1 Patterns of Personal and Political Life Among Taiwanese-Americans Linda Gail Arrigo Post-Doc, Inst. of Sociology, Academia Sinica, Taipei, 2002-04 Green Party Taiwan International Affairs Officer, 1997-present Tel: (886-2) 2662-3677 Fax: 2662-6897 Mobile: 0928-889-931 E-mail: [email protected] Mail: No. 38, 6F, Tsui-Gu Street, Shen Keng Township, Taipei County 222, TAIWAN 2006 submitted to Taiwan Inquiry, a journal of the North American Taiwanese Professors’ Association (earlier version was presented at the Asian-American Literature Conference May 7, 2005, Chinese College of Culture, Taipei, Taiwan) ABSTRACT Taiwanese migrated to the United States first as graduate students in science fields in the late 1960s and 1970s, and later also as investors and businessmen in the 1980’s and 1990’s. Although within the United States they were classified within the broad ethnic category “Chinese American”, among the migrants the sharp political and cultural divide between native Taiwanese and Chinese “mainlanders” within Taiwan of the early period was reproduced and in fact exaggerated overseas, where the migrants could opt for separate social circles and language usage in private life. Moreover, in the mid-1970’s Hokkien-speaking Taiwanese-Americans took up a strident and relatively unified community position in support of Taiwan’s democratization and independence that deeply affected their personal lives and their relations with their homeland, given the Taiwan government’s overseas network of spies and the blacklisting that denied them the right to return. With the rising clout of the native Taiwanese middle class in Taiwan and then political opening in the late 1980’s, tensions decreased, and the businessmen migrants contributed to the growth of enclaves dubbed “Little Taipei” such as in Flushing, New York and Monterey Park, California, where the native Taiwanese vs. mainlander distinction waned. Despite this politicized context that at one time brought some Taiwanese into contract with international revolutionary movements, Taiwanese-Americans, as part of the secure American middle class and even the military-industrial complex, have generally imbibed a very conservative and pro-American political outlook. Likewise, their personal life perspectives tend to be stable, conventional, and non-confrontational. This pattern continues in their second generation, although here Taiwanese-American youth are increasingly subsumed among the other descendants of the Chinese diaspora, as in their generation they relate mainly to the dominantly white U.S. society. Key words: Taiwanese-American, Chinese-American, Taiwan, Little Taipei, brain drain, migration, diaspora, democratization, Kuomintang (KMT), Democratic Progressive Party, blacklist, exile politics, national liberation movement. 2 Introduction This article is meant to be a loose social history of the Taiwanese-American community from the 1970’s to the present. “Taiwanese” here is meant to specify “native Taiwanese”, ethnically “Han” (ethnic Chinese) living in Taiwan for several generations (i.e. they originated from south China, speaking either Hokkien or Hakka dialects), in contrast to “mainlanders” who came to Taiwan after 1945 from various parts of China together with the government of Chiang Kai-shek [1]. This is an important distinction, but of course it has often been neglected and obscured, parallel to the Chiang regime’s long insistence that Taiwan is only a small part of China, and that there was no internal discontent with its minority rule within Taiwan. For example, Iris Chang’s 2003 book The Chinese in America, devotes one chapter to “The Taiwanese-Americans”, but the description and cases she provides are all “mainlander” migrants from Taiwan, and there is surprisingly no mention of the Hokkien-speaking migrants and their community and political organizations. So I believe the social history to be presented here is a necessary correction to the English literature. But aside from describing the native Taiwanese Americans, I will occasionally mark some of the contrasts with the mainlanders from Taiwan who settled in the United States, and with Taiwanese who has migrated to Japan and elsewhere. This account could be seen as an ethnographic commentary, composed largely of casual observation and anecdote, but hopefully still largely representative. It is written mostly from my own experience as part of the Taiwanese-American community, bonded first by marriage in 1969 and later from 1975 on by participation in the historic events of the Taiwan democratic movement. So I am describing in most detail the “brain drain” generation that migrated from Taiwan to the United States for graduate study in the period of the mid-1960’s to late 1970’s and their political activities of the 1980’s. However, I will also discuss the businessman migrants of the 1980’s and 90’s, the “little study-abroad students” of the 90’s, and the second generation of the migrants. [2] Initial Migration of Native Taiwanese: The Brain Drain, 1970’s When Taiwan was “restored” to the Republic of China in August 1945 following Japan’s surrender, fifty years after it had been occupied, most of the population was literate in Japanese; but this education was not recognized by the new rulers. After a decade the younger generation of native Taiwanese had substantially made the transition from Japanese to Mandarin Chinese, albeit with bitterness over the coercive suppression of their mother tongues by the Nationalist Chinese educational system. The children of mainlanders had some privileges and subsidies for schooling as the dependants of bureaucrats and military, but by the late 1960’s native Taiwanese were at least 70% of the student body in technical fields at the most prestigious university, National Taiwan University (i.e. a little less than the native Taiwanese proportion in the whole population, 85%). In political, diplomatic, and social disciplines the mainlanders clearly predominated, as seen especially at the second-ranked university, National Chengchi University, which was originally founded as a KMT cadres college and specialized in these fields. From some meager population data, and also consistent with Iris Chang’s description, it is my impression that in the 1950’s most migration from Taiwan to the United States was by mainlanders, whose families were still sunk in the refugee experience and mentality. Some with wealth stayed in Taiwan only briefly and then sought the safety of the United States or other countries as soon as possible, fearing the Chinese communists would eventually prevail. Others hedged their bureaucratic positions in Taiwan by sending their sons for study abroad, a route towards obtaining green card status. 3 By the 1960’s, however, the rapid expansion of technically-advanced military, aerospace and nuclear industries in the United States created the “brain drain” that swept tens of thousands of Taiwan youth to graduate school and thence secure employment in the United States. The official numbers for study abroad, which had to be approved by the Ministry of Education until July 1989, are given as follows in five year increments: Table 1. Taiwan Students Going Abroad for Study, Main Countries USA & Australia, UK, France, Total in 5 Students Year Japan Canada N Zealand Germany yr period Abroad 1950-54 1416 0 4 21 1441 3637 1955-59 2645 5 43 303 2996 2553 1960-64 6719 11 206 1041 7977 4564 1965-69 11457 24 364 989 12834 6780 1970-74 9761 27 385 377 10550 12029 1975-79 18537 26 599 776 19938 12250 1980-84 26626 15 575 636 27852 17560 1985-89 35233 64 4762 4303 44362 22590 1990-94 69213 8186 18224 10253 105876 30960 1995-99 78137 14161 33233 8047 133578 36410 2000-2004 79844 15450 46319 8087 149700 29234 Source: This table has been compiled from two tables, 1950-1989 and 1988-2004, on the ROC Ministry of Education website. There are numerous inconsistencies in the original tables. During 1989 the requirement for approval of study abroad by the Ministry of Education was deleted; and the sources of information change after this and the figures suddenly escalate. Appreciation to Dr. Jerome Keating for pointing me to this source. Total for going abroad for study in the five-year period is just for the countries in prior columns, and does not include sizeable later numbers for Singapore (600-800 in 2004), Southeast Asia, or other European countries (875 in 2004), etc., or the small figures given for “Other” for the period 1950-89 (maximum 122). Numbers of students abroad is taken from numbers on a chart on the Ministry of Education website, apparently those currently known to have student status. The data given is the first year in the five-year period. The peak is in the year 1994, at 37,580. Note that after 1990 there are many fewer abroad at one time relative to total numbers going abroad for study in the period, implying that the majority are in short-term programs. Averaging the students abroad at the beginning and end of the period and dividing by the number of students who have gone abroad, we obtain the following indices: 1950-54 2.15 1980-84 0.72 1955-59 1.19 1985-89 0.60 1960-64 0.71 1990-94 0.32 1965-69 0.73 1995-99 0.25 1970-74 1.15 2000-04 0.20 1975-79 0.75 4 By the end of 1974, nearly 32,000 students had gone to study in North America. Probably less than 10% returned to Taiwan after completion of study. One might suspect U.S. geo-political strategy in this cultivation of youth from Taiwan. The general impression is that 90% of the graduates of National Taiwan University in engineering fields went to the U.S., the vast majority with financial aid in the form of scholarships and research assistantships. Otherwise, U.S. tuition was prohibitive, and for the hard-working student from some country village, even the airplane ticket (say US$400) was a challenge barely met through pooling family and community resources. (In 1960’s Taiwan the monthly salary for an office worker was about US$25.) With their poor English language skills, Taiwanese students and their wives in the States often eked out a living as waiters and workers in Chinese restaurants. The peak of numbers going to Japan in 1960-69, I believe, reflects the preferences of Taiwanese who spoke some Japanese from pre-1945 schooling or through their parents; but the numbers of students with such linguistic background dropped within the following decade. Continuing the pattern of study established during the Japanese period, many studied medicine. Doctors were the few elite representatives of native Taiwan society during the Japanese colonial period, and likewise have been prominent in opposition to Kuomintang rule. Native Taiwanese students in Japan often came into contact with the Taiwan independence organizations that were established there in the 1950’s and 60’s. A fair number became political prisoners in the mid-1960’s after their return to Taiwan. One such example is Dr. Chen Chung-tung of Yungho, Taipei County, who went to Japan to study medicine, joined Ku Kuan-min’s underground organization, and was arrested in 1965, newly married, the year after his return, for recruiting others to the Taiwan independence goals. Ironically, the name his father gave him in the Japanese period could be taken to mean “China united”. During his ten years imprisonment, he served as the clinic doctor at the Taiwan Garrison Command prison at Jingmei, south of Taipei, and was thus able to compile about four hundred names to add to the list of political prisoners that was smuggled out in 1971 and published abroad. [2] There are a large number of Taiwanese in Japan, and also many Taiwanese-Japanese marriages, including Japanese marrying Taiwan indigenous women, especially Atayal and Truku. But rigid Japanese laws restricting residence rights and naturalization made it difficult for Taiwanese to achieve citizenship status in Japan. The Japanese government also tacitly allowed Taiwan dissidents to be kidnapped from Japan by the ROC security agencies. The Taiwanese community in Japan was very fearful of public activity, through to the 1980’s. In the late 1960’s and 1970’s, America was the land of opportunity. Once the student had completed his degree in the United States, his prospects were good. Citizenship was a prerequisite for the military-industrial complex, but somehow this was usually expedited. In fact some American blacks grumbled that they had struggled for affirmative action, only to see choice technical jobs go to recently-arrived Asians – predominantly from Taiwan, because at that time there was little migration from Korea and none from mainland China – , Asians who had no identification with American minorities, and no critical sense of the role of the military-industrial structures they worked for. The native Taiwanese may have had a slight advantage over mainlanders from Taiwan in this: security clearance was easier for those who had no relatives living under communist control. However, poor English and limited integration into American culture kept these technical specialists below positions of management and authority. This association with the American military-industrial complex has perhaps accentuated the conservative tendencies of the Taiwanese-American community, though the diversity of professional employment seems to have gradually expanded, to medical research and practice, aerospace and aviation (e.g. Boeing), non-military engineering (e.g. electricity utilities), professorships, etc. 5 The few native Taiwanese who came to the United States in this early period to seek advanced degrees in sociology and political science were for the most part unable to find employment in their field, not surprising because of limited English proficiency, and were forced to find practical business opportunities. Two examples of this are found in a recent book of interviews with Taiwanese-American community leaders in the New York area. [3] Both Lee Cheng-san and Patrick Huang (Huang Dzai-tien), long active in Taiwanese community organizations in the New York area, began sociology studies in 1968 and 1974 respectively, but they have had to make their living through restaurant and real estate businesses. Rather, Patrick’s family with two sons for many years depended on wife Sharon’s salary as an accountant, while he devoted himself to Taiwan independence activities. Those who went to the United States to study political science, international relations, or sociology on Taiwan government scholarship were predominantly mainlanders, but did include a few Taiwanese in cooperation with the ruling KMT, such as Parris Chang (Chang Hsu-cheng), who went to study at the University of Washington in Seattle in the mid-1960’s and later became chair of the Political Science Department at University of Pennsylvania, College Park. But such Taiwanese have still been able to make the transition to Taiwan identity politics; in 1993 Dr. Chang was appointed a Democratic Progressive Party National Legislator. Many mainlanders in social sciences got their Ph.D.’s at conservative Southern or religious institutions, such as St. John’s in Queens, New York; and if they did not return to government or KMT party service in Taiwan, they often became professors at like institutions, where they represented the KMT version of Chinese and Taiwan history in academic debates. As for lifestyle, the technocratic and academic salarymen generally lived in the standard middle-class suburbs or in college towns, in large, minimally-furnished tract houses, to make the most of income tax deductions and rising property values. Some were exposed to black neighborhoods if their universities were in the inner city, as at University of Chicago, but for the most part Taiwanese-Americans avoided racial issues and particularly black neighborhoods, to protect their investment, while they became deeply engrossed in their own Taiwanese-American activities. Wives generally also had come originally as students, even though they likely met their husbands in Taiwan before graduate study. Some, like Lee Cheng-san, were married in the relatively traditional context of 1960’s Taiwan, and left their wives and children for a few years with the extended family of their parents, before they brought their wives to the United States. Either way, wives rarely had the luxury of devoting themselves to study or childcare; their quick contribution to family finances was imperative, because the husband’s career took precedence. In middle age, some wives complained that they had given up their studies at the master’s level, to support the husband’s Ph.D. studies, and were left with boring medical technician and library jobs for the next twenty years. In the early period, however, aside from marrying a classmate or a classmate’s sister, a student on the way to a Ph.D. could come back to Taiwan for a brief trip after years of forlorn student bachelorhood, and quickly get a wife through introduction by family and matchmakers, due to the prestige and bright prospects of studying abroad. Such was the background of the Chung Chao-man case, in 1969 or 1970. Let me indulge here in relating one sensational case. Short, dark, and taciturn, and in the last year of Ph.D. studies at University of California, San Diego, Chung was smitten with a pretty, petite, vivacious Hakka girl surnamed Tang, whose parents reportedly persuaded her to marry him. Her father was an ROC representative to Mexico, in nearby Tijuana. But Tang became involved with a quirky grad student, also Taiwanese, and a few months later demanded a divorce from her husband. Perhaps his upcoming thesis orals added to his exasperation. After an all-night argument overheard by Taiwanese neighbors in the student apartments, there was abrupt silence. Two days later, San Diego police came to the campus to ask assistance from other Taiwanese students in explaining a cryptic telegram from Taiwan. In a week, the 6 whole story emerged. Chung Chao-man had killed his wife with a kitchen cleaver, wrapped her body in a sleeping bag that he put in the back of his car, and flew back to Taiwan, where he gave himself up to police. In Taiwan there was public sympathy for Chung, wronged by his wife’s adultery. But Annette Lu (Lu Hsiu-lien), founder of Taiwan’s early women’s movement and now Vice President of Taiwan, in 1970 wrote newspaper articles to challenge the husband’s presumed right to avenge his honor. [4] Chung was sentenced to seven years. After his release he was still able to take up a professional career in Taiwan. But such a tale of adultery was quite exceptional for the Taiwanese migrants. Rather, to my impression they tended to staid, conventional relationships in marriage, extremely stable, and even more so than among their age mates back in Taiwan. That is, whereas the Taiwanese-Americans tended to reside somewhat isolated in college towns and simple professional communities, back home businessmen were often feted at girlie bars, the society tacitly condoned men maintaining second wives, and there were more environments where potential partners speaking the same language could be found. Other Routes of Migration in the 1960’s and 1970’s Also, during the period when there were thousands of U.S. troops and officers in Taiwan, especially in support of the war in Vietnam, about mid-1960’s to early 1970’s, a fair number of enlisted men and NCO’s married Taiwanese women, often less educated women whom they might have met in bars, tourist shops and dance halls around Lin Shen North Road. For one such couple I knew in Taiwan in about 1967, their five-year-old son provided translation for communication between them. To my knowledge, if the women went to the States with their husbands, the marriages were basically stable (because the women were long-suffering and fatalistic, as well as devoted to their children), and the women became accustomed to American life, despite loneliness in their huge tract homes. Also, once the wife had achieved U.S. citizenship after three years of residence, it was relatively easy in those days for her siblings and parents to obtain visas and then green cards, and so her migration was a boon for her family members, who might apply their Taiwanese spirit of enterprise and hard work to restaurants or dry-cleaning shops. But twenty years later, after seeing the advance of prosperity in Taiwan and the accumulation of houses by working class people who were able to take the initiative in their own society and saved hard and bought houses, while they migrated, some women who married GI’s or spent time as laborers in South America regretted that decision. That is, they regretted moving to a foreign land where they could only be marginal or dependant. The men they married only rarely learned any Chinese, and there were unlikely to be other Taiwanese near the mid-Western hometowns of U.S. military men. They had to assimilate to American society on its own terms. The apparent alienation of such women migrants from their own culture can perhaps be shown in one example that now has an interesting denouement in the next generation. Tony Coolidge is an American who only in his late twenties began to try to trace his Asian ancestry. He did not know until after his mother’s untimely death that his heritage was an indigenous tribe of northern Taiwan, the Atayal in Wulai, a mountainous hot springs area south of Taipei that has long been a center of tourism. He found that his mother was one of three daughters who married American military men, following on an aunt who married to the U.S. in 1962. The family ran a tourist hotel. Tony was born in 1967; his teenage mother was deserted by a GI who was transferred back to the States. Two years later, she married an American intelligence officer, bore another son and a daughter, and followed her husband to assignments in Germany and Korea. Tony painfully saw her loneliness; some twenty years later, divorced, she was able to join her sisters in Florida, but she never returned to Taiwan. Tony married a Taiwanese woman he met in the university, and in 1995 he sought out his relatives in Taiwan. Deeply impressed by the warmth of his Atayal uncles and cousins, he set up an organization and a website, www.atayal.com, and in October 2004 put together a festival of indigenous cultures, native American and Taiwanese, in Orlando, Florida. [5] 7 Some low-income, limited-education native Taiwanese were able to leave Taiwan in the way of migration to Brazil, Central America, and some other Latin American countries, as did Japanese, in the 1970’s. Some mainlanders, fearful Taiwan would soon capitulate to the communists, went to South America or even Africa soon after 1950, for lack of a better destination. Many of these migrants, or their children, re-migrated later to the United States; hence there are some young Taiwanese-Americans and Chinese-Americans with Hispanic names and fluency in Spanish or Portuguese, or even more exotic languages. The Rise of Formosan Nationalism: Taiwanese-American Community Organizations By the late 1960’s, the number of native Taiwanese students in the United States began to reach a critical mass, at least enough to lead to small eruptions of dissent. Kansas State University at Manhattan, Kansas, was the site of one successful struggle, one from which many of the participants went on to become the founding force of the United Formosans for Independence. This struggle was recently recounted by N.H. Wang (Wang Neng-hsiang) on August 2, 2005, in an interview at the National History Institute in Hsintien, south of Taipei. N.H.’s story is illustrative of the dedication of hundreds of Taiwanese youth abroad at this time. [6] “N.H.”, born in 1933 in Nandze District of Kaohsiung City, became an abandoned child wandering the countryside for three years after his father, who fled China in 1912 (defeated Manchu supporters) and was registered as “Chinese”, was interred by the Japanese authorities during World War II. N.H. witnessed executions in Kaohsiung during 2-2-8. Despite the gaps in his education and inability to speak Mandarin Chinese, he was able to graduate from National Taiwan University in political science in 1959. His knack for taking tests brought him good positions in the post office and the customs service, but his experience as a native Taiwanese in the mainlander-dominated bureaucracy left him with deep resentment of the KMT’s discrimination and political control. He went to the United States in Fall 1965, choosing Kansas State because it provided full scholarship and support. N.H. arrived just in time to take up the task of demanding university recognition for the Formosan Student Association; the administration would provide subsidies for only one foreign student group from each country. After a formal hearing by the administration, the Chinese Student Association was displaced in favor of the Formosans, a cause for great celebration. In Winter 1966, N.H. participated in the founding meeting of the United Formosans for Independence, in Philadelphia. The Taiwan authorities retaliated by revoking N.H.’s passport, and two years after arriving he was stateless and blacklisted, and unable to bring his wife from Taiwan, resulting in divorce some years later. N.H.’s childhood history here as “Chinese” is unusual; more common for the early migrants is an impoverished childhood in the countryside, especially given conditions of wartime and early ROC rule. E.g., Patrick Huang’s right arm is underdeveloped and minimally usable because he fell out of a tree as a child, and his family had no money for medical treatment. Lee Cheng-san’s family was left destitute after his father, a member of farmers’ rights movements in the Japanese period, was involved in armed resistance during 2-2-8 and hid for seven years. In 1969 another student activist, Cary Hong (Hong Dze-sheng), and friends drove around the United States to visit campuses and collect the name lists of Chinese student associations and related groups. N.H. made up name lists of Taiwanese everywhere he went by telephoning all the Chinese names in the phone book and selecting those who answered with a Taiwanese accent. N.H. was editor of three publications that were mailed out: Wang Chun 8 Fong (Hoping for the Spring Breeze) and Taiwan Ren-chuan Wen-hua (Taiwan Human Rights Culture), handwritten in Chinese characters, and Independent Taiwan in typewritten English. In the next few years N.H. went on to orchestrate a campaign for writing letters to the editor to challenge China Lobby control of American public opinion, and in 1972 he moved to Washington D.C. to concentrate on lobbying the U.S. Congress. N.H. made his living as a certified public accountant. It is difficult to gauge the impact of this early footwork. There was a deep pall of fear; reportedly, Taiwanese students would not dare to borrow from the library George Kerr’s account of the 1947 massacres, Formosa Betrayed, finally published in 1966, for fear that the circulation list could be obtained by spies, and they would turn the pages with chopsticks so as not to leave fingerprints. Every campus had “professional students” who made monthly reports, and who could exaggerate reports out of spite or to claim achievement in gathering intelligence. But to external impressions, in the early years there was very little politicization among the community of students who could speak Mandarin Chinese, more or less: these included students from Hong Kong and Malaysia as well as Taiwan, both native Taiwanese and mainlander. They picnicked and celebrated Chinese New Years and the Moon Festival with potluck dinners; all had meager budgets, and a few had small children. But this easy community changed precipitously in 1970. In January 1970 the famous professor of international law Peng Ming-min, under house arrest in Taiwan after his 1966 attempt to distribute a pamphlet demanding Taiwan self-determination, suddenly surfaced in Sweden. In April a Cornell student in sociology, Peter Huang (Huang Wen-hsiung), attempted to assassinate Chiang Ching-kuo, heir apparent, in New York City. Then in 1970 and 1971 students in Taiwan and overseas mobilized to protest the U.S. return of some small rocky islets northeast of Taiwan (Diaoyutai, “fishing platforms”, in Chinese or Senkaku Islands in Japanese) to Japan together with Okinawa. Ostensibly at first called in support of ROC claims, the demonstrations overseas turned into a movement against the Chiang Kai-shek regime, and in favor of the Peoples Republic of China. Especially the sons and daughters of KMT bureaucrats seemed to turn into instant Red Guards; their shrillness no doubt reflected all the torturous contradictions of KMT propaganda, as well as confrontations with parents frozen in the trauma of the Chinese civil war. Later the Diaoyutai Movement was said to be taking instructions from Huang Hua, the PRC ambassador to Canada. Nixon was also courting rapprochement with China. The Cantonese-Americans went wild with excitement: for a hundred years they had sired the next generation with returns to their native villages, but they had been cut off from their Chinese heritage by anti-communist paranoia since 1949. The PRC’s 1971 accession to the China seat in the United Nations, long overdue, sealed the delegitimization of the Republic of China regime on Taiwan. At this point the reaction of the students from Taiwan split abruptly between native Taiwanese and mainlanders, with mainlanders insisting Taiwan was part of China, and native Taiwanese quietly demurring. Most importantly, the formation of Taiwan identity that was embryonic in the 1960’s began a life of its own in 1970-71. The Taiwan independence movement, which until that time had been mostly centered in Japan, was reorganized in 1971 under U.S.-based leadership as the World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI, colloquially referred to in English as “woofy”, and in Chinese as “du meng”); this united groups in Japan, Europe, the U.S., Canada, and Brazil, whose membership was kept secret except for a few public figures. In 1970-71, Taiwanese-American associations (Taiwan Compatriot Associations, or “tong 9 hsiang huei”) began springing up all over the United States. Though they put on a non-political front at first, merely forming communities of Hokkien-speakers for social activities and mutual assistance, the opposition to KMT-forced assimilation to Mandarin Chinese was implicit, and they soon became reservoirs for assistance to the native Taiwanese opposition in Taiwan. WUFI sought out and secretly inducted the most active members of the community organizations, and fought off attempts by the KMT to infiltrate and water down their programs. A world-wide association of Taiwanese clubs was formed in 1973, and it held annual conferences where inevitably the future of Taiwan was discussed, and exiled political figures were asked to address the central sessions. In addition to the world conference held at various locations, four or five regional conferences throughout the U.S. would be held over the Fourth of July weekend, renting U.S. campus facilities, combining adult political and cultural activities with family recreation, usually with about 300-500 families attending each. The congregations of Christian churches which spoke Hokkien, usually Presbyterian as an extension of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, played an even more militant role of promoting Taiwanese identity and independence. The ROC and its consulates responded by forming their own Taiwan Friendship Associations, speaking Mandarin, and featuring subsidized recreation and entertainment with no political content, or merely cultural expression of the motifs of Chinese nationalism, i.e. supporting tours of Peking opera and dance, and sending summertime teachers to the Chinese language weekend schools. More sinister were the networks of “professional students” on every campus, usually with government scholarship, that were paid to make reports on their fellow students, intimidate the few students who dared to be critical of the regime, and stop the spread of unfavorable information and activities. [7] I was once told in the late 1980’s that the KMT spy network even extended into professional life: that there were informants among employees at IBM in New York State. The KMT networks operated nearly openly with the apparent tacit consent of American security agencies such as the FBI, despite U.S. laws against acting as the agent of a foreign government. The consequences of being identified as opposition could be serious: loss of ROC passport, blacklisting for re-entry to Taiwan and jobs in government institutions (especially damaging for those with high education), harassment of relatives in Taiwan, and even arrest on return to Taiwan. In one early notable case, a graduate student at University of Hawaii, Chen Yu-hsi, was kidnapped from Japan in 1968 because of his involvement in anti-Vietnam War activities, and sentenced to seven years; under international pressure he served only four years and was allowed to return to Hawaii in 1975. Dr. Chen Wen-chen, a professor at Carnegie Mellon University, who was also secretly a member of Taiwan Era, a leftist Taiwan independence organization, was found murdered the day after he was taken in for questioning by the Taiwan Garrison Command, during a trip back to Taiwan in July 1981. [9] Rita Yeh (Yeh Dao-lei), a young mainlander studying sociology at the University of Minnesota, was arrested after return to Taiwan and sentenced to fourteen years in January 1981 based partly on her activities in the U.S., 1974-77. [10] Rita Yeh was released after seven years, but has not appeared to talk about her experience. All of these cases depended on intelligence gathered in the United States. Despite the overall political conservatism of the Taiwanese-American community, the ideals of the 1960’s civil rights, social justice, and anti-war movements in the United States and Europe did resound with many Taiwanese, especially those from impoverished rural backgrounds; it may be hard it envision now, but a select few Taiwanese were involved in organizing Mexican tomato-pickers in the mid-West, hung out with the Students for a Democratic Society, or traveled to Nicaragua to observe the revolutionary social milieu there. Even the conservative World United Formosans for Independence flaunted liberal leftists like Cary Hong, as if to take on a radical cachet that proved they were serious revolutionaries like the South Africans or the Palestinians. 10 For comparison, the Taiwanese students in Europe also took up some of the political tone of the countries they resided in, to my experience. Their fields of study were also different from those who went to the States: Taiwan students studied art in Paris, music in Vienna, and law and social welfare in Germany. The detailed statistics of the Ministry of Education show that numbers of students went to France earlier than to Germany. Taiwanese students in Germany and Sweden formed at least a few disciplined, closely coordinated Marxist organizations. Those in France spoke with revolutionary romanticism, in grandiose Maoist jargon, while lounging in smoke-filled cafes. The European cadres of World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI) were sharply critical of the pro-Americanism of the U.S. organization; but they were far in the minority in the whole membership, in which the Taiwanese-Americans with natural science backgrounds predominated. An outcome of a working class background among migrants to Latin America was that the Taiwanese in Brazil were among the most militant in opposition to the KMT and more ready to use violent means; Su Bing’s (Shih Ming, based in Tokyo) leftist Taiwan independence underground network, which carried out sabotage bombings on KMT facilities such as the Central News Agency in Taipei, had active cells there in the 1970’s and 80’s. The Kaohsiung Incident, 1979: Concern for Homeland Leads Taiwanese towards the American Political Process The Taiwan democratic movement of 1978-79, culminating in the Formosa Magazine organization and the Kaohsiung Incident, December 10, 1979, and the subsequent trials, galvanized the overseas native Taiwanese of all stripes. A community and church telephone news service founded in 1978 by Eileen Chang (Chang Yang Yi-yi) of Jamaica, N.Y., “Voice of Taiwan”, quickly became a beacon for quick communications. The Voice of Taiwan originally just provided a recorded telephone message about upcoming community events to the caller. But in November 1978, Eileen thought to call up the number in Taiwan given for the newly-formed Non-KMT Candidates Campaign Coalition – my home number, since my husband at the time, former political prisoner Shih Ming-teh, was the General Secretary. With the relative immunity of a white American, I relayed the news of the rapid coalescence of the opposition forces, despite tapped phones. Eileen compiled that with other smuggled information sources and analyses to record a daily news report. Voice of Taiwan spread across the Taiwanese-American communities, because anyone could dedicate a telephone line and an answering machine to the task, and in 1980 it had some thirty lines, with some reporting in Mandarin and Hakka and English, as well as in Hokkien. The network printed up cards with all the lines listed, so that any visitor from Taiwan could get the news that was censored in Taiwan as immediately as possible, and could also link up with Taiwanese-American community groups wherever they were, to follow the tumultuous events in Taiwan. The overseas organizations that had emerged in 1978-79 to report on and support the democratic movement in Taiwan reached a critical mass as they responded to the crackdown subsequent on the Kaohsiung Incident. In these dozen months, especially with the breakthrough of the “dangwai” opposition movement to public action, the overseas supporters had formed multiple links with the opposition figures in Taiwan, adding political participation to their occasional trips home to see aging parents or develop business opportunities. They knew personally many of those on trial in March and April 1980, e.g. through activities organized by the community groups and churches. Lawyer Yao Chia-wen, for example, had been in the United States in 1975 for several months on an Asia Foundation grant to study legal aid programs.