Margin of appreciation in context of freedom of religion (Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights) in the interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights by Nilufar Shahpanahi (LLM program) A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of LLM Graduate Department of Faculty of Law University of Toronto @ Copyright by Nilufar Shahpanahi 2011 Abastract Margin of appreciation in context of freedom of religion (Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights) in the interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights LLM 2011 Nilufar Shahpanahi Graduate Department of Faculty of Law University of Toronto This thesis addresses numerous key points on the application of the margin of appreciation principle in relation to Article 9 (2) of the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ('Convention').1 In general terms, the margin of appreciation doctrine means that the State is allowed a certain measure of discretion, subject to European supervision, when it takes legislative, administrative, or judicial action in the area of a Convention right.2 The margin of appreciation is given to Contracting States to allow variation amongst them in terms of interpretation of the rights guaranteed.3 1 Carolyn Evans: Freedom of religion under the European Courts of Human Rights; Oxford University Press. 2001 p. 51. 2 Harris, O'Boyle & Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on Human Rights 2nd. edition, Oxford University Press, 2009. p. 11. 3 Jill Marshall: Personal Freedom through Human Rights Law? Martinus, Nijhoff Publishers 2009. p. 42. ii Table of contents 1. .......................................................................................................................... Tabl e of contents ............................................................................................................. 2 2. .......................................................................................................................... Intro duction ..................................................................................................................... 3 3. .......................................................................................................................... Defi nition and the origins of the margin of appreciation ................................................ 4 4. .......................................................................................................................... Main characteristics and the scope of the doctrine ............................................................ 8 5. .......................................................................................................................... 5 stage process of the margin of appreciation in terms of freedom of religion ....... 18 5.1. ................................................................................................................. "Pres cribed by law" ............................................................................................... 20 5.2. ................................................................................................................. Legit imate aims ..................................................................................................... 22 5.3. ................................................................................................................. "Nec essary in a democratic society" ...................................................................... 28 5.3.1. ........................................................................................................... Neut rality and impartiality 28 5.3.2. ........................................................................................................... Pluralism, secularism 31 iii 5.3.3. ........................................................................................................... Relig ious symbols and identity 40 5.4. Proportionality ................................................................................................ 46 6. Variables determining the scope of the margin of appreciation in case of freedom of religion ............................................................................................... 47 7. The width of the margin of appreciation, general policy, conclusion ................................51 iv 1. Introduction This thesis addresses numerous key points on the application of the margin of appreciation principle in relation to Article 9 (2) of the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ('Convention').4 In general terms, the margin of appreciation doctrine means that the State is allowed a certain measure of discretion, subject to European supervision, when it takes legislative, administrative, or judicial action in the area of a Convention right.5 The margin of appreciation is given to Contracting States to allow variation amongst them in terms of interpretation of the rights guaranteed.6 Underlying the doctrine is the understanding that the legislative, executive and judicial organs of a state party to the Convention basically operate in conformity with the rule of law and human rights and that their assessment of the national situation in cases that go to Strasbourg can be relied upon.7 The margin of appreciation doctrine has many manifestations in the Convention (e.g. see Article 5 and 6 and 14; it has been instrumental as well in the Application of Article 15 when deciding whether there is public emergency), however that of Article 9 is considered to be relevant in this paper. First I will provide a general overview of the margin of appreciation doctrine (definition, underlying motive, scope, critique, main traits) then, I will elaborate and analyze the application of the margin of appreciation approach specifically in context of Article 9 (and all of its pre-conditions) involving the case law as well. 4 Carolyn Evans: Freedom of religion under the European Courts of Human Rights; Oxford University Press. 2001 p. 51. 5 Harris, O'Boyle & Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on Human Rights 2nd. edition, Oxford University Press, 2009. p. 11. 6 Jill Marshall: Personal Freedom through Human Rights Law? Martinus, Nijhoff Publishers 2009. p. 42. 7 Harris, O'Boyle & Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on Human Rights 2nd. edition, Oxford University Press, 2009. p. 14. 1 If we look at Articles 8-11 of the Convention, we can see that the rights guaranteed and protected (e.g. freedom of religion, freedom of expression) shall be limited and interference with the exercise thereof is allowed on specific grounds related to public interest, stipulated in paragraph (2) of each Article. 2. Definition and the origins of the margin of appreciation The national margin of appreciation can be defined in the Convention context as the freedom to act; maneuvering, breathing or 'elbow room',8 or the latitude of deference or error which the Strasbourg organs will allow to national legislative, executive, administrative, and judicial bodies before it is prepared to declare a national derogation from the Convention, or restriction or limitation upon a right guaranteed by the Convention If we take a look at what the margin of appreciation doctrine literally means we can see that according to the Oxford English Dictionary 'appreciation' means the 'perception of delicate impressions or distinctions'. A margin in its sense is defined as 'the limit below or beyond which something ceases to be possible or desirable.' It would appear to us at first glance that the margin is the latitude allowed to the States in striking a balance between a right guaranteed by the Convention and a permitted derogation. Despite the relatively long historical development of the margin of appreciation doctrine in Convention terms and its antecedents in the jurisprudence of the domestic courts of States, it is nevertheless surprisingly difficult to define the margin of appreciation, let alone its precise boundaries. The origins of the margin doctrine lie in the administrative review jurisprudence of the French Conseil d'Etat and equivalent continental institutions, and in martial law. The French 8 Lockwood: Working Paper for the Committee of Experts on the Limitations Provisions in Human Rights Quarterly 35,68,1984. 2 notion of the 'marge d'appréciation' can be compared to the German principles of 'Beurteilungspielraum'. The first category of cases to which the margin principle has been applied are those dealing with national derogations from Convention guarantees in emergency situations under Article 15.9 After the 'Lawless Case' both the Commission and the European Court of Human Rights ('Court) began the incorporation of margin doctrine into their non-emergency case analysis, focusing it most particularly on the Articles containing express limitation clauses qualifying the rights and freedoms guaranteed (primarily Articles 8-11.) The margin doctrine was born into Convention jurisprudence in the Commission Report in the Cyprus cases. In Greece v. United Kingdom, applications were lodged with the Commission alleging multiple violations of Convention provisions by the United Kingdom, which was then administering the island of Cyprus. United Kingdom pleaded Article 15 of the convention, allowing States to derogate from Convention provisions in case a public emergency threatens the life of a nation. The question was raised as to what were the powers of the Commission, when a State, invoking Article 15, departed from the obligations laid down in the Convention. The Commission held that it was "competent to pronounce on the existence of a public danger which, under Article 15, would grant to the Contracting Party concerned the right to derogate from the obligations laid down in the Convention." The Commission also considered that it was "competent to decide whether measures taken by a Party under Article 15 of the Convention had been taken to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the 9 Howard Charles Yourow: The margin of appreciation doctrine in the dynamics of European Human Rights Jurisprudence 1996. Kluver Academics Publishers p.12. 3 situation....The Government should be able to exercise a certain measure of discretion in assessing the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation."10 Since the Belgian Linguistic case11, both the Commission and the Court have wrestled with the incorporation of the national margin principles, which emerged in the early derogation cases into their jurisprudence in other types of cases. These cases may be organized into three subject matter categories: a) Criminal and Civil Due Process cases arising under Articles 5 and 6; "Personal Freedoms" cases, with sub-categories arising under Articles 8- 11; and Discrimination cases arising under Article 14. The other important aspect of the Belgian Linguistic case is how the principles of supervisory function and main analysis are applied. Through this case, the margin doctrine entered into the Court's consideration of the 'Personal Freedoms' Articles, thus becoming an important standard in the Court's repertoire. The Court never bridges its use of the margin doctrine in these cases by linking it to its foundations, martial law and review of admininstrative discretion in the French Conseil d'Etat and equivalent institutions in other continental states. The original use of the doctrine within Article 15 derogation context, clearly an exceptional situation bearing little resemblance to the kinds of "ordinary" rights restriction situations envisaged in the operation of the "Personal Freedoms" Article. The second important methodological mainstay to emerge from Belgian Linguistic is the place of the principle of proportionality, and its relation to other of the Court's tests.With regard to the development of the general supervisory function, note the linkage of legitimate aim of state action (reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realized to "regard to the principles...in democratic societies...".) 10 Greece v. United Kingdom, 2 Yearbook of the European Convention 174-199. 176, 1958-59. 11 Belgian Linguistic case 1 EHRR 252 (1968) 4 These are the very components of supervisory function and margin doctrine analysis which come into prominent play on all of the "Personal Freedoms" articles cases which follow. Judge Wold in his dissenting opinion in the Belgian Linguistic case argues that every human right granted by the Convention must be the same in all the contracting States. The right to education (Belgian Linguistic case revolves around that) must have exactly he same content in all the Member States which have ratified the Convention. The majority opinion contravenes this basic aim of the Convention when it states that human right of education " by its very nature calls for regulation by the State, regulation which may vary in time and place according to the needs and resources of the community and he individuals." This demonstrates that the majority view goes outside the scope of the Convention. Judge Wold remarks that it would be a very dangerous road to embark upon if the articles of the Convention were to be interpreted in such a way as to allow the member States to regulate the human rights "according to the needs and resources of the community." Judge Wold holds the view that such interpretation can not be accepted. I strongly disagree with this interpretation. In my opinion, it carries the Court into questions of each Member State. Judge Wold has pointed out that "it is true that the competent national authorities are frequently confronted with situations and problems which call for different legal solutions. But this fact has no relevance when we are interpreting the content of the different concepts of human rights in the Convention. We can not have different concepts of human rights in the different member States. That applies ...to all the..concepts of the Convention...(which) must be interpreted in the same way for all European states. We must find a "European" interpretation.12 12 Belgian Linguistic case 1 EHRR 351. (1968) 5 3. Main characteristics and the scope of the doctrine The doctrine was first explained by the Court in Handyside v. UK.13 The doctrine has been first manifested in relation of Article 10 (2), and since then the application thereof has been extended to other Convention Articles as well, such as Article 9. The foregoing case has concerned a restriction on freedom of expression. The Court had to consider whether a conviction for possessing an obscene article could be justified in virtue of Article 10 (2) as a limitation on freedom of expression, which was necessary for the 'protection of morals'. The Court stated: "....state authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of those requirements (of morals) as well as on the 'necessity' of a 'restriction' or 'penalty' intended to meet them...Nevertheless, Article 10 (2) does not give Contracting States an unlimited power of appreciation. The Court ... is empowered to give the final ruling on whether a 'restriction' or 'penalty' is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10. The domestic margin of appreciation thus goes hand in hand with European supervision."14 Why need supervision? Deeply rooted historical and cultural differences separate countries constituting the parties of the Convention. The Nordic and Mediterranean mentalities are powerful factors setting out the diversities prevalent in European national legal systems which must be acknowledged by the Convention. The incorporation of of newly freed Central and Eastern European nations formerly in the Soviet sphere may bring about East-West fault lines within the Council's 13 Handyside v. UK A 24 (1976); 1 EHRR 737 14 Handyside v. UK A 24 (1976); 1 EHRR 737 paras 48-49. 6