The local politics of Global Jihad A study on the evolution of militant Islamism in the Palestinian refugee camp of Ain al-Hilwe Erling Lorentzen Sogge MØNA 4592 Master's thesis in Middle Eastern studies 30 credits Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages, UNIVERSITY OF OSLO Spring semester, 2014 Abstract Can Jihadists become pragmatics? In Palestinian refugee camp Ain al-Hilwe, located in Southern Lebanon, the Jihadi-Salafi militia Usbat al-Ansar has a long history of catering to the needs of the local refugee population. Integrated into the political system of the camp, the group shares the responsibility for what is now close to 90,000 refugees, as people at the time of writing keep pouring in from a war-stricken Syria. While Usbat al-Ansar might best be known for a wave of terrorism and assassinations launched against both Palestinian leaders and Lebanese officials during the 90s, the group has in recent years chosen a different pattern of behavior. Whereas Usbat al- Ansar still commits to the principle of readying the world for the emergence of a global caliphate through armed jihad, it now participates in a Unified Political Leadership of the Palestinian factions that administer Lebanon's twelve refugee camps. How should we understand this development? The aim of this thesis is to further explore the meaning of Usbat al-Ansar 's venture into national Palestinian politics in Lebanon. Have the Palestinian mainstream movements been able to contain the radical Jihadi-Salafis, or should we understand this formation as a sign of clandestine extremist groups gaining ever more ground in the Palestinian community in Lebanon? I pursue the hypothesis that Usbat al-Ansar has developed from being a clandestine militia, into becoming a significant political and military force in their native camp. This study shows that the group is an integral part of the Islamic Forces, a political constellation which controls a significant part of Ain al-Hilwe. Inviting the Islamic Forces into national Palestinian politics has been a way for the mainstream Palestinian movements to ensure their continued stake in what is the country's biggest and most important refugee camp. Ironically, we will see that the Jihadi-Salafis of Usbat al-Ansar have become one of the most efficient forces when it comes to warding off the present-day volatile, clandestine militias the camp society still suffers at the hands of. ii Acknowledgments First off I would like to thank my supervisor Dag Tuastad for his patience, quick replies and encouragements. Both during my field study and the following process of writing, his advice has been invaluable. This study could not have been realized without the generous support of Ambassador Svein Aass, Chargé d'affaires Stine Horn, and International Development Officer Manal Kortam and the rest of the staff at the Norwegian Embassy in Beirut. I especially would like to thank for Manal for her help in facilitating my fieldwork, her endless support and genuine interest in my project. I would also like to thank fellow trainee Ole Denstad for putting up with my antics throughout our six months at the embassy, and Chargé d'affaires of the Norwegian embassy of Damascus (pt. Beirut) Martin Yttervik for his clever wit and constant encouragements. I am forever indebted to the Hassan family for inviting me into their home and treating me like a family member even though they as displaced Palestinians from Syria were going through one of the harder periods of their lives. I hope to see you back in Damascus when all of this is over. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to every interlocutor who received me and participated in this study. I would particularly like to thank Mr. Edward Kattoura for taking the time to see me at his office in the Mar Elias camp and sharing his insight on more than one occasion. Thanks to Isra, Rashid, Abdallah, Abu Muhammad, Abu Khalid and Abu Wadiaa and for their selfless generosity and assistance in facilitating my visits to the camps. Finally I would like to thank Veslemøy Oma for all her kind support. I wouldn't have gotten through this without you. Erling Lorentzen Sogge, May 25. 2014 iii Notes on Arabic transliterations I loosely base my transliterations on the guidelines provided by the International Journal of Middle East Studies 1. Citations in Arabic will be written in both Colloquial Arabic and Formal Arabic depending on the source. Although one in Levantine Arabic most often replaces the letter qāf [q] with a glottal stop, the hamza ['], or in some dialects gāf [g], I will in all cases use the letter q for clarity. For the sake of simplicity my transliterations of formal Arabic will exclude modes and cases. When typing out names of lesser known groups, organizations or places I will display these fully transcribed and translated in the notes the first time they appear. I will not transcribe people's names, but rather use the spelling most commonly used in the Lebanese English language press. All transliterations and translations of Arabic or Norwegian are mine. 1 “IJMES Transliteration system for Arabic, Persian and Turkish,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, last modified April, 2014, accessed May, 8. 2014, http://ijmes.ws.gc.cuny.edu/files/2014/04/TransChart.pdf iv Abbreviations and Arabic glossary DFLP Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine Fedā'ī (pl.Fedā'īīn) A combatant. The term sometimes refers to the PLO combatants who “sacrificed” themselves while throwing themselves at Israeli tanks during the 1968 battle of Karāme in Jordan. ḥaqq al-ʿawda The right of return ICRC International Committee of the Red cross ʿIlm Knowledge. For scholars of Islam,ʿilm is a scientific approach to extracting the knowledge of the Islamic sources LAF The Lebanese Armed Forces, i.e. the Lebanese army MB The Muslim Brotherhood al-Nakba The disaster. The word is commonly refers the expulsion of the Palestinians during the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine PFLP – GC Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command PLO The Palestinian Liberation Organization PRS Palestinian Refugee(s) from Syria PRL Palestinian Refugee(s) from Lebanon Shūra The Islamic principle of consultation. Sometimes referred to as an alternative to democracy Tawṭīn Naturalization, the act of making someone a citizen UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNRWA United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East v Table of contents Introduction........................................................................................................................................1 Research question...........................................................................................................................2 The structure of the study...............................................................................................................3 1 Theoretical framework....................................................................................................................4 The precarious situation of the refugees in Lebanon.........................................................................4 Previous studies.................................................................................................................................5 War, memory and civil rights.........................................................................................................5 Governance.....................................................................................................................................6 Islamism in the camps....................................................................................................................7 A different angle.............................................................................................................................8 Firewalls and Conveyor-belts: A typology.......................................................................................8 Conclusion.........................................................................................................................................9 2 Methodology...................................................................................................................................11 A field study.....................................................................................................................................11 Access and limitations.................................................................................................................11 Interviews........................................................................................................................................12 Meeting the factions....................................................................................................................12 Camp dwellers, NGOs and authors..............................................................................................13 Language......................................................................................................................................13 Ethical implications......................................................................................................................14 3 A political map of Ain al-Hilwe.....................................................................................................15 The rise and fall of a revolution.......................................................................................................15 Days of revolution (Ayyām al-thawra)........................................................................................16 The death of the revolution...........................................................................................................16 The aftermath of the war...............................................................................................................18 A present-day political map of Ain al-Hilwe...................................................................................19 The Islamic Forces.......................................................................................................................20 A divided Fatah............................................................................................................................22 Security and arms.........................................................................................................................23 The clandestine militants..............................................................................................................24 Conclusion.......................................................................................................................................26 vi 4 Local and global jihad in Ain al-Hilwe........................................................................................27 Who are the Jihadi Salafis?.............................................................................................................29 Who are Usbat al-Ansar?..............................................................................................................30 The origins of jihadi Salafism in Ain al-Hilwe................................................................................31 A Teheran-backed Jihad................................................................................................................31 Aligning with the Lebanese Salafi current...................................................................................33 Setting the stage for global jihad..................................................................................................34 When a refugee camp becomes an emirate....................................................................................35 Lessons from Nahr al-Barid.........................................................................................................37 Shock waves in Ain al-Hilwe.......................................................................................................38 The Hamas effect.............................................................................................................................39 Conclusion.......................................................................................................................................42 5 Confrontations during the Syrian crisis......................................................................................43 Forming a national leadership.........................................................................................................44 Echos from Syria..........................................................................................................................44 Palestinian perspectives on the Islamic Forces: A question of security........................................45 On containing the radicals...............................................................................................................47 Conclusion.......................................................................................................................................49 6 Conclusion......................................................................................................................................51 Closing remarks............................................................................................................................52 7 List of interviews............................................................................................................................53 8 Bibliography...................................................................................................................................55 9 List of major Palestinian factions in Lebanon............................................................................61 10 A map of the official Palestinian refugee camps of Lebanon...................................................62 vii Introduction According to Thomas Hegghammer, director of terrorism research at The Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, events following the outbreak of the «Arab Spring» have shaken our understanding of militant Islamism 1. This has particularly been evident in the battlefield of the ongoing Syrian war, he argues, where al-Qaida affiliated groups have shown an unexpected amount of pragmatism and adaptability. As these groups gain ground, they are posed with new challenges and adapt accordingly: Is this the first time we have seen al-Qaida-affiliated militias pass out medicines and food among people in need? 2 Looking at Palestinian Jihadist groups in Lebanon, one might wonder why our perspective hasn't been challenged earlier. In the Palestinian refugee camp Ain al-Hilwe, 3 located in Southern Lebanon, the Jihadi-Salafi militia Usbat al-Ansar 4 has a long history of catering to the needs of the local refugee population. Integrated into the political system of the camp the group shares the responsibility for what is now close to 90,000 refugees, as people keep pouring in from the war-stricken neighboring country. While Usbat al-Ansar might best be known for a wave of terrorism and assassinations launched against both Palestinian leaders and Lebanese officials during the 90s, the group has in recent years chosen a different pattern of behavior. After the Jihadist militia Fatah al-Islam 5 engaged in a long drag-out battle against the Lebanese Armed Forces in 2007, an event which displaced nearly 30,000 Palestinian refugees and completely destroyed the northern Nahr al-Barid camp, Usbat al-Ansar issued a fatwa condemning any attacks on Lebanese soldiers 6. In the wake of the crisis at Nahr al-Barid the International Crisis Group advised the Palestinian factions to “create a single representative body” to serve as a unified interlocutor in their dialogue with Lebanese authorities 7. As of 2013 this unified Palestinian body is a reality. The project, 1 Thomas Hegghammer “Jihadism: Seven Assumptions Shaken by the Arab Spring,” Middle East Political Science, (2014): http://pomeps.org/2014/02/03/jihadism-seven-assumptions-shaken-by-the-arab-spring/ 2 cf. The Washington Post, «Rival al-Qaeda-linked groups fortifying in Syria with mix of pragmatism and militancy,» October 13. 2013: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/al- qaeda-linked-groups-taking-root-in- syria/2013/10/13/11d01b12-334c-11e3-8627-c5d7de0a046b_story.html 3 ʿAin al-ḥilwe (The sweet spring) 4 ʿUṣbat al-anṣār al-islāmiyya (The Islamic League of Partisans) 5 Fataḥ al-islām (The Islamic Conquest) 6 The Daily Star, “Osbat al-Ansar issues fatwa outlawing fighting with LAF,” December 6. 2008: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2008/Dec-06/56796-osbat-al-ansar-issues-fatwa-outlawing- fighting-with-laf.ashx#axzz2uGSpq7Zz 7 International Crisis Group, “Lebanon's Palestinian Dilemma: The Struggle over Nahr al-Bared,” Middle East Report, no. 117 (2012): http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/egypt-syria- lebanon/lebanon/117-lebanons-palestinian-dilemma-the-struggle-over-nahr-al-bared.aspx 1 spearheaded by Hamas, came at a point when the factions were at loggerheads over the Syrian crisis and must perhaps be seen as an attempt to contain the mounting political tension. Interestingly this body includes some of the Jihadist movements from Ain al-Hilwe that earlier were thought to pose the biggest threat to stability in the camp. After completing a field study in Ain al-Hilwe in the early 2000s, political scientist Bernard Rougier warned that Usbat al-Ansar was taking part in a “warlike cult of jihad” he saw emerging in the camp; one that through its violence had been able to reduce the influence of the “Palestinian national movement” to the extent where one no longer could “speak of a Palestinian society in Lebanon's camps”8. Rougier's work has become a benchmark study in analyzing the emergence militant Islamist groups in the refugee camps of Lebanon, but recent events suggest that the dynamics of Palestinian Islamism in said country might be changing. Whereas Usbat al-Ansar still commits to the principles of militant jihad and the struggle for a global caliphate 9, it now takes part in national Palestinian politics in Lebanon, where it routinely meets the PLO and the other factions at the Palestinian Embassy in Beirut. How should we understand this development? Research question The aim of this study is to further explore the meaning of Usbat al-Ansar 's venture into national Palestinian politics in Lebanon. My research question is as follows: Is the inclusion of Usbat al- Ansar in the Unified Political Leadership of the Palestinian factions a result of the mainstream Palestinian movements having been able to contain the threat of Jihadi-Salafism and its most significant proponents in the camps, or should we understand this formation as a sign of clandestine extremist groups gaining ever more ground in the Palestinian community in Lebanon? In order to seek an answer to this question I pose the hypothesis that Usbat al-Ansar has developed from being a violent, clandestine militia, into becoming a significant political and military force in their native camp. This study shows that the group is an integral part of the Islamic Forces, a political constellation which controls a significant part of Ain al-Hilwe. Unable to compete with their military force, the mainstream Palestinian movements have reluctantly accepted Usbat al-Ansar as a party they need to cooperate with. 8 Bernard Rougier, Everyday jihad: The rise of militant Islam among Palestinians in Lebanon, Trans. Pascale Ghazale (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2007), 2, 3. 9 Burhan Yasin,“ʿUṣbat al-anṣār minʿiṣāba 'ilā ʿaāmil 'istiqrār fī lubnān (Usbat al-Ansar: From an armed gang to an agent of stability in Lebanon”,) Saidadays.com, May 4. 2013: http://saidadays.com/news.php?go=fullnews&newsid=15834 2 The structure of the study In the first chapter I will give an overview of previous studies done on Islamism in the Palestinian refugee camps of Lebanon, before I situate this thesis within a theoretical framework. In chapter two I will present the methodological approach which forms the foundation of this study, and discuss ethical implications. In chapter three I delve into the security zones of Ain al-Hilwe where I present an updated political map of the camp. Although it is the base of the Islamic Forces, I contest the hypothesis that Ain al-Hilwe is a breeding ground for Jihadism. I maintain that it rather should be seen as a contested ground, where a myriad of movements are vying for influence. The fourth chapter seeks to improve our understanding of the ideology of Usbat al-Ansar, as it follows their evolution from Teheran-backed resistance militia, into a global Jihadist movement. In this chapter we are introduced to volatile Jihadi-Salafi groups such as Fatah al-Islam and Jund al- Sham, where I argue that Usbat al-Ansar has developed in a different direction. In chapter five I present the circumstances surrounding the creation of a Unified Political Leadership and seek to understand why the Islamic Forces of Ain al-Hilwe have been included in this project. Further, I explore how clandestine militias are confronted by the mainstream Palestinian movements. The sixth and final chapter concludes the study and provides a summary of its main findings. 3