Duel18COVER.qxd:DUE 13 COVER 18/6/09 16:19 Page 1 D U E L This is the account of the machines of war pitted against each other (cid:129) 1 and the combatants who operated them. Step onto the battlefield 8 OSPREY and immerse yourself in the experience of real historic combat. DUEL M 1 Engage the Enemy A B R M1 ABRAMS A M S T-72 URAL VS T - Operation Desert Storm 1991 7 2 U R The Cold War saw many clashes between Soviet- and US-built tanks, A L but few were as devastating as the fighting in the deserts of Iraq in 1991. The M1A1 Abrams was perhaps the world’s most modern tank, M1 ABRAMS its latest version barely two years old. Its great Cold War rival, the Soviet T-72, was the mainstay of the Red Army, and its export version was the best tank that Iraq’s Republican Guard could boast. But it was hampered by second-rate sights and ammunition, as well as by inadequately trained crews, and Iraq’s best armored formations were destroyed wholesale by the tanks of the US Army. Featuring expert T-72 URAL technical analysis and an in-depth account from an M1A1 officer who fought the Iraqi T-72s, this is a fascinating account of modern armor at war. Operation Desert Storm 1991 Color artwork Photographs Unrivaled detail Maps and cutaway artwork S O T SPREY US $17.95 UK £12.99 E V PUBLISHING CAN $19.95 E ISBN 978-1-84603-407-7 N 5 1 7 9 5 J . Z A L O G 9 781846 034077 A O S P STEVEN J. ZALOGA WWW.OSPREYPUBLISHING.COM R E Y © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com DUE018correx2.qxd:Layout 1 15/4/09 11:41 Page 1 M1 ABRAMS T-72 URAL OPERATION DESERT STORM 1991 STEVEN J. ZALOGA © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com DUE018correx2.qxd:Layout 1 18/6/09 15:59 Page 2 Editor’sNote FirstpublishedinGreatBritainin2009byOspreyPublishing, MidlandHouse,WestWay,Botley,Oxford,OX20PH,UK Foreaseofcomparisonpleaserefertothefollowing 443ParkAvenueSouth,NewYork,NY10016,USA conversiontable: E-mail:[email protected] 1mile=1.6km ©2009OspreyPublishingLtd. 1lb=0.45kg Allrightsreserved.Apartfromanyfairdealingforthepurposeofprivatestudy,research, 1yd=0.9m criticismorreview,aspermittedundertheCopyright,DesignsandPatentsAct,1988,nopart ofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedinaretrievalsystem,ortransmittedinanyform 1ft=0.3m orbyanymeans,electronic,electrical,chemical,mechanical,optical,photocopying,recording 1in=2.54cm/25.4mm orotherwise,withoutthepriorwrittenpermissionofthecopyrightowner.Inquiriesshouldbe addressedtothePublishers. 1gal=4.5liters ACIPcatalogrecordforthisbookisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary 1ton(US)=0.9tonnes PrintISBN9781846034329 Author’sNote PDFe-bookISBN9781846038761 TheauthorwouldliketothankProfMarkGergesofthe Pagelayoutby:KenVailGraphicDesign USArmy’sCommandandGeneralStaffCollegeforhis IndexbyAlanThatcher extensivehelpinrecountinghisexperiencesasanM1A1 TypesetinITCConduitandAdobeGaramond AbramstankcompanycommanderduringOperation MapsbyBounford.com DesertStorm.IfirstmetMarkmorethandecadeagowhen OriginatedbyPDQDigitalMediaSoloution Iattendedhislectureaboutthe1stArmoredDivisionin PrintedinChinathroughBookbuilders DesertStorm,sponsoredbytheNewYorkMilitaryAffairs Symposium.Hehadrecentlyreturnedfromserviceinthe 09 1011 12 13 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 GulfWarandhadbeenassignedtoteachhistoryatthe OspreyPublishingaresupportingtheWoodlandTrust,theUK'sleadingwoodlandconservation nearbyUSMilitaryAcademyatWestPoint.Besides charity,byfundingthededicationoftrees. describinghisexperiencesasatankcompanycommander totheNYMASaudience,heshowedavideotapetaken byhisunitrecordingthebattleofMedinaRidge.This videotapeleftaconsiderableimpressiononmeasthe clearestexpositionofthenatureofcontemporarytank warfareIhadeverseen.Thebattlefieldwasutterlyempty windsweptdesert;theIraqitanksweremorethan2km awayandinvisibletothenakedeye.Theonlyevidence oftheirpresencecamepartwayintothetapewhensmall flashesdottedthehorizon,followedbybarelyvisible plumesofsmoke.ItwashardlytheHollywooddepiction ofmodernwar.SoIwasverypleasedwhenMarkagreed tohelpoutandrecounthisexperiencesonceagainforthis book.IwouldalsoliketothankJohnCharvat,Stephen “Cookie”SewellandLeeNessfortheirhelponthisproject. FORACATALOGUEOFALLBOOKSPUBLISHEDBYOSPREY MILITARYANDAVIATIONPLEASECONTACT: OspreyDirect,c/oRandomHouseDistributionCenter, 400HahnRoad,Westminster,MD21157 Email:[email protected] ©OspreyPublishing.Accesstothisbookisnotdigitallyrestricted.Inre- turn,weaskyouthatyouuseitforpersonal,non-commercialpurposesonly. OspreyDirect,TheBookServiceLtd,DistributionCentre, Pleasedon’tuploadthispdftoapeer-to-peersite,emailittoeveryoneyou know,orresellit.OspreyPublishingreservesallrightstoitsdigitalcontent ColchesterRoad,FratingGreen,Colchester,Essex,CO77DW andnopartoftheseproductsmaybecopied,storedinaretrievalsystemor E-mail:[email protected] transmittedinanyformbyanymeans,electronic,mechanical,recordingor otherwise(exceptaspermittedhere),withoutthewrittenpermissionofthe www.ospreypublishing.com publisher. Pleasesupportourcontinuingbookpublishingprogrammeby usingthispdfresponsibly. © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com DUE018correx2.qxd:Layout 1 15/4/09 11:41 Page 3 CONTENTS Introduction 4 Chronology 8 Design and Development 10 Technical Specification 25 The Combatants 42 The Strategic Situation 51 The Campaign 60 Analysis 76 Bibliography 78 Index 80 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com DUE018correx2.qxd:Layout 1 15/4/09 11:41 Page 4 INTRODUCTION The Cold War never turned hot, so the intriguing question remains: “How would NATO tanks have stacked up against Warsaw Pact tanks?” Other conflicts, fought away from the main theater, may hint at the answer. Operation Desert Storm of February 1991 provided a fascinating example of modern US versus Soviet-built tanks in action. This conflict was not a perfect surrogate for a NATO–Warsaw Pact clash since the latter had better tanks than the Iraqi T-72M1 and Warsaw Pact crews were probably better that the average Iraqi tank crews. Nevertheless, close examination of these tank battles provides an intriguing look at the state of tank technology and tank warfare at the end of the Cold War. Desert Stormwas not the first war which pitted US against Soviet equipment. The first significant clash occurred in Korea in 1950 when the North Korean Army spearheaded their attack on South Korea using Soviet-supplied T-34-85 tanks, and the US-led intervention involved M4A3E8, M26 and M46 tanks. Although the North Korean T-34-85 tanks proved to be highly effective in the initial invasion when faced with poorly trained South Korean infantry, once they were challenged by US Army tanks they suffered massive losses. The reasons were far less to do with the technology of the opposing tank types, which was fairly similar, but instead it was primarily crew quality which made the difference. The US crews were better trained than their North Korean opponents, and this core issue of crew competence would resonate through many later Cold War tank battles. The 1956 war between Israel and Egypt involved tank combat between US-built Sherman tanks and Czechoslovak-supplied T-34-85 tanks, and once again the results were heavily dependent on crew quality. The 1967 Six-Day War saw the first major clash involving tanks developed after World War II. The Israel tank units largely relied 4 on the British Centurion and US M48A2 Patton tanks while the Egyptian and Syrian © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com DUE018correx2.qxd:Layout 1 15/4/09 11:41 Page 5 forces used Soviet T-54 and T-55 tanks. However, the tank battles were one-sided in favor of Israel even when Israeli units used modified Sherman tanks, and the importance of crew performance was demonstrated especially clearly when Israeli Shermans successfully confrontated the modern Jordanian M47 and M48 tanks. The 1973 Arab–Israeli War saw yet another generation of Cold War tanks put to the test, in this case the US M60A1 and the new Soviet T-62. The results of this conflict were not as lopsided as some of the earlier wars, though ultimately, the Israeli tanks exacted a punishing kill-ratio against their opponents. These wars could not provide an entirely accurate model for a potential NATO– Warsaw Pact tank confrontation due to differences in terrain, tactics, training and many other factors. But time after time, they suggested that the ultimate factor in deciding the outcome of tank combat was crew performance and not tank technology. The technical balance between NATO and Warsaw Pact tanks through most of the Cold War was close enough that it could not alone determine the outcome of tank fighting. This book will argue that the same was true about Operation Desert Storm. The T-72 became the standard But it will also argue that Desert Stormprovided an example where there was not only license-produced Soviet tank in the 1980s in Poland, a clear advantage in crew quality on one side, but that there was a much greater Czechoslovakia, India, and technical disparity than was the case in most of the previous clashes. Yugoslavia. Iraq was not the The American M1A1 Abrams, German Leopard 2, British Challenger, and Soviet only army to use the T-72 T-72 and T-80 were the ultimate tank designs of the Cold War years, and still have in the 1991 war. The Kuwaiti not been replaced by a new generation of tanks. Indeed, there is some question 35th Fatah Brigade operated the Yugoslav-built M-84A whether they will be replaced in the foreseeable future, since they continue to be viable version as part of the Joint battlefield contenders so long as they are well maintained and regularly updated. Coalition Force Group. In recent years the focus has instead been on the adoption of a new generation of (US DoD) 5 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com DUE018correx2.qxd:Layout 1 15/4/09 11:42 Page 6 The M1A1 Abrams tank lightly armored wheeled vehicles that are more economical for peacekeeping represented the culmination operations rather than high-intensity combat. of a number of technological Several features distinguished the M1A1/T-72 generation from previous trends in the 1960s and generations of tanks. In terms of firepower, these tanks represented the final switch to 1970s, which included the introduction of a new the use of APFSDS (armor-piercing, fin-stabilized, discarding-sabot) ammunition generation of digital (simply termed “sabot” in the US Army) for tank fighting. While APFSDS had already electronics. This provided been used by previous generations of tanks, HEAT (high explosive anti-tank) substantially better accuracy ammunition had remained the predominant type in NATO and Warsaw Pact use at long range, the ability to fire through the 1970s. APFSDS began to attract serious attention due to its extensive on the move, and significantly improved capabilities to see at use by Syrian and Egyptian T-62 tanks in the 1973 Arab–Israeli War. The final night and through smoke and triumph of APFSDS was due in part to advances in ammunition technology, but also fog. (GDLS) 6 to improvements in fire-control systems that gave APFSDS a level of accuracy © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com DUE018correx2.qxd:Layout 1 15/4/09 11:42 Page 7 resembling that of rivals such as guided tank projectiles. Both the M1A1 Abrams and the T-72 relied on APFSDS as their primary tank-fighting ammunition at the time of Operation Desert Storm. The greatest disparity between the M1A1 Abrams and the T-72M1 was not in actual gun performance but rather in gun fire-control. The Abrams used a far superior FLIR (forward-looking infrared) thermal-imaging sight while the T-72 relied on the older and less versatile active infrared technology for night vision. The ultimate rule in tank fighting has always been “see first, fire first, hit first.” It was the thermal sights on the M1A1 that provided the crucial combat edge in Operation Desert Storm, since US tanks could spot and engage Iraqi tanks before the US vehicles could be seen. Iraqi tanks suffered another significant disadvantage in 1991 in that they were supplied with inferior ammunition – a generation behind that used by the Russian army of the time. In terms of armor, the M1A1/T-72 generation marked a distinct turning away from homogenous steel armor towards laminate armor. Laminate armor had been used since the 1960s in the glacis plates (the heavily armored sloping front of a tank’s hull) of Soviet designs such as the T-64, but it had taken some time for armies to be convinced that laminate armor was worth the trouble compared to conventional steel armor. The M1A1 and T-72 provide some important clues to the advantages of the new generations of armor and their value on the modern battlefield. In this respect, the M1A1 held a critical edge over the export T-72M1, which had armor inferior to that of the Russian army’s contemporary T-72B tank. There was also an important contrast between the T-72 and M1A1 in terms of propulsion. At the time of these tanks’ design there was heated debate about the relative value of conventional diesel engines against the new generation of gas-turbine engines. In the Soviet case both engine types were utilized – the T-72 had a diesel engine, the T-80 a gas-turbine one. The US M1A1 was powered by a gas turbine, but this remained one of the most controversial features of the tank. Operation Desert Stormdid not silence this debate, despite the outstanding performance of the Abrams. The M1 Abrams and T-72 Ural offer a curious contrast in terms of design and development paths. The M1 Abrams program constituted an entirely new effort aimed at producing the best tank possible, albeit within a tight budget. The T-72, on the other hand, was a reinterpretation of the existing T-64A, arising from industrial rivalries within the Soviet Union. Despite the vehicles’ relative technical merits and flaws, the outcome of the tank battles of Desert Stormhinged as much on tactics, terrain, and crew capabilities as on the machines themselves. The Iraqi army was a mass conscript force that had become oversized as a consequence of recent wars; the army sacrificed quality for quantity in a bid to overcome Iran. The US Army had gone through a decade of reform and was now a lean professional force that had been honed to a sharp edge for potential combat in central Europe. By far the greater disparity between the two armies lay in their quality of troops than in the quality of technology. 7 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com DUE018correx2.qxd:Layout 1 15/4/09 11:42 Page 8 CHRONOLOGY 1968 1980 January Start of development of T-72. February First delivery of series production M1 Abrams. 1972 September 22 Iraq attacks Iran. February Start of development of M1 1981 Abrams. Start of production of T-72 Model 1973 1975 tank in Poland. August Official state acceptance of T-72. 1982 November Start of production of T-72. Start of production of T-72M1 1975 export tank in USSR. Start of production of T-72 Model 1984 1975 export tank in USSR. October First delivery of series production 1976 IPM1 Abrams. November Start of engineering development of M1 Abrams. The best version of the T-72 in Iraq in 1991 was the T-72M1, like this example captured from the Hammurabi RGFC Armored Division and 1979 subsequently put on display at Fort Stewart, Georgia. It has the characteristic features, including upgraded turret armor, smoke May Production approval of M1 Abrams. dischargers, a thermal sleeve on the gun, and appliqué armor Start of production of T-72A tank. on the hull glacis plate. (Author) 8 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com DUE018correx2.qxd:Layout 1 22/4/09 10:10 Page 9 The final tank combat of Operation Desert Stormoccurred after the ceasefire on March 2, when the Hammurabi Division bumped into the US 24th Infantry Division while trying to escape, leading to the short but intense “Battle of Rumalyah.” This is an M1A1 of Company C, 4–64 Armor, during the fighting. (US Army) February 24, 0600 hours G-Day – start of coalition ground campaign against Iraq. February 26, 1500 hours 2nd ACR starts Battle of 73 Easting. February 27, 1200 hours 1st Armored Division starts Battle of Medina Ridge. February 28, 0800 hours Ceasefire. March 2 Hammurabi Division bumps into 24th Infantry Division, starting 1985 Battle of Rumalyah. Start of production of T-72M tank Capt Mark Gerges, commander of Bravo Company, 2–70 Armor, in Poland and Czechoslovakia. is seen here inspecting a destroyed BMP-1 at the Medina Ridge Start of production of T-72B battlefield, which his team revisited in March 1991 to further in USSR. examine the conduct of the battle. Gerges was awarded the Bronze Star and the Bronze Star with Valor device for his service during August First delivery of series production Operation Desert Storm. (Mark Gerges) M1A1 Abrams. 1986 Start of production of T-72M1 in Poland and Czechoslovakia. 1987 Start of production of T-72S export tank in USSR. 1988 August 20 Official ceasefire halts Iran–Iraq War. October First delivery of series production M1A1HA Abrams. 1990 August 2 Start of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 1991 January 17 Start of coalition air campaign against Iraqi forces in Kuwait. 9 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com