MATERIAL BEINGS Peter van Inwagen MATERIAL BEINGS Cornell University Press Ithaca and London Copyright © 1990 by Comell Univel'sity All rights l"esel·Ved. Except for brief quotations in a review. this book, 01' pal·ts thel"eof, must not be reproduced in any form without pel'mission in writing fmm the publisher. For information, addl"ess Comell University Pl"eSS. Sage House, 512 East Sta te Sh"eet, Ithaca, New York 14850. First published 1990 by Comell University Press First printing. Comell Paperbacks, 1995 Library of Congress Cataloging'in'Publication Data Van Inwagen, Peter. Material beings / Peter van Inwagen. p.cm. Inc\udes bibliographical references and indexo ISBN'13: 9íS-ü-S014'S306'6 (pbk.: alk. pal>erl L Ontology. 2. Identily. l. Title. BD31l.V35 1990 ll1-dc20 90-55125 Cornell University PI"eSS strives to use en\'imnmentally l"eSponsible suppliers and materials to the fullest extent possible in the publishinl4 of its books. Such matel'ials inc\ude vegetable-baSffL 10w'VOC inks. and acid·fl't~e papers that al'~ recyc\ed, totally chlorine-fl't~e. . or partly composed of nonwood fibel'S. For fUl·ther infomlatioll, visit OUl' website at www.cOl·nellpress.comell.edu. Pa¡>erback printing 10 9 S 7 Tornyrnother and the rnernory of rny father · .. consider an object, . . . what is an object? Philosophers are always saying, ·WelI, just take a chair for exaruple." The moment they say that, you know they do not know what they are talking about any more. What is a chair? WelI, a chair is a certain thing over there ... certain?, how certain? The atoms are evaporating from it from time to time-not many atoms, but a few-dirt falIs on it and gets dissolved in the paint; so to define a chair precisely, to say exactly which atoms are chair, and which atoms are air, or which atoms are dirt, or which atoms are paint that belongs to the chair is impossible. So the mas s of a chair can be defined only approximately. In the sarue way, to define the mass of a single ob- ject is impossible, because there are not any single, left-alone objects in the world. --Richard Feynman, Lectures on Physics, Vol. 1 The story is indeed a little difficult to believe. Still, you might try. -·"-E. Nesbit, The Phoenix and the Carpet Contents Preface 1 1. Introduction 17 2. The Special Composition Question 21 3. Contact, a Representative Answer to the Special 33 Composition Question 4. *The General Composition Question 38 5. *What We Shall Not Presuppose 52 6. Answers to the Special Composition Question According to 56 Which Composition Occurs When Sorne 'JYpe of Physical Bonding Occurs 7. *A nswers to the Special Composition Question According 61 to Which Composition Occurs When Combinations of Various 'JYpes of Physical Bonding Occur 8. Extreme Answers to the Special Composition Question: 72 Nihilism and Universalism 9. The Proposed Answer 81 10. Why the Proposed Answer to the Special Composition 98 Question, Radical Though It Is, Does Not Contradict Our Ordinary Beliefs 11. The Topic of the Previous Section Continued: Paraphrase 108 12. Unity and Thinking 115 13. Artifacts 124 14. The Identities of Material Objects 142 15. Brain Transplants 169 16. Two Problems about Personal Identity: Memory and 182 Cornrnissurotorny 17. The Problern of the Many and the Vagueness of 213 Cornposition 18. The Vagueness of Identity 228 vii viii Contents 19. The Vagueness of Existence 271 Notes 285 Index 297 MATERIAL BEINGS