Master of Fine Arts Thesis Deft Perception Allusions of Reality Hannah Thompsett Submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirement for the degree of Master of Fine Arts, School of Art and Design Division of Ceramic Art New York State College of Ceramics at Alfred University Alfred, New York 2016 Hannah Thompsett, MFA Table of Contents: Introduction/Deft Perception: Allusions of Reality………………………………………3 The Cognitive and Phenomenal Aspects of Visual Perception…………………………..4 Projected Experiential Knowledge: Paper as Subject…………………………………….6 Time: Changing Viewpoint and the Active Role of the Perceiver………………………..7 The Paradox of Pictorial Representation: ………………………………………………...9 Photography: A History Imbued with Truth……………………………………………..12 Material: Truth…………………………………………………………………………...15 Conclusion/Subjective Perspective………………………………………………………16 Appendices: Appendix One Discussion of Visual Perception: Martin Seel’s Red Ball………………………17 Appendix Two Time: Simultaneous and Momentary Perception………………………………..18 Appendix Three Merleau-Ponty: Temporality and Changing Viewpoint in Painting…………......19 Appendix Four Trompe l’oeil and Illusion……………………………………………………….21 Works Cited…………………………………………………………………………….23 Technical Statement……………………………………………………………………24   2 Introduction/Deft Perception: Allusions of Reality In our encounter with our surroundings, we construct a reality through a collaboration of our senses and our brains’ processing of information. Knowledge of our world is accumulated through experience, which is mediated through belief and expectation. We learn to trust our perceptions as truth and allow the process of translating exterior phenomenon, which constantly informs and reassures our perceived reality, to fade from consciousness. Occasionally, when this truth is challenged, such as in the case of illusion, our trust falters. We become cognizant of our personal archives of knowledge and the malleability and subjectivity of each of our constructed realities. Each of our senses plays a role in understanding space and objects. We learn to anticipate spatial and temporal relationships through the interaction of visual, auditory, and vestibular processes. Representation is an attempt to emulate reality, and when encountering a representation of a space or an object, we use the same experiential knowledge from our perceived realities to make sense of the depiction. Through projection of our experiential knowledge, we can understand a range of likeness beginning at a mere suggestion of form or space. In the case of pictorial representation, we interpret a depiction in relation to our experienced reality using vision alone. So, if we understand both reality and representation through vision and experiential knowledge, how does our encounter with actuality compare to our encounter with representation? In my work, I am playing with the boundary between perceived reality and representation in order to question the reality that we assume as truth. By working with ceramics, paper, and photography, I examine the idea of constructed reality through material, allusion, and representation. Each piece provides an opportunity for   3 interpretation, which can either support or challenge archives of experiential knowledge. Multiple layers of information make it difficult to immediately decide which characteristics are the most important or truthful, thus creating tension within and between each of the objects and representations. The process of perception slows down as the viewer makes value judgments by measuring the current apprehension against her experience, expectations, and beliefs. When the process of perception is slowed down and given conscious attention, we have the opportunity to consider the delicacy and individuality of our constructed realities and assumed truths. The Cognitive and The Phenomenal: Aspects of Visual Perception There are two aspects of visual perception that are agreed upon by many accounts: the phenomenal and the cognitive. The cognitive aspect can be discerned from the phenomenal aspect when there is any judgment made based on previous knowledge of the perceiver. Such judgments can be as simple as the identification of an object or its function, and as complex as relating the visual stimuli to specific events or memories. The phenomenal aspect of perception can be described as any trait that is logically immediate and perceived through the senses. For example, colors and shapes can be understood experientially, as sensations or impressions. While these two aspects can be separated through definition, it is difficult or impossible to separate them in practice. Somatic processes mediate both cognitive and phenomenal aspects of visual perception, which means that knowledge about visual stimuli cannot be gained without sensual experience. Also, once any knowledge is gained of this information, it becomes nearly impossible to see a shape, color, or situation   4 as purely sensational.1 However, by having a consciousness and intention to our looking and interaction with space and objects, it is feasible to move one aspect of perception, either cognitive or phenomenal, to the forefront of our experience. Martin Seel states that attempting to separate the two aspects of perception causes “a conceptual incommensurability… first, from a simultaneous reception of various aspects of the object and, second, from a consideration of their momentary appearance.2” While it is possible to give preference to one type of looking over another, it is the combination of these different factors in visual perception that leads us to our overall understanding of objects, space, and the interface between the two. The melding of both cognitive and phenomenal processes of visual perception is important in my work, because it prompts the comparison between new experience and learned relationships. I present the work to be perceived phenomenally by the senses through the use of light and arrangement. The viewer also perceives the work cognitively through the projection of her accumulated knowledge from previous experiences, objects, and relationships. In addition to recalling information from the viewer’s previous encounters, each piece continuously adds to her personal archive of knowledge, which instantaneously begins to inform the current apprehension (and so, future experiences). Thus, the intertwined and circuitous act of perception evolves from primary encounter, to measured comparison, to understood information, to truth, and back continuously. The work in Deft Perception encourages and emphasizes this process through the use of repeated visual qualities and overlapping subject matter.                                                                                                                 1 See Appendix One: Discussion of Visual Perception: Martin Seel’s Red Ball 2 Martin Seel, Aesthetics of Appearing (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2005), 27.     5 Projected Experiential Knowledge: Paper as Subject My use of paper as a subject and not as a material illustrates the process of projecting experiential knowledge into situations. For example, the thin porcelain panels are reminiscent of paper in their flatness, whiteness, and proportional, rectangular format. The grayscale image on the face of each panel is a recording of what a piece of paper once was: creased, puckered, crumpled, or folded. However, no paper is actually present, and the panels possess physical traits quite separate than those of a piece of paper. The ceramic is rigid, and stacked and leaned against the walls of the gallery. If it were to be bent or creased, it would shatter, crack, or break. Although the edge of the panel is thin for a slab of porcelain, it is too thick to accurately mimic a piece of paper. It is curious how much the format of the panel and the depicted image of paper recall the actual material of paper when the material presence of the ceramic is more substantial and verifiable. In fact, the only reason that the viewer relates the panels to paper at all is through her projection of knowledge about paper as a material. A projection this clear and assured is possible because of the general familiarity with paper in everyday encounters. The materiality of a crumpled piece of blank paper is more immediately familiar than a thin flat ceramic panel with an image of crumpled paper on its surface. When viewing these pieces, the viewer must contemplate the discrepancies between what is expected of a piece of paper and the ceramic object that is actually being presented. Because of the fluidness of the process of perception, this discrepancy does not take long to assuage, and the experience is quickly logged into the archive of experiential knowledge. The process is slowed down long enough for the viewer to call attention to it and feel a momentary breach of trust in her personal constructed reality.   6 Time: Changing Viewpoint and the Active Role of the Perceiver Time is an important factor in perceptual experiences, which Seel recognizes by using the words simultaneous and momentary in describing a visual encounter.3 Maurice Merleau-Ponty also discusses the significance that time plays in visual perception through the concepts of viewpoint and temporality.4 He states, “Our relationship to space is not that of a pure disembodied subject to a distant object but rather that of a being which dwells in space relating to its natural habitat.”5 This position emphasizes the importance of the body’s presence as not only a vehicle for absorbing sensual phenomenon and transporting it to the brain for translation into information, but as a participant within the explored space as well. This mobility of the body commands an ever-changing perspective within space in respect to the passing of time. With a fluid viewpoint, there is no clear edge between object and space. As the perceiver’s viewpoint changes, surfaces wrap around bends, and corners seamlessly blend with the simultaneous existence of other objects. Color and light act to both define an object’s physiognomy and blend objects and space together. The field of pyramids accentuates the viewer’s active role as a moving participant through the space. Forty-nine porcelain pyramids are arranged in a square grid that stands about fifteen inches tall. The field of white pyramids softly reflects light in a way that they appear to be glowing. This sort of light remains flat on the surface of the forms and causes a grayscale that is lightest at the piece’s farthest point. As the viewer comes                                                                                                                 3 See Appendix Two: Time: Simultaneous and Momentary Perception 4 See Appendix Three: Merleau-Ponty: Temporality and Changing Viewpoint in Painting   5 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The World of Perception (New York: Routledge, 2004), 55.   7 closer to the grid, the frontal view of the pyramids as triangular slowly gives way to reveal their square bases, which was previously only evidenced by the square grid format of the arrangement. As the viewer circles the arrangement, the points of the pyramids ebb and flow from up close to farther away. The grayscale shifts with the movement of the viewer indicating that the effect is a momentary and situational function of the light, and not an inherent feature of the material. The viewer can control and change what she sees based on her movement. This active role is especially emphasized when paired with the large image installed as wallpaper, which pictures a similar scene, but from a fixed vantage point that is not actually achievable by the viewer. The source photograph used to create the large image of the wallpaper was captured from a viewpoint directly above a similar field of pyramids, causing the square base of the pyramids to be the most obvious shape of the composition. Each of the squares is crossed with the edges of the pyramids and dotted with their points, which protruded directly toward the camera lens. However, only one of the points in the motif is directly in the center of its square. Each of the other points wanders away from the middle, farther and farther with each step away from the center. The fixed perspective of the camera can only center one of the pyramids. Since the source image repeats in the wallpaper, the fixed vantage point appears many times. Even though the image is stagnant in comparison to the physical field of pyramids, it still suggests the possibility of multiple or changing viewpoints within the image. As the source image is digitally manipulated through cutting, repeating, rotating, and reflecting, it creates layers of pattern. The layers shift and change based on the viewer’s proximity to the piece. From across the gallery, the image appears as broad   8 stripes of grays and whites. As the viewer gets closer to the piece, the grid of the pyramids becomes evident. Finally, the individual pyramids are recognized as the building blocks for the whole pattern. Once they are recognized, they are instantaneously likened to the physical ceramic pyramids within the space. The change in the image and the recognition that occurs based on the viewer’s proximity to the piece highlights her active role as a moving participant through time and space. Because the image is installed as wallpaper with the photographs and panels on top of it, this experience is secondary to the other pieces. The vastness of the image field and the information that it depicts dissipates into the background of the experience, while continuously informing the apprehension of the rest of the work. The Paradox of Pictorial Representation The viewer’s changing position in space and her proximity to a piece influences the way she perceives both physical objects and images. However, it is important to discuss how the experience elicited by viewing pictorial representations changes from the experience of apprehending three-dimensional objects, which exist within the viewer’s space through direct interaction. Pictorial representations, such as paintings, impose a paradox of viewing in which the perceiver is aware of the painting’s simultaneous categorization as two distinctive objects of perception. Firstly, the painting can be seen as an object within the viewer’s actual space. With this type of existence, the surface of the painting is opaque, and the characteristics of material, such as texture, can be recognized. Secondly, the surface of the painting is seen as transparent, and the depicted space is comprehended. For this mode of perception to be set in place, the viewer must   9 voluntarily suspend disbelief, and project her accumulated knowledge of her learned reality into the space of the picture. Scale, occlusion, color, light, and other denotations of space within the picture plane may not comply with the viewer’s space outside the frame. The projection of the viewer is crucial, for if it does not occur, the space within the picture plane will never become apparent. The frame is a key factor in experiencing a painting or other pictorial representation as two-fold. It plays an important role within both the space of the viewer (painting as object) and within the picture plane (depicted space). The frame acts to separate the two spaces and characterize them. Evelyn Leblanc-Roberge says, “The frame is not only defined by some tangible, tactile structure, but also by a theoretical concept of space. Therefore, what is left out is also what determines the frame.”6 The apparentness of the frame completes the paradox of painting in which two distinct spaces can be understood simultaneously. Instead of calling the depiction of pictorial space in this case an illusion, allusion is a more appropriate term. Soltis defines the difference in terms as follows: “[Allusions] are visual situations which are suggestive but not deceptive.”7 The fact that the viewer is aware of the painting’s existence as an object means that she is never deceived by its depiction of space as reality. The material and object presence of the photographs and leaning ceramic panels therefore function as allusion, and not illusion. Although many effects similar to those                                                                                                                 6 Evelyn Leblanc-Roberge, “In the Aquariums, Behind the Doors” (MFA thesis, Alfred University, 2011), 22. 7 Jonas F. Soltis, Seeing, Knowing, and Believing: a Study of the Language of Visual Perception (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company Inc, 1966), 137-138.   10