This paper is a draft version of: Marques, J., Paez, D. y Abrams, D. ( 1998 ) Social identity and intragroup differentiation as subjective social control. En: J F Morales, D Paez, J C Deschamps and S Worchel (Eds), Current Perspectives on Social Identity and Social Categorization. New York: Sage (pp 124-142) Social Identity and Intragroup Differentiation: the “Black Sheep Effect” as a function of subjective social control José M. Marques Dario Paez University of Porto University of the Basque Country Dominic Abrams University of Kent at Canterbury This chapter draws from four theoretical and empirical sources: the social identity and self-categorisation framework (e.g. Hogg, 1992; Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Tajfel, 1978; Turner, 1992; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987) which, for simplicity, we herein designate as “SIT framework”; ideas recently set forth by Marques and Paez (1994) on the subjective dynamics of intragroup differentiation based on research on the “black sheep effect” and related to the Durkheimian perspective on social control and deviance; and research by Sherif and Hovland (1961) on attitudes and judgment. Its aim is to propose a cognitive-motivational framework to explain why people differentiate more strongly among ingroup than outgroup members as shown in the “black sheep effect”. Research on this effect has addressed those situations in which normative and counter-normative ingroup and outgroup members are made salient to the subjects, to show that people tend to, respectively, upgrade and downgrade ingroup members who bolster and oppose normative ingroup standards, as compared to outgroup members. The black sheep effect has been assigned to subjects’ attempt to legitimate the overall ingroup’s positiveness, by derogating those ingroup members who, in opposing the ingroup’s normative standards, threaten such positiveness. This view is consistent with the SIT framework (cf Marques and Paez, 1994). However, a full explanation of the black sheep effect requires qualification of some SIT assumptions as well as the proposal of some complementary processes which, in our view, better substantiate its emergence. The specific goal of this chapter is to distinguish between the notion of “group norm” as a descriptive principle of intergroup differentiation, i.e. of cognitive clarity (e.g. Hogg, 1992; Turner et al, 1978) and the notion of “group norm” as a prescriptive standard whereby ingroup members anchor their judgments of other ingroup members in order to ascertain, not the intergroup distinctiveness, but rather the legitimacy of the ingroup’s superiority (Marques & Paez, 1994). In this vein, we shall speak of descriptive norm to refer to the former, and prescriptive norm to refer to the latter kind of process. Whereas the descriptive norm stands more for a cold concomitant of social categorization, the prescriptive norm would emerge as a hot consequence of such categorization, particularly when norm violation becomes salient within the ingroup (Forsyth, 1995). Attitudes towards a behavior, feeling or way of thinking refer to the individual evaluative judgement, and norms refer to the group level - to the group modal or mean attitude towards a behavior, etc. Attitude is the internal side of the social influence process and norms are the group level of social influence ( Kenny and Lavoie, 1985). Litterature on attitude and judgement and on social sharing or 1 interpersonal attitude expression and validation is reviewed from this perspective, as a complement to understand normative influence processes. Another major goal is to set a model to explain what happens between the two processes: informational descriptive and normative prescriptive. To us, the basic question thus is: through what kinds of mechanisms do individuals step from a descriptive norm which generates intergroup differentiation and identification to the ingroup, to a prescriptive norm according to which such identification is regulated and reinforced? The SIT Framework Social Differentiation, Social Attraction, and the Metacontrast Principle Among other well-known assumptions, the SIT framework states that, in social life, people attempt to achieve cognitive clarity by exaggerating intergroup differences and intragroup similarities (Hogg, 1992; Doise, Deschamps & Meyer, 1978; Tajfel, 1969, 1978; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963). This process of perceptual accentuation is associated with self- stereotyping. When self-stereotyping occurs, the ingroup becomes fully representative of the self (Turner, 1981). Social identity is an outcome of this self-stereotyping process, in that, depersonalized self-perception generates on a cognitive self-representation which encompasses only those attributes shared within the ingroup, to the detriment of the idiosyncratic features of the self or those features which create some similarity between the self and the outgroup. These attributes correspond to an ingroup prototype (Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994; Oakes & Turner, 1990; Turner et al, 1987), i.e., in defined contexts, they simultaneously create the highest similarity among members of the same group, and the maximum differentiation between members of opposing categories. According, for instance, to Hogg (1992), group prototypes fulfill structuring and emotional functions. The structuring function of group prototypes is related to social differentiation and intragroup assimilation, in that it allows individuals to perceive the social world in terms of meaningful, differentiated units, while generating perceived interchangeability among group members. In the case of the ingroup, such interchangeability includes the self. Because the self is assimilated to the ingroup prototype, this prototype becomes associated with an emotional function. Indeed, because, when the group is cognitively salient, a positive orientation towards the self becomes intrinsically equivalent to a positive orientation towards the group. Therefore, attraction to the self becomes social attraction, or attraction to the ingroup. An important implication of this function is that attraction within the group is not an outcome of interpersonal attitudes among group members, but rather, the result of an attraction towards the group position which best contributes to social differentiation. Because the self is assimilated to this prototype, the cognitive representation of the group becomes a mediator of a positive orientation towards the self. According to Turner et al (1987; cf also Hogg, 1992; Hogg & McGarty, 1990) the cognitive construction of group prototypes, may be operationalized in terms of a metacontrast: given a distribution of group member positions on relevant intergroup dimension (for instance, a personality attribute or an attitudinal response-scale), a metacontrast ratio can be found for each group member, so that the group’s most prototypical member is the one who occupies the position which simultaneously maximizes intergroup differences and intragroup similarities. The metacontrast ratio of each member (MCRk) can be computed as follows (Hogg, 1992; Hogg & McGarty, 1990; Turner et al, 1987): Ó n I=1 Ik - Oi __________________ n M C R k= ___Ó_________________ m I=1 Ik - Ii __________________ m-1 where: Ik=position of ingroup member k on the dimension Oi=positions of outgroup members on the dimension Ii =positions of remaining ingroup members on the dimension m=total number of ingroup members n=total number of outgroup members The Metacontrast and Rejection of Group Deviants Basic motivation for the metacontrast logic is uncertainty reduction - in fact, Hogg & Abrams (1994) desmise the "warm" self-esteem motivation approach of SIT by a "cold" cognitivistic motivation of uncertainty reduction. In fact, metacontrast principe explain descriptive fit, as the authors acknowledge, but, it is a less a satisfactory mechanism to explain normative fit - related to the content and to the "correct" side of the position of group members and prototypes. In fact, as we will show by means of a mental experiment, metacontrast can nont explain black sheep effect. As Hogg (1992) pointed out, the metacontrast notion has two main features. One such feature is that it allows to easily determine the prototypical-normative position of each group, that is, what, at the outset, we described as a denotative norm of group clarity. The second feature is that it shows that the normative group position increases as the group mean becomes extreme, and that such an increase is higher than an increase in the group mean. These two features can be easily stated in the example of Figure 2, below. One might be tempted to see the black sheep effect, mainly the rejection of ingroup deviates as a direct outcome of the metacontrast principle: the metacontrast corresponds to a principle according to which individuals are motivated to construct clear-cut intergroup differentiations, and, therefore, collapse group members to their prototypes; therefore, ingroup deviates would be disliked, because they negatively contribute to intergroup differentiation (i.e. provokes cognitive uncertainty). By the same token, outgroup members who are normative to (viz, typical of) their group 1 would be better liked than outgroup deviates. In this vein, the descriptive component of social differentiation would readily become a prescriptive one. As Hogg (1992) stated, “when a specific social identity is the salient basis for self-conception, self-perception and conduct become ingroup stereotypical and normative, perceptions of relevant outgroup members become outgroup stereotypical, and intergroup behaviour acquires --to varying degrees, depending on the history of relations between the groups-- competitive and discriminatory properties” (pp. 90-91). However, this statement does not clearly spell out the relationship that exists between social categorization and the assignement of value to the characteristics that insure the ingroup’s positive distinctiveness. Developing on this idea, Hogg (1992) carries on by stating that “highly non-prototypical in- or outgroup members will be disliked, particularly if, by being non-prototypical, they are actually being prototypical of the other group. This may explain the strong negative attitudes that exist towards traitors and ‘black sheep’”(p.103). One should notice, however, that the relationship between intergroup differentiation and rejection of ingroup deviates, as found in black sheep studies (see Marques and Paez, 1994 for a recent thourough review) is not that this idea is not entirely straightforward. These studies show, on the one hand, that rejected ingroup deviates do not necessarily occupy outgroup prototypical positions, but contribute negatively to ingroup positivity. On the other hand, socially desirable outgroup members --who, according to the above quotation, would be ingroup prototypical provoking cognitive confusion and, therefore, as strongly disliked as were undesirable ingroup members-- were moderately evaluated. Finally, some of these studies showed that outgroup members who behave similarly to ingroup members, and then also provokes cognitive uncertainty, actually are positively judged, mainly when a prescriptive norm is salient to the subjects - it is dificcult to explain these results by a motivation to reduce uncertainty and confusions between groups (Abrams’s study). In brief, although the explanation provided by Hogg (1992) appears elegant and parsimonious in light of the basic principles of the SIT framework, it seems necessary to add more complex explanatory principles to it. Namely, it seems more likely that the black sheep effect occurs due to a perceived threat to the legitimity of the superior position of the ingroup prototype (an emotional response to a norm violation), than to a lack of intergroup distinctiveness. In others words, rejection of deviant correspond not to "cold" logic associated to reduction of uncertainty or cognitive clarity, but, to the normative and "warms" processes by wich groups precibe what is "ougth" to do - and not simply to describe their prototypical position or what "we are doing". Referent Informational Influence, Intragroup Differentiation, and the “Black Sheep Effect” Associated with the above mentioned functions is a process of referent informational influence (Turner, 1991; Turner and Hogg, 1987): as individuals internalize or cognitively construct the ingroup prototype and assimilate themselves to it, they conform to this prototype in terms of their attributes and behaviour, in relevant group settings (Hogg, 1992). Therefore, referent informational influence is process whereby perceived ingroup attributes are internalized as norms defining the appropriate features and behaviour standards of the social self (Turner, 1991). The “Black Sheep Effect” and the Metacontrast Principle The explanation proposed by Marques and Paez (1994) draws from the general assumptions of the SIT framework. However, it differs from this framework in one basic process which deserves to be discussed. It clearly stands out from the first section that the SIT framework may offer one explanation for the black sheep effect (Footnote 1). Namely, it would state that socially undesirable (viz. non-prototypical) ingroup members would be disliked, because they contribute negatively to the clearness of group boundaries. In turn, socially desirable (viz. prototypical) ingroup members would be liked, since they bolster such clearness. As Hogg (1992, p. 103) pointed out, “people should have a more positive attitude towards those others who are relatively more than less prototypical, and therefore should like both ingroupers who are ingroup-prototypical and outgroupers who are outgroup-prototypical. Of course, highly non-prototypical in- or outgroup members will be disliked, particularly if, by being non-prototypical, they are actually being prototypical of the other group. This may explain the strong negative attitudes that exist towards traitors and ‘black sheep’”. The important issue in Hogg’s statement, above, is that, in assuming that the subjects’ judgments were only aimed to enhance intergroup differentiation (to accomplish uncertainty cold cognitive motivation), one should necessarily expect subjects to express more unfavourable feelings towards undesirable ingroup and desirable outgroup members as a negative reaction to those who threaten the intergroup boundaries, and to express more favourable feelings towards those who bolster such boundaries, i.e. desirable ingroup and undesirable outgroup members. This would help them perceiving clear-cut boundaries between the groups, and would function as a means to generate clarity and meaningfulness in their social identity: those members (ingroup or outgroup) who do not attune to their group’s norm hence hindering social distinctiveness, would be rejected, whereas members normative to their groups hence emphasizing distinctiveness, would evoke favourable reactions. In brief, intergroup situations would correspond to the following cognitive operations: (1) people would exaggerate intergroup differences and intragroup similarities while engaging in a self-stereotyping process. This would help them to perceive clear-cut boundaries between the groups and would function as a means to generate clarity and meaningfulness in their social world including their social identity; (2) such perception would be anchored on group prototypes, that is, normative positions upholding 1 intergroup differentiation and intragroup similarity, as given by group representations reified in their most prototypical members; (3) the judgmental outcome of this process would be two-fold: those members (ingroup or outgroup) who occupy normative positions, and therefore contribute to a clear-cut ingroup distinctiveness would be liked, whereas counter-normative members who hinder such distinctiveness would be rejected. This final point bears close implications for evidence on the “black sheep effect”. Indeed, an explanation based on a search for intergroup differentiation and clarity of group boundaries may partly account for more negative judgments of undesirable than of desirable ingroup members, but does not seem to explain the entire phenomenon. One reason is that this explanation is a cold cognitive one, that does not explain more self-ésteem related warm motivation. Another reason is that this explanation does not take into account active life of a group, that not only share a label and where subjects infer prototypical positions, but where subjects pollarize descriptive judgement, and more important where subject becames involved in "moral judgements" and comittement - related to group goals and group regulation. More empirically precise, the black sheep effect studies never showed that outgroup members who are counter- normative in light of ingroup standards (i.e. socially undesirable, outgroup-prototypical outgroupers) are judged as favourably as are normative (i.e. ingroup-prototypical) ingroupers, or, at least, that the former are judged more favourably than desirable (i.e. ingroup.prototypical) outgroup members. Instead, it was consistently found that socially desirable ingroup members are judged more favourably then socially undesirable outgroup members. In brief, it is not clear whether engaging in the black sheep effect is imediately aimed only to the cold cognitive aim of increase intergroup distinctiveness. It seems to us that, in line with the explanation proposed by Marques and Paez (1994), subjects may be more imediately concerned with warranting the legitimacy of ingroup norms, hence warranting a moral, an evaluative superiority of the ingroup. On accepting this idea, we need to establish the process through which this phenomenon occurs. One possibility is that the black sheep effect is really a direct function of the metacontrast descriptive fit principle. Imagine, for instance, the distribution of members of groups A and B with 3 members each, on attribute X as depicted in Figure 1. By separately computing the metaconstrast ratios for each group (MCRa and MCRb), one can conclude that members A1 (MCR=4.00) and B1 (MCR=8.00) are prototypical of their groups, i.e., they occupy the groups’ normative positions on the scale, whereas members A2 (MCR= -1.46) and B3 (MCR= -5.33) would be the less typical, or more counter-normative, of their groups. ------------------------------------------------ Insert Figure 1 about here ------------------------------------------------ There is, however, a worth noting feature in this example: Groups A and B would include, each, one member closer to the other group -- these are, respectively, members A2 and B3. Notice, however, that member A2 (scale position=1) is farther from his group prototype (scale position=6) than is member B3 (scale position=3) from Group B’s prototype (scale position=2). Yet, the metacontrast ratio of member A2 (-1.46) would still be closer to group A’s prototype (4.00) than would be the metacontrast ratio of member B3 (-5.33) to group B’s prototype (8.00). As far as we see, the metacontrast notion does not allow one to predict the emergence of the black sheep effect. As Hogg (1992) pointed out, an instance of social behaviour corresponding to the specific case of member A2 in our above example (a highly non-prototypical instance of his social category) would be uncommon, “since categorization of individuals as ingroup members accentuates their prototypicality, and highly non-prototypical ‘members’ are likely to be categorized as outgroupers or non-ingroupers” (p.103). Typically, in the black sheep effect studies, subjects are presented with four targets, according to a 2(ingroup vs outgroup member) x 2(socially desirable vs socially undesirable member) factorial design. The general pattern of results, is a strongly positive evaluation of the socially desirable ingroup member, a strongly negative evaluation of the socially undesirable ingroup member, and moderate evaluations of both the socially desirable and the socially undesirable outgroup members. But, on accepting Hogg’s contention, one would consider the black sheep effect as an outcome of judgments of one ingroup member (the “socially desirable ingroup member”) and of three outgroup or non-ingroup members (the “socially desirable outgroup member”, the “socially undesirable outgroup member”, and the “socially undesirable ingroup member”). Taking our example of Figure 1, and assuming that group A is the ingroup, Hogg’s claim would be supported by one of two judgmental outcomes. The first one is that member A2 would be judged more favourably than, for instance, member B2, who occupies exactly the same scale-position. In this case, the judgmental outcome would be led by the group tag associated to the members, to the detriment of these members’ positions on the stimulus scale. This would correspond to a top-down, or deductive judgmental process (e.g. Fiske and Taylor, 1993; Tajfel, 1969). Because of his/her tag, member A2 would have been cognitively assimilated to the A ingroup prototype -- member A2 would thus be perceived as a member of group A. This process would very much correspond to the perceptual accentuation process found, for instance, by Tajfel and Wilkes (1963). The second judgmental outcome, supportive of Hogg’s argument is that member A2 would be evaluated as negatively as members B2, B3, and B1. In this case, the judgment would be more strongly affected by the members’ positions, and their status as members of group A or B would be an outcome of these positions. This would have more of an inductive, or bottom-up, process. Because of his/her scale position, member A2 would be cognitively assimilated to the B outgroup prototype --member A2 would thus have been perceived as a member of Group B. Still, no matter which of the two outcomes would emerge, they both would have important implications. The first implication is that group member A2 could be derogated relative to members A1 and A3 (either because of his/her less typical cognitive ingroup status, or to his/her cognitive outgroup status), but there is no sound reason to expect this member to be derogated relative to members B1, B2, and B3. Most likely, judgments would show an interaction between the category label (A or B) and group members’ positions, such that members A1 and A3 would be judged more favourably than the remaining. If the 1 former possibility held, member A2 would be judged less positively than the remaining members of group A and more positively than the members of group B. If the latter possibility held, member A2 would be judged less positively than members A1 and A3 and as negatively as group B members. But, in no case, could one expect member A2 to be more derogated than group B members. Clearly, none of the two alternatives accounts for the black sheep effect. Indeed, in accepting an elementary explanation of the black sheep effect based uniquely on the metacontrast principle, one could not account for the fact that “outgroup members” or “non-ingroup members” (e.g. group member A2) are evaluated even more negatively than other outgroup members (e.g. group members B1, B2, and B3). A prognosis based on our model would state that member A2 would be more strongly rejected than members B1, B2 and B3, because this member would be perceived as an ingroup instance. Therefore, we assume that group judgments are primarily deductive. In the example of Figure 1, member A2 would be more judged according to the A ingroup tag. As a result, this member would be strongly derogated exactly because he/she would represent a higher threat to the social self than would other non-ingroup or outgroup members. Clearly, this assumption needs theoretical elaboration. In discussing the antecedents and consequences of the “black sheep effect”, Marques and Paez (1994) drew from the general principle underlying referent informational influence. However, they started from the assumption that, in everyday life, people accept the normative principle that one should conform to ingroup standards, not only because they best differentiate among groups, but perhaps more importantly, because these standards should be “by definition”, the best or even the only ones acceptable (what we are ougth to do). From this starting point, they established a parallel between rejection of ingroup deviates as found in the black sheep effect studies, referent informational influence, and Festinger’s (1950) model of group pressures towards conformity. To put it shortly, Festinger (1950), proposed that affiliation in groups fulfills two basic functions, a social reality function, i.e. uncertainty avoidance through selective affiliation with those who share similar beliefs, and a locomotion function, i.e. facilitation of goal achievement through affiliation with those people who share similar goals which could not be accomplished by the isolated individual. Parsimoniously (see Bales classic work for instance), we can posit two group goals: an expressive or moral - to have a collective "good face" - and an instrumental one - to perform succesfully some goal. This process would be insured within the group through two forms of social control, which Jones and Gerard (1967) designated as informational, and normative influence. Informational and normative influence would be generated by the fact that group members become interdependent, because they need each other both in order to ascertain consensus about relevant issues and to coordinate action for the purpose of goal achievement (cf also Cartwright and Zander, 1968). In other words, because subjects not only share a label and a passive similar position, but, because they became an structured collective with a common activity. As a result, any failure on the part of a group member either to comply with the group’s majority opinions or with social coordination for goal achievement would motivate the other members to exert pressures upon them in order to restore the group’s functionality. This idea formed the basis for research showing that people in small groups generate consensual opinions (e.g. Festinger, Schachter & Back, 1950) and reject deviant members who resist group pressures to comply with the group’s position on a relevant matter of opinion (e.g. Schachter, 1951) or intentionally fail to contribute to group’s goal achievement (e.g. Jones and DeCharms, 1967). This research further shows that increases in group homogeneity or in the discrepancy between the majority and the deviant stand increase the majority’s pressures towards uniformity (e.g. Levine, 1980; Levine & Pavelchak, 1984; Moreland & Levine, 1982; Shaw, 1976). On the other hand, as we have argued, some historical sociology researches shows that following witchcraft social cohesion improves (Hamilton & Rauma, 1995). Following in part McKirnan (1980), informational influence is related to the structural aspect of social norm, that is the cognitive core content and distinctivennes of behavior and traits associated to the group. Informational influence and prototypical information are the “external” and internal side of this social processes. Normative influence is related to the range and evaluative component of the norm. The range of variation of trait and behavior around the prototype mean that norm are conceived of as latitude of aceptable behaviour and characteristics. This aspect is associated to the evaluative component.i.e. elicitation of affective reaction and regulatory responses when norms are violated. Normative influence is the external version and prescriptive cognitions are the internal side of this processes. Informational influence requires only cold self categorization and differenciation, and normative influence requires affective and value ladden social identification, occurring when informational influence is established (polarization et normes). This may be an explanation of what occurs at the emotional- cognitive level in the small group research. In line with recent reinterpretations of this process by authors like (Hogg, 1992; Hogg and Abrams, 1988) and Turner (1990; Turner and Hogg, 1987), we argued that findings in small group behaviour, including rejection of group deviates, can be more parsimoniously assigned to a basic process of social attraction and referent informational influence, than to interpersonal attraction between group members, or, to the classic processes of informational and normative influence -the basic antecedents of group behaviour traditionally accepted by the “social cohesion” approach. Indeed, because in the black sheep effect studies, subjects reject deviate ingroup members without prior interpersonal acquaintance or face-to-face interaction, this rejection cannot be assigned to interpersonal attraction or similarity as accepted by traditional “group-cohesion approach” (cf Hogg, 1992). However, we think that a categorization per se, being an important step, is not enough. In fact, facing a black sheep subjects are forced to became immerged in a mini group crisis and conflict. This crisis elicits creative cognitive process aimed to solve not uncertainty reduction task, but to mantain a satisfactory collective self-esteem. 1 In this vein, we argued that self-stereotyping would generate two basic phenomena: first, it would increase the perception of group homogeneity to an extreme, since the representation of the group would amount but to a prototype; second, and as a consequence, the individual’s perceptual field would be engulfed by the single and absolute goal of maintaining or enhancing social identity. Therefore, social identity would become a subjective group rationale, i.e. the group’s unique and absolute reason of existence from the individual’s standpoint. This would generate a state of perceived absolute interdependence as particular phenomenological relationship between the self and the ingroup. Absolute Interdependence and Subjective Control Such a relationship would, in turn, motivate the individual to exert subjective control over ingroup members in order to sustain a sense of legitimacy of the ingroup’s superior position relative to other groups. A threat to such legitimacy, and hence to the self, would arise with any perceived lack of conformity within the ingroup in light of the relevant ingroup standards. As a result, people would attempt to subjectively exert control over ingroup members, especially over those who threaten the overall positiveness of the group and its relative superiority over the outgroup: “self- stereotyping encompasses a perceived interdependence between the individual and the ingroup members, in defining the social self according to [ingroup] stereotypical standards. Clearly, the only "group goal" one can reasonably think of in these circumstances, is the maintenance or the enhancement of social identity. That is, if social categorisation entails a sense of interdependence between the self and the representation of other ingroup members, then the perception of social desirability of any ingroup member would contribute towards a positive social identity. This would explain approval of likable ingroup members as found by studies on the black sheep effect. Concomitantly, one may suppose that those ingroup members who do not attune to the standard levels necessary to promote a favourable self-definition, become embarrassing, and instigate aversive reactions. To summarize, in the case of the cognitive group, whereas upgrading likable ingroup members would come as a subjective reward, derogation of unlikable ingroup members would fulfill a function similar to that fulfilled by pressures towards uniformity in the case of small groups” (Marques and Paez, 1994, pp.60-61) or to witchtcrafts in middle ages societies (Hamilton & Rauma, 1995). In brief, self-categorization, referent informational influence, and perceived absolute interdependence among ingroup representatives, would trigger a cognitive representation, or an “implicit theory” of group processes in the individual’s mind. This is why we proposed the notion of “group dynamics of the mind” to draw a parallel between the black sheep effect as a subjective active, not passive, process of “reward” of socially desirable ingroup members and “punishment” of socially undesirable ones, and the similar process traditionally observed in small-group research, wherein people reject or derogate group members who deviate from the group mainstream. As can be