Copyright 0 1997 By JamesM . West MARTIAL LAWLESSNESS: THE LEGAL AFTERMATH OF KWANGJU James M. Westl FoR DR. CHO! SUNG-IL (1941-1991) Abstract: On August 26, 1996, two former presidents of the Republic of Korea, Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh Tae-Woo, were convicted of insurrection, treason, and corruption. The charges arose out of their December 1979 coup and the ruthlessly violent suppression of a democratic protest in the city of Kwangju in May 1980. This article recounts the origins and analyzes the progress of this dramatic criminal trial, which has attracted worldwide attention. The current South Korean head of state, President Kim Young-Sam, has depicted the conviction of his predecessors as a historic juncture opening a new era of constitutionalism for Korea. Despite the popularity of the prosecutions in Korea, however, critics see the cases as motivated by revenge or political opportunism and have questioned whether the trials actually will serve to establish a Rule of Law under which Korea's dynamic political economy can purge itself of chronic corruption and authoritarian abuses of power. Other issues examined include continuing impacts of the Kwangju tragedy upon U.S.-Korean relations as well as possible implications of the criminal prosecutions for Korean reunification and for future transitions to democracy in other nations. TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION A. The Notion of "Rightingt he Wrongs of History" B. "Creeping Coup ": October 1979 through May 1980 C. The Kwangju Massacre, May 1980 D. Impunity as an Affront to History II. THE MILLS OF JUSTICE BELATEDLY GRIND A. Timing, Scope and Momentum of Delegitimation B. From "Let History Judge " to "Judges! Let's Rectify History!" 1. Prosecutionf or the Coup d'Etat? "Let History Judge" 2. Prosecutionf or the Kwangju Massacre? "Let History Judge" 3. The "Slush Fund" Scandal and the Downfall of Roh Tae- Woo 4. "Judges! Let's Rectify History!" III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY OVER RETROACTIVITY A. Differing Assessments of Limitations Constraints PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 6, No. I B. Special Laws to Resolve PrescriptionI mpediments C. The ConstitutionalC ourt Judgment of February1 6, 1996 D. InternationalA spects of the Retroactivity Problem IV. DICTATORS IN THE DOCK: "THE TRIAL OF THE CENTURY" A. The Trial Begins B. The Cross-Examinationo f the Defendants C. Sentencing and Appeals D. MartialL aw Powers: Limited or Unlimited? 1. The Insurrection Charges 2. The Treason Charges 3. Abuse of MartialL aw Power V. LOOKING AHEAD: UNRESOLVED ISSUES A. PotentialI mpact on PopularA ttitudes Toward Law B. Potential Conflict between the Supreme Court and the ConstitutionalC ourt C. Collaborationw ith Past Regimes D. "Rectification" of History E. The Relevance of InternationalL aw 1. "Genocide" and "Crimes Against Humanity" 2. The United States and the Kwangju Massacre F. Legal Precedentsf or Korean Reunification VI. CONCLUSION I. INTRODUCTION In South Korea, the Kwangju massacre of May 1980 is widely regarded as the nation's most traumatic historical episode since the Korean War.' Over fifteen years later, the bloodshed at Kwangju has a complex Lecturer on Law and Research Fellow, East Asian Legal Studies, Harvard Law School. This paper benefited from input from Edward J.B aker, Son Kwang-Un, and Yoon Dae-Kyu, among others. An opinion poll recently conducted at Seoul National University indicated that today's students "overwhelmingly" regard the Kwangju massacre as "the greatest tragedy in Korean history since 1945." This surprised the academics who designed the survey, for they naturally believed that the prevailing response would be the Korean War. Nicholas Kristof, For Victims of Korea's Ugly Years, A Time to Savor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1995, at A3. See generally THE KWANGJU UPRISING: SHADOWS OVER THE REGIME IN SOUTH KOREA (Donald Clark ed., 1988). For broader context, see MARK L. CLIFFORD, TROUBLED TIGER: BUSINESSMEN, BUREAUCRATS AND GENERALS IN SOUTH KOREA (1994) (concerning Park's assassination); JANUARY 1997 THE LEGAL AFTERMATH OFK WANGJU significance that pervades yet transcends domestic politics. In what follows, the focus will be upon legal repercussions of the Kwangju incident, particularly upon the criminal prosecutions of former presidents Chun Doo- Hwan (in office 1980-88) and Roh Tae-Woo (in office 1988-93), who on August 26, 1996, were convicted of military insurrection, treason, and massive corruption. One aim will be to consider whether this criminal case, labeled "the trial of the century" by the Korean mass media, actually marks the opening of a new phase in the transition from dictatorship to democracy that has been unfolding in Korea since 1987.3 Precisely what happened at Kwangju in May 1980 was hotly contested for years. The events have been variously characterized as an "uprising," a "massacre," an "anti-fascist rebellion," a "riot," a "people's democratization movement," a "communist-led insurrection," an "abortive revolution," a "national liberation struggle," an "exercise of state terror," a "North Korean provocation," a "holocaust," and even an "act of genocide." Recent Korean legislation and the legal proceedings to date have discredited the Chun regime's original depiction of the episode as a revolt organized by North Korean operatives. Instead, the Kwangju incident now is described officially in South Korea as a spontaneous and self-defensive reaction by citizens against grossly excessive force deployed by an illegitimate military junta.4 Since Kwangju, other violent attacks upon civilians by armed forces under the command of undemocratic regimes have been witnessed elsewhere in the Far East: massacres took place in Rangoon in August and HUMAN RIGHTS IN KOREA: HISTORICAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES (William Shaw ed., 1991); ASIA WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS INK OREA (1986) (report by Dr. James Palais). 2 As explained infra text Part 1, the charges against the former presidents and 14 other former South Korean Army generals stem from a military coup on December 12, 1979, from the killing of more than 200 civilians in Kwangju in May 1980, and from other measures taken by Chun in the process of installing himself in the presidency in August 1980. The corruption charges relate to extortion and personal misappropriation by the former presidents of hundreds of millions of dollars in "donations" from businessmen over the 1980-1993 period. Appeals were pending at the time of writing. , James M. West & Edward J. Baker, The 1987 Constitutional Reforms in South Korea: Electoral Processes and Judicial Independence, I HARV. HUM. RTS. Y.B. 135 (1988), reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS IN KOREA: HISTORICAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1, at 221-52. ' "The historical significance of the May 18 Kwangju democratization movement has been newly illuminated to allow the people to cast off the yoke of past history and participate in creating the New Korea. The historical meaning of the June 10, 1987 democratization movement has also been reevaluated to credit the main players of that movement with having worked for the accomplishment of democratic reforms." Anti-Corruption Drive Without Sanctuary: Part 4 in a Series of Articles on President Kim Young-Sam's Three Years of Change and Reform, KOREA PRESS SERV., Feb. 28, 1996. See also The Underdogs Bite Back: South Korea, ECONOMIST, Dec. 16, 1995, at 32. PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 6, No. I September 1988, in Beijing in June 1989, in Bangkok in May 1992, and in East Timor on more than one occasion. Korea's disposition of criminal charges against the former military junta probably is being followed with interest by powerholders in Indonesia, Burma, China, and elsewhere who, in case of a future regime change, may also find themselves bereft of de facto immunities long taken for granted.5 If Kwangju belongs in the same legal category as the Tiananmen Square massacre or the State Law and Order Restoration Council ("SLORC") atrocities in Burma, then one begins to grasp why so many Koreans have felt betrayed by the United States. The United States organized sanctions against China and Burma, at least temporarily, but it refrained-for reasons of national security-from any comparably concrete response against the Chun junta in the wake of the Kwangju massacre.6 On the contrary, Chun was the first foreign head of state invited to pay a call on Ronald Reagan in Washington, D.C., in early 1981.7 As many predicted at the time, this move induced the Korean populace to surmise that Chun's usurpation of power had been condoned, if not covertly encouraged, by the American government.8 The double standard of the Cold War era came to be enshrined in the scholastic distinction between "authoritarian" and "totalitarian" regimes, a failed attempt to rationalize support of "friendly anti-communist dictators" ranging from the Shah of Iran to Ferdinand Marcos to Park Chung-Hee and Chun Doo-Hwan in South Korea.9 5 A newspaper editorial of March 1996 declared: "Should Seoul stray off [the path to democracy] as Koreans calling for righteousness stumble into excesses instead, a bungled democratic transition could result. That would have a chilling effect on even more fragile processes in several other Asian countries. That is why the trial of two former presidents which opened this week is so worrying." Review and Outlook: Korean Portents, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 1996, at 8. Despite such warnings and related predictions that dictators may become less willing to negotiate relinquishment of their autocratic powers, the punishment of Korea's former military junta conceivably could induce other dictators to exercise more restraint by showing that their future impunity is not to be taken for granted. 6 In June 1989, President George Bush first suspended military exports to China, then suspended all high-level diplomatic exchanges and ordered sympathetic consideration to be given to Chinese nationals in the United States wishing to extend their stays. Jan-Michele Lemon, China: United States Policy After Tiananmen Square, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 195, 196-97 (1990). In the wake of indiscriminate killings in Rangoon on August 8-12, 1988, the U.S. government made an official protest and following the related coup, on Sept. 18, 1988, all U.S. aid to Burma was cut off. See 1989 ASIA Y.B. (Far E. Econ. Rev.) 95. 7 MICHAEL KLARE & CYNTHIA ARONSON, SUPPLYING REPRESSION: U.S. SUPPORT FOR AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES ABROAD 86 (198 1). ' See Jerome A. Cohen & Edward J. Baker, US. ForeignP olicy and Human Rights in South Korea, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN KOREA: HISTORICAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1,a t 171, 216-17. ' See, e.g., STANLEY HOFFMAN, JANUS AND MINERVA: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 387-88 (1987): JANUARY 1997 THE LEGAL AFTERMATH OF KWANGJU Preliminarily, a glance at salient features of the historical context may render more comprehensible the legal aftermath of Kwangju, particularly ongoing controversies over the dictates of "justice" in the criminal cases brought against the two ex-presidents and fourteen other former generals. A. The Notion of "Righting the Wrongs of History" For many Koreans, the Cold War partition of the nation constitutes the historic wrong of the present era, and one which, directly or indirectly, has engendered many subsequent tragedies and miscarriages of justice."° In 1945, after war's end brought the lifting of thirty-five years of Japanese colonial rule, the Korean people largely supported a systematic purge of those who had collaborated with the Japanese regime." Even before partition, however, the anti-communist priorities of the U.S. military government precluded retribution against pro-Japanese Koreans accused of treason.12 In fact, the Republic of Korea's ("ROK") military and state administrative apparatus, particularly the legal system and the police, were staffed in large part by former collaborators. 3 With American support, the tables quickly were turned against leftists who had led the anti-Japanese resistance and who were among those demanding a purge of collaborators.14 The opportunity for a reckoning was lost. Under President Syngman Rhee (in office 1948-60), a pattern of corrupt authoritarianism emerged in which the legal system lacked basic As for the famous distinction between totalitarian and authoritarian governments, it rests ... on a confusion between the world of ideal-types ... and the world of political realities. As a result, it tends to ascribe to actual totalitarian governments attributes of the pure ideal-type, and to credit (or debit) them with a capacity of mass mobilization and an ability to control all sectors of society that far exceed their resources .... Also, the distinction unduly beautifies authoritarian regimes. Today, such regimes are often anything but "traditional"; they are either sophisticated modem versions of fascism, with emphasis on controlling the corporate groups it pretends to resuscitate or to create, or they are systems of uncontrolled bureaucratic and technocratic rule. They are not satisfied with banning political parties (or creating false ones) and limiting freedom of political expression, but insist on preventing society from organizing itself in a way that could challenge the arbitrary power of the state-hence the purging of unions and universities. " See generally Bruce Cumings, The Division of Korea, in TWO KOREAS-ONE FUTURE? 5 (John A. Sullivan & Roberta Foss eds., 1987). CARTER J. ECKERT ET AL., KOREA OLD AND NEW: A HISTORY 327-37 (1990). 2 See, e.g., John P. Lovell, The Military and Politics in Postwar Korea, in KOREAN POLITICS IN TRANSITION 153, 155-56 (Edward R. Wright ed., 1975). 13 GREGORY HENDERSON, KOREA: THE POLITICS OF THE VORTEX 141-44 (1968). "4 See generally BRUCE CUMINGS, THE ORIGINS OF THE KOREAN WAR: LIBERATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF SEPARATE REGIMES 1945-1947, at 428-44 (1981). PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 6, No. I prerequisites of legitimacy. The criminal justice system became a weapon used to silence Rhee's political opponents, many of whom were imprisoned or even judicially murdered.15 Under his rule, the National Security Act, modeled on the 1925 Peace Preservation Act of the Japanese colonial period, abridged or annulled civil liberties, and the Constitution repeatedly was modified.16 Popular outrage against Rhee culminated in the student- catalyzed revolution of April 19, 1960."7 Rhee's ouster presented another potential occasion to purge anti-democratic figures, including former collaborators. The coup d'stat of May 16, 1961, soon brought a purge orchestrated by Park Chung-Hee, but the overriding goal of the new military strongman was to secure his own power.18 Gradually it became clear that Park had no intention of tolerating democratic politics or a Rule of Law capable of constraining abuses of official authority.19 Another chance for a historical reckoning thus also miscarried. Constitutional instability worsened under military authoritarianism, and the legal order was seriously deformed by a long concatenation of draconian martial law decrees.20 Park coercively repressed all political challengers and by 1972 had ensconced himself as President for life.2' B. "Creeping Coup": October 1979 through May 1980 The assassination of President Park Chung Hee on October 26, 1979, created a severe power vacuum.2 A true believer in his own indispensability, Park failed to fix coherent contingency plans for succession. Assassin Kim Jae-Kyu, director of the Korea Central Intelligence Agency ("KCIA"), immediately was arrested along with a group of his subordinates.23 Choi Kyu-Ha, Park's pliant civilian prime " Gregory Henderson, Human Rights in South Korea 1945-1953, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN KOREA: HISTORICAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1, at 125, 165-69. 6 James B. Palais, 'Democracy' in South Korea 1948-1972, in WITHOUT PARALLEL: THE AMERICAN-KOREAN RELATIONSHIP SINCE 1945, 322-27 (F. Baldwin ed., 1973). " See RICHARD C. ALLEN, KOREA'S SYNGMAN RHEE: AN UNAUTHORIZED PORTRAIT 225-34 (1960). 's JOHN KIE-CHIANG OH, DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL 138-44 (1968). " See generally SUNG-JOO HAN, THE FAILURE OF DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH KOREA (1974). 20 Palais, supra note 16, at 338-50. 21 Cohen & Baker, supra note 8, at 176-88. 22 See CLIFFORD, supra note 1, at 138-42. 23 The course of events between the assassination and the Kwangju massacre in May 1980 is described in a chronology appearing in THE KWANGJU UPRISING: SHADOWS OVER THE REGIME IN SOUTH KOREA, supra note 1, at 10-14. JANUARY 1997 THE LEGAL AFTERMATH OF KWANGJU minister, assumed the role of acting chief of state and declared martial law.24 Choi soon lifted a few of the Yusin-era martial law decrees that were highly unpopular, but he proved irresolute and incapable of controlling the military.25 Substantial segments of the Korean populace cautiously had welcomed Park's demise as an overdue opportunity for democratic reforms.26 Park's death was generally believed to have been occasioned by growing challenges to his high-handed and brutal Yusin autocracy. The immediate events leading up to Park's assassination began when Park expelled Kim Young-Sam, then a leader of the opposition New Democratic Party, from the National Assembly on October 4, 1979.27 Large-scale street protests erupted in the following week in Kim's home base area of Pusan, then spread to nearby Masan, leading Park to declare martial law and to ban public assemblies.28 Park ordered Kim Jae-Kyu to Pusan by on October 19 to evaluate the situation. Park's inclination was to dispatch military commandos to quell the protests by the use of overwhelming force, even if doing so entailed serious bloodshed.29 The KCIA chief later claimed he had counselled against such a risky course, warning that massive resistance would follow.3" Park apparently rejected Kim's advice, agreeing instead with his bodyguard, Ch'a Chi Ch'ol, an advocate of ruthless countermeasures who argued that even large-scale killing of protestors would bring no unmanageable repercussions, domestically or internationally.31 Kim Jae-Kyu claimed that in the end the only way he could preempt the use of commandos in South Kyongsang province was by gunning down the President.32 14 THE KWANGJU UPRISING: SHADOWS OVER THE REGIME IN SOUTH KOREA, supra note 1, at 10. 25 Cohen & Baker, supra note 8, at 189-90. 26 Choi Jang-Jip, Political Cleavages in South Korea, in STATE AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY KOREA 33 (Hagen Koo ed., 1993). 2:7 Cohen & Baker, supra note 8, at 189. 2S ECKERT ET AL, supra note 11, at 371. 29 See, e.g., SOHN HAK-KYu, AUTHORITARIANISM AND OPPOSITION IN SOUTH KOREA 155-73 (1989). 30 CLIFFORD, supra note I, at 139. 3' CLIFFORD, supra note I, at 139. 3 Kim Jae-Kyu's testimony declaring a tyrannicidal motive for killing Park has been doubted by some, who emphasize Kim's personal enmity toward Ch'a, a key rival. "Disagreement over [Kim Jae- Kyu's] motives, variously alleged to have been personal ambition, principled opposition to Park's authoritarian regime, and a nervous breakdown resulting from mental exhaustion, was not resolved at his trial, which ended with sentences of death for him and six other defendants." FRANKLIN L. FORD, POLITICAL MURDER: FROM TYRANNICIDE TO TERRORISM 322 (1985). PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 6, No. I Less than six weeks after Park's death, a violent putsch was executed. The coup d'dtat launched on December 12, 1979, by Chun Doo-Hwan, Roh Tae-Woo, and their supporters was facilitated by Chun's position as head of the Army internal security unit entrusted with investigation of the assassination.33 Chun's clique, centered in the Eleventh and Twelfth Classes of the Korean Military Academy, seized power by forcibly arresting the martial law commander, Chung Seung-Hwa, and other senior generals on suspicion of conspiring in the assassination. 4 Chun abruptly moved frontline armored forces from the Demilitarized Zone to Seoul in support of the coup, reportedly causing consternation in the U.S.-led Combined Forces Command.35 Firefights in central Seoul between ROK army contingents resulted in casualties, including the deaths of several men loyal to Chung's side. Choi Kyu-Ha and other civilian holdovers from the Park Chung Hee regime quickly acquiesced in the seizure of the military command structure by Chun, who publicly pretended to support Choi's succession to the presidency.36 Over the next few months, however, Chun consolidated de facto rule by his clique, and in April he illegally installed himself as director of the KCIA, a key organ of state coercion alongside the military.37 After enduring increasingly repressive rule under Park Chung-Hee, the Korean people in spring 1980 were hoping for an early transition to democracy. As Chun's clique tightened its grip on the state, demonstrations erupted in Seoul and around the country in early May.38 On May 17, Chun openly seized power by declaring nationwide martial law, dissolving the National Assembly, arresting a wide spectrum of opposition politicians and student dissidents, and banning assemblies and demonstrations.39 The city of Kwangju in South Cholla province, a stronghold of veteran opposition leader Kim Dae-Jung, was the scene of protest demonstrations on May 18, 31 Cohen & Baker, supran ote 8, at 190. 3 Cohen & Baker, supra note 8, at 190. 3' Cohen & Baker, supra note 8, at 190. 36 CLIFFORD, supra note 1, at 143-52. 37 THE KWANGJU UPRISING: SHADOWS OVER THE REGIME IN SOUTH KOREA, supra note I, at 11. 3' Cohen & Baker, supra note 8, at 192: Beginning in May, campus demonstrations increased dramatically. Students were calling for an end to martial law; the dismissal of Chun, President Ch'oe [Choi Kyu Ha], and Prime Minister Sin Hyon-hwak; the prompt drafting of a new constitution; and early elections.... As many as 100,000 students demonstrated in downtown Seoul on the 15th. They were met with tear gas. Riot police equipped with gas masks, shields, and clubs attacked the students, beating many. Hundreds were injured. Many were arrested. "9 Cohen & Baker, supra note 8, at 192. JANUARY 1997 THE LEGAL AFTERMATH OF KWANGJU when local students learned that Kim, as well as their own leaders, had been detained.4" C. The Kwangju Massacre, May 1980 Popular antipathy toward Chun's junta stems from their usurpation of power, gross abuses of human rights, and proclivity for corruption while in office, but most of all it stems from the terror unleashed against the citizens of Kwangju in May 1980. Precisely what transpired in Kwangju has been hard to ascertain, due in part to cover-ups and to disinformation spread by the Chun and Roh governments.41 One reason the recent criminal prosecutions have been broadly supported in Korea is that they afford a belated opportunity to uncover the truth once and for all, and to put an end to conflicting accounts of the massacre. For example, immediately afterwards, estimates of casualties varied from the government's figure of 191 killed (including twenty-three soldiers), to claims by dissidents that 2000 or more perished.42 These questions have not yet been definitively resolved. Scale of casualties aside, certain key facts about the Kwangju massacre are now established beyond serious dispute. First, a deliberate decision was made on May 18 to send into Kwangju elite "black beret" troops of the Special Warfare Command.43 These Special Forces were paratroopers tasked to be inserted behind North Korean lines in the event of war-they were experts in hand-to-hand combat, trained to dispatch enemy forces without revealing their presence.44 Second, the Special Forces were told by their commanders that participants in the Kwangju demonstrations were the spearhead of a communist revolution being orchestrated by North Korea.4" The Chun Doo- Hwan regime persisted for years in characterizing the initial Kwangju 40 Tim Wamberg, The Kwangju Uprising: An Inside View, 12 KOREAN STUDIES 33-56 (1988). 4 For example, the Korean Army forwarded false reports to the U.S. Embassy that "liberated" Kwangju was the scene of many summary executions by communist "People's Courts." It was also claimed, without any basis, that the disorder in Kwangju was being used as a pretext for widespread personal revenge killings by local people. See Yoon Sung-Min, Document: Report on the Kwangju Incident to the National Assembly National Defense Comittee, June 7, 1985, reprinted in THE KWANGJU UPRIStNG: SHADOWS OVER THE REGIME IN SOUTH KOREA, supra note 1, at 83-93. 42 ASIA WATCH, supra note 1, at 36-42. 4 THE KWANGJU UPRISING: SHADOWS OVER THE REGIME IN SOUTH KOREA, supra note 1, at 12. Gregory Henderson, The Politics of Korea, in TWO KOREAS--ONE FUTURE?, supra note 10, at 105. 4s See, e.g., ECKERT ET AL., supra note 11, at 374. PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 6, No. I demonstrators, college students protesting arbitrary arrests of their leaders, as agents under North Korean control who were intent on fomenting a revolution to be coordinated with a North Korean incursion across the Demilitarized Zone.a6 No credible evidence has ever been produced to substantiate Chun's claim. Third, ample testimony of eyewitnesses has confirmed that the Special Forces not only used egregiously excessive force against unarmed demonstrators; they also committed random attacks on obviously innocent civilians.47 Paratroopers carried out door-to-door searches in the course of which they brutally beat any young men they found without attempting to check their identity.48 Some of these innocent victims were killed or permanently incapacitated by head trauma and other wounds.49 Passersby in the streets, including females, were assaulted, battered, and in some instances killed and mutilated with bayonets.5° Not just the intensity of the violence, but especially its indiscriminate character, make it apt to speak of "state terror" at Kwangju. In hindsight, the escalation of street violence in Kwangju was precipitated by the excessive brutality of the ROK military, not by any covert action attributable to North Korea. In recent years, a near-consensus has emerged in Korea that the "rebellion" in Kwangju was spontaneous and self-defensive in nature. Unwarranted brutality of the Special Forces, along with lies contemporaneously disseminated by the state-controlled media, provoked tens of thousands of Kwangju citizens to organize themselves to resist the Army invasion, including by "liberating" firearms from local armories. Due to Korea's system of universal military conscription, virtually all adult males in Kwangju were military veterans and many were members of the ' The allegation of North Korean involvement remained a part of "the official story" for years afterwards. A Report to the National Assembly by Defense Minister Yoon Sung-Min, June 7, 1985, asserted that "our national security was threatened both from within and without"; that "intelligence said that North Korea would soon attack the South"; that "[g]roundless rumors [were] fabricated by impure elements"; that "the Supreme Court [in convicting Kim Dae-Jung] made it clear that some political forces pulled a string for the flare-up of the Kwangju incident"; and that "impure elements which were manipulated by well-organized outside forces stimulated the Kwangju citizens by rousing regional sentiments while circulating rumors." Yoon Sung-Min, supra note 41, at 84, 89. "' See Warnberg, supra note 40 (an eyewitness account). 4' ASIA WATCH, supra note 1, at 36-42. 49 ASIA WATCH, supra note I, at 36-42. 50 ASIA WATCH, supra note 1, at 37.