CONTENTS • The Ligue Communiste-Lutte Ouvriere Agree- · ment for the Parliamentary Elections of March 1973. • In Vietnam, Nixon Forced to Substitute Contain ment Policy for Negociation . • The .November 1972 International Conference Organized by Lutte Ouvriere. January 1973 No PRICE: FF 3 CLASS STRUGGLE CONTENTS Page 2 The Ligue Communiste-Lutte Ou vriere Agreement for the Par I iament ary Elections of March 1973. Page 7 In Vietnam, Nixon Forced to Sub stitute Containment Policy for Ne gociation. Page 12 The November 1972 International Conference Organized by Lutte Ou vriere. NUMBER 6 CLASS STRUGGLE THE LIGUE COMMUNISTE-LUTTE OUVRIERE AGREEMENT FOR THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS OF MARCH 1973 The revolutionary movement will be present in the parliamentary elections of March 1973. Indeed in about 300 out of the 473 constituencies that exist in France, there will be a Trotskyist candidate, belonging either to Lutte Ouvriere or to the Ligue Communiste; 170 candidates will run for Lutte Ouvriere and 130 for the Ligue Communiste. Moreover, most of the 300 constituencies are working class ones. They are distributed among most of the large and middle-size towns of the country and among 84 out of the 95 counties. This means that, for the first time in the history of the Trotskyist movement, most of the French workers will have the opportunity of voting for one of its candidates. Small as this achievement may appear compared with that of the big right and left-wing organizations, it was beyond our wildest dreams a few years ago, and it gives evidence of the progress accomplished by the Trotskyist organizations and of their potential. But the division of the Trotskyist movement posed an important problem for its intervention in these elections. And this problem could not have been settled without overcoming the irresponsibility and the sectarianism which unfortunately are usually present in a whole portion of the extreme left. At the eve of summer 1972, three Trotskyist organizations had publicly announced their intention of putting up candidates in the parliamentary elec tions. These were the Ligue Communiste (French section of the United Se cretariat), the Organisation Communiste lnternationaliste (OCl-close to the International Committee) and our organization. But none of these organiza tions thought of covering all the 473 constituencies of the country with its own forces. So, we proposed (cf. Class Struggle No 2) a political agreement to those organizations, consisting of: - an agreement concerning the sharing out of the constituencies, so that there should be, at most, one candidate of one of the three organizations in each constituency; - a call from each organization for a vote for the revolutionary candidate 2 CLASS STRUGGLE regardless of the organization to which he belongs; - the running of all these candidates with the common label of «Revolu tionary Front» beside the name of their own organization. We made such proposals because we thought it unjust that candidates belong ing to different Trotskyist organizations, claiming to belong to the same politi ·::al tradition; fighting the same fight in the class struggle, should fight one another, without having tried to achieve even a Ii mitated political agreement for this electoral campaign. Nevertheless we do not think that the differences separating our organizations are negligible; on the contrary, they are important. But, when we are facing our bourgeois and reformist enemies in full view of the workers, these divergences, considerable as they are, are of little importance compared with what we have in common. For, in the revolutionaries' electoral campaign, that is what really matters. This is not a way of concealing our divergences for the period of this campaign for fear that they should give the workers a bad impression of us. On the contrary, we have to give the workers evidence that we are responsible revolutionaries and that our diver gences do not prevent us from fighting together every time it is possible. An agreement among the Trotskyist organizations for this electoral cam paign would permit them to enlarge considerably the scope of their action. As a matter of 'fact, by the agreement we were proposing to add together the forces of the various components of the Trotskyist movement: by distributing their candidates among as many constituencies as possible, so that as many workers as possible would have the concrete opportunity of expressing, through their votes for a revolutionary candidate, their hostility to the right as well as their distrust of the «Union of the Left». This is to say that our proposal was by no means a mere agreement for the sharing out of the constituencies, or as a ~eader of the Ligue Communiste has put 1t a <mon-agressive pact», this phrase indicating clearly a wrong way of posing the problem. The distribution of the constituencies could only be a part of the political agreement we were proposing. We were not seeking by this agreement to conceal where we diverge, but to underline what the three orga nizations have in common, what make them choose, whether they want it or not, the same camp in order to fight the bourgeois and reformist candidates. We meant this agreement to underline the solidarity of the revolutionary movement against its class-enemies, whatever internal divergences it may have. Moreover, the agreement concerning the sharing out of the constituencies im plied in itself such a political agreement, since a sharing agreement among organizations considering one another as an enemy is scarcely possible. But this proposal elicited strong reservations from the Ligue Communiste as well as from the OCI, although these two organizations immediately declared themselves favorable to a sharing agreement. The fact was that a political agreement came up against the sectarian habit of the extreme left and particularly of the Trotskyist organizations. The facts themselves made this agreement necessary. For the workers as well 3 .»sruelliavarT xuamoc elgis el suos ,1791 sraMum snoitcele sed srol USP elettuL rap nummoc ne eenemngapmac al ed sehciffa seL siraP« num ed selapicin te ereirvuO elarotcele e 3 f M(f'~O.l.!COt 11UCp A~ lSSA\C tO .f1fJH A HtO" U1Qt1 '1' ''' "'f ~,'," ;p \ q f rial c cltsc xiottc .STtcliavarl <'to'\,H!' '\<iiI \' tY <'}tol\'1 ;;,'- omr mBllHltfT E TElTfEUlltfVOO ~ .o. .»srekroWc eht rednu ~ dna ereirv ;el ngiapmac fo sretsoP _ al nommo USP ehtmmoc ni d nwot eht eht ot siraP11 leb 1791 ,hcraM ni ·uO ett uL ynbo snoitcele licnuoc CLASS STRUGGLE as for our bourgeois and reformist enemies, the Trotskyist organizations repre sent the same political trend, whether they like it or not. None of them can claim to be the only representative of the revolutionary movement. It was therefore the situation itself that made it necessary for the Trotskyist orqanizations to achieve an agreement so that the workers could see them facing up to the right as well as to the «Union of the Left» in the same political way. Actually, it did not imply for any of them an abandonment of originality or the hiding of divergences with the other two. Each of them could run its campaign as it saw fit, according to its own methods and political analysis. But what this agreement needed was merely the awareness of reality, the realization that, for our class enemy as well as for the workers, we represent the same tendency, ·nd therefore we have to fight together. Despite their reserves and their sectarianism, the OCI as well as the Ligue Communiste did indeed understand that, since they immediately accepted a discussion about the sharing out of the constituencies. They have proved stobbom in so far as a political agreement was concerned, even though this was made necessary by the sharing agreement; this is therefore a grave incon sistency on their part. As far as the OCI is concerned, sectarianism has eventually prevailed, since this organization has turned down the political agreement and therefore the sharing agreement as well. Even though the OCI representative had agreed to the discussion of the sharing agreement since the beginning of the negociations among the three groups, that is since May 1972, he finally declared in December that his organization would not call for a vote for the Ligue Communiste or Lutte Ouvriere on the first ballot, but was planning to call for a nationwide vote in favor of Lutte Ouvriere, the Ligue Communiste or ... of the Communist Party and the Socialist Party, setting all these organizations on the same level. Furthermore, the OCI did not undertake to guarantee that its national political position would be that of its local militants. Thus, the OCI allowed for the possibility that some of its militants would suppor' the CP or the SP ... against the Ligue Communiste or Lutte Ouvriere ! Such a position vitiated any political significance in the sharing agreement which, in that case, would have been reduced to mere unprincipled electoral bargaining. Thus we had no choice but to admit the breakdown of discussion from the OCI and to fall back on an agreement between the Ligue Communiste and Lutte Ouvriere. Later on, we learned that the OCI had finally decided to run 19 candidates only, even though at the beginning of the discussions it had claimed to be able to run 18fl candidates! Such a cut-back means its withdrawal from these elections and the loss of the opportunity of appearing as a national political movement, since the number of its candidates is to small to have the legal right of using the radio and the TV. We are convinced that, if the OCI has finally made this choice, it is not because of mere material difficulties, but rather for political reasons. The fact that the OCI refused to sign an agreement with the Ligue Communiste and Lutte Ouvriere should have meant that it considered 4 CLASS STRUGGLE that it was necessary to match us politically even in the electoral field, to appear on a national scale as a movement distinct from the two others and able to explain to the workers why they should support it rather than the others. Though such an attitude would have been the only logical consequence of its withdrawal, the OCI has not chosen it, thus admitting in a negative fashion that a political agreement was made necessary by the situation. The fact that the OCI has finally chosen retirement rather than acceptance of an agreement with the other organizations proves its own sectarianism and inconsistency, as well as the fact that the Trotskyist organizations had no other logical choice than to reach a political agreement. This attitude of the OCI is merely the reaction, only too frequent in the extreme left, of hiding one's head in the sand rather than accepting the responsible attitude made necessary by the situation. After all, the attitude of the Ligue Communiste itself bears out this point of view. Even though its representatives had agreed from the beginning to talk constituencies, they did express, like the OCI, some reservations about the political agreement we were proposing, because they did not realize, anymore than did the OCI, that accepting the first discussion without accepting the second one was illogical. During its own congress, held on December 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th, the Ligue Communiste clearly expressed this opposition in a motion which ran as follows (cf. Rouge No 184 -December 16th, 1972): «The first ballot will be viewed as an anti-electoral fight which will allow a programmatic clarification. (. .. ) The revolutionary tendency cannot assert itself against the 'Union of the Left' program by setting up a political coalition of the various components of the extreme left. Such a coalition, if it were pos sible, would bring confusion and contradict our strategy of clarification of the extreme left.» «This assertion cannot be achieved either through an agreement between Lutte Ouvriere, the OCI and the Ligue, including blocked vote on the first ballot. Such a 'solution' (. .. ) creates confusion by crediting the journalistic idea of a 'Trotskyist family'. Moreover, such a 'Trotskyist' vote does not permit us to block all the votes of the extreme left so that a tendency refusing the 'Union of the Left' should appear on the electoral field». But reality is stubborn and it has finally forced itself even upon those who did not want to face it: that is how the leaders of the Ligue themselves, a few days after their congress, finally accepted our proposition of a political agreement by signing together with our organization the following text· «'The real nature of bourgeois parliamentarism, in the constitutional par liamentary monarchies as well as in the most democratic republics, lies in the periodic decision as to which member of the ruling class will tread down and oppress the workers from parliament for a given number of years.' These words written by Lenin in 1917 have not aged, and the forthcoming parliamentary elections of 1973 provide an excellent illustration of them. 5 CLASS STRUGGLE On one side, there are the Gaullists who have been in power for 14 years, their present allies the 'Giscardiens' and the 'Centristes', and the 'Reformateurs' who declared themselves ready to rally the present majority. These people, beyond their apparent quarrels, declare openly that their goal is to preserve capitalist interests. On the other side, there are the parties grouped in the 'Union of the Left'. Though they pretend to want to 'change life', these parties only seek to gain workers' votes so they can participate in government, without fundamentally altering any of the cogs or structures of the bourgeois state and system of exploitation. The tenor of the 'coalition program' they have signed together gives evidence of their will not to attack capitalism in itself. Thus the revolutionaries will intervene in this campaign to claim that the overthrow of the capitalist system cannot be achieved by elections but only by class struggle, and to support the goals of socialist revolution. The two organizations, Ligue Communiste and Lutte Ouvriere, will run candi dates jointly in 300 constituencies. The Ligue Communiste and Lutte Ouvriere call the workers to vote for these candidates in order to express their will to put an end to capitalist exploitation, to refuse the reformist dead end, whether it be Stalinist or social-democrat, and their will to choose together the only way that can lead to their liberation, that of the socialist revolution. Thus, this political agreement between the Ligue Communiste and ourselves is settled today. Its main purpose is that, in face of the right and of the «Union of the Left», the revolutionary movement should use all its forces to show that it is present and active in the working class. We only regret that the OCI did not deem it necessary to sign this agreement and eventually preferred to withdraw. The revolutionary movement has still much to do before it can rid itself of one of its major faults-the sectarianism that leads to resignation when faced with political tasks. We are quite conscious of this deficiency and we shall fight it in all its forms. If we have really succeeded in diminishing this sectarianism of the Trotskyist organizations during these preelectoral discussions, we can claim to have defended thereby the general interests of the Trotskyist movement; that is, the interests of the working class. 6 CLASS STRUGGLE IN VIETNAM, NIXON FORCED TO SUBSTITUTE CONTAINMENT POLICY FOR NEGOCIATION Late last October, with the approach of the presidential elections, the US-Vietnamese peace talks seemed to accelerate after being bogged down for four years. Carefully calculated rumors released from Washington suggested that a cease-fire agreement was to be signed in the next few days. The important concessions agreed upon by North Vietnam as stated in the draft agreement published the 26th of October by Hanoi alone, apparently sub stantiated the belief that the negociations had come to their final phase, that the draft agreement was definitive, and that there was nothing left to do but to sign it. The elections are over now. Nixon secured his new office by neutralizing the opponents of his Vietnam pol icy; yet, today, peace seems further away than in October. The war has intensified south ot the Utti parallel. The North is being drowned beneath a deluge of bombs. In the meantime, the Kissinger Le Due Tho talks appear derisive and useless. There are no words to express the indignation one feels before Nixon's ignominious game: he played with the peoples' hopes for peace-the hopes of the American people, and above all those of the Vietnamese people-in order to secure his own re-election. Yet, however hypocritical and wicked Nixon be, his policy goes far beyond his own personality. Obviously, the US imperialism made the decision to prolong the war, and to intensify it in North Vietnam. TOWARD FURTHER CONCESSIONS IN VIETNAM ? Is it to squeeze more concessions from the Vietnamese people? This is surely not the main reason. Between the extreme claims such as those expressed by Thieu, and the October draft agreement, there is undoubtedly a possibility for further concessions, on the side of Hanoi and the PRG, especially on two essen tial points. 7 CLASS STRUGGLE The first is Thieu's demand that the sovereign and independent Vietnamese nations be recognized, i.e., that two Vietnamese states be definitively estab lished and that the 17th parallel be declared an inviolable border; the draft agreement on the other hand specifies that the United States recognize the «independence, sovereignty, unity and integrity of the Vietnam territory as was established in the 1954 Geneva agreement.» But in this regard, Hanoi and the PRG have already made major concessions: they have recognized the existence today of two Vietnamese states; consequent ly they have separated the problem of future relations between the two states from that of the settlement of the war; they have dropped the problem of re unification in the draft agreement. So, Thieu's claims merely come up to a principled statement, without any real meaning, at least for the time being. Thus the US has obtained what was essential in this field. Thieu's second demand is that his government and administration be sovereign on the whole South Vietnam territory. However the draft agreement established that: «from cease-fire to the forma tion of a government following free democratic general elections, the two exist ing administrations will be maintained in South Vietnam, with their respective functions in foreign and domestic policies. .. » There too, the draft agreement already implies important concessions on the side of the PRG, since it recognizes in effect all the prerogatives of a government for the Saigon regime during the transition period between cease-fire and elec tions, moreover, it accepts Thieu at the head of this government. Clearly, the PRG can make no further concessions in this area. For to accept Thieu's demands would result in the dismantling of the administration and state institutions set up by the PRG in an important part of South Vietnam. In other words, it would be the abandonment of all that they won since the beginning of the war. It would be the PRG's defeat. If the US were in a posi tion to obtain that, there would be no negociations. But, after ten years of war, despite an army of 500,000 men, the US have proved unable to do so: there lies. their problem. Consequently, any further concessions which might be extorted from the Vietnamese are either minor ones, or not concessions at all, but pure surren der. IN PLACE OF CONTAINMENT, ANOTHER POLICY Were Hanoi and the PRG to go to the extreme limit in concessions, the US would nonetheless have to leave. For the first time in its own history, Ameri- 8