JeffreyW. Legroand AndrewMoravcsik ealism, the oldest and most prominent theoretical paradigm in international relations, is in trouble. The problem is not lack of interest. Realism remains the primary or alternativetheoryinvirtuallyevery majorbookandarticleaddressinggeneral theories of world politics, particularly in security affairs. Controversies be- tween neorealism and its critics continue to dominate international relations theorydebates.Noristheproblemrealism’spurportedinabilitytomakepoint predictions.Manyspeci￿crealisttheoriesaretestable,andthereremainsmuch globalcon￿ictaboutwhichrealismofferspowerfulinsights.Noristheproblem the lack of empirical support for simple realist predictions, such as recurrent balancing; or the absence of plausible realist explanations of certain salient phenomena, such astheCold War, the“end of history,”1orsystemic change in general.Researchprogramsadvance,afterall,by there￿nementandimprove- ment of previous theories to account for anomalies. There can be little doubt thatrealisttheoriesrightfully retaina salientpositionininternationalrelations theory. JeffreyW.LegroisAssociateProfessorofGovernmentandForeignAffairs,UniversityofVirginia.Andrew MoravcsikisProfessor ofGovernment,HarvardUniversity. We are grateful to Charles Glaser, Joseph Grieco, Gideon Rose, Randall Schweller, Jack Snyder, StephenVanEvera,StephenWalt,WilliamWohlforth,andFareedZakariaforprovidingrepeated, detailed correctionsandrebuttalstoouranalysisoftheirrespective work;toRobertArt,Michael Barnett, James Caporaso, Thomas Christensen, Dale Copeland, Michael Desch, David Dessler, ColinElman,MiriamFendiusElman,DanielEpstein,MarthaFinnemore,StefanoGuzzini,Gunther Hellmann,RobertJervis,PeterKatzenstein,RobertKeohane,StephenKrasner,JohnMearsheimer, JohnOwen,RobertPaarlberg,StephenRosen,Anne-MarieSlaughter,NigelThalakada,Alexander Wendt,andparticipantsatcolloquia atBrownUniversity andHarvardUniversity’sJohnM.Olin Institute for Strategic Studies for more general comments; and to Duane Adamson and Aron Fischerforresearchassistance. 1. WeagreewithmuchoftheanalysisinJohnVasquez,“TheRealistParadigmandDegenerative vs.ProgressiveResearchPrograms:AnAppraisalofNeotraditionalResearchonWaltz’sBalancing Proposition,”AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,Vol.91,No.4(December1997),pp.899–912.Butwe donotagree,amongotherthings,thatbalancingbehaviorperseprovidesastrongtestofrealism orthatrealismisbeyondredemption.Onvariouscriticisms, seealsoFrancisFukuyama,TheEnd of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992); Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., International Relations and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); and Paul W. Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neorealist Theory,” in MichaelE.Brown,SeanM.Lynn-Jones,andSteven E. Miller,eds., ThePerilsofAnarchy:Contem- poraryRealismandInternationalSecurity(Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress,1995),pp.421–461;PeterJ. Katzenstein,RobertO.Keohane,andStephenD.Krasner,“InternationalOrganizationandtheStudy of World Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 670–674; and InternationalSecurity,Vol.24,No.2(Fall1999),pp.5–55 ©1999bythePresidentandFellowsofHarvardCollegeandtheMassachusettsInstituteofTechnology. 5 International Security 24:2 6 Thecentralproblemisinsteadthatthetheoreticalcoreoftherealistapproach has been undermined by its own defenders—in particular so-called defensive and neoclassicalrealists—who seek to address anomalies by recastingrealism in formsthatare theoreticallyless determinate,less coherent, and less distinc- tive to realism. Realists like E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, and Kenneth Waltz sought to highlight the manipulation, accumulation, and balancing of power by sober unsentimental statesmen, focusing above all on the limits imposed on states by the international distribution of material resources. They viewed realism as the bulwark against claims about the autonomous in￿uence of democracy, ideology, economic integration, law, and institutions on world politics.Many recent realists,by contrast,seek toredress empirical anomalies, particularly in Waltz’s neorealism, by subsuming these traditional counterar- guments. The result is that many realists now advance the very assumptions and causal claims in opposition to which they traditionally, and still, claim to de￿ne themselves. This expansion would be unproblematic, even praiseworthy, if it tookplace on the basis of the further elaboration of an unchanging set of core realist premises.Itwouldbequiteanintellectualcoupforrealiststodemonstrate—as realists from Thucydides through Machiavelli and Hobbes to Morgenthau sought to do—that the impact of ideas, domestic institutions, economic inter- dependence, and international institutions actually re￿ects the exogenous distribution and manipulation of interstate power capabilities. Some contem- poraryrealistsdocontinuetocultivatesucharguments,yetsucheffortsappear today more like exceptions to the rule. Many among the most prominent and thoughtful contemporary realists invoke instead variationin other exogenous in￿uences onstatebehavior—statepreferences, beliefs, andinternationalinsti- tutions—totrumpthedirectandindirecteffectsofmaterialpower.Suchfactors are consistently treated as more important than power. We term such an ap- proach“minimalrealism,”becauseitretainsonlytwocoreassumptions—little morethananarchyandrationality—neither ofwhichisdistinctivelyrealist.By Benjamin Frankel, ed., Realism: Restatements and Renewal (London: Frank Cass, 1996),pp. xi–xii. Forrejoinders,seeKennethN.Waltz,“EvaluatingTheories,”AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 913–918; Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Progressive ResearchandDegenerativeAlliances,” AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,Vol.91,No.4(December 1997),pp. 899–912;Colin ElmanandMiriam FendiusElman,“Correspondence:Historyvs.Neo- realism:ASecondLook,”InternationalSecurity,Vol.20,No.1(Summer1995),pp.182–193;Elman andElman,“LakatosandNeorealism:AReplytoVasquez,”AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,Vol. 91,No.4(December1997),pp.923–926;RandallL.Schweller,“NewRealistResearchonAlliances: Re￿ning, not Refuting, Waltz’s Balancing Proposition,” American Political ScienceReview, Vol. 91, No.4(December 1997),pp. 927–930;andStephen M.Walt,“TheProgressive Power ofRealism,” AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,Vol.91,No.4(December1997),pp.931–935. Is Anybody Still a Realist? 7 reducing realist core assumptionsto anarchy and rationality, minimal realism broadensrealismsofarthatit isnow consistentwith anyin￿uence on rational state behavior, including those once uniformly disparaged by realists as “le- galist,” “liberal,” “moralist,” or “idealist.” The concept of “realism” has thus been stretched to include assumptionsand causalmechanismswithin alterna- tive paradigms, albeit with no effort to reconcile the resulting contradictions.2 Contemporaryrealistslackanexplicitnontrivialsetofcoreassumptions.Those they set forth either are not distinctive to realism or are overtly contradicted by their own midrange theorizing. In sum, the malleable realist rubric now encompasses nearly the entire universe of international relations theory (in- cluding current liberal, epistemic, and institutionalist theories) and excludes only a few intellectual scarecrows (such as outright irrationality, widespread self-abnegating altruism, slavish commitment to ideology, complete harmony of state interests, or a world state). Thepracticalresult is thattheuse ofthe term “realist”misleadsus astothe actualimportofrecentempiricalresearch.Themislabelingofrealistclaimshas obscured the major—and ironic—achievement of recent realist work, namely to deepen and broaden theproven explanatorypower and scope ofthe estab- lished liberal, epistemic, and institutionalist paradigms. The more precise the midrange theories and hypotheses contemporary realists advance, the clearer it becomes that such claims are not realist. Some subsume in a theoretically unconstrained way nearly all potential rationalist hypotheses about state be- havior except those based on irrational or incoherent behavior. Others rely explicitly on variation in exogenous factors like democratic governance, economic interdependence, systematic misperception, the transaction cost– reducing properties of international institutions, organizational politics, and aggressive ideology. This is obscured because most realists test their favored explanations only against other variants of realism—normally Waltzian neo- realism—rather than against alternative liberal, epistemic, and institutionalist theories, as they once did. Recent realist scholarship unwittingly throws the realist baby out with the neorealist bathwater. Our criticism of recent realisttheory is nota semanticquibble, an invitation to yet another purely abstract debate about the labeling and relabeling of 2. GiovanniSartori,“ConceptMisinformationin ComparativePolitics,” AmericanPoliticalScience Review,Vol.64,No.4(December1970),pp.1033–1053.Thisisanotherwayinwhich ourcritique differs from that of Vasquez, who has also charged that the realist paradigm is degenerating. Vasquez argues that “there is no falsi￿cation before the emergence of better theory,” and that alternativeparadigmsdonotexist.Wedemonstratethattheydo.Vasquez,“TheRealistParadigm,” p.910. International Security 24:2 8 internationalrelationsideal-types,ora philosophicalinquiry intothedevelop- ment of research paradigms. It is a direct challenge to the theoretical distinct- ivenessofcontemporaryrealism,onewithimmediateandsigni￿cantpractical implications. Recent realist theory has become a hindrance rather than a help in structuring theoretical debates, guiding empirical research, and shaping bothpedagogyandpublic discussion.Itno longerhelps tosignaltheanalyst’s adherence to speci￿c deeper assumptions implicated in any empirical expla- nation of concrete events in world politics. If such complete confusion is possible, some might be tempted to reject realism—and perhaps with it, all “isms” in international relations theory—as inherently vague, indeterminate, contradictory, or just plain wrong.3 This is an understandable response, but it is, at the very least, premature. Although battles among abstract “isms” can often be arid, the speci￿cation of well- developed paradigms around sets of core assumptions remains central to the study of world politics. By unambiguously linking speci￿c claims to common core assumptions, paradigms assist us in developing coherent explanations, structuring social scienti￿c debates, considering a full range of explanatory options, de￿ning the scope of particular claims, understanding how different theories and hypotheses relate to one another, and clarifying the implications of speci￿c ￿ndings. While realism is not the only basic internationalrelations theory in need ofclari￿cation,itslong historyand centralpositionin the ￿eld make it an especially important focus for theory, research, pedagogy, and policy analysis. No other paradigm so succinctly captures the essence of an enduring modeofinterstateinteractionbased on themanipulationofmaterial power—one with avenerable history.4 And it need notbe incoherent. Accord- ingly, we shall propose not a rejection but a reformulation of realism in three assumptions—a reformulation that highlights the distinctive focus of realism on con￿ict and material power. Thisarticleproceedsinthreesections.Webegin by elaboratingthedesirable qualities of a theoretical paradigm in international relations and, guided by these criteria, propose a formulation of realism that we believe captures its enduring essence. We then document the theoretical degeneration of recent “minimalrealist”theory.Weconcludebyhighlightingthepracticaladvantages 3. Vasquez,“TheRealistParadigm”;andDavid A.LakeandRobertPowell,eds.,StrategicChoice andInternationalRelations(Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press,1999). 4. Jared Diamond, Guns,Germs, and Steel: TheFatesofHuman Societies(NewYork:W.W. Norton, 1997). Is Anybody Still a Realist? 9 for theoretical debate and empirical research of consistently adhering to a narrower and more rigorous reformulation of the realist paradigm. Realism as a Theoretical Paradigm Realism,manyhaveobserved,isnotasingletheorybutafamilyoftheories—a “paradigm.”5 Nearly all scholars who have voiced an opinion on the subject over the past quarter century agree that what makes it possible and useful to speakaboutrealismasauni￿edparadigmistheexistenceofaseriesofshared core assumptions. In this section, we ￿rst discuss desirable attributes of a set of core assumptions,then offer an appropriate reformulation of realism. Whether a paradigm is conceptually productive depends on at least two related criteria, coherence and distinctiveness.6 First and least controversial, a paradigm must be logically coherent. It must not contain internal logical contradictions that permit the unambiguous derivation of contradictory con- clusions.Tobesure,giventheirbreadth,paradigmsarelikelytobeincomplete. The use of differing auxiliary assumptions may thus generate multiple, even contradictory, propositions. But there must be a constraint on such deriva- tions.7 When theoretical explanation of empirical ￿ndings within a paradigm consistently relies on auxiliary assumptions unconnected to core assumptions to predict novel facts or clear up anomalies, we learn little about the veracity of thoseassumptions.When it relies on auxiliaryassumptionscontradictory to underlyingcoreassumptions,ourcon￿denceinthosecoreassumptionsshould weaken.8 5. Ora“basictheory,”“researchprogram,”“school,”or“approach.”Forsimilarusage,seeStephen VanEvera,citedinBenjaminFrankel,“RestatingtheRealistCase,”inFrankel,Realism,p.xiii;and Walt,“TheProgressivePower ofRealism.”Wedonotmeantoimply morewith theterm“para- digm”thanwestate. 6. For a fuller account of the desirable criteria, see Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Working Paper Series (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1998). There we also employ these standards to reject paradigmatic de￿nitions of realism based on ideal-typical outcomes (e.g., “pessimism” or “con￿ict”),vagueconcepts(e.g.,“powerandinterest”),intellectualhistory,oroutcomespredicted bymorethanonetheory(e.g.,“balancing”). 7. Ourcentralcriticismofrecentrealismisnotthattherealistparadigmisincoherentorindistinct simplybecauseitgeneratesvarious,evencon￿icting,theoriesandhypotheses.Wedonotbelieve thatdisagreementamongrealistsperseisasignofdegeneration.SeeWalt,“TheProgressivePower ofRealism,”pp.932–933. 8. See Imre Lakatos, “Falsi￿cation and the Methodology of Scienti￿c Research Programs,” in LakatosandAlanMusgrave,eds.,CriticismandtheGrowth ofKnowledge(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1970),pp.131–132. International Security 24:2 10 Second and more important for our purposes here, a paradigm must be distinct.Its assumptionsmustclearly differentiate it from recognized theoreti- calalternatives.Paradigmaticformulationsmustmakesensenotonlyon their own terms, but also within the context of broader social scienti￿c debates.9 Onlyinthiswaycanwespeakmeaningfullyoftestingtheoriesandhypotheses drawn from different paradigms against one another, or about the empirical progress or degeneration of a paradigm over time. The appropriate level of generality,number ofassumptions,andempiricalscopeofaparadigmarenot, therefore, qualities intrinsic to any single paradigm, but depend on the schol- arly debate in which the paradigm is employed. Realism coexists in a theoretical world with at least three paradigmatic alternatives for which core assumptions can been elaborated. The ￿rst, the institutionalistparadigm,containstheoriesandexplanationsthatstresstherole of international institutions, norms, and information. Examples include the transaction cost–based analyses of functional regime theorists and, perhaps, the sociologicalinstitutionalism espoused by someconstructivists.10 The second alternative, the liberal paradigm, contains theories and explana- tionsthatstresstheroleofexogenousvariationinunderlyingstatepreferences embedded in domestic and transnationalstate-society relations. Paradigmatic liberal assumptions underlie most of what are referred to as “second-image” (andmany“second-imagereversed”) theories.Examples include claimsabout theautonomousimpactofeconomicinterdependence, domesticrepresentative institutions,andsocialcompromisesconcerningtheproperprovisionofpublic goodssuch as ethnic identity, regulatory protection,socioeconomicredistribu- tion, and politicalregime type.11 9. Fundamental debates are always (at least) “three-cornered,” pitting two (or more) theories againstthedata.Seeibid.,p.115. 10. Forastatementofcoreassumptions,seeRobertO.Keohane,InternationalInstitutionsandState Power(Boulder,Colo.:Westview,1989);StephenD.Krasner,ed.,InternationalRegimes(Ithaca,N.Y.: CornellUniversityPress,1983);andKeohane,AfterHegemony:CooperationandDiscordintheWorld PoliticalEconomy(Princeton, N.J.:PrincetonUniversity Press,1984). 11. Forastatementofcoreassumptions,seeAndrewMoravcsik,“TakingPreferencesSeriously:A LiberalTheoryofInternationalPolitics,” InternationalOrganization,Vol.51,No.4(Autumn1997), pp. 513–553. Helen V. Milner, “Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis of International, American, and Comparative Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 759–786;Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S.Nye,Power and Interdependence:World Politics in Transition(Boston:Little,Brown,1977);MichaelW.Doyle,“LiberalismandWorldPolitics,”Ameri- can Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986),pp. 1151–1169;Richard Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968); and Elman and Elman, “Correspondence,” p. 924,all concur that such theoriesarenonrealist. Is Anybody Still a Realist? 11 The third less,well-articulated, alternative, the epistemic paradigm,contains theories and explanations about the role of collective beliefs and ideas on which states rely in calculating how to realize their underlying goals.12 In contrastto liberal theories (which stress the way the ideas shared or manipu- lated by groups in￿uence state preferences and policy) and institutionalist theories (which stress the role of formal norms and institutions in providing informationtostates),the epistemic paradigm stresses exogenous variationin thesharedbeliefsthatstructuremeans-endscalculationsandaffectperceptions of the strategic environment.13 Examples include many arguments about cul- ture (strategic, organizational,economic, and industrial), policy paradigms in particular issue areas, group misperception, standard operating procedures, and some types of social learning.14 Aparadigmis onlyaspowerfulanduseful asitsabilitytoruleoutplausible competing assumptions and explanations about the world. Enduring interna- tionalrelationsparadigmshavehelpedtofocusourattentiononparticularcore assumptions and causal mechanisms. Debates among realists, liberals, epistemictheorists,andinstitutionalistshavetraditionallycenteredaroundthe scope, power, and interrelationship of variation in material capabilities (real- ism), national preferences (liberalism), beliefs (epistemic theory), and interna- tionalinstitutions(institutionalism)onstatebehavior.Aformulationofrealism 12. An “episteme” or “system of understanding” implies a collective mentality and should be distinguishedfrompurelypsychologicalapproachesaboutindividualperceptionsandpersonality traits, althoughthese may sharesimilarities. Our use of the word seeks tosituate the paradigm betweendeepconstitutiveconnotationsof“socialepisteme”inJohnG.Ruggie,“Territorialityand Beyond:Problematizing Modernityin InternationalRelations,” InternationalOrganization, Vol. 47, No.4(Winter1993),p.157,andinterest-groupfocusof“epistemiccommunity”inPeterM.Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” International Or- ganization,Vol.46,No.1(Winter1992),pp.1–35. 13. Ontheroleofbeliefsinrationalisttheory,seeJonElster,“Introduction,”inElster,ed.,Rational Choice(NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress,1986),pp.1–33;andArthurDenzauandDouglass North,“SharedMentalModels:Ideologies andInstitutions,” Kyklos,Vol.47,No.1(Spring 1994), pp.3–31. 14. John Odell, U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources of Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982);Paul Egon Rohrlich, “Economic Culture and ForeignPolicy,”InternationalOrganization,Vol.41,No.1(Winter1987),pp.61–92;KathrynSikkink, IdeasandInstitutions:DevelopmentalisminBrazilandArgentina(Ithaca,N.Y.:CornellUniversityPress, 1991);PeterHall,“Policy Paradigms,SocialLearning,andtheState,”Comparative Politics,Vol.25, No.3(April1993),pp.275–295;JudithGoldstein,Ideas,Interests,andAmericanTradePolicy(Ithaca, N.Y.:CornellUniversityPress,1993);AlastairIainJohnston,CulturalRealism:StrategicCultureand Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995);Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The CultureofNational Security:Norms, Identity, and World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs (Ithaca,N.Y.:CornellUniversityPress,1996);andElizabethKier,ImaginingWar:FrenchandBritish MilitaryDoctrinebetweentheWars(Princeton,N.J.:Princeton University Press,1997). International Security 24:2 12 thatsubsumedallthecoreassumptionsunderlyingtheseothertheorieswould be a misleading guide to theoretical debate or empirical research. Perpetually underspeci￿ed, perhaps internally contradictory, such a formulation would evade rather than encourage potentially falsifying theoretical counterclaims, thereby defeating the basic purpose of grouping theories under paradigms in the￿rstplace.Surely realism,withitsenduring commitmenttothestatesman- like manipulation of con￿ict and power, is more than just a generic form of rationalism.Realism musttherefore remain distinctfrom itsliberal, epistemic, and institutionalistcounterparts. realism as a paradigm: three core assumptions Many among the most prominent contemporary forms of realism lack both coherence and distinctiveness. To see precisely why and how this is so, how- ever,wemust￿rstdemonstratethatacoherent,distinctformulationofthecore assumptions underlying the realist paradigm is possible, practical, and pro- ductive. Three “core” assumptions are necessary and suf￿cient for this pur- pose. Our formulation comprises the essential elements of a social scienti￿c theory, namely assumptions about actors, agency, and structural constraint.15 Thoughfew ifanyformulationsintherealistliteratureareidenticaltothisone, many overlap.16 assumption 1—the nature of the actors: rational, unitary political units in anarchy. The ￿rst and least controversial assumption of realism concerns the nature of basic social actors. Realism assumes the existence of a set of “con￿ictgroups,”each organizedasa unitarypoliticalactorthatration- allypursuesdistinctivegoalswithinananarchicsetting.Withineachterritorial jurisdiction, each actor is a sovereign entity able to undertake unitary action. Between jurisdictions,anarchy(no sovereignpower)persists.Realistsassume, moreover,thatthesesovereigncon￿ictgroupsarerational,intheconventional sensethattheyselectastrategybychoosingthemostef￿cientavailablemeans to achieve their ends, subject to constraintsimposed by environmental uncer- tainty and incomplete information.17 15. JamesS.Coleman,FoundationsofSocialTheory(Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversity Press, 1990). 16. RandallL.SchwellerandDavidPriesssuggestthisde￿nition,althoughtheyneglectitintheir midrangetheorizing. Schweller andPriess, “ATale of Two Realisms: Expanding theInstitutions Debate,”InternationalStudiesReview,Vol.41,No.1(1997),pp.1–32.WaltcomescloseinWalt,“The Progressive Power of Realism,” p. 932. For an all-inclusive de￿nition including many of these elements, seeFrankel,“RestatingtheRealistCase.” 17. KennethN.Waltz,TheoryofInternationalPolitics(Reading,Mass.:Addison-Wesley,1979),p.94; StephenD.Krasner,StructuralCon￿ict:TheThirdWorldagainstGlobalLiberalism(Berkeley:Univer- Is Anybody Still a Realist? 13 What is essential to the logic of realist theory is not the particular scope of the actors,but the ability to draw a sharpdistinctionbetween anarchyamong actorsandhierarchywithinthem.AsKenneth Waltz,RobertGilpin,andmany others have noted, under other historical circumstances one might replace stateswith tribes, domains,principalities, city-states,regional politicalunions, orwhateverother con￿ictgroup enjoys a monopolyoflegitimateforce within territorialjurisdictions.Inmoderninternationalrelations,thestateis generally accepted as the dominant form of political order able to pursue a unitary foreign policy.18 assumption 2—the nature of state preferences: fixed and uniformly conflictual goals. The second realist assumption is that state preferences are ￿xed and uniformly con￿ictual.19 Interstate politics is thus a perpetual interstate bargaining game over the distribution and redistribution of scarce resources. Much of the power of realist theory, leading realists like Carr, Morgenthau, and Waltz consistently maintained, comes from the assumption that state preferences are ￿xed. It is this assumption,they argue, that releases us from the “reductionist” temptation to seek the causes of state behavior in themessyprocessofdomesticpreferenceformation,fromthe“moralist”temp- tation to expect that ideas in￿uence the material structure of world politics, from the “utopian” temptation to believe that any given group of stateshave naturally harmonious interests, and from the “legalist” temptation to believe that states can overcome power politics by submitting disputes to common rules and institutions.20 sity of California Press,1985),p.28;HansJ. Morgenthau,Politicsamong Nations: The Strugglefor Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973),pp. 7–8; Robert Gilpin, “No One Loves a PoliticalRealist,”inFrankel,Realism,p.7;andRobertO.Keohane,“Realism,Neorealism,andthe StudyofWorldPolitics,”inKeohane,ed.,NeorealismandItsCritics(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1986),pp. 1–26.This rationality can be bounded; the precise level ofcalculating ability is inessentialtoourpurposeshere,aslongasmiscalculationsarerandom;iftheyarenot,thenother theoriesmaytakeover. 18. Gilpin, “No One Loves a Political Realist”; and Kenneth N. Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory,” in Robert L. Rothstein, ed., The Evolution of Theory in International Relations (Columbia:University ofSouthCarolinaPress,1991),p.37. 19. Preferences shouldremain clearly distinct from strategies. State preferences are de￿nedover states of the social world and are therefore “prestrategic,” that is, they remain unin￿uenced by shifts in the strategic environment, such as the distribution of power. Preferences are akin to “tastes” that states bring to theinternationalbargainingtable,althoughthey themselves mayof courseresultfromformsofinternationalinteractionotherthanthosebeingstudied,asdonational preferences resulting from economic interdependence. See Robert Powell, “Anarchy in Interna- tionalRelationsTheory:TheNeorealist-NeoliberalDebate,”InternationalOrganization,Vol.48,No. 2(Spring1994),pp.313–344;andMoravcsik,“TakingPreferencesSeriously.” 20. Morgenthau,Politicsamong Nations,pp. 2–12;Waltz,TheoryofInternationalPolitics,pp.18–37; andWaltz,“RealistThoughtandNeorealistTheory,“pp.21–37. International Security 24:2 14 Despite their general agreement on the assumption of ￿xed preferences, realistsdisplayfarlessagreementabouttheprecisenatureofsuchpreferences. Mostassumeonly that,inWaltz’s oft-cited phrase,states“ataminimum, seek their ownpreservationand,atamaximum,driveforuniversaldomination”— an elastic assumption much criticized for its vagueness. Such an imprecise assumption negates the explanatory value of assuming ￿xed preferences.21 From game theorists like Robert Powell to constructivists like Alexander Wendt, there is broad agreement that this does not constitute a sharp enough assumption about the nature of the state—that is, of its state-societyrelations and resulting state preferences—on which to build explanatory theory. In a world of status quo states and positive-sum interactions, for example, tradi- tional realist behaviors may well not emerge at all. Lest we permit the entire range of liberal, epistemic, and institutional sources of varying state prefer- ences to enter into realist calculations, a narrower assumption is required.22 We submit that a distinctive realist theory is therefore possible only if we assume the existence of high con￿ict among underlying state preferences— what John Mearsheimer labels a “fundamentally competitive” world and Joseph Grieco sees as one dominated by relative gains seeking (a high value of k).23 Only then does a rational government have a consistent incentive to employ costly means to compel others to heed its will. Only then, therefore, should we expect to observe recurrent power balancing, the overriding im- perative to exploit relative power, and (in extreme cases) concern about sur- vivaland security, as well asother realist pathologies.24 In short, realistsview 21. Waltz,TheoryofInternationalPolitics,p.118. 22. Powell,“AnarchyinInternationalRelationsTheory,”p.315;AlexanderWendt,“SocialTheory of International Politics,” unpublished manuscript, Dartmouth College, 1998,p. 309;Randall L. Schweller,“Neorealism’sStatus-QuoBias:WhatSecurityDilemma?”inFrankel,Realism;Moravc- sik,“TakingPreferencesSeriously”;JeffreyW.Legro,“CultureandPreferencesintheInternational CooperationTwo-step,”AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,Vol.90,No.1(March1996),pp.118–137; BarryBuzan,CharlesJones,andRichardLittle,TheLogicofAnarchy:NeorealismtoStructuralRealism (New York:Columbia University Press, 1993);andJohn GerardRuggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” in Krasner, InternationalRegimes. 23. JohnJ.Mearsheimer,“BacktotheFuture:InstabilityinEuropeaftertheColdWar,”International Security,Vol.15,No.1(Summer1990),pp.5–56;andJosephM.Grieco,“AnarchyandtheLimits ofCooperation:ARealist CritiqueoftheNewestLiberalInstitutionalism,”InternationalOrganiza- tion, Vol. 42,No.3 (Summer 1988),pp. 485–507.Grieco maintainsthat states seek both absolute andrelativegains.Therelativeimportanceofrelativegainsisgivenbythecoef￿cientk.Thehigher thevalueofk,Griecomaintains,thestrongertheincentivesforrelative-gainsseekingandthemore pronounced the tendency to engage in “defensive positionalist” realist behavior. For a more detailedanalysis,seepp.25–27below. 24. Schwellerputsthiswell:“Ifstatesareassumedtoseeknothingmorethantheirownsurvival, why would theyfeel threatened? .. .Anarchyandself-preservation alonearenotsuf￿cient. ... Predatorystatesmotivated byexpansionandabsolutegains,notsecurity andthefearofrelative