MARINE INVESTIGATION REPORT M12W0207 STRIKING OF TERMINAL BULK CARRIER CAPE APRICOT ROBERTS BANK, BRITISH COLUMBIA 07 DECEMBER 2012 The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) investigated this occurrence for the purpose of advancing transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability. Marine Investigation Report M12W0207 Striking of Terminal Bulk Carrier Cape Apricot Roberts Bank, British Columbia 07 December 2012 Summary On 07 December 2012 at 0045 Pacific Standard Time the bulk carrier Cape Apricot, while under the conduct of a pilot, struck the causeway and conveyor system connecting Westshore Terminals berth 1 to the main terminal at Roberts Bank, British Columbia. As a result of the impact, the causeway and conveyor collapsed into the water, and the vessel’s bow sustained damage. There was minor pollution and no injuries. Ce rapport est également disponible en français. - 2 - Factual Information Particulars of the Vessel Name of vessel Cape Apricot IMO number 9311828 Port of registry Panama Flag Panama Type Bulk carrier Gross tonnage 90 091 Length1 288.93 m Draught at time of occurrence Forward: 6.99 m Aft: 8.80 m Built 2004, Koyo Dockyard Co. Ltd., Japan Propulsion 1 main engine (17 700 kW) driving a fixed propeller Cargo Ballast Crew 22 Registered owner Leo Ocean SA, Japan Manager Tokei Kaiun KK, Japan Description of the Vessel The Cape Apricot is a gearless bulk carrier2 built of steel with the machinery spaces and accommodation aft (see Photo 1Error! Reference source not found.). The vessel has 9 cargo holds and hatches. A bulbous bow encloses the forepeak water ballast tank, and a collision bulkhead segregates the forepeak from the cargo holds. The bridge is equipped with the Photo 1. Cape Apricot required navigational equipment, 1 Units of measurement in this report conform to International Maritime Organization Standards or, where there is no such standard, are expressed in the International System of units. 2 A gearless bulk carrier is a vessel that is not equipped with loading or unloading equipment. - 3 - including an automatic identification system (AIS)3 and 3 cm and 10 cm radars with automatic radar plotting aid (ARPA) capability. The steering stand is located on the centreline of the vessel. On the port side of the steering stand is a console that includes the bridge telegraph. The vessel is also fitted with a voyage data recorder (VDR). Westshore Terminals Limited Westshore Terminals Limited is a coal export facility located on Roberts Bank, a man-made island (see Photo 2) situated in the Strait of Georgia near the Tsawwassen ferry terminal south of Vancouver, BC. A container facility, known as Deltaport, is also located on Roberts Bank. Photo 2. Aerial view of Roberts Bank (photo: Westshore Terminals) Westshore Terminals Limited exports coal from 2 berths. Berth 1 is connected to the main terminal via a trestle that supports both a causeway and coal conveyor system. The trestle is comprised of piles that are located at intervals of 18.29 m and joined together by pile caps. It extends into the water from the southwestern corner of Roberts Bank. Berth 2 is located on the 3 An AIS is an automated system that transmits and receives information from other vessels and shore- based stations. - 4 - island itself. Westshore Terminals Limited is designed to export 33 million tonnes of coal per year. The highest export year was 2012, when 33 million tonnes was exported. History of the Voyage On 03 December 2012, the Cape Apricot arrived in ballast at Constance Bank anchorage off Victoria, BC, awaiting a berth at Roberts Bank in order to load coal. On 06 December, Westshore Terminals berth 2 became available for the Cape Apricot, and the vessel commenced heaving anchor at 20204 to depart for the Brotchie pilot station in Victoria to pick up the pilot.5 On the bridge were the master, the third officer acting as officer of the watch (OOW), and a helmsman. After the pilot boarded the vessel at 2102, he and the master exchanged information about the intended berthing manoeuvre at Westshore Terminals berth 2, which entailed the tugs joining the vessel outside the basin, making a starboard turn, entering the basin and then using tugs to turn the vessel off the berth. The master-pilot exchange card and the pilot card were completed and signed by both the master and pilot. Following the master-pilot exchange, the pilot set up his portable pilot unit (PPU) in order to monitor the vessel’s progress. The vessel continued its voyage, passing East Point at 2327 and exiting Boundary Pass at 2335. During the passage, the port anchor was prepared for use in case of an emergency. As the Cape Apricot entered the Strait of Georgia, the pilot steadied up on a course of 325° gyro (G) for a direct approach to Westshore Terminals, which was 13.3 nautical miles (nm) ahead.6 At approximately 2345, the pilot attempted to contact the tugs at Roberts Bank to inform them the Cape Apricot would be 15 minutes ahead of schedule; he used various channels7 on the very high frequency (VHF) radiotelephone but was unsuccessful in making contact. As the Cape Apricot approached Point Roberts, the pilot gave notice for manoeuvring speed in order to slow the vessel down and, at 0022, he ordered half ahead. Three tugs were scheduled to assist the Cape Apricot for berthing: the Seaspan Resolution, the Seaspan Osprey, and the C.H. Cates VII, which was to assist with mooring lines. At 0023, the Seaspan Resolution and the C.H. Cates VII departed the tug basin to meet the vessel, at which time the pilot was able to contact the Seaspan Resolution and communicate his intentions. At 0031, the vessel was approximately 1.4 nm SSE of the Westshore Terminals trestle when the pilot ordered the engine to be stopped. At 0035, the third tug, the Seaspan Osprey, departed the tug basin to meet the vessel. By 0038, the Cape Apricot was south of buoy T2,8 its bow was 4 All times are Pacific Standard Time (Coordinated Universal Time minus 8 hours), unless otherwise stated. 5 See Appendix A for the Cape Apricot’s route between the Constance Bank anchorage and Roberts Bank. 6 The average speed over the ground up to that time had been 15.3 knots. 7 The pilot made calls on VHF channel 76A (Roberts Bank), channel 17 (used by pilots), and channel 65A (Seaspan dispatch). 8 The entrance to the Roberts Bank basin is buoyed. For inbound vessels, buoys T1 and T2 are located on the port and starboard sides of the basin respectively. - 5 - 5.2 cables from the trestle (Figure 1) and the Seaspan Resolution was at the stern. At this time, the vessel’s speed was 5.4 knots and the heading was 327°G. Approximately 1 to 3 minutes later, when the vessel was between 1.9 to 0.5 cables from the transit leading into the basin,9 the pilot ordered the rudder hard to starboard, but the vessel’s response was minimal. At the time of the order, the rudder was already hard to starboard. At 0040, the pilot made a call on his mobile phone. Figure 1. Cape Apricot’s progress towards berth 2, and tugs’ positions at 0042 By 0042, the Seaspan Resolution’s line was made fast on the Cape Apricot’s stern and the pilot ordered the slack to be taken out of the line. The C.H. Cates VII was standing by. The Seaspan Osprey was alongside the port shoulder of the Cape Apricot, approximately 1 minute later, at which time it was requested to push easy10 by the pilot. The bridge of the Cape Apricot then crossed the transit and the pilot ordered the Seaspan Resolution to pull half, straight astern. At approximately 0044, as the Seaspan Osprey was pushing the Cape Apricot, the tug’s master noticed the trestle being illuminated by the tug’s deck lights. He then used the VHF radiotelephone to contact the pilot and warn him that the Cape Apricot was getting close to the trestle. Around the same time, the chief officer, who was stationed for line handling on the Cape 9 For inbound vessels, the transit is on a bearing of 032°T. 10 Tug orders generally state the direction and degree of force that is to be applied (idle, easy, half, and full). - 6 - Apricot’s bow, informed the master that the trestle was approximately 50 m from the vessel’s bow. When the Seaspan Osprey master warned the pilot of the vessel’s proximity to the trestle a second time, the pilot ordered the Seaspan Resolution to pull full in the astern direction and the Seaspan Osprey to push full. Either shortly before or during the last communication, the pilot ordered dead slow astern on the main engine and then gave orders of slow, half, and full astern within the next 30 seconds. At 0045 the Cape Apricot struck the trestle on a heading of 344° True (T) at a speed of approximately 3.5 knots. The master of the Seaspan Osprey had backed off the Cape Apricot shortly beforehand in order to avoid damage to his own vessel. A 128 m section of the trestle collapsed upon impact, and the vessel proceeded about 35 m through the way of the trestle before coming to a stop. Through a combination of engine movements and assistance from the tugs, the Cape Apricot backed out of the trestle at approximately 0048 and pulled out to the basin in order to proceed to berth 2. The vessel turned off berth 2 with the assistance of the tugs and docked at 0245. Damage to the Vessel Damage to the bow section of the Cape Apricot was limited to the forepeak tank. A survey by the classification society carried out following the occurrence identified the following: • a dent on the stem plate between frames 327 and 331 • buckling on 3 side longitudinals, which also extended to the associated stiffeners and No. 2 port stringer between frames 327 and 331 • a dent on the stem plate located above the No. 2 port stringer between frames 322 and 326. Damage to the Terminal Damage to the terminal was extensive; approximately 128 m (6 pile sections) of the causeway to berth 1 collapsed into the water, and the damage to the coal conveyor system extended approximately 145 m (see Photo 3 and Photo 4). Furthermore, services to berth 1 (including electrical power and fresh water) were cut off at the time of the striking, rendering the berth temporarily inoperable. A quantity of coal, estimated at less than 30 tonnes, also entered the water. - 7 - Photo 3. Trestle seen from the basin looking Photo 4. Trestle and conveyor belt seen from towards berth 1 berth 2 The berth was back in service 2 months later and repairs to the causeway were completed in late April 2013. Personnel Certification and Experience The crew of the Cape Apricot were all certified for their positions on board. The master had 12 years of experience as a deck officer and had made his first voyage as chief officer in 2008. He had been promoted to the position of master in November 2011 when he joined the Cape Apricot. The master had received bridge resource management (BRM) training in the Philippines. He had not previously docked at Westshore Terminals. The OOW had been sailing as a deckhand and apprentice since 2001 and obtained his certificate as officer in charge of a navigational watch in March 2012. He had joined the Cape Apricot as a deckhand in April 2012 and had been promoted to third officer in September 2012. The helmsman had been sailing since 2009 and joined the Cape Apricot as a helmsman in April 2012. The pilot on the Cape Apricot had obtained his licence as Pilot, Class II in 1993. In 1994, he obtained his Class I, Unrestricted licence. Since June 2009, the pilot had docked 4 other similar types of vessels from the same direction (southerly approach) at Westshore Terminals berth 2, and he had docked 21 vessels at other berths at Roberts Bank. The pilot had completed a BRM course and held a valid medical certificate. Vessel Certification The Cape Apricot was certificated and equipped in accordance with existing regulations. Environmental Conditions The weather around the time of the occurrence was overcast with occasional rain. The visibility was good and, in the hour preceding the striking, the wind was veering from SSE to SSW at 16 knots near Roberts Bank. The current off Roberts Bank runs along the shoreline and follows the general direction of the Strait of Georgia; as such, an ebbing current sets to the southeast and a flooding current to the northwest. The speed of the current is affected by the mixed semidiurnal tides.11 While the Cape 11 A mixed semidiurnal tide means that the area experiences 2 high tides and 2 low tides of different sizes each lunar day. - 8 - Apricot was transiting from East Point, the current was primarily in a northwesterly direction, but it turned to a southeasterly direction just after midnight.12 Vessel Manoeuvring Characteristics The vessel’s manoeuvring information on the bridge indicated that, for a starboard turn made under normal ballast conditions with maximum rudder angle and the engine half ahead (41 revolutions per minute), the vessel’s advance would be 743 m (or 4.0 cables) and the transfer would be 402 m at 90° heading change (Figure 2). If the heading change was less than 90° or if the Figure 2. Cape Apricot turning circle rudder angle or engine orders differed from the ones specified above, the transfer and advance distances would be affected. The diagram supplied with the Cape Apricot was not sufficiently detailed to measure these values. When compared to other bulk carriers of a similar size, for a heading change of 65°, the advance value would be between 80 to 92 percent of the 90° course change value. Approaches to Westshore Terminals Berth 2 Approaches to Roberts Bank are determined by local pilots based on various factors such as the type of vessel, the berth to be used, environmental conditions (i.e., wind and current), the availability of tugs, and other vessel traffic information. Three tugs are on hand at Roberts Bank to assist with vessel movements. They are stationed in the tug basin near Deltaport. Generally, when a vessel scheduled to berth at Westshore Terminals requires the assistance of tugs, the tugs are ordered and a crew is assigned. Once the crew is on board, the tugs then monitor the AIS for the inbound vessel’s arrival time. Pilots can also communicate directly with the tugs through VHF radiotelephone. Ordinarily, tugs join incoming vessels that are bound for berth 2 outside the basin and west of buoys T1 and T2, but they sometimes join as late as inside the basin. In order to compare the Cape Apricot’s approach with other approaches to Westshore Terminals berth 2, the Transportation Safety Board (TSB) obtained AIS tracks for 35 of the 44 vessels that had docked there between 30 November 2011 and December 2012.13 For each approach, environmental information (wind and current) was collected. The 35 tracks were then plotted to 12 The tide turns around 1 hour after high water at Point Atkinson, located 19 nm NNW of Roberts Bank. High tide at Point Atkinson was at 2322 on 06 December 2012. 13 The tracks of 9 vessels were eliminated from the comparison, either because AIS information was unavailable or because the vessels had to be kept off the berth to make way for a departing vessel. - 9 - show the different approaches to berth 2 (see Figure 3). Of these 35 approaches, 6 were made in environmental conditions (wind and current) similar14 to those experienced by the Cape Apricot around the time of the occurrence. The Cape Apricot’s track was the closest track to Point Roberts, meaning that it required the largest change of course in order to enter the basin on the transit. The data included also 1 other approach made by the same pilot while on board a bulk carrier of the same type as the Cape Apricot. Figure 3. Southerly approaches to Westshore Terminals berth 2 (original map and vessel track information from Shipfinder.co; compilation of vessel tracks by TSB) 14 The wind direction was within 30° and the current was within 0.5 knots of that experienced by the Cape Apricot.