FOR THE REBUILDING OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONTENTS • Clashes Inside the Union of the Left: the CP Does Not Trust Mitterrand in the Least, But Still Pins Its Hopes on Him •Are We Going Toward a General Crisis in the Capitalist System? •The Italian Crisis pubfilhed by November 1974 No PRICE: FF 3 CLASS STRUGGLE CONTENTS Page 2 Clashes Inside the Union of the Left: the CP Does Not Trust Mitterrand in the Least, But Still Pins Its Hopes on Him Page 7 Are We Going Toward a General Crisis in the Capitalist System? Page15 The Italian Crisis NUMBER 23 CLASS STRUGGLE CLASHES INSIDE THE UNION OF THE LEFT: THE CP DOES NOT TRUST MITTERRAND IN THE LEAST BUT STILL PINS ITS HOPES ON HIM The French Communist party and the Socialist party have been directing harsh words at each other for about a month. Surprising as it may be, the strife was stirred up precisely by those who for years have been the more industrious partners in the alliance. This was the very CP that had agreed to the greater number of concessions, and more often than not shelved its own party interests to save the Union of the Left. Six months ago, the CP agreed not to put up a candidate of its own in the presidential election. It agreed to give full support to Mitterrand, First Secretary of the SP, as the unique candidate of the left from the first round of the election, and to campaign for him without objection. In the past weeks however, the CP has been wondering openly about the sincerity of its allies, that is, the SP and Mitterrand himself. What is at stake? Is there going to be a drastic change in the policies of the French CP ? Could the CP have decided to take the risk of breaking up the Union of the Left? In other words, is the CP giving up the idea altogether? And if so, why? This outburst of doubt and query was provoked by the results of the six parliamentary by-elections held on 29 September and 6 October. In the first round of those elections, the scores of the candidates of the CP declined by an average of 2.5 percent, whereas that of the SP increased by 8 percent. Thus, with 26.9 percent of the vote, the SP was becoming by far the leading left-wing party in those constituencies-at the expense of the CP, which won no more than 18.9 percent of the vote. In addition, on the second round, whereas two Socialist candidates were elected owing to CP voters' support, the only Communist candidate who stood a chance was defeated because part of the Socialist voters failed to switch to him. Under these circumstances, it is easy to understand the CP's ill-tempered reaction. As a matter of fact, the first attack was launched on the very day that followed the second ballot, in a note published by the Political Bureau of the CP which called in question some of the themes included in the propaganda of the SP. But this fit of bad temper has since developed into a forceful, systematic, and relentless campaign. This problem was the central theme of the Twenty-First Congress-a special congress planned before the summer vacation-he! d by the CP on 24-27 October at Vitry-sur-Seine. This means that one ought to look beyond mere resentment at poor electoral results-which only revealed the problem for the real motivations of the French CP. 2 CLASS STRUGGLE NO SWING TO THE LEFT Those who at one point were under the impression that the whole thing was a crucial change in the policy of the French CP certainly feel now that they ought to look for a better explanation. This is no swing toward the left. On the contrary, the Twenty-First Congress reinforced the right-wing policy resolutely followed by the CP in the past few months. Last spring, just after the presidential election, the CP launched a campaign for «The Union of the French People for Democratic Change.» In the meantime, it was campaigning to expand the Union of the Left to its right so that it might attract a number of Gaullists for example. Thus, for months, each critical remark about the present government uttered by former ministers of de Gaulle-Charbonnel or even Debre for example-has been highlighted in L 'Humanite. Meanwhile, the CP was trying its best to convince a large section of the bourgeoisie that the Union of the Left and its «Common Program of Government» could also take care of its interests. This trend has been fully confirmed by the Twenty-First Congress, the final resolution of which, voted unanimously, reads as follow: --- The managers of small or medium-sized firms endangered by capital merging are worried about their future. The threat does not lie in the legitimate claims of their employees, which the CP vigorously supports; the threat lies in the policy followed by the big firms, by the banks, and by the government. This fact should encourage them to join the Union of the People for Democratic Change. Further on, the same text says: The Communists have fought hard against a number of aspects in the Gau/lists' policies. But the former and the latter stood shoulder to shoulder in the main struggles for the independence and dignity of France. This is what is at stake again today. That is why they can join together in a broad alliance whose aim would be to bring about the unity, the prosperity, the greatness, and the prestige of our nation. The Communists consider the bringing together of the working-class, the democrats, and the Gau/list patriots as necessary for achieving the Union of the People of France. One of the main themes of the speech delivered by General Secretary Georges Marchais-he took it up again on the following day in a television broadcast called Actuel 2 -and which is also to be found in the final resolution, stressed the fact that, in all honesty, without objection or mental reservations, the CP would fight today for an advanced democracy ... not for socialism. Socialism would come at a later stage. Georges Marchais could even be seen blaming the SP for entertaining confusion in this respect: If the SP now suddenly believes that the order of the day is to engage in a decisive fight for the advent of socialism in France, it should say so. The CP does not believe so, and its leaders repeated it again and again, throughout the congress. 3 CLASS STRUGGLE So there is no leftist swing to be found in the policy of the CP. More than ever before, the party pictures itself as a responsible party, ready to defend loyally the interests of the bourgeoisie if it helped the Comm11r1ists come into power. It spends a lot of time reassuring the bourgeoisie. One need only note the appeal made to «small and medium sized firm managers» or to the «Gaullists.» It will even go so far as to present itself as the guarantor of these interests, as opposed to some left-wing trends now coming into being inside the SP. It knows for sure that if the bourgeoisie has no ground for fearing the daring words uttPred inside Fram;ois Mitterrand's party, which has thoroughly demonstrated its dev, • .n to the interests of the bourgeoisie, the same does not hold for the CP. Its ties with' the USSR and with the working class still look suspicious in the eyes of the bourgeoisie. So it has to produce more guarantees than the SP in order to be trusted. But, in any case, this is not the reason why the CP is now quarrelling with the SP. ALLIES NOT TO BE TRUSTED ... The real bone of contention was revealed by the General Secretary of the CP at Vitry. The CP is not shifting to a more left-wing policy, nor does it fear that the SP should respond to some mysterious calls from the extreme left. It is afraid that its SP allies will abandon the CP for other alliances. Georges Marchais said: Clear objectives go hand in hand with clear alliances. He also noted that things are not in the least bit clear when our partners in the left vote for Mr. Poher, who is known to share the political views of the government. Neither are they clear as regards local authorities where the non-Communist left enters into alliances with the right, which they hardly conceal under labels referring to centrism. Following up his argument, Georges Marchais bluntly asked the SP what was meant by «the persistent speculations on the possibility that Giscard d'Estaing might call on Francois Mitterrand as leader of the government.» Such is the sore spot in the Union of the Left as far as Georges Marchais is concerned. The faithful ally of the CP is all the less reliable as the possibility of its taking part in the government looks more likely. As long as it looked as if. they might remain in the opposition for a long time, the SP and Mitterrand could afford to sign the Common Program of Government with the CP, and claim in all their public speeches that they would never deceive the Union of the Left. But the situation has been different in the past few months. On the political level, after Giscard d'Estaing was elected president of the Republic, the majority has grown to include the «centrists» led by Lecanuet, who used to stand in the opposition. At the same time, the presidential majority is proving more and more fragile and shows growing internal cracks-especially inside the UDR-that might well make it collapse soon. Moreover, on the social and economic levels, difficulties are piling up, not mentioning the threat of a severe crisis. 4 CLASS STRUGGLE Given these facts, the possibility that Giscard d'Estaing might call on the left and on Mitterrand should not be ruled out. At this point, Georges Marchais and the leaders of the CP should remember what Mitterrand and the leaders of the SP actually are, and how they behaved in the past. They should remember that for twenty years those men have refused systematically any alliance with the CP in order to gain right-wing allies; that for twelve years, they ruled the country with those right-wing allies under the Fourth Republic; and that only under the severe pressure of events and because they could see no other chance of ever coming into power again did they finally consent to concluding an alliance with the CP. Now, what will be their attitude in the future if the ways which lead to power are suddenly opened again by the right or by an alliance with it. The leaders of the French CP can rightly be worried and rankled. They are now all the more rankled as for 15 years the left has never been as close as it is now to acceding to power-if we are to believe the left-wing politicians themselves. They are all talking about it, contemplating it, and discussing the possibilities: a call from Giscard to Mitterrand to form a new government, dissolution of the Parliament and new elections, etc. And it is at this moment, with the left so close to reaching its goal, that the French CP, ,because of its alliance with the SP, could be betrayed at the last minute and robbed of all its efforts! They are all the more worried for the last electoral results correctly showed that the SP is gaining ground, while the French CP is marking time and retreating. And given the electoral system in use for parliamentary elections, a slight decline of the CP in such elections-and the possibility of near general elections does exist-would be a disaster for the CP. A few percent less for the CP, and a few percent more for the SP would mean perhaps the loss of half or even three quarters of CP seats and in any case would mean an overwhelming disproportion in numbers between Socialist and Communist deputies. And in that case of course, even if the left did come out of the elections victorious on the whole, the CP would not have much of a chance of entering the government. They would only be doing the spade work for the SP. In any way it would only be a repeat on a wider scale of what took place last month in the by-elections . . . . AND NOTHING ELSE TO DO BUT TO RELY ON THEM It is out of the question that the French bourgeoisie would accept a government in which the CP held the main position. The most they could allow the CP would be participation in a government led by the Socialists and Mitterrand, be it a government of «the Union of the Left» made up of only «R adicaux,» Socialists, and Communists, or be it a government of «the Union of the People of France,» which is to say the left and a fraction of the right. The CP knows it so well that during the presidential campaign they stressed the point that in the event of Mitterrand's victory they would not ask for the positions of prime minister, home secretary, or the ministeries of the army and foreign affairs. The SP and Mitterrand know it too, for part of their electoral campaign consisted in explaining to the electors that for the left to have a chance of victory it is absolutely necessary that the SP overtakes the CP as the main party of the left in this country, and this is what the CP blames them for. 5 CLASS STRUGGLI But on the other hand to assert itself even for the positions of minor ministeries, thel CP must be indispensable to Mitterrand and to the bourgeoisie, and for that, it must be a political and social force. So, to reach its goal, on the one hand the CP must accept in advance to play only second rank behind Mitterrand and also must show that it accepts this; but on the other hand it must still be an indispensable force of the first rank. Playing an openly secondary role means weakening itself. Because it completely dis appeared from the electoral scene behind Mitterrand in the spring, in autumn the legisla tive elections it met with both a loss of votes and the loss of first place it had previously held to the Socialist Party. Between these two requirements the way is winding and narrow. A blow on one side is almost automatically followed by a blow on the other. This is the kind of tactic that it has been carrying out for a month. The polemic with the SP, the objective that Marchais fixed for his party to pick up 25 percent of the votes at the next elections, the stubborn call from the Congress that the CP is the party of the working class, and its implication that it is the only one which can ensure social peace are the indispensable counter-parts to the campaign for Mitterrand's presidency. They do not contradict the campaign; they are not a withdrawal from the attitude of the spring. These points are part of the same policy, the policy that the CP has led for years. An example of it is the attitude of the CGT in the postmen's strike which at the time of writing has lasted for more than 10 days. In the preceding months, the CGT showed itslef resolutely opposed to any offensive strike by the working class, which is to say any strike over a wages dispute. Today, it is supporting-for the time being-the postmen's strike which is precisely over a wages dispute. In fact, the CGT and behind it the CP, in order to show that they are capable of stopping or calling off strikes have to show that they are capable of starting and leading them. The grunts and groans shown today by the CP towards the SP are not those of someone looking for a divorce. On the contrary they are the moans and threats of someone who is not quite sure of his partner's faithfulness and who, having strong reasons to doubt, comes to realize that he is being taken in. The CP without any doubt is right to believe that to avoid being rejected it has to be as strong as possible. To be indispensable is its only chance. But in no way does it have any other pol icy: its lot, no matter how much it shouts and flexes its muscles, is entirely in the hands of Mitterrand and the bourgeoisie. 6 CLASS STRUGGLE ARE WE GOING TOWARD A GENERAL CRISIS IN THE CAPITALIST SYSTEM? Is capitalist economy already headed toward a crisis comparable to that of 1929 ? Even when they answer in the negative the most incurable optimists amongst bourgeois politicians and economists discuss the economic situation in these terms. The 1929 catas trophe which all the partisans of capitalist economy had relegated to the ranks of a bad me mory of a by-gone period of capitalism, is once again brought forward. Nobody dares claim today-as they did so dogmatically only a short time ago-that capitalism is capable of master ing the economy and of developing its production harmoniously. Economists are now hapha zardly looking for solutions to meet the threats from all sides, whereas they had been spend ing their time praising an economic system which was only miraculous in that it did not collapse for a quarter of a century. The language, too, has changed. Instead of the rosy picture of a better and better future, we have today visions of the apocalypse or, at least, exhortations to sacrifice. Part of the catastrophic tone of world leaders is certainly political calculation. Starting now, they must make us accept bigger sacrifices in the name of the struggle against the perils of the future. But, from all evidence, the immediate problems of capitalist economy are already serious enough. Even if they do not give way to a worldwide collapse in the short term, they put an end to the period of relative prosperity enjoyed by most, if not all, capitalist countries. To be sure, we are not yet in a crisis of overproduction. Despite three years of overt monetary crisis, the apparatus of production continues to work, and engenders a profit at a rate which, except for a few sectors of the economy, should satisfy capitalists. But the aggravation of two kinds of simultaneous and interdependent phenomena indicates the fragility and completely artificial nature of the pursuit of economic activity at present levels. These two phenomena are serious enough in themselves. They are even more serious in their predictable consequences on production. This concerns, on the one hand, the trade deficit-i .e., the balance between what a country spends and what it receives in return through buying and selling abroad-of the quasi-totality of the big capitalist countries. This deficit is for most of them mainly due to the rise in the price of oil and must be financed or absorbed in one way or another. But that is pre cisely one of the biggest problems of the bourgeoisie of all the European countries, who are all affected with the exception of Germany. We will come back to this later. 7 CLASS STRUGGLE It concerns, on the other hand, the disturbing cracks in the banking system. This began with the floundering of the German Herstatt Bank. This was followed by one of the banks in the top twenty American banks, Franklin Bank of New York. Others were seriously hit by colossal losses in ... monetary speculation. The number one German bank, the Westdeutsche Landesbank lost close to 100 million dollars, the number four English bank, Lloyd's bank, some 75 million, the Union des Banques Suisses, 50 million ... And even the third largest bank in the United States and the world, the Chase Manhattan Bank (belong ing to the Rockefeller empire and the one most preferred by the oil companies). was badly hit by monetary instability. These two kinds of phenomena are the direct or indirect result of worldwide inflation which nobody is capable of controlling. They both lead either to a serious economic slow down, or, worse, to a brutal collapse. FROM THE MONETARY CRISIS ... The principal and immediate problem of the capitalist world, which gives rise to all the other problems, remains in fact the continual aggravation of world inflation and the resulting persistent crisis in the international mor.etary system. For years, the capitalist countries played the role of sorcerer's apprentice by financing their prosperity by printing paper money. For years, economies eager for fresh money absorbed larger and larger quantities of paper money put at their disposal by their governments. What each government did within its borders-the only place where its own paper money has any value as legal tender because the government has fixed this value-the United States did on a world scale. Dollars were the international instrument of payment equal to gold in the monetary system built after the war. They were issued in large numbers by the Americans according to the needs of their economy, and according to the needs of the world economy as well. These dollars flooded al I countries. The different countries were not, however, the only ones to increase the world's supply of money. The banks, through bank credits, played their part. The American economy, like all the others, prospered on the biggest indebtedness that history has ever known. In the space of eight years, from 1965 to 1973, the total indebtedness of the American economy went from 1,235 thousand million to 2,526 thousand million dollars, that is to say, twice the gross national product of the United States. This formidable amount of money accumulated in the world economy, in the form of notes and bank deposits worth gold-inasmuch as all the world accepted it as such, or to be more exact, inasmuch as all the world accepted the American dollar as the principal paper money, guarantor of all the others. We know what followed. By lavishly spending dollars abroad in order to finance its investments and its military obligations as the principal guardian of imperialism, the United States aggravated and made permanent the deficit in its balance of payments. This permanent deficit eventually gave rise to defiance on the part of all those who had dollars. They now tried to get rid of these in favor of other currencies which appeared to be momentarily more valuable. Enormous sums of money which during the period of confidence in the dollar 8 CLASS STRUGGLE and American economy returned to the American banks in the form of diverse deposits when not used, were now withdrawn in search of a better investment. It was sufficient for these speculative sums to anticipate a devaluation or a reevaluation, for this to happen, either because of their being massively changed into the currency concerned or by their deserting it. The period of relative stability guaranteed by the unanimous confidence in the dollar was followed by a series of reevaluations and some devaluations, beginning with the dollar itself. This continually modified the exchange rate of the different currencies in regard to each other. The collapse of the international monetary system in force after the war became official on that famous day, 15 August 1971, when Nixon announced the inconvertibility of the dollar into gold. Since that time, not only has the capitalist world not found a stable international mone tary system permitting the conversion of currencies at a fixed rate, but it has in a way made this instability permanent by generalizing floating currencies. In other words, that exchange rate of currencies varies from day to day according to supply and demand. Such a system is prejudicial to international commerce, but what other choice is there? How can the monetary system be affected without inflation being aggravated? Inflation, instead of going down, has been getting worse since the overt monetary crisis. A further aggravation occured when the dollars corresponding to the origin of the Ame rican deficit, and dispersed throughout the world, led to the creation of a new type of currency: the famous «eurodollars.» Non-American banks which possessed deposits in dollars, re-lend (as is the case for all deposits) a multiple of the amount deposited. Thus an enormous reserve of money is created for which no government assumes the responsibility: neither the United States, because these loans take place on foreign territory; nor the country in ques tion, because it is not its currency which is loaned. And so the money thus created is controlled by nobody. No restriction of credit and no state measure applies to it. In 1973, the global amount in these eurodollars reached the level of 165 thousand million dollars-that is, about half the money in circulation in the United States. And in 1974, it should reach 200 thousand million . . . . TO THE GENERAL DEFICIT IN THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS The depreciation of currencies (for so long the apparently minor counterpart of the multi-sided assistance which each nation gives its bourgeoisie) is in the process of trans forming itself into a plague. The slowing-down of the development of world trade due to the crisis in the international monetary system, and the uncertainty which this gives rise to in the field of international exchange, is already serious enough in itself. But the consequences of inflation and of the monetary crisis on the healthy functioning of capitalist economy do not stop there. One of the most serious of these at the present time is the rise in the price of oil. 9