© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com CAMPAIGN 282 LEYTE 1944 Return to the Philippines CLAYTON K. S. CHUN ILLUSTRATED BY GIUSEPPE RAVA   Series editor Marcus Cowper   © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com CONTENTS ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN 5  CHRONOLOGY 9  OPPOSING COMMANDERS 12  US commanders Japanese commanders n OPPOSING FORCES 16  US forces Japanese forces in the Philippines Order of battle n n OPPOSING PLANS 24  US plans Japanese plans n THE CAMPAIGN 30  Initial moves A-Day: October 20 A-Day+1: On to Leyte Valley The Battle of Leyte Gulf Securing n n n n the Leyte Valley Kenney’s air power grounded Securing the Ormoc Valley Suzuki’s last gamble: n n n Burauen From Deposito to Ormoc The last stand: Palompon n n AFTERMATH 88  THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY 93  FURTHER READING 94  INDEX 95   © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com The approach to Leyte, July–October 1944. N XXXX4thFleet(bypassed)Truk Islands XX 1USMC (from Guadalcanal) NewIreland XXXXX8thAreaImamura(bypassed) Britain w e N 15 JuneMarianaSaipanIslandsTinian24 JulyXXXX21 July5thGuamFleetSpruance 3–13 June3–13 June3–13 June CarolineIslands CIFIC OCEAN ay XXXXXSWPAForcesMacArthurBismarckSea22 April NORTHEASTNEW GUINEA PAPUA M A 2 2 P Battle ofPhilippine Sea, 18–19 June. XXXXWPTFHalsey30 March3–18 June Ulithi30 March Yap 30 MarchPalauIslandsPeleliu30 March3–13 June7–8 Sep XXXTF56Mitscher Battle offBiak 8–9 June. 27 May Biak2 July NoemfoorHollandia DUTCHNEW GUINEA ne 16 Ju 15–17Sept XXXXXSWPAForcesMacarthur ea S ne a XXXXXXXXSouthForceSouthernPhilippines SeaLuzon XXXX 14th PHILIPPINEISLANDSSep–OctSouthChinaMindoroXXXX3rdSeaFleetSamarHalsey15 Ju17–20PanayLeyteXXXXXOct24 SepNegrosSWPAXXXXCebuForcesCenterXXXXBoholForceMacArthur35XXXXPalawan7thFleetMindanaoKinkaid14 JuneXXXX 6th12–14 SepOzawaKrueger NORTHBORNEOTalaud Celebes Sea Morotai15 SepXXXXXBORNEO2ndHalmaheraArea CelebesCeramXXXX 19th US carrier strikesBand500 miles0 500km0 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN In early 1942 the Japanese had rolled to victory throughout Asia and the Pacific. The United States, Australia, Great Britain, the Netherlands, China, MacArthur had suffered one of the US Army’s greatest defeats and other powers feared that Japan would sweep away any opposition in in her history during the fight their quest for expansion. At the time, the chance of mounting a major for the Philippines in 1942. The campaign against Tokyo seemed remote. However, by the summer of 1944 Japanese defeated a combined the strategic picture had changed in favor of the Allied Powers in all theaters. American and Filipino force that was numerically larger, but American and British forces had landed in Normandy. Italy was no longer in some instances poorly wholly under Fascist control. The Soviet Union continued to push the trained and equipped. Here IJA Germans west. Moreover, Japan had suffered several major defeats. forces celebrate in Bataan. Americans had put the Japanese on the strategic defensive. On March 24, MacArthur vowed to reverse this situation. The first step 1942 the American–British Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) had agreed to towards returning to the allow Washington to determine Pacific war strategy. With this mandate, Philippines was retaking Leyte. Washington responded. The US Navy (USN) had decimated the Imperial (US Army) Japanese Navy (IJN) carrier forces at Midway in early June 1942. American submarines initiated a successful campaign against Japanese merchant ships. Army and Marine Corps forces had gone on the offensive at Guadalcanal, New Guinea, the Marshalls, and the Gilbert Islands. Japan was bogged down in China, which forced Tokyo to employ thousands of troops to pacify the country. By 1944, Washington was about to penetrate areas directly affecting Japan’s survival. The Allies had successfully challenged the Japanese on the peripheral areas of their empire, but were now getting closer to Tokyo. Soon, the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) would establish B-29 bomber bases that would deliver destruction directly over Honshu and Kyushu. Ground forces readied to strike in the Central Pacific and push north. The only question for Washington centered on where American forces would initiate the main drive to defeat Japan. The American Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had earlier agreed to focus on the Luzon, Formosa, and South China region to support bombing missions over Japan, cut off resource access, and prepare for a Japanese 5 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com home islands invasion. Before kicking off such a campaign, Washington needed to agree on a common strategy. In the Pacific, the Americans had two major lines of effort: the Central Pacific and the Southwest Pacific. The Central Pacific was under the control of Admiral Chester Nimitz and unsurprisingly featured a primarily naval focus and selected island-hopping to defeat or isolate the Japanese. In the Southwest Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur had driven up New Guinea towards the Philippines. The JCS approached future Pacific strategy to defeat Japan under certain assumptions. With unconditional surrender as the agreed-upon Allied end state against the Axis Powers, Washington would have to conduct a campaign of primarily military means. This meant Allied forces would invade Japan to force its capitulation. For an invasion, JCS planners concluded that they needed a sustained bombing campaign to reduce Japanese military capabilities. Since the USAAF did not employ strategic bombers with sufficient range to hit Japan from Allied controlled areas in early 1944, the Americans required bases closer to Japan. One potential site was China, but logistical questions and the threat of territory loss to Japanese advances made this option untenable. Naval aviation could attack targets around Japan, but American soldiers, like these this required forward logistical and maintenance facilities. As MacArthur from the 7th Infantry Division, and Nimitz pushed north, plans to secure advanced bases developed. needed all of their training and Additionally, to defeat Japan the Americans had to isolate Tokyo from her experience, as well as the full source of raw materials and food in Southeast Asia. range of available weaponry, to eject Japanese defenders Two approaches developed. Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval throughout Leyte. Using fire Operations and Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, advocated an and maneuver, US troops invasion of Formosa and the taking of Amoy, a Chinese port. King thought slowly advanced. Infantrymen he could bypass the Philippines. This proposal allowed the United States to had to use explosives, flamethrowers, and heavy station B-29s and other aircraft closer to Japan to support aerial operations. artillery to push out the IJA. Taking Formosa would create a large staging base to launch an invasion fleet These soldiers would find the against Japan, and would also block Japanese access to the South China Sea fighting in Leyte as tough as and Tokyo’s shipments of oil, raw materials, and food from Southeast Asia. they did here on Kwajalein in early 1944. (US Army) A further benefit was keeping China in the war. Although the Nationalist and Communist Chinese forces were fighting the Japanese in a grinding war of attrition, losses were still heavy among the scantily equipped, ill-trained, and poorly led Chinese soldiers. If China fell, the Japanese could transfer several divisions around the Pacific and make an invasion bloodier for Washington. King believed a direct assault on Formosa was possible. His plan included bypassing all of the Philippine islands. In several approved plans (like JCS 713 “Strategy in the Pacific” dated February 16, 1944 and JCS/713/1 “Future Operations in the Pacific”, dated March 10, 1944) the JCS agreed that 6 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com Formosa was the most important single objective in the China, Formosa, and Luzon areas. However, debate raged in Washington. Some critics believed that conducting such an operation required air and support facilities in the southern or central Philippine islands. MacArthur disagreed about the plan to bypass the Philippines. Questions arose about the availability of sufficient naval forces to invade and sustain operations in Formosa and China. Skipping the Philippines would also leave significant Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and IJN forces in the rear of Allied lines. In addition, after Washington had belittled Tokyo’s pronouncements about creating the Leyte was the largest Pacific Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and treatment of her occupied amphibious operation to date peoples, America would appear to have abandoned those same oppressed in the war. MacArthur used an all-army landing force in the subjects in this move. Avoiding a fight in the Philippines could send the campaign. The invading force wrong message that Washington did not care about the Filipinos. Additionally, was much greater than the IJA’s “abandoning” the Philippines would also prolong the deplorable treatment defending forces, the 16th meted out to prisoners-of-war. Division. The Americans were thankful that Suzuki had The counter-strategy to a Formosan campaign was to take the Philippines, decided to not make a ending with Luzon’s conquest. Although this option would provoke heated beachfront defense. Instead he debate among American strategic leaders, the emphasis on detouring all of would avoid massive pre- the Philippines softened. Sending an invasion fleet against Formosa required landing bombardments and plan on using counterattacks Nimitz to support his campaign with naval aviation units alone. Land-based with reinforcements. (US Navy) air forces did not have sufficient range from MacArthur’s bases in the Southwest Pacific or Nimitz’s current bases. Nimitz also needed a large land force to take Formosa. Building such a force required time. Supplying such an endeavor also involved a vast and complex system to feed, clothe, equip, and maintain this force. By March 1944, the JCS recognized the necessity for closer logistical and support bases if the Allies invaded Formosa. MacArthur received directions to plan an incursion into the southern Philippines. Creating a base in the Philippines would enable Washington to continue planning to take Formosa or Luzon. While debate raged about selecting Formosa or Luzon, the Japanese were not idle. Tokyo also perceived the threat of further American moves in MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) and Nimitz’s Pacific Ocean Area (POA). The IJA and IJN, according to ULTRA cryptographic intercepts, started to strengthen their positions in Mindanao, Celebes, the Palau Islands, and other areas. To continue their move north, the Americans had to expand their front against the Japanese. Nimitz and MacArthur realized that capture of Leyte or Mindanao would improve operations. Nimitz’s forces also made progress in the POA by capturing the Mariana Islands in June 1944. This was significant since the Americans now had B-29 bases to hit Japan, a key rationale for the Formosa option. Still, King did not abandon his plan to take Formosa. This came to a head when President Franklin Roosevelt, Nimitz, and MacArthur met on July 26, 1944 at Pearl Harbor. MacArthur and Nimitz debated both approaches. No official decision was made at the meeting, but Roosevelt was now thrust into the decision. 7 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com Meanwhile, Admiral William Halsey, Nimitz’s Third Fleet commander, had already fought the Battle of the Philippine Sea, which severely weakened the remaining Japanese carrier forces. This allowed Halsey to conduct carrier strikes across the Philippines and prepare for actions against the Palau Islands. Halsey’s planes had hit the Palau Islands on September 7–8, then Mindanao, and the central Philippines from September 12–14. MacArthur had already committed to taking Morotai, a stepping stone to the Philippines, on September 15. Coincidentally, Halsey reported a limited Japanese military presence in the Central Philippines to Nimitz on September 12. The admiral identified that Leyte was “wide-open to attack” and advised taking it immediately. A downed USN pilot was informed by his Filipino rescuers that there was no Japanese presence on Leyte. MacArthur’s staff knew otherwise since his headquarters had evidence of a significant A key objective before the enemy presence on Leyte. Halsey suggested canceling amphibious operations Leyte operation could against Mindanao, Yap, the Palaus, and other sites. Nimitz radioed the JCS, commence was taking the who were with their British counterparts in Quebec during the Octagon island of Morotai. This island Conference. Nimitz volunteered to provide naval and ground forces slated provided an air base for Kenney’s aircraft to support for Yap to MacArthur. General George Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, future operations in the then contacted MacArthur’s headquarters at Hollandia, New Guinea. southern or central Philippines. Lieutenant-General Richard Sutherland, MacArthur’s chief of staff, Americans took the beaches on responded that MacArthur could take Leyte. MacArthur was at sea, with a September 15, the same day as the attack on the Palau Islands. Morotai invasion force, under radio silence. Sutherland disagreed with the Eventually, heavy bombers, suggestion of no Japanese on Leyte, but with Nimitz’s additional forces, he from Kenney’s Thirteenth Air believed MacArthur could overcome the IJA. The invasion date was set for Force, flew from Morotai. (US October 20. Army) Kenney used many different types of aircraft. The Consolidated B-24 Liberators allowed MacArthur’s forces to hit targets at long range, given the proper basing, from New Guinea; Kenney sent B-24s to strike Davao in Mindanao. Unfortunately, Leyte was in the central Philippines and required MacArthur to take Morotai in order to base B-24s from the Thirteenth Air Force there. (US Air Force) 8 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com CHRONOLOGY 1941 December 8 Imperial Japanese forces attack the Philippines.  May 6 American and Filipino forces surrender unconditionally to the Japanese. Tokyo begins a long occupation of the Philippines.  1942 March 24 Anglo-American planners agree that the United States should lead the Pacific campaign planning for the Allies.  1943 February 25 MacArthur’s SWPA staff initiate planning for recapturing the Philippines under the Reno plans series.   1944 March 10 The JCS approves proposals for future Pacific operations to include actions against Formosa for February 15, 1945.  June 13 The JCS requests comments by MacArthur and Nimitz on bypassing the Southern Philippines to invade Formosa or Japan.  July 4 Nimitz radios King’s staff to suggest American forces acquire Mindanao as an air base for the Formosa operation.  July 9 Saipan falls; Tojo resigns as Japanese prime minister.  July 23 MacArthur releases schedule of SWPA future operations to include the capture of Morotai on September 15 and Mindanao on November 15.  July 24 Japanese Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ) completes the Sho-Go series of plans to fight the decisive victory for the Pacific.  July 27 Roosevelt, MacArthur, and Nimitz meet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii to discuss Pacific strategy. Questions arise about invading Formosa and leaving the Philippines untouched.  September 9 Halsey begins a carrier air strike campaign against Japanese targets in the Philippines, Formosa, and other locations.  September 12 Halsey reports that Leyte is unoccupied and suggests American forces invade the island. The JCS queries MacArthur’s staff about a Leyte invasion. Sutherland replies that an invasion is feasible and the invasion date is set for October 20.  9 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com September 15 American forces invade Morotai. Halsey’s Western Pacific Task Force invades the Palaus.   September 21 GHQ SWPA releases Operations Instruction 70 outlining the invasion of Leyte. MacArthur also reports to the JCS that he can land on Luzon by December 20; he suggests a Formosa invasion is unnecessary.   October 10 General Yamashita Tomoyuki takes command of the Fourteenth Area Army in Manila.  October 13 VII Amphibious Force sails from Hollandia to Leyte.  October 14 III Amphibious Force at Manus departs for Leyte   October 17 Elements of the 6th Ranger Battalion take Suluan and Dingat islands in Leyte Gulf. The Americans begin minesweeping operations in routes into and around the invasion sites. Japanese radio stations receive word of the American landings. The IJN Combined Fleet commander and the IJA headquarters initiate Sho-Go 1.   October 18 Delayed by a day, US Rangers take Homonhon Island. Seventh Fleet ships bombard Leyte’s beaches.  October 19 All American invasion convoys converge into Leyte Gulf.  October 20 The Sixth Army invades Leyte. Operations concentrate near Tacloban, Dulag, and the Panaon Strait. Admiral Soemu Toyoda orders IJN forces to destroy Kinkaid’s invasion force in Leyte Gulf.   October 21 American forces near Dulag face determined Japanese opposition. The 1st US Cavalry Division enters Tacloban.   October 22 Terauchi decides to organize his forces for a tough fight on Leyte to destroy the American invaders. Krueger’s forces consolidate positions near Dulag and start to push out the Japanese defenders.   October 23 MacArthur restores the Philippine Civil Government. Cavalrymen from the 1st US Cavalry Division start moving north on land and through amphibious operations to control the San Juanico Strait. Supply issues arise for the Americans.  October 24 American forces push inland. The next few days see Krueger taking Burauen and nearby airfields. Japanese reinforcement convoys from Luzon start under Operation TA.   October 25 Start of the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Kinkaid’s ships survive Japanese naval attacks. Japanese land forces continue to resist the Americans, especially in the XXIV Corps area, but start to give ground under pressure.  October 27 Kenney sends P-38s from the 475th Fighter Group to Tacloban.  10 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com