Logic, Liberty, and Anarchy: Mill and Feyerabend on Scientific Method KENT W. STALEY* ArkansasStateUniversity On the surface, J. S. Mill and Paul Feyerabend appear to hold differing views of scientificmethod.Millattemptstoframeasetofrulesorcanonsfortestingevidence based on rationality and inference, whereas Feyerabend, in his so-called “epistemo- logicalanarchism”,callsforabandoninganyattempttoseparatethegoodfromthebad in science according to a fixed view of rationality. Yet, somewhat paradoxically, FeryerabendcitesMillastheoriginatorofwhathe(Feyerabend)hastosayindefense ofepistemologicalanarchy.First,IarguethatthoseaspectsofMill’sOnLibertythat aresuggestiveofananti-rationalistphilosophyareentirelycompatiblewiththetheory of scientific method Mill offers in A System of Logic. Second, in the process of reconcilingthesetwoworksofMill,Ihopetoshedlightonhowwearetounderstand Feyerabend’scritiqueofmethodologicaldogmatism. Paul Feyerabend is infamous for his calls for “epistemological anarchism,” an abandon- mentoftheattempttowinnowthegoodfromthebadinscienceaccordingtoafixedview of rationality. The associated slogan is “anything goes.” Feyerabend writes: [I]fyouwantuniversalstandards,Isay,ifyoucannotlivewithoutprinciplesthathold independently of situation, shape of world, exigencies of research, temperamental peculiarities,thenIcangiveyousuchaprinciple.Itwillbeempty,useless,andpretty ridiculous—but it will be a “principle.” It will be the “principle” “anything goes.” (Feyerabend,1978,p.188) This kind of statement has driven philosophers of science practically insane. *Direct all correspondence to: Kent Staley, Department of Philosophy, Arkansas State University, State University,Arkansas72467-1890. TheSocialScienceJournal,Volume36,Number4,pages603–614. Copyright©1999byElsevierScienceInc. Allrightsofreproductioninanyformreserved.ISSN:0362-3319. 604 THESOCIALSCIENCEJOURNALVol.36/No.4/1999 In A System of Logic, published in 1843, John Stuart Mill declares that his aim is to attemptacorrectanalysisoftheintellectualprocesscalledReasoningorInference,and ofsuchothermentaloperationsasareintendedtofacilitatethis:aswellas...tobring together or frame a set of rules or canons for testing the sufficiency of any given evidencetoproveanygivenproposition.(Mill,1974,p.12) Here,then,aretwophilosophersapparentlyatcross-purposes.Feyerabendappearstobe trying to put an end to the kind of project that Mill seeks to carry out. Yet, Feyerabend typically cites John Stuart Mill as the originator of much of what he hastosayindefenseofepistemologicalanarchy.FeyerabendcitesMill’sargumentsinthe essay On Liberty, co-written with Harriet Taylor. ThefactthatargumentsfromOnLibertycanbeusedinwhatseemstobeanattackon the very aim of the System of Logic suggests that there is a conflict within Mill’s own works.Iwillargue,however,thatthoseaspectsofOnLibertythataresuggestiveofwhat Feyerabend would call an anti-rationalist philosophy of science are entirely compatible withthetheoryofscientificmethodofferedinMill’sLogic.Inthelatter,Iwillshow,Mill offers us a way of thinking about rules of scientific method that leaves room for the pluralism and openness of On Liberty. In the process of reconciling Mill’s two works, I hopealsotoshedsomelightonhowFeyerabend’scritiqueofmethodologicaldogmatism can be understood in a way that does not lead to utter despair over the prospects for a fruitful, normative methodology of science. “ANYTHING GOES” AND MILL’S ON LIBERTY In a recent essay, Elisabeth Lloyd corrects a common misunderstanding regarding Fey- erabend and that phrase “anything goes.” Feyerabend never intended this to be any kind of a positive recommendation. Feyerabend wrote that the slogan “does not express any conviction of mine, it is jocular summary of the predicament of the rationalist” (Feyera- bend, 1978, p. 188). Feyerabend does not suggest that one should approach science with thebeliefthat“anythinggoes,”andthenjustactinanarbitrarymanner.“Anythinggoes” is simply the only thing left to say if one insists, in the face of the principle–defying history of science, on having some universal methodology. Because progress in science has occurred in a manner that could never be captured by any universal set of rational principles, any such proposed principle would at some point be an obstacle to some important advance. Thus, an interest in learning the truth is, for Feyerabend, one reason for abandoning the quest for a fixed set of rules governing rationality. Here Feyerabend proclaimshisdebttoMill.Henotesthattheargumentssupportinghiscriticismsoftheuse of methodological norms to squelch opposing viewpoints were framed by Mill in On Liberty,andadds,“Itisnotpossibletoimproveuponhisarguments”(Feyerabend,1978, p. 86) The well-known thesis of On Liberty is that “the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of theirnumber,isself-protection”(Mill,1977,p.223).Itisinacivilizedsociety’sownbest interesttobemaximallytolerantofactionsthatthemajorityinthatsocietyfinddistasteful, Logic,Liberty,andAnarchy 605 evenrepugnant.Thelimitonsuchtoleranceisreachedwhenactionthreatensharmagainst another person. CentraltoMill’sessayistheapplicationofthisgeneralprincipletotherealmofbelief andexpression.Henotesthat“thepeculiarevilofsilencingtheexpressionofanopinion is,thatitisrobbingthehumanrace;posterityaswellastheexistinggeneration;thosewho dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it” (Mill, 1977, p. 229). Mill explains that the proliferation of opinions is beneficial in two ways. First, you oughttotoleratetheproliferationofopinionsatoddswithyourown,becauseoneofthem might be correct (and your own in error). Encouraging the expression of the opposing opinion creates the possibility of being corrected. Second, even if your own opinion is correct, you will not only appreciate its correctness better, but you will have a better understandingofjustwhatyouropinionis,ofjustwhatitmeans,ifyourembraceofthat truth is subsequent to a vigorous defense of it against an opposing view. In the first kind of case, Mill is concerned with the requirements for correcting a deeply-held false opinion. Experience alone is insufficient, for discussion is needed to arrive at a correct interpretation of experience. Furthermore, whereas “[w]rong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and argument,” discussion is needed, because “facts andarguments,toproduceanyeffectonthemind,mustbebroughtbeforeit”(Mill,1977, p. 231). Such facts and arguments cannot be conjured at will. Being corrected by a fact or argument often requires listening to a person who has the desire, ability, and liberty to expresshimselfonitsbehalf.Youharmyourownchancesoflearningtruthbydeclaring him in advance to be outside the boundaries of respectable opinion. In the second kind of case, Mill argues for the benefits of allowing the advocacy of falsehoods. There are two kinds of such benefits. The first relates to the conditions required for knowledge. According to Mill, the most significant element of the “cultiva- tion of the understanding” is “learning the grounds of one’s own opinions,” and this requires consideration of opposing viewpoints. He writes, “Even in natural philosophy thereisalwayssomeotherexplanationpossibleofthesamefacts;somegeocentrictheory instead of heliocentric, some phlogiston instead of oxygen; and it has to be shown why that other theory cannot be the true one: and until this is shown, and until we know how it is shown, we do not understand the grounds of our opinion” (Mill, 1977, p. 244). MillmakesasimilarpointinASystemofLogic:often,severalcompetingtheoriescan explain a single set of facts. Mill’s position in the Logic is that any claim to have strong evidence for a theory must be grounded in an argument that rules out competing alternatives. But, according to On Liberty, the ability to give such an argument often requires becoming acquainted with the alternatives, not just superficially, but “from personswhoactuallybelievethem;whodefendtheminearnest,anddotheirveryutmost for them.” Absent such a confrontation, the majority might hold a belief that happens to betrue,but“itmightbefalseforanythingtheyknow:theyhaveneverthrownthemselves into the mental position of those who think differently from them, and considered what such persons may have to say; and consequently they do not, in any proper sense of the word, know the doctrine which they themselves profess” (Mill, 1977, p. 245). Thesecondbenefitofexposuretofalsehoodsconcernsmeaning.Millwrites,“notonly the grounds of the opinion are forgotten in the absence of discussion, but too often the meaning of the opinion itself” (Mill, 1977, p. 247). A complete comprehension of the 606 THESOCIALSCIENCEJOURNALVol.36/No.4/1999 meaning of an idea depends on the deployment of that idea in response to one who opposes it. To not only hold a belief, but to understand what that belief means, requires that one have some significant awareness of the consequences of putting that belief into action, and Mill suggests that defending the belief helps one become aware of such consequences. Mill calls upon the proliferation of opinions as an aid in the pursuit of and compre- hensionofthetruth.Theneedforsuchproliferation,accordingtoMill,issogreatthat“if opponents of all important truths do not exist, it is indispensable to imagine them, and supply them with the strongest arguments which the most skillful devil’s advocate can conjure up” (Mill, 1977, p. 245). This brings us back to Feyerabend. Lloyd points out that Feyerabend can be seen as playing the role of the “devil’s advocate,”whichMill’sessayinsistsisimportantforachievingthekindofopenconsid- eration of alternatives that is requisite to the pursuit of truth. For example, Feyerabend argued vigorously on behalf of astrology in one context, but in another admitted, “Astrologyboresmetotears.However,itwasattackedbyscientists,NobelPrizewinners among them, without arguments, simply by a show of authority and in this respect deserved a defense” (Feyerabend, 1991, p. 165). Viewedinthisway,someofFeyerabend’smoreoutrageouswritingscanbeunderstood as “quite principled and unified” (Lloyd, 1997, p. 403). When Feyerabend perceives that somepointofviewisbeingvilifiedorneglected,onnoothergroundsthanthedislikeor ignoranceofitonthepartofauthoritiesintheintellectualworld,hewouldchallengethe intellectual community to think about that point of view, to answer its claims with arguments, even if that meant offering illogical arguments himself. PRINCIPLES OF SCIENCE AND RULES OF ART Although Mill’s central concerns in his A System of Logic departed significantly from those in On Liberty, and although the theories of knowledge in the two works seem superficially to be at odds, I will argue that they are entirely compatible. What’s more, I will argue that the two works complement one another in just the right way, offering a view of how truth might be effectively sought by understanding underlying principles of rationality,whileatthesametimemakingcleartheneedforaquitebroadlibertyofbelief and expression even in the most flagrant violation of those very same principles, not in spite of our interest in learning the truth, but in pursuit of that interest. In A System of Logic, Mill states that logic could be defined as “the science of the operations of the understanding, which are subservient to the estimation of evidence” (Mill, 1974, p. 12), and announces his intention to give “a correct analysis of the intellectual process called Reasoning or Inference” and “on the foundation of this analysis” to present “a set of rules or canons for testing the sufficiency of any given evidence to prove any given proposition” (Mill, 1974, p. 12). In every practical matter, as Mill saw it, one is guided by certain “rules of art,” and every set of rules of art is based on some body of science that justifies those rules. The rules of art, being formulated as imperatives, are premised on some proposed end to be attained. Scientific investigators seek to formulate a principle describing a causal regu- Logic,Liberty,andAnarchy 607 laritybetweenthedesiredendandthose“causesandconditions”thatproduceit:“Artthen examines these combinations of circumstances, and according as any of them are or are not in human power, pronounces the end attainable or not” (Mill, 1974, p. 944). Strictrulesofartcannotbearticulated,however,untiltheappropriatetheoremhasbeen establishedbyscience.Inthemeantime,somepracticalrulesareneededtoguideconduct, “inthefirstplace,becausethetheorycanseldombemadeideallyperfect,”andsecondly, because any statement of a rule of art that took into account “all the counteracting contingencies” would be too complex for practical use (Mill, 1974, p. 944–945). Consequently,a“wisepractitioner”willregardrulesofartasprovisional,andwillrefer continuallyto“thescientificlawsonwhichtheyarefounded,”foritisonlythesethatwill tellone“whatarethepracticalcontingencieswhichrequireamodificationoftherule,or whicharealtogetherexceptionstoit.”Suchanabilitytolookpasttherulesofart,tothe underlyingscientificprinciplesonwhichtheartisbasedisneededevenforattaining“the specific end which the rules have in view” (Mill, 1974, p. 945–946). Therefore, Mill deplores those who regard “such unbending principles” not only as universalandbindingwithrespecttothespecificendpostulatedintherules,butas“rules ofconductgenerally,withoutregardtothepossibility,notonlythatsomemodifyingcause maypreventtheattainmentofthegivenendbythemeansthattheruleprescribes,butthat success itself may conflict with some other end, which may possibly chance to be more desirable” (1946). Here are three important points: First, rules of art that are based on an incomplete science are necessarily provisional. Second, scientific principles that justify rules of art typicallywillhaveceterisparibusclausesandotherqualifications,sothatanyoneacting accordingtoaruleofartwillbewisenottoadhereblindlytotherule,butwillreferoften tothescientificprinciplesthemselves,toseewhetherthoseprinciplesjustifyapplyingthe rule to the case at hand. Third, even if one finds a principle of science that is truly universal,itdoesnotfollowthatonemustalwaysactonanyrulesbasedonthatprinciple, due to the possibility of a conflict with some overriding aim. If we apply these general claims to the rules of logic, we can conclude the following: (1) to the extent that Mill’s analysis of the science of logic is not the final word on the subject, his rules of inference must be taken to be provisional; (2) to the extent that the principles on which Mill’s rules of inference are based are subject to qualifications and ceteris paribus conditions, the rules themselves will sometimes lead one into errors, and anyone reasoning according to them should take into consideration the possibility of exceptions; and (3) even if Mill’s analysis of the science of logic has discovered truly universal and exceptionless rules, there may be cases where other aims take on greater importance than the aim of logic, thus prompting a suspension of those rules. An important objection has to be considered, however. The context for Mill’s discus- sionoftherelationshipbetweenscienceandartisanargument,notaboutlogic,butabout the scientific basis for social policy. He is denouncing “those who deduce political conclusionsnotfromlawsofnature,notfromsequencesofphenomena,realorimaginary, but from unbending practical maxims” (Mill, 1974, p. 889). Itisincumbentonme,then,toshowthatMill’sgeneralcommentsaboutrulesofartcan rightfullybeappliedtotherulesoflogic.Thiswillrequireabriefsurveyofthescientific underpinnings of Mill’s Logic. 608 THESOCIALSCIENCEJOURNALVol.36/No.4/1999 THE SCIENCE AND ART OF LOGIC In Mill’s Examination of the Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, he writes that the “theoreticgrounds”oflogic“arewhollyborrowedfromPsychology,andincludeasmuch ofthatscienceasisrequiredtojustifytherulesoftheart”(Mill,1979,p.359).Although Hamiltoninsiststhatlogicisbothascienceandanart,MillnotesthatHamiltonconceives the subject matter of the science of logic to be “the laws of thought as thought,” setting out“theconditionssubjecttowhichbytheconstitutionofournaturewecannotbutthink.” But Mill observes that this science, the science of the laws of thought as thought, is not really logic at all, but psychology. Consequently, for Hamilton, all that can genuinely count as logic is “the narrowest conception of an Art—that of a mere system of rules. [Hamilton’s definition] leaves Science to Psychology, and represents Logic as merely offering to thinkers a collection of precepts, which they are enjoined to observe, not in order that they may think, but that they may think correctly, or validly” (Mill, 1979, p. 359). FromMill’scommentsregardingrulesofart,itshouldbeapparentwhyhewouldabhor thisideaoflogicas“ameresystemofrules.”Ifonehasonlytherulestoadhereto,without an awareness of the scientific principles underlying those rules, one will be at risk of applying the rules blindly, ignoring the complicating conditions and qualifications that might require one to set aside the rules. Mill has often been accused of presenting a “psychologistic” logic, based on his commentsabouttherelationshipbetweenpsychologyandlogic.Itisimportanttobeclear, however,onwhatexactlyconstitutesthescienceoflogic,andhowitrelatestoMill’srules of art. (I will presently concern myself only with the inductive part of Mill’s Logic.) As R. F. McRae has pointed out, the theoretical basis for the rules of inductive reasoningistobefoundintheMill’sdiscussionofcausation.Millwrites,“Thenotionof Cause being the root of the whole theory of Induction, it is indispensable that this idea should at the very outset of our inquiry, be, with the utmost practicable degree of precision, fixed and determined” (Mill, 1974, p. 326). For Mill, the problem of causation lies at the root of the fundamental type of problem addressed by inductive reasoning. There is a uniformity to nature, according to the Law of Causation, but the uniformities are not apparent in nature simply as we experience it, because it is a uniformity consisting of a tangled web of individual causal connections. The task of the scientist is to single out particular threads in this web and identify them. Inordertoformulaterulesofinductivelogic,Millseekstosolve,initsmostgeneralform, theproblemofisolatingcausalconnections.Itistheanalysisofthisprocess,thesolution toageneraltypeofproblemthatformsthescientificbasisofinductivelogic.Millwrites, Tocertainfacts,certainfactsalwaysdo,and,aswebelieve,willcontinueto,succeed. The invariable antecedent is termed the cause; the invariable consequent, the effect. Andtheuniversalityofthelawofcausationconsistsinthis,thateveryconsequentis connectedinthismannerwithsomeparticularantecedent,orsetofantecedents.(Mill, 1974,p.327). The universality of the law of causation is “the source from which the canons of the Inductive Logic derive their validity” (Mill, 1974, p. 327). Logic,Liberty,andAnarchy 609 Mill’sanalysisofcausationdisclosesaprinciplerelatingaphenomenon(thesolutionto a characteristic type of problem), and a process that produces that phenomenon (the mentalprocessofcausalreasoning).Mill’srulesofinductivereasoningaretherulesofart based on that “scientific” principle. ConsidertheMethodofDifference.Mill’sdiscussionofithasthreeelements.First,he states a rule of art. Second, he notes the “axioms” involved in the use of this method. Third, he states a “canon,” which is a “regulating principle” of the method. The rule of art is the following: IfourobjectbetodiscovertheeffectsofanagentA,wemustprocureAinsomeset of ascertained circumstances, as A B C, and having noted the effects produced, comparethemwiththeeffectoftheremainingcircumstancesBC,whenAisabsent. IftheeffectofABCisabc,andtheeffectofBC,bc,itisevidentthattheeffect ofAisa.(Mill,1974,p.391) Herethemethodisstatedasahypotheticalimperative,tellingtheinvestigatorwhatsteps to follow, conditional on her having a certain aim, and then indicating what conclusion maybedrawnfromaspecificoutcomeofperformingtheprocedure.Thisisclearlyarule of art. Millthenliststwoaxioms“impliedinthismethod.”First,“Whateverantecedentcannot be excluded without preventing the phenomenon, is the cause, or a condition, of that phenomenon.” Second, “Whatever consequent can be excluded, with no other difference in the antecedents than the absence of a particular one, is the effect of that one” (Mill, 1974, p. 391). These axioms follow directly from Mill’s discovery that the cause of a phenomenon is the collection of antecedent conditions, on the occurrence of which the occurrence of the phenomenon itself is invariably and unconditionally consequent. Finally, the canon, or “regulating principle” of the Method of Difference is the following: Ifaninstanceinwhichthephenomenonunderinvestigationoccurs,andaninstancein which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurringonlyintheformer;thecircumstanceinwhichalonethetwoinstancesdiffer, istheeffect,orthecause,oranindispensablepartofthecause,ofthephenomenon. (Mill,1974,p.391) Thecanonsoccupyamiddlegroundbetweentherulesofartstatedinthemethods,and theabstractscientificprinciplesstatedintheaxioms.Theyshowhowthoseaxiomsapply tothetypeofsituationinwhichtheinquirerisinterested.Thecanonisastatementoffact, formulated like a scientific principle, but so as to be more useful than the axioms to the person seeking to apply the rule of art. MILL’S METHODS: AN “ANTI-RATIONALIST” METHODOLOGY Thisanalysisshowsthattherulesofinductivemethodarerulesofarttowhichtheremight be exceptions. Why should these rules have exceptions? 610 THESOCIALSCIENCEJOURNALVol.36/No.4/1999 Consider again the three general points regarding rules of art made earlier. First, rules ofartmaybeprovisionalbecausetheyareformulatedonthebasisofanimperfectscience. InthePrefacetotheLogic,Millnotesthathehasendeavoredtorefutethosewhodenied theverypossibilityofaninductivelogic“inthemannerinwhichDiogenesconfutedthe skeptical reasonings against the possibility of motion; remembering that Diogenes’ argument would have been equally conclusive, though his individual perambulations might not have extended beyond the circuit of his own tub” (cxiii). Here, Mill seems to hint that his theory might not be complete, while insisting that its very existence is conclusive proof that such a theory is possible. The second way in which the universality of rules of art is limited is through the qualificationsandceterisparibusconditionsthatmightberequiredinafullstatementof the underlying scientific principles. Mill certainly intends for investigators to keep such pointsinmindwhenusinghisinductivemethods.Forexample,onecanapplyMill’srules of induction only on the condition that one has properly described the antecedents and consequents,whichispartlyamatterofobservation.Theexperimentalinvestigatorhasto beginwithadecompositionofthe“chaos”ofantecedentandconsequentconditionstaken as wholes into distinct facts (Mill, 1974, p. 379). Mill insists, however, that one cannot state rules of art for this task (Mill, 1974, p. 379–380). Furthermore, any belief that one has properly represented the facts of observation can only be provisional, and may stand in need of correction. Mill writes, It is only essential, at whatever point our mental decomposition of facts may for the presenthavestopped,thatweshouldholdourselvesreadyandabletocarryitfarther asoccasionrequires,andshouldnotallowthefreedomofourdiscriminatingfaculty tobeimprisonedbytheswathesandbandsofordinaryclassification;aswasthecase with all early speculative inquirers, not excepting the Greeks, to whom it seldom occurred that what was called by one abstract name might, in reality, be several phenomena, or that there was a possibility of decomposing the facts of the universe intoanyelementsbutthosewhichordinarylanguagealreadyrecognized.(Mill,1974, p.381) Here Mill clearly states that any apparently perfect application of his rules of inductive reasoningcouldbeinerrorinawaythatsimplymoreinductionwillnotcorrect.Criticism ofthelanguageusedtodescribethefactsonwhichthatinductionrestsmaybenecessary. The third and final limitation on the universality of rules of art is that the aim that a certain practical rule takes as given might be overridden by some other aim. We know from Mill’s definition of logic as “the science of the operations of the understanding, whicharesubservienttotheestimationofevidence”(Mill,1974,p.12)thattheindividual applying his rules of inference aims to estimate the strength of the evidence for some claim. Notetwothings:First,theaimisnotcollectiveagreementastothetruthofsomeclaim. Second,theaimisnotakeenunderstandingofthemeaningofthepropositioninquestion. Mill writes in the Introduction to the Logic, “The sole object of Logic is the guidance of one’s own thoughts” (Mill, 1974, p. 6). Where the Logic is concerned only with how the individual should go about evaluating the evidence for or against a proposition, with the aim of forming her own beliefs, On Liberty is concerned with social conduct: Logic,Liberty,andAnarchy 611 SupposingIhavemadeupmymindregardingsomeproposition,evenonthebasisofthe appropriatelogicalconsiderations,howshouldItreattheviewsofothers?Whatkindsof responsestodisagreementsarejustified?Inansweringthesequestions,Milldiscoversthat toleration, even encouragement, of views in conflict with one’s own are to one’s own epistemic benefit, and to the benefit of society in general. Furthermore, because of the broader benefits that derive from the clash of opinions, I mightchoosetosetasideMill’srulesforthesakeofthegreatergood.Imightrecognize that for my own selfish interest in evaluating the strength of the evidence, it would be better to stick to the rules, but decide that it would be a greater advantage to my fellow citizens if I defend some view that was otherwise being neglected, even if deep down I suspected there was very little evidence in support of it after all. This is how we might interpret much of what Feyerabend did during his lifetime. Here the aim of helping the community to have access to a broader range of views, and so to a greater chance of learning the truth, supersedes my personal aim of evaluating the evidence for the propositioninquestion.Lloydrightlypointsoutthatthesocialcontextinwhichscientific authority is deployed was a lifelong concern of Feyerabend’s, as well as part of Mill’s broader concern with the use of authority to suppress opinion. Turning to the second point: recall Mill’s claim that a belief that has ceased to be challenged, and hence defended, might lose much of its worth for us, even if it is in fact true. It might come to be held as a “dead dogma.” Although we continue to have a true belief,welackavividapprehensionofitstruth.Hereagain,stickingtotherulesoflogic mayservetheaimofcorrectlyestimatingthestrengthofevidence.Yet,Imightchooseto ignore those rules and mount a quixotic attack on a true belief, in order to provoke a defense of that truth. My aim might be to gain a vivid appreciation of that truth. LOGIC AS A PARTNER TO LIBERTY We can sum up Mill’s position as follows: One can state rules of inductive logic. These are rules of art for evaluating the evidence for any given proposition. They are based on principles derived from an analysis of the kind of problem inductive reasoning seeks to solve:howtoseparateasinglecausalrelationshipfromamixtureofmanydifferentcausal relationships. The rules are provisional insofar as the principles on which they are based might be incomplete or incorrect. The rules are subject to limitations insofar as the principlesonwhichtheyarebasedaresubjecttoqualifications,suchastheconditionthat one must use an appropriate descriptive vocabulary. Finally, these rules are subject to limitationsinsofarasotheraimsmightbemoreimportantthantheaimofdeterminingfor one’sselfthestrengthoftheevidenceforagivenproposition.Onemightaimtoprovoke debate,inordertoencouragecriticismandtheconsiderationofalternatives,andinorder to promote a more vivid apprehension of whatever truths might already be widely believed. For all these reasons, a proponent of Mill’s philosophy, not only as it appears in On Liberty,butasitappearsintheLogic,mightdoallthesortsofthingsthatFeyerabenddid: advocate seemingly discredited theories, look for weak spots in apparently well– confirmed theories, employ polemical tricks and slick arguments on behalf of despised views,etc.ButFeyerabendwasnotaproponentofMill’sphilosophyasitappearsinboth works. Indeed, he seems to have ignored the Logic entirely. Perhaps he should not have. 612 THESOCIALSCIENCEJOURNALVol.36/No.4/1999 Mill, I have argued, would have agreed with Feyerabend’s insistence on the impossi- bilityofformulatinguniversal,exceptionlessrulesofscientificmethodthatcouldalways beusedtoseparatewell-supportedfrompoorly-supportedtheorieswithoutdoingdamage totheprospectsforcontinuedscientificprogress.Nevertheless,Millfounditquiteuseful to go ahead and formulate some rules of practice for use in scientific inquiry. At times, Feyerabend seems open to Mill’s kind of provisional, exception-laden methodology.Clarifyinghisuseofthephrase“anythinggoes,”hewritesthatthisphrase “is the only way in which those firmly committed to universal standards and wishing to understand history in their terms can describe my account of traditions and research practices...If this account is correct then all a rationalist can say about science (and aboutanyotherinterestingactivity)is:anythinggoes”(Feyerabend,1978,p.40,emphasis in original). Implicitly, although a “rationalist” might be reduced to saying “anything goes,” a non-dogmatic methodologist, a person who is willing to venture a theory of scientific method that is provisional, subject to exceptions, and subject to vetoes in the pursuit of other aims, can say many interesting things about inductive reasoning and the evaluation of evidence: this is what Mill did. AlthoughFeyerabenddeniesthat“anythinggoes”constituteshisownviewofscientific method,hisalmostuniformlynegativerhetoricmakesiteasytoconcludethatitis.There is not much to distinguish “anything goes” from “rules tend to get broken,” and one can easily get the impression that Feyerabend has little else of a positive nature to say about howscienceproceeds.Thisispartlyamatterofdifferingaims.Feyerabendwascentrally concernedwiththeproblemsconfrontedbyMillinOnLiberty,whereastheprofessional philosophers at whom Feyerabend aims so many of his barbs are more interested, typically, with the problems addressed in Mill’s Logic. Both Feyerabend and his critics failtonoticethattheLogicitself,althoughitoffersaninductivemethod,doesnotpropose the kind of universal standards that Feyerabend considered threatening to liberty. Although I believe that Feyerabend may at times be receptive to Mill’s kind of provisional theory of scientific method, he is more concerned with how any such theory might be used. Feyerabend worries that theories of confirmation, or of demarcation, will be used to protect an already-too-powerful scientific and intellectual elite against chal- lengesfromoutsidethe“tradition”ofWesternscienceandintellectualism.Heworriesthat theseeliteswillusetheirauthorityandresourcestosquelchdiscussionofalternativesto, notonlyspecifictheories,butalsothebroaderintellectualtraditioninwhichthosetheories cametolife.HereadsOnLibertyasofferingasolutiontothisveryproblem:“Proliferation is introduced [by Mill] as the solution to a problem of life: how can we achieve full consciousness;howcanwelearnwhatwearecapableofdoing;howcanweincreaseour freedomsothatweareabletodecide,ratherthanadoptbyhabit,themannerinwhichwe want to use our talents?” (Feyerabend, 1981, p. 67). Mill tackles this problem with a clearer eye. Although maintaining that even logical rules have exceptions, Mill articulates a science and an art of inductive reasoning. He offersthislogicnotasatrumponallotherdiscussions,atooltohelpscientificauthorities coerce the beliefs of everyone else, but as a tool for everyone—to examine, but also to discard if they wish. It, too, is to be subject to the open discussions encouraged by On Liberty. We sometimes cannot separate the discussion of scientific theories from the discussion of theories of science, as recent debates over creationism, for example, show.