This book is the first to offer a detailed analysis of Aristotelian and Kantian ethics together in a way that remains faithful to the texts and responsive to debates in contemporary ethics. Recent moral philosophy has seen a revival of interest in the concept of virtue, and with it a reassessment of the role of virtue in the work of Aristotle and Kant. This book brings that reassess- ment to a new level of sophistication. Nancy Sherman argues that Kant preserves a notion of virtue in his moral theory that bears recognizable traces of the Aristotelian and Stoic traditions, and that his complex anthropology of morals brings him into surpris- ing alliance with Aristotle. She develops her argument through close readings of major texts by both Aristotle and Kant, illustrat- ing points of congruence and contrast. While scrupulously focusing on textual details the book pre- sents a dialogue between Aristotle and Kant that sheds light on contemporary debates about the importance in any account of moral judgment of general principles, on the one hand, and a grasp of particulars on the other. She also argues for the signifi- cant role emotions play in both the Kantian and the Aristotelian accounts of moral agency. Making a Necessity of Virtue Making a Necessity of Virtue Aristotle and Kant on Virtue NANCY SHERMAN Georgetown University CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, CB2 IRP CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, United Kingdom 40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA 10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, Australia © Nancy Sherman 1997 This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 1997 Typset in Palatino Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Sherman, Nancy, 1951- Making a necessity of virtue : Aristotle and Kant on virtue / Nancy Sherman. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-521-56383-6 (hardcover). - ISBN 0-521-56487-5 (pbk.) 1. Aristotle - Ethics. 2. Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 - Ethics. I. Title. B491.E7S44 1996 179'.9 - dc20 96-26314 CIP A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 0-521-56383-6 Hardback ISBN 0-521-56487-5 Paperback Transferred to digital printing 2004 To Marshall, Kala, and Jonathan Contents Preface and Acknowledgments page xi Abbreviations and Notes on Translations xiv Chapter 1 A New Dialogue 1 1 The Framing Questions 5 2 Activity, Agency, and External Goods: Aristotle, the Stoics, and Kant 9 3 A Brief Overview 20 Chapter 2 The Emotional Structure cf Aristotelian Virtue 24 1 Opening a Dialogue on the Emotions 24 2 The Alleged Problem with Emotions 28 3 How Emotions Figure in Morality 39 4 Aristotelian Emotions 52 5 Emotions and Their Relation to Choice 75 6 Cultivating Emotions 83 7 Cultivating Emotions Through Music and Tragedy 89 8 Virtue and Nonconflictual Emotions 93 Chapter 3 A Brief Stoic Interlude 99 1 Against Aristotelian Moderation 101 2 Stoic Therapy 107 3 Stoic Apathy and Kantian Antisentimentalism 116 Chapter 4 The Passional Underpinnings of Kantian Virtue 121 1 Some Background 121 vii Contents 2 Morality's Foundation and Moral Anthropology 127 3 Kantian Virtue 135 4 The Cultivation of Emotions as Supports for Duty 141 5 Virtue as a Structured Composite 158 6 In What Sense Are We Agents of Our Emotional Experience? 164 7 Respect as a Distinctive Moral Emotion 175 8 A Few Comparative Notes 181 Chapter 5 The Shared Voyage 187 1 Doing Things Together 188 2 Aristotelian Friendship and Shared Activity 199 3 Friendship and Its Place in Good Living 208 4 Wider Altruism 217 5 Kant and Friendship 224 6 The Ethical Commonwealth as a Social Goal 233 Chapter 6 Aristotelian Particularism 239 1 Brief Remarks on Practical Reason and "Habituated" Virtue 241 2 Aristotelian Particularism: A Start 243 3 Emotions as Evaluative 248 4 Perception and Intuitionism 254 5 Rules and Practical Insight 262 6 The Practical Syllogism Revisited 276 Chapter 7 Making Room for Practical Wisdom in Kantian Ethics 284 1 Some Roles for the Categorical Imperative 289 2 The Content of Maxims 294 3 Kantian Universalizability 305 4 Kantian "Reflective" Deliberation 311 5 Comparing Aristotle and Kant on Judgment and Deliberation 325 Chapter 8 Perfecting Kantian Virtue: Discretionary Latitude and Superlative Virtue 331 1 How Demanding is Kantian Virtue? 331 vin