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Libya in Western Foreign Policies, 1911–2011 PDF

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Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World Libya in Western Foreign Policies, 1911—2011 SASKIA VAN GENUGTEN Security, Confl ict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World Series Editors Effi e G. H. Pedaliu LSE-Ideas London, United Kingdom John W. Young University of Nottingham Nottingham, United Kingdom The Palgrave Macmillan series, S ecurity, Confl ict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World aims to make a signifi cant contribution to academic and policy debates on cooperation, confl ict and security since 1900. It evolved from the series Global Confl ict and Security edited by Professor Saki Ruth Dockrill. The current series welcomes proposals that offer inno- vative historical perspectives, based on archival evidence and promoting an empirical understanding of economic and political cooperation, con- fl ict and security, peace-making, diplomacy, humanitarian intervention, nation-building, intelligence, terrorism, the infl uence of ideology and religion on international relations, as well as the work of international organisations and non-governmental organisations. For information on our Global Confl ict and Security series click here. More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/14489 Saskia   Van Genugten Libya in Western Foreign Policies, 1911–2011 Saskia   Van Genugten Emirates Diplomatic Academy Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates Security, Confl ict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World ISBN 978-1-137-48949-4 ISBN 978-1-137-48950-0 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-48950-0 Library of Congress Control Number: 2016936393 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2 016 The author(s) has/have asserted their right(s) to be identifi ed as the author(s) of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifi cally the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfi lms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specifi c statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the pub- lisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. Printed on acid-free paper This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature The registered company is Macmillan Publishers Ltd. London A CKNOWLEDGMENTS This book would never have reached completion without the support of others. I would like to express gratitude to all those who made positive contributions to the research conducted during my time in the graduate program of Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and beyond. I am deeply indebted to Professor Erik Jones, and to Professor Karim Mezran, Professor Dirk Vandewalle, Professor Camille Pecastaing and Professor David P. Calleo. I thank them for the expertise and skills transferred as well as the guidance, trust and friend- ship given. With regard to the research, many people gave me assistance in several archives. I thank Anna Landolfi of ENI and Flavia Magnolfi of UNICREDIT in particular. I also want to mention two women whose professional and academic “tutelage” and encouragement—probably without them even realizing it—have been very infl uential in putting me on my current path: Professor Beatrice de Graaf and Ambassador Stella Ronner-Grubačić. My gratitude also goes out to Dr. Timo Behr, who has shown tremendous patience with me and who has been supportive throughout the process of getting this text ready for publication. I am extremely grateful to my parents, Ruud van Genugten and Marianne Gevers, for their general and generous support. I thank my brother Paul for his comradeship, his inexhaustible wit and his great editing skills and I thank my brother Richard, who has remained with me in spirit during this entire project after teaching me that one should live in the moment, v vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS and make it matter. I would like to add that the research that formed the basis for this book would not have been possible without the fi nancial and material support of SAIS Johns Hopkins University—in particular the Bologna Center, the Compagnia di San Paolo, Mr. Robert J. Abernethy and the Royal Dutch Institute in Rome. C ONTENTS 1 Introduction 1 2 Libya’s Origins: The Colonial Scraps of North Africa 7 3 Libya During the World Wars: Other People’s Battlefi eld 2 5 4 Libya: A By-Product of Great Power Politics 4 5 5 The “Cyrenaican” King and the Anglo-A merican Alliance 5 9 6 Qaddafi ’s Coup: Erasing Historical Deviations 8 1 7 Reagan and Libya: Bullying the Rogue 105 8 Reconciliation and Fighting Islamic Extremism Together 1 27 9 Post-Qaddafi Libya: Wishful Transitional Thinking 1 47 Bibliography 1 65 Index 1 79 vii CHAPTER 1 Introduction Libya has a short but volatile history. The desert lands between Egypt and Tunisia have undergone major changes ever since Italian colonialism imposed on the local inhabitants the idea of belonging to a territory with defi ned boundaries and a centralized authority. After the Second World War, external powers established Libya as an independent state, a deci- sion made in the framework of the United Nations (UN). The UN itself was, back then, an experimental way of trying to impose on international politics some form of global governance through interstate consultation mechanisms. In the newly invented United Kingdom of Libya, a reluctant, British-backed monarchy replaced ruthless colonial rule. After 18 years in power, in 1969, a group of young military offi cers overthrew the rule of King Idris al Sanussi and replaced it with a radical, overenthusiastically authoritarian and anti-Western republic. Mu’ammer el-Qaddafi then brought 42 years of oppressive stability to Libya, based on a cult around his personality, around shared griev- ances against the West and the forceful suppression of dissent. His regime disposed of an effective manipulative mechanism to retain authority as it could control the top-down redistribution of wealth from the export of natural resources.1 By consequently absorbing the great majority of 1 See for example Hazem Beblawi, “The rentier state in the Arab world”, in Giacomo Luciani (ed), The Arab state, University of California Press, 1990, pp. 85–98; and Michael L. Ross, “Does oil hinder democracy?” World Politics 53 (3) 2001, pp. 325–61. Applied to © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016 1 S. Van Genugten, Libya in Western Foreign Policies, 1911–2011, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-48950-0_1 2 S. VAN GENUGTEN Libyans as employees of the state bureaucracy, the regime made a criti- cal mass dependent on its goodwill. Political opposition could not only lead to prison or worse, but also to job loss or the withholding of social benefi ts affecting entire families. At the same time, Qaddafi knew to keep the Libyan bureaucracy and especially the security institutions in a state of continuous fl ux. The chaotic changing of institutions and a myriad of reporting lines was part of a strategy to mitigate the risks of coup attempts as it prevented the development of alternative power centers within state institutions. Libya’s fate turned again when in 2011, in the wake of popular upris- ings in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt, Britain and France initiated and led an intervention that empowered a plethora of Libyan opposition groups, both abroad and within the country. In the absence of any well- established or uncontested state structures, the opposition organized itself through local, informal networks of loyalty, establishing local militias and local governance structures. The short-term political objective of toppling Qaddafi initially united the rebels. However, beyond that shared goal lin- gered irreconcilable visions of what a future, post-Qaddafi Libya should look like. The international coalition that ultimately triggered the down- fall of Qaddafi and his regime expected their military intervention and the following political transition to be short and successful, with a change of regime causing few negative regional and global consequences. Ideas about developing a new Libya were simplistic: the West and its partners would back the National Transitional Council (NTC) and the loosely related militia. The West expected the Libyans – wealthy and highly educated on paper – to need little postwar assistance and imag- ined that they would work together towards a more liberal and more business-friendly future. Unfortunately, the assumptions underlying that best-case scenario turned out to be utterly fl awed and post-Qaddafi Libya descended into civil war. Libya remained marred by centrifugal forces pulling the country apart. Once again, the United Nations had become the framework through which the international community tried to fi nd common ground between the warring parties and the different regions, in order to prevent the break-up of its own creation – the independent, unifi ed state of Libya. Libya, see Dirk Vandewalle, Libya since independence: oil and state-building , I.B. Tauris, 1998.

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