defining "science." recent writing conflates several under The different things that label. following me seem be to to quite separate phenomena: Science as search truth— 1. for for accurate data about the world, and for theo- d world ways that in that guide further searching Wolpert most the JOURNAL OF ETHNOBIOLOGY Winter 2000 133 understood intuitive of proposals. that the search for truth often takes It is wrong Kuhn famous and "phlogiston" turns, as in the cases of (see 1962) static The continents (Oreskes 1999), but that is in the nature of a search. search is body seen as resulting in a of facts, or at least pragmatically useful data, held together by a framework of higher-level representations that can be called and "axioms," with Gonzalez "assumptions." To extreme "theories" or, (1998), framework might be seen merely "worldview" social constructionists, this as "cosmo or vision." Science as a repository of True Facts or of Absolute Truth. Although mili- 2. still tantly upheld by some champions Sokal 1997), this position no longer (e.g. is Contemporary can about really tenable. scientific practice get us to the truth many when make things ordinary observation will not, but that does not Sci- ence a God-given repository of infallible wisdom. In fact, philosophers of now wrong science hold that a genuine search for truth must take turns. Oth- — Humoral erwise not a search merely a repetition of the obvious. medicine, is it many and were good alchemy, phlogiston, other theories ideas in their time, probably the best that could have been done with the data at hand. The methods and disproofs of these theories signalled advances in the techniques improvement of scientific practice, and, following those, the of theory. Science advances not by learning ex cathedra truth but by providing better and better now Kuhn and most theories, as pointed out as scientists agree. Possi- (1962) bly a subvariant of the old science-as-God's-truth view the popular is we mass conception of "science": Flashy technology. This the concept find in is media and overmakes between Wars. (Wolpert the distinction Star [1993] sci- ence and technology, but has some valuable comments on the issue.) — — modern Science as one specific form the Western form of the search for 3. accurate knowledge. There are two major contenders for the form. there First, 14* began perhaps century and was the self-conscious "science" that in the is 17* work formulated in the 16*^ and centuries in the writings and of Francis men Bacon, Galileo Rene Descartes, and, Robert Boyle and Galilei, later, like Isaac Newton. This a science defined (ultimately) as working from observa- is tion to inductive and then hypothetico-deductive theories, and testing these by (and the observations also) experiment. It contrasts this search with re- ceived wisdom, bias, and popular belief. This science did indeed break radically with earlier ways of knowing. If it is not the only "science," it at least deserves some marking; Randall sort of terminological Collins' "rapid discovery sci- good The second by ence" (Collins 1998) a choice. "science" as defined is is mid-20* with the logical positivists in the century, formal operations, cov- its emphasis on and/ and ering laws, verification or falsification, formally (=mathematically) stated theoretical models. (This is so restrictive that has it abandoned by most been current authorities.) This type of definition has the advantage of cutting off one specific type of truth-search, but has the disad- it vantage making comparison impossible between contemporary of international and knowledge science other traditions. "what Science as scientists do." This allows us to include the faked data, char- 4. latanry, and vendettas that sometimes characterize scientific practice. also It ANDERSON No. 2 Vol. 20, 134 — own whole people with eating habits, directs us to look at scientists as their and daily paranoias, so forth. lives, most 5. — even China, with unquestionably great scientific tradition, tional societies its mod- did not have a concept of "science" or a "science establishment" (until have term ''knowledge" but not ern times). Traditional societies usually a for opposed knowledge. Chinese Arabic one for "science" as to other types of xue, Greek/Latin included scientia Bv humanities. contrast, in :r t] now modern countries, "Big Science" has a of own, institutional- life its ized in such organizations as the National Science Foundation. Evidently, the three of these approaches characterize science as a special first kind of truth-seeking activity. The second pair treat science as a part of social ac- — somewhat The approach above tion in general as a social construction. third is — intermediate, in that regards science as a social construction ^but a superior it one, one that inevitably leads to truer and better knowledge. Champions and faked of science see science as a truth-seeking see activity, — and "bad data, vendettas the like as science" alien contamination of the enter- The and and prise. attackers critics of science see as a part of social action, thus it many and see in terms of 4 5 above. For of them, the "bad science" just as it is scientific as the "good," and phlogiston just as real as any other scientific con- is demonstrated rmodynamics the — There are thoughtful reasons to see science in the above ways so long as all kept are analytically distinct. I one looks modern American If at institutions, "Big Science" a totally differ- is thing from the tiny and scattered band of experimenters, often working in modern science" in They are linked but they are not linked by similarities in institutional or forms. political Conversely, one looking if is at the accumulation of accurate data, one can reasonably look at Assyrian medicine, Chinese agricultural experiments, and Maya bird lore along with Nobel Prize experiments. One however, be will not, terribly concerned about the personal lives of the Assyrian or Chinese scholars. — one If sees science in a broader and more sociological sense science as the know somethin and wisdom intuition received an tell therr, Maya and become more scholars interesting. This the position of most is ans of science. has the major advantage human It of allowing all societies than defining // "science cultural Given the high word prestige of the "science" in political ramifications to these alternate courses of action. Certainly most the reasonable of the restrictive definii term "science" to Dost-lfSnn Rarnni;in-r:Ainp This footnote Mayas the Assyrians, Chinese, human ^^ff JC 't^^i 1 If "science" limited is JOURNAL OF ETHNOBIOLOGY Winter 2000 135 methodology and institutionalized rules of that the positivists scientific philoso- 20^ phers of the early 17^^ century (let alone the century) invoked, then by definition was no there science before 1600 (or 1900 in the case of the positivists). Moreover, much modern of science does not count. Astronomy, astrophysics, paleontology, most and most historical geology, of ecology, of behavior biology are basically observational than being based on Not sciences, rather controlled experiments. Maya only bird lore, but even professional ornithological research, rarely conforms Popperian Hempelian canon to the full or (see Kitcher 1993 for the best discussion Above and most of these issues). directly relevant to the present paper, tax- all, onomy modern not a hypothesis-and-lab-experiment though science, is cladistics beginning change is to that. Much of the rhetoric in the "science wars" of the 20^^ century has been late associated with a disregard for the above distinctions. Sometimes the disregard appears be but simply any what to willful, often careless. In case, has often it is happened has been an all-out attack on the entire search for knowledge and un- derstanding, justified by the failings of some scientists (some do fake their data, many way some are biased in one or another). Conversely, champions of science make have failed to the necessary distinctions, and have talked as an attack on if was the current social institutionalization of science in the United States an attack know on attempts anything. Sokal seems be all to (1997), in particular, to peril- ously close to taking such a view. Of have course, in the real world, impossible to a search for truth that it is is completely wholly and uninfluenced by disinterested, objective, social attitudes We known and have day David Hume. Even institutions. this since at least the of after half a century of critical theory, C. Wright Mills' book The Sociological Imagi- nation (1950) remains probably the best statement on the subject in social science. The can hope understand them moral best the scientist for to biases, adjust in a is direction, and compensate for them by seeking verification or disproof of findings from other investigators from other schools or laboratories (Bacon 1901; Kitcher 1993). may At this point, it be interesting to turn to a different tradition. If two ut- with come terly different societies, utterly different scientific traditions, to similar from perhaps conclusions similar data, there objective truth lurking behind the is and when two such way cultural screen. societies differ totally in the they con- If may and struct the world, then science not exist at the social construction of all, may knowledge be be an and some truly said to arbitrary To solipsistic activity. extent, the degree of "social construction" in science an empirical question. is THE MAYA OF QUINTANA ROO For the last ten years, in collaboration with Mexican (including Maya) and United States colleagues, have been carrying out research on knowledge of plants I and animals among the Yucatec Maya of the "Maya Zone" of Quintana Roo. This, was the central part of the state, is the area that never truly reconquered after the Maya known Dumond War" rebellion of 1846-48 as the "Caste (Bricker 1981; 1998). Maya now The in the present Yucatan state were crushed in 1848, but in what is ANDERSON Vol No, 2 20, 136 Quintana Roo they remained independent until 1901, and in the remote v was were never subdued. There fighting as they really re( interior tral my own Chunhuhub. Cv 1934 in Dzula, the community next to base in Dzula do admit Alfonso ethnograph habitants of not defeat. Villa Rojas, much and some area eastward in the mid-1930s, encountered hostiUty The Maya, unsubdued, have continued preserve a cultural danger. to m undly changed over time much knowledee retains ty- mi millennia of from documents, which, 16^^ century onward (Landa 1937; Alvarez 1997; Arzapalo Marin 1987, 1996; analy- ses in Anderson and Medina in prep.), record biological and medical lore close to The Maya, everyone knows, one most today's. as created of the greatest^ brilliant, most innovative, and most original civilizations the world has ever seen (Sharer The modern Yucatec of Quintana Roo are one of the several successor groups 1994). much Maya. probably assume of the Classic safe to that of their biological It is Maya knowledge derived from a Classic base, given the consistency in usage is since the very earliest dictionaries (Alvarez 1997; Anderson and Medina in prep.). This base has been greatly supplemented in more recent centuries by Spanish (in- and modern Maya cluding Moorish) lore international biological science. The are some Maya; not sort of living fossil, preserving for us the mysteries of the Classic nor are they a tiny isolated group. They are bearers of the elaborate and expert science of a long-lived, populous, brilliantly successful, constantly evolving civili- zation. Maya languages have a written tradition going back 1600 years, at first in and hieroglyphic syllabic scripts, later in Spanish letters. V^ritten transmission has been but a small significant part of cultural transmission for a very long time. In we Yucatan, for instance, have such examples as the Rituals of the Bacabs (orig. ca. 1600; see Roys 1965, Arzapalo Marin 1987), which records magical and medical from lore the earliest part of the Colonial period. Such huge from homogeneous a tradition far or uniform Hervik is (see e.g. own and has 1999), its self-reflexive turn (Sullivan 1989). This article focuses on knowledge recorded and around Chunhuhub, in Quintana Roo. Chunhuhub a large farming town some is of 5,000 people, occupying an ejido (communal landholding) Maya of 14,330 ha. All are Yucatec except a few ad- for ministrators and and number technicians, a small of in-migrants from central Almost Mexico. everyone Most is bilingual. families raise maize, beans, squash. still and by other crops slash-and-burn cultivation of raneine from tracts more. Every family medi commonly cine Some game is practiced. obtained, but overhunting is still Medina rowth from Some logging is carried out, but valuable woods were depleted in the JOURNAL OF ETHNOBIOLOGY Winter 2000 137 early 1990s. Stockrearing and beekeeping are important. The vast majority of the population highly knowledgeable about wild and tame animals, is forests, fields, medicinal herbs, insects, and indeed aspects of the environment. Given the all solidly agricultural nature of the community, this knowledge of a pragmatic, is wider model experiential type, fitting well into the of "ecology of practice" devel- oped by Nyerges (1997). Chunhuhub months and more Research in lasted for six in 1991 six in 1996, was by with almost annual visits during intervening years. joined in the field I Hunn me Eugene during a month in 1991; he introduced to Felix Medina Tzuc, my who Hurm became and collaborator field assistant. Dr. also recorded bird voices Maya (Hunn and worked Don with in the field for experts to identify 1992) Felix how Maya and myself on seeing far could go in identifying birds from pictures in Peterson and Chalif guide Mexican birds (Peterson and Chalif Other- to 1989). 's Chunhuhub and wise, research consisted primarily of walking through neighboring Maya ejido and ranch lands, observing birds in the field and obtaining identifica- Maya tions. also listened to a great deal of conversation about birds and other I and argument what biota, including a great deal of discussion over just to call a was (Hanks particular bird. Since studying "referential practice" 1990), rather I than in the psychology of classification, found expedient to spend a great deal I it made of time in the field listening to actual practice, and minimal use of formal techniques beyond the frame interviewing described by Frake Thus, eliciting (1980). name the following data refer strictly to usage in ordinary conversation. did not I carry out experiments of the sort done by Atran (1999) and others, since was I Hanks interested, at this stage of research, in different questions (see 1990 for dis- and approach studying Maya; cussion justification of the referential-practice in however, experimentation will be carried out in future research, opportunity per- mitting). modem Maya The do not have a concept of "science" in the international sense. They do, however, have a reasonable equivalent. based on the core term k'aj It is "to know." Connected to this the complex word ool, which means "heart," and is by extension "knowledge, condition" (and sometimes also "lungs" and other will, we know internal items near the heart). Uniting these, get k'ajool, "to something, noun and "knowledge." to recognize," thus the verbal k'ajoolal This as near as is we can get to "science." not a far reach; k'ajoolal focally signifies practical It is working knowledge. on and some This article focuses classification uses of birds, with comparisons contemporary to bird representation in international biological science. MAYA BIRD CLASSIFICATION Classification often described as "carving nature at the joints." This, of course, is How Maya assumes that nature has joints. similar are bird taxa to those of con- temporary biological science? In ethnoornithology, as in science wars, there a range from social-construc- is No tionist to realist positions. one is as extreme as Feyerabend (1987), but Ellen and Bulmer and Forth degree Ellen (1993), (1996), to a (1967) stress social factors, ANDERSON No. 2 Vol. 20, 138 has been sharply of narrowly realist models. Conversely Boster (1987; Boster, critical Hunn seem more and and d'Andrade Berlin and O'Neill 1986; Boster 1988) (1977) prone assume people recognize categories that are real in the sense of evolu- to Atran and Berlin take a relatively strong position: tionary biology. (1990) (1992) people are mentally programmed to recognize the multistranded similarities that provide, and thus do carve nature at the joints. Atran's evolutionary relationships due seems considerably more qualified and nuanced, to his pro- position later with longed study (including use of psychological experiments, in collaboration Maya (Atran psychologists) of classification 1999). Itzaj Maya Maya The Yucatec data are consistent with the position that the recog- However, use nize groupings that are natural in the sense of evolutionary biology. and other cultural and social factors enter into and shape the classification system. by and The system can be understood only taking both culture nature into ac- count. Maya names bird are mostly at a level that Brent Berlin (1992) calls "folk ge- These are usually one-word names. They contrast with each other; to nerics/'^ place bird in one folk generic means not in any of the others. They are some- a it is down broken which normally formed by adding an times into "folk specifics," are adjective to the generic. Thus ch'om means "vulture"; chakpool ch'om, "red-headed Turkey Maya, and most vulture," the Vulture (Cathartes aura), English, Latin, like is languages (Berlin 1992; his usage followed here, rather than that of Atran 1999, is more for convenience than because of any deep theoretical reason), use the classic name pattern in which a folk-generic modified by an adjective to produce a is name who (The Greco-Latin genus roughly "one up," specific. Cathartes, cleans name covers one or two other vulture species; aura comes from a Native American — many for this bird.) Latin terminology has higher categories the familiar phyla, and Maya orders, families of Linnaean taxonomy. terminology has only classes, Maya one: the unique beginner ch'ich' "bird." also has very few folk specifics. Almost all classifying of animals and plants is done at the folk-generic level. (This most Native American true in systems.) is named Of the 89 terminal taxa (folk genera not broken down, or folk species) Appendix listed in the below, 63 have a one-to-one correspondence with the spe- by cies recognized international omithology. Ten are focus-and-extension names: whose name more a focal species is extended, or less often, to other birds that are seen as distinct but are not named. In 9 cases, a terminal taxon a Linnaean genus is genus (4 cases), part of a (2 cases), or a group of closely related genera cases). In (5 names 3 cases, a terminal taxon a whole family, and in one case a name covers two unrelated but very similar families {kusuun: and One name swifts swallows). — only one a broad, vague category without Linnaean is counterpart. two down In cases, a folk generic broken which is into folk specifics, all of have a one-to-one correspondence with One the international ones. of these folk generics corresponds Linnaean to a one family, to a pair of closely related Lin- naean genera. In addition, I identify 13 groups, loosely named or named by extension of the name one of of their species (see below). Of these 13 larger groups fami- ("folk one corresponds two lies"), to (Lirmaean) orders, two an to order, six to a family, two and two to part of a family, to a genus.