Project Gutenberg's Legal Status Of Women In Iowa, by Jennie Lansley Wilson This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org Title: Legal Status Of Women In Iowa Author: Jennie Lansley Wilson Release Date: April 15, 2004 [EBook #12049] Language: English Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 *** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LEGAL STATUS OF WOMEN IN IOWA *** Produced by Garrett Alley, and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team. LEGAL STATUS OF WOMEN IN IOWA. COMPILED BY JENNIE L. WILSON, LL. B. Member of the Polk County Bar. DES MOINES: IOWA PRINTING COMPANY. 1894. Preface. This book has been prepared for the purpose of presenting to the women of Iowa, in a brief and concise form, those laws which pertain to subjects in which they are most deeply interested, and about which there is a strong and growing demand for certain and accurate information. In this age of general intelligence, when learning in some degree is so readily attainable, the maxim, that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one," has a measure of justice in it, which could not be claimed for it in former times, and it is most certainly true that, "As the subjects of law, if not as its makers, all ought to know enough to avoid its penalties and reap its benefits." Every woman should understand the law of her own state concerning marriage, divorce, the care and custody of children, and the mutual rights and duties of husband and wife incident to the marriage relation. She should know something of the law of minors and guardianship, of administration, and descent of property, and her knowledge should certainly embrace that class of crimes which necessarily includes her own sex, either as the injured party, or as particeps criminis. In the arrangement of this work, a very brief synopsis of the common law upon these subjects is given, as the principles of the common law underlie our entire statute law, and a knowledge of the former is absolutely essential to render much of the latter intelligible. The statute law of the state has been given in the exact words of the statutes, with but few exceptions, and the explanations or notes following these have been gathered from decisions of our supreme court. The references are to sections of McClain's Annotated Code and Supplement. The design of the work is not broad enough to give to the most careful reader that knowledge of the minutiae of the law necessary in the application of its principles to particular cases and under a special state of facts. It is in nowise adequate, even though its contents should be thoroughly mastered, to make every woman her own lawyer, in matters where she would otherwise require legal advice, but it is hoped that its statements are sufficiently plain and free from technical phraseology and legal terms, that even the casual reader may readily comprehend them, and be able to gain a general understanding of the law of our state upon these subjects. J.L.W. Des Moines, Iowa, May 1894. TABLE OF CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. SYNOPSIS OF COMMON LAW. Common law in force—Changes—Marriage—Dissolution of marriage—Power of husband—Disabilities of wife—Custody of children—Property rights—Descent of property—Discrimination in criminal matters—Right of appeal—Reason for subjection of women CHAPTER II. MARRIAGE. Contract of marriage—Legal age—No express form necessary—Who may solemnize— When void CHAPTER III. HUSBAND AND WIFE. Property rights of married women—Remedy by husband or wife against the other—Wife's torts—Conveyances to each other—Conveyances to third parties—Wages of wife— Contracts of wife—Family expenses—Removal from homestead—Conveyance of property when husband or wife is insane CHAPTER IV. DIVORCE, ANNULLING MARRIAGES AND ALIMONY. Jurisdiction of court—Evidence—Causes for divorce—Husband from wife—Maintenance during litigation—Alimony—Custody of children— Annulling illegal marriages—Causes—Legitimacy of children CHAPTER V. MINORS AND GUARDIANSHIP. Majority—Contracts of minors—Natural guardians—Guardians of property—Powers and duties of guardian—Guardians of drunkards, spendthrifts and lunatics CHAPTER VI. APPRENTICING AND ADOPTION OF CHILDREN. Method of apprenticing—Schooling and treatment of minors—Who may adopt—Method and effect of adoption—Home for the friendless— Powers CHAPTER VII. WILLS AND LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION. Who may make wills—Of what property—Verbal wills—Wills in writing—Revocation—Cancellation—Executors—Administration—Who entitled—Time allowed CHAPTER VIII. SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE—DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY. Exempt personal property—Life insurance—Allowance to widow and children—Descent and distribution— Personal property—Real property—Dower—Curtesy—Widow's share not affected by will—Descent to children—To parents—To wife and her heirs—Illegitimate children inherit from mother—When they may inherit from father—When father may inherit from child CHAPTER IX. HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTIONS. Homestead exempt—Family defined—Conveyance or encumbrance—Liability for taxes and debts—What constitutes homestead—Exemptions to head of family —Insurance—Personal earnings—Pension money—Damages producing death CHAPTER X. CRIMINAL LAW—ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN. Rape—Intent to commit—Compelling to marry— Carnal knowledge—Producing miscarriage—Enticing female child—Seduction—Marriage a bar to prosecution—Adultery—Evidence in cases of rape or seduction—Bigamy—Lewdness—Houses of ill fame—Penalty for prostitution—Incest—Illegitimate children—Support of—Rendered legitimate by marriage of parents CHAPTER XI. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS. Damages under prohibitory liquor law—Parties in actions for seduction—In actions for injury to minor child—Married women—When husband or wife deserts family —Husband or wife as witness—Communications between husband and wife—Women eligible to office —Police matrons—Right of suffrage CHAPTER XII. CONCLUSION. Common law in Iowa—Law will not always protect married women—It may cause hardship and suffering—Change or modification needed Common Law CHAPTER I. SYNOPSIS OF COMMON LAW. Until a comparatively recent period the laws of England in force at the time of the independence of the American colonies, relating to married women, the mutual duties of husband and wife, their property rights and the care and custody of children, were everywhere in force in this country except in those states which were originally settled by other nations than the English. The agitation of the last fifty years, caused by the demand for equality in educational opportunities and in professional, business and trade relations, as well as for the legal and political recognition of women, has brought about great changes in these laws, until they are in many instances almost entirely superseded by statutory enactments more in accordance with the spirit of justice and in greater harmony with the requirements of a higher form of civilization. In many states they have reached a condition in which the legal status of husband and wife is nearly, if not wholly, one of equality. It must always be borne in mind, however, that the common law is the foundation upon which almost the entire structure of our American system of jurisprudence is based, although it is claimed that it has only been recognized by our courts so far as it has been "applicable to the habits and conditions of our society and in harmony with the genius, spirit and objects of our institutions." As it became apparent from time to time that it was not thus applicable, or where it failed to meet the requirements of the changed conditions of society the strictness of its rules was relaxed by giving to them a broader construction, or, when this could not be done, they were modified or entirely changed by statute. Marriage was regarded by the common law as a civil contract and might be entered into legally by a boy of fourteen or a girl of twelve years of age, provided they were under no legal disability to contract marriage. This was called the age of consent, or discretion, and a marriage contracted prior to this time was inchoate only, and might be repudiated by either party upon arriving at the legal age. If one of the parties was above and the other under the required age, the marriage might still be disaffirmed by either. If Common law in force. Changes. Basis of statue law. Marriage after reaching the age of consent the parties continued to live together as husband and wife, this would be regarded as an affirmance of the marriage. The mutual consent of the parties themselves, followed by cohabitation, was sufficient to constitute a legal marriage, without the observance of any formalities. The formal ceremonies provided by statute for the celebration of marriages, and the penalties imposed upon clergymen and others who married those who had not complied with these formalities, were solely for the purpose of providing a convenient and certain proof of marriage, should it be afterwards necessary to establish that fact by evidence, rather than to invalidate marriages which would otherwise be legal. Having established the marriage relation, it could only be dissolved by death or divorce granted by act of parliament, or, in this country after the declaration of independence, by act of legislature. No absolute divorce could be granted for any cause arising after the marriage, but a separation might be decreed in case of adultery by either party. By the rules of the common law, the person and property of women were under the absolute control of their husbands. The maxim, Uxor non est juris, sed sub potestate viri, "a wife is not her own mistress, but is under the power of her husband," is but an expression of the actual legal status of a woman from the instant she entered the matrimonial state, until released therefrom by death or divorce. Marriage was the act by which she ceased to have a legal existence, by which, we are told, her very being became incorporated or consolidated into that of her husband. From the time her identity became thus merged, she was presumed by the law to be under the protection and influence of her husband, to be so absolutely and entirely one person with him, that she had henceforth no life in law apart from his. The legal fiction of the unity of the persons of husband and wife dates back to feudal times, and may, perhaps, have been a necessity of the age and of the peculiar social and political systems of that period. Like many another law having its inception in a sincere desire to secure the greatest good to the greatest number, and apparently necessary for that purpose at the period of social development which gave it birth, it existed for centuries after it had ceased to result in any benefit or afford any protection, and after the reason for its being had passed away and been forgotten. We are told that at marriage the husband "adopted his wife and her circumstances together." He might exercise his power over her person by restraining her of her liberty in case of gross misbehavior, or by giving her moderate chastisement in the same degree that he might administer correction to his children. An early decision of one of our state courts interpreted this to mean that a man might whip his wife with a switch as large as his finger, but not larger than his thumb, without being guilty of an assault. Husband and wife being one person could not contract nor enter into a business partnership with each other; neither could one convey property to the other without the intervention of a third party. The wife was incapable of receiving a legacy unless it was willed to another person as trustee, for her use and benefit, and if a legacy were paid directly to her, the husband could compel the executor to pay it again to him. The wife had no power to contract a legal debt nor to bind herself by any kind of an agreement, neither could she make her husband liable for any debt or contract, except for necessaries. These, the husband was under obligation to provide, and in contracting for them, the law assumed that the wife was acting as his agent. She might release her right of dower in lands of her husband, but only when examined separately she acknowledged that the conveyance or release was not secured by his influence or coercion. Her earnings though acquired by her individual labor and in a business separate and apart from her husband belonged to him, and he could collect them by action. This was the law though husband and wife were living apart. They could be subjected to the payment of his debts, by his creditors, and if he died without a will they descended to his heirs as other personal property. They were not considered the property of the wife, even in equity, without a clear, express, irrevocable gift, or some distinct affirmative act of the husband, divesting himself of them and setting them apart for her separate use. A wife had no power to convey her real property, nor could she devise her personal property by will, without the consent of her husband. The husband had the legal right to establish his home or domicile in any part of the world where "his interests, his tastes, his convenience, or possibly, his caprice might suggest," and it was the wife's duty to follow him. If she refused to accompany him, no matter upon what ground she based her refusal, she was guilty of desertion. A promise by the husband before marriage as to the establishment of the place of residence of the family, created a moral obligation only and was a mere nullity in law. Whenever there was a difference of opinion between husband and wife in regard to the location of the common home, the will of the wife had to yield to that of the husband. This law of domicile was based upon the grounds of the "identity of the husband and wife, the subjection of the wife to the husband, and the duty of the wife to What constitutes. Dissolution of marriage. Subjection of married women. Legally dead. Unity of person. Power of husband. Disabilities. Wife's power to contract. Release of dower. Wife's earnings. Power of conveyance and devise. Domicile. make her home with her husband." Neither husband nor wife was competent as a witness to testify either for or against the other in civil or criminal cases. The husband was entitled to the society and services of his wife and he might bring an action for damages against anyone who harbored her, or persuaded or enticed her to leave him or live separate from him. If injuries were wrongfully inflicted upon her, two actions might be brought against the party responsible for the wrong, one by husband and wife for the personal injury to the wife, and one by the husband for loss of the wife's services. In either case, the amount recovered belonged to the husband. The wife could neither sue or be sued unless her husband was joined with her in the suit. A judgment recovered against her alone was void, because she was unknown to the law apart from her husband. One entered in her favor became the property of her husband. The consent of the husband was necessary to enable a married woman to act as executor, administrator, guardian or trustee. The husband became responsible for the maintenance of the wife according to her rank and station, and if he failed to make suitable provision for her, tradesmen might furnish her with necessaries at her request and could collect payment from the husband. He was liable for all of her debts contracted before marriage, and this was the case, though he may have received no property with her. He was responsible for certain wrongs committed by her after marriage, such as libel and slander, and judgment could be recovered against him. If a wrong were committed jointly by both, action might be brought against the husband alone. When a judgment was recovered upon contract, or because of the wrongful act of the wife, if the husband failed to pay it, he might be imprisoned. After the death of the husband the law gave the widow a right to remain forty days in his house, during which time her dower might be assigned. This right was known as the "widow's quarantine." The father was legally entitled to the custody of his children,—the right of the mother was never recognized, it being expressly stated by Blackstone that "a mother, as such, is entitled to no power, but only to reverence and respect." He might by will appoint a guardian for them after his death, though yet unborn, and might apprentice them or give them into the custody of others without the consent of the mother. All personal property belonging to the wife vested absolutely in the husband at marriage. He could will it to whom he pleased or, if he died without a will, it descended to his heirs. Even her wearing apparel and ornaments known by the term "paraphernalia," belonged to the husband. During his life he had the power to sell or give them away, but he could not devise them by will. If they remained in the possession of the wife while the husband lived, she was entitled to them over and above her dower, but even then creditors of the husband might claim them, if there chanced to be a deficiency of other assets with which to pay the debts of the estate. The wife's choses in action, or evidences of money or property due to her, such as notes, bonds, contracts or the like, belonged to the husband if he reduced them to possession during her life, and they could be taken for his debts. He might bequeath them by will, but if he died without a will they descended to his heirs. If he failed to reduce them to possession while the wife lived, after his death they would revert to her heirs. If she outlived her husband they belonged to her. After the husband's death the wife took one-third of his personal estate if there were children, and one-half if there were no children. The husband was entitled to the control, use and enjoyment, together with the rents and profits of his wife's real estate during the marriage, and if a living child were born, he had, after the wife's death, a life estate in such property and might retain possession of it while he lived. This was known as the husband's title by curtsy. The wife took a dower, or life estate in one-third of the husband's lands after his death, whether there were children or not. This estate of dower was forfeited should the husband be found guilty of treason, but his interest in her lands was not disturbed by the treason of the wife. His life interest in her real estate attached to trust estates, but she could claim no interest in trust estates of her husband. If the wife owned leases of land they could be sold or assigned by the husband during marriage. If he survived his wife they belonged to him, if she survived him, they belonged to her, provided he had not disposed of them while living. Personal property descended to males and females in equal shares, but the oldest son was entitled to the whole of his father's real property. The unity of husband and wife was not so strongly affirmed by the common law when it dealt with their relation to criminal matters. When a wife committed an offense against the state she possessed a separate and distinct life and personalty, for the purposes of punishment. It is true that she was still inferior and this distinction was recognized and emphasized by the difference in the penalties imposed for the commission of the same crimes, these penalties being in inverse ratio to the importance of the criminal. Witness. Husband entitled to society of wife. Suits at law. Wife as executor. Duty of husband. Liable for anti-nuptial contracts. Torts of wife. Widow's quarantine. Custody of children. Property rights. Wife's paraphernalia Choses in action. Real property of wife. Curtesy. Dower. Descent of property. Unity of person in criminal law. If a wife committed theft, burglary or other offenses in the company or presence of her husband, the law presumed that she acted under compulsion and held her not guilty, but this presumption did not extend to cases of murder or treason, and it might always be overcome by proof that she acted independently. The exception in cases of murder or treason, we are informed, was not alone because of the magnitude of the crimes, but rather on account of "the husband having broken through the most sacred tie of social community by rebellion against the state, had no right to that obedience from a wife which he himself, as a subject, had forgotten to pay." If a man murdered his wife it was as if he had murdered a stranger, and he might avail himself of the benefit of clergy, and secure immunity from punishment, provided he could read, but women were denied all benefit of clergy because of their sex, and because they "were not called upon to read." If a wife killed her husband it was a much more serious offense, he being her lord, and she was guilty of treason and subject to the same punishment as if she had killed the king. In cases of petit treason the penalty depended upon the sex of the criminal, men being sentenced to be drawn and hanged, while women were drawn and burnt alive. In larceny, bigamy, manslaughter and other crimes, men might claim the benefit of clergy and by taking holy orders, escape all punishment, except branding in the hand and a few months imprisonment, while women might receive sentence of death and be executed for the first offense. Later the law was changed so that in cases of simple larceny under the value of ten shillings, they might be burned in the hand and whipped, stocked or imprisoned for any time not exceeding one year. The disability of sex and of ignorance were both finally removed and all men and women admitted to benefit of clergy. By the common law, adultery and seduction were not classed with crimes, but were only civil injuries for which compensation might be recovered by husband, father or guardian, but the woman, who might be wronged, had no right of action for the injury to herself, and the State did not recognize any wrong to society by an injury to the person of one who was civilly dead. The crime of rape was punishable by death, and consent, though proved, was no defense, if the offense was committed upon a child under ten years of age. Magna Charta, granted by King John, while redressing many hardships and grievances incident to feudal times, and confirming and securing to the people many rights and liberties, among which was the right of the wife to dower in her husband's property, denied to women the right of appeal except in case of the death of their husbands. The right of appeal was the privilege of private prosecution for crime. (Analogus to our present method of commencing prosecutions by information.) According to Blackstone, even the disabilities of the wife were for the most part intended for her protection and benefit, and he adds: "So great a favorite is the female sex of the laws of England!" The discrimination made by the common law between men and women, was based alone upon the assumption that women were, and must be always dependent by reason of their sex. In the light of a broader humanity, the distinctions seem cruel and barbarous, but that they were the result of any spirit of injustice or intentional tyranny, or of any desire on the part of men to oppress women or impose upon them any hardship or burden because of their physical weakness, is not at all probable. They were merely the outgrowth of the conditions incident to ruder stages of social development, and were, perhaps, as favorable to women at that period, as the laws of our own times will be considered when judged in the light of the civilization of the future, after successive centuries of intellectual and moral growth have been added to the enlightenment of to-day. Law of Iowa. CHAPTER II. MARRIAGE. Marriage is a civil contract requiring the consent of parties capable of entering into other contracts, except as herein otherwise declared. [§3376.] While marriage is defined to be a contract, it is rather a status or relation assumed by the act of marriage. Society is recognized as a third party to the agreement and as having a well defined interest in the duties and obligations of such relation. It is because of this interest, that the law defines the qualifications of the parties, the terms, rights and obligations of the contract, and also for what causes and in what manner it may be terminated. "It stands alone and can be assimilated to no other contract." Theft, burglary, etc. Presumption of innocence. Murder of wife. Murder of husband. Petit treason. Larceny, bigamy, etc. Adultery and seduction. Rape. Right of appeal. Reason for discrimination. Contract. Between what ages valid. A marriage between a male person of sixteen and a female of fourteen years of age is valid, but if either party has not attained the age thus fixed, the marriage is a nullity or not at the option of such party made known at any time before he or she is six months older than the age thus fixed. [§3377.] The common law rule fixing the age of consent to marriage at fourteen for males and twelve for females is not repealed in Iowa. The time in which the parties may disaffirm the marriage is merely extended by the statute. Previous to any marriage within this state, a license for that purpose must be obtained from the clerk of the district court of the county wherein the marriage is to be solemnized. [§3378.] As under the common law, no express form or ceremony is necessary to constitute a valid marriage, any mutual agreement between the parties to assume the relation of husband and wife, followed by cohabitation, being sufficient, provided there is no legal disability on the part of either existing at the time. It is immaterial how the intention to marry is expressed. It has been held in this state that a marriage was legal, where the woman intended present marriage, though the man did not, where they had assumed the relation of husband and wife, and his conduct had been such as to justify her in believing that he had intended present marriage. Marriages by consent only, are not rendered void by a provision punishing parties for solemnizing marriages in any other manner than that prescribed by law. Such license must not in any case be granted where either party is under the age necessary to render the marriage absolutely valid, nor shall it be granted where either party is a minor, without the previous consent of the parent or guardian of such minor, nor where the condition of either party is such as to disqualify him from making any other civil contract. [§3379.] Unless such clerk is acquainted with the age and condition of the parties for the marriage of whom the license is applied for, he must take the testimony of competent and disinterested witnesses on the subject. [§3380.] He must cause due entry of the application for the issuing of the license to be made in a book to be procured and kept for that purpose, stating that he was acquainted with the parties and knew them to be of competent age and condition, or that the requisite proof of such fact was made known to him by one or more witnesses, stating their names, which book shall constitute a part of the records of his office. [§3381.] If either party is a minor, the consent of the parent or guardian must be filed in the clerk's office after being acknowledged by the said parent or guardian, or proved to be genuine, and a memorandum of such facts must also be entered in said book. [§3382.] If the clerk of the district court grants a license contrary to the provisions of the preceding sections, he is guilty of a misdemeanor, and if a marriage is solemnized without such license being procured, the parties so married and all persons aiding in such marriage are likewise guilty of a misdemeanor. [§3883.] The punishment provided for misdemeanors is imprisonment in the county jail not more than one year, or by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by both fine and imprisonment. Marriages must be solemnized either: 1. By a justice of the peace or mayor of the city or incorporated town wherein the marriage takes place; 2. By some judge of the supreme or district court of this state; 3. By some officiating minister of the gospel ordained or licensed according to the usages of his denomination. [§3384.] After the marriage has been solemnized the officiating minister or magistrate shall, on request, give each of the parties a certificate thereof. [§3385.] Marriages solemnized with the consent of parties in any other manner than is herein prescribed, are valid, but the parties themselves, and all other parties aiding or abetting, shall forfeit to the school fund the sum of fifty dollars each. [§3386.] The person solemnizing marriage shall forfeit a like amount, unless within ninety days after the ceremony he shall make return thereof to the clerk of the district court. [§3387.] The clerk of the district court shall keep a register containing the names of the parties, the date of the marriage, and the name of the person by whom the marriage was solemnized, which, or a certified transcript therefrom, is receivable in all courts and places as evidence of the marriage and the date thereof. [§3388] The register of marriages kept by the clerk is always sufficient to establish marriage, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, but record evidence is not indispensable. The fact of marriage may be shown in various ways. It may be proved by the admissions or uncontradicted testimony of either party, or a legal presumption may be raised by the testimony of either husband or wife with proof of continued cohabitation. The evidence of witnesses who were present and witnessed the marriage is always sufficient. Between what ages valid. License. Under age. Consent of parent. Proof of age. Record. Proof of consent of parent. Penalty. Who may solemnize. Certificate Penalty. Return. Register of marriages. These provisions so far as they relate to procuring licenses and to the solemnizing of marriages, are not applicable to members of any particular denomination having, as such, any peculiar mode of entering the marriage relation [§3389]. But when any mode is thus pursued which dispenses with the services of a clergyman or magistrate, the husband is responsible for the return directed to be made to the clerk and is liable to the above named penalty if the return is not made [§3390]. Marriages between persons whose marriage is prohibited by law, or who have a husband or wife living, are void; but if the parties live and cohabit together after the death of the former husband or wife, such marriage shall be deemed valid [§3392]. A judicial decree is not necessary to annul a marriage between parties one of whom has a wife or husband living at the time, as such marriages are absolutely void, nor does such marriage confer any right upon either in the property of the other. A marriage procured by fraud or force is void, because it lacks the essential element of consent. Such marriages may be annulled by a court of equity, but false representations as to character, social position or fortune do not constitute such fraud on the opposite party as to avoid a marriage induced thereby. CHAPTER III. HUSBAND AND WIFE A married woman may own in her own right, real and personal property acquired by descent, gift or purchase, and manage, sell, convey, and devise the same by will, to the same extent and in the same manner that the husband can property belonging to him. [§3393.] The husband is the legal head of the family and household furniture, pictures and all similar property used in the house occupied by husband and wife, is considered as being in the possession of the husband and under his control. Such property may be sold or mortgaged by the husband without the consent of the wife. Property conveyed to both jointly is held by them as tenants-in-common. Each owns an undivided one-half interest in such property, and this interest may be sold on execution to satisfy claims against husband or wife as the case may be. Property purchased with funds belonging to both husband and wife is owned by them jointly, the interest of each being in proportion to the amount of the purchase price contributed by each. A married woman may convey or encumber any real estate or interest therein belonging to her, and may control the same, or contract with reference thereto, to the same extent, and in the same manner as other persons [§3106]. Every conveyance made by a husband and wife shall be deemed sufficient to pass any and all right of either to the property conveyed, unless the contrary appears on the face of the conveyance [§3107]. While Iowa was still a territory, in 1840, power was conferred upon a married woman to release her dower and to convey her real estate by any conveyance executed by herself and husband and acknowledged by a separate examination and acknowledgment. This law was re-enacted in 1846, and was the first law passed in the State of Iowa for the better protection of married women. This remained the law until 1851, when an act was passed by which she might convey her interest in real estate "the same as any other person." When property is owned by either the husband or wife, the other has no interest therein which can be the subject of contract between them, or such interest as will make the same liable for the contracts or liabilities of either the husband or wife who is not the owner of the property, except as provided in this chapter. [§3394.] The distributive share or dower interest of each in the property of the other, is inchoate and becomes complete only upon the death of the owner of the property; consequently any agreement between the husband and wife relinquishing their respective interests in each other's property, though such agreement should be made in contemplation of separation is invalid. Upon a dissolution of the marriage relation by divorce, the husband and wife may contract with each other with reference to a division of the property, provided the contract is reasonable, just and right. A husband may pay taxes and interest on an incumbrance on a homestead owned by his wife, but occupied by both, and may make repairs upon the same. He may make improvements on land owned by the wife and may expend time and labor in caring for any of her property, without rendering such property liable for his debts, provided there is no collusion between them and no evidence of fraud on the part of either. A wife's property cannot be taken for her husbands debts, although it may be in possession of the husband and the creditors have no notice of the wife's ownership. Should either the husband or wife obtain possession or control of property belonging to the other, either before or after marriage, the owner of the property may maintain an action therefor, or for any right growing out of the same, in the same manner and extent as if they were unmarried. [§3395.] If property or money belonging to the wife, but in possession of the husband is used by him, with her knowledge and Peculiar mode. Husband responsible for return. When void. Property rights of married women. Real property, Conveyance, or contract. Conveyance by husband and wife. Interest of either in other's property. Remedy by one against the other. consent, in the payment of debts incurred for family expenses, or for other purposes connected with the support of the family, she cannot recover for the same, in the absence of an express agreement on his part to repay her. If a wife advances money or property to her husband to be used as he may choose, the presumption is that she does so in view of the mutual benefits which may accrue from the advancement and she cannot recover the same unless there is an agreement for its repayment. For all civil injuries committed by a married woman, damages may be recovered from her alone, and her husband shall not be responsible therefor except in cases where he would be jointly responsible with her if the marriage did not exist [§3396.] This statute abrogates the rule of the common law, making a husband responsible for civil injuries committed by his wife. The common law presumption that criminal acts done in the presence of the husband were by compulsion, is still recognized in this State but may be overcome by proof to the contrary. A conveyance, transfer or lien executed by either husband or wife, to or in favor of the other shall be valid to the same extent as between other persons [§3397.] When the rights of creditors might be prejudiced by transfers of property between husband and wife, such transactions will be closely scrutinized, and the utmost good faith must plainly appear, but where no fraudulent intention is shown they will be upheld if based upon an adequate consideration. If a conveyance is made by the husband to the wife when the husband is largely indebted and insolvent, such conveyance is presumptively fraudulent, but a conveyance to a wife in payment of a valid claim, even though made at a time when the husband is largely indebted to others, will not be considered fraudulent the wife having the same right as other creditors to obtain payment. All contracts between husband and wife where no other consideration appears than an agreement to perform some duty already incumbent upon the parties, because of their relations as husband and wife, are against public policy, and will not be enforced in law. Such, for example, as a promise by the husband to pay money to the wife to induce her to live with him, when she has no legal ground for not living with him; or an agreement to allow the husband to obtain a divorce when he has no legal cause for divorce, or a conveyance of property in consideration of future care and support because the husband is growing old; or a contract between husband and wife by which the husband agrees to pay the wife at stated intervals, sums of money, in consideration of the faithful performance by the wife of the obligations incident to the marriage relation. But our courts have held that exempt property may be transferred by the husband to the wife without any consideration; that a deed from husband to wife in consideration of a dismissal by the latter, of a proceeding for divorce, is valid; that a contract between husband and wife by which the wife, for a consideration, after a decree of divorce, agrees to release all her dower interest in the real estate of the husband, is binding. Voluntary conveyances, in favor of third parties, by a man or woman in contemplation of marriage, and with the evident intention of defeating the marital rights of the other party, in such property, will be held fraudulent, and may be set aside in an action by the injured party after marriage. Contracts and conveyances made before marriage and duly recorded, will not be set aside on account of the marriage relation, as the fact of recording is sufficient to charge the wife with notice of the transactions. Ante-nuptial contracts, if free from fraud and imposition, are valid, and such a contract stipulating that each is to have the untrammeled and sole control of his or her own property, real and personal, as though no marriage had taken place, will be enforced. The dower right of each in the other's property is completely waived by such contract. In case the husband or wife abandons the other and leaves the state, and is absent therefrom for one year without providing for the maintenance and support of his or her family, or is confined in jail or the penitentiary for the period of one year or upward, the district court of the county where the husband or wife, so abandoned or not confined, resides, may, on application by petition setting forth fully the facts, authorize him or her, to manage, control, sell and encumber the property of the husband or wife for the support and maintenance of the family and for the purpose of paying debts. Notice of such proceedings shall be given as in ordinary actions, and anything done under or by virtue of the order of the court, shall be valid to the same extent as if the same was done by the party owning the property. [§3398.] A wife who is abandoned by her husband without her fault, may pledge his credit for necessaries, and if left in the management of his business may make all contracts incident to such management. She may also sell exempt property and apply the proceeds towards the support of the family before absolutely forced to do so by the destitution of the family. All contracts, sales or incumbrances made by either husband or wife by virtue of the power contemplated in the preceding section, shall be binding on both, and during such absence or confinement, the person acting under such power, may sue and be sued thereon, and for all acts done, the property of both shall be liable. No suit or proceeding shall abate or be in anywise affected by the return or release of the person confined, but he or she may be permitted to prosecute or defend jointly with the other. [§3399.] The husband or wife affected by the proceedings contemplated in the preceding sections, may have the order or decree of the court set aside or annulled, but the setting aside of such decree or order shall in nowise affect any act done thereunder. [§3400.] A husband or wife may constitute the other his or her attorney in fact, to control and dispose of his or her Husband not liable for wife's torts. Conveyances to each other valid. Conveyances to third parties. Abandonment of either. Contracts and sales binding. Decree set aside. Attorney in fact. property for their mutual benefit, and may revoke the same to the same extent and manner as other persons. [§3401.] The fact of the marital relation does not, of itself, establish the presumption that the husband is the agent of the wife, for the transaction of business for her, but in order to bind her, he must be expressly authorized to act as agent, or she must, after knowledge of the act, expressly or impliedly ratify it. Such agency or ratification may be established by circumstances, and the degree of evidence required in such cases, is less than is necessary to establish an agency between independent parties, or the ratification by the husband, of acts done by the wife or his agent. A wife may receive the wages of her personal labor and maintain an action therefor in her own name, and hold the same in her own right; she may prosecute and defend all actions at law or in equity for the preservation and protection of her rights and property as if unmarried. [§3402.] The husband is entitled to the wife's labor and assistance in the duties and obligations growing out of the marriage relation, and to her earnings, if she is not engaged in a separate business on her own account; but her earnings for services performed for others than her husband or acquired in carrying on an independent business, belong to her alone. Such earnings may be invested in property and it will be exempt from seizure for debts of her husband. She may bring actions for injuries to herself, whether of person, property or reputation in the same manner as if she were unmarried. If she suffers personal injury by which the husband is deprived of her services or society he has a right of recovery for such loss and for expenses for medicine and medical treatment. The wife cannot recover in such case, unless it appears that she has expended her own money in payment of such expenses. If, at the time of the injury she is engaged in a separate business, and death results, the husband may still recover for loss of society and expenses, but an action for damages can be brought only by the administrator of her estate. Although husband or wife may maintain an action against the other for the recovery of property, neither has a right of action for damages sustained by the infliction of personal injury, and this is true even though the one inflicting the injury has been criminally convicted and fined for the assault. Neither husband or wife is liable for the debts or liabilities of the other incurred before marriage, and except as herein otherwise declared, they are not liable for the separate debts of each other; nor are the wages, earnings, or property of either, nor is the rent or income of such property liable for the separate debts of the other [§3403.] The husband is liable for necessaries furnished the wife, upon an implied obligation to provide for her a reasonable support. The term "necessaries," is not confined to the supply of things actually demanded for her sustenance, such as food, clothing and medicine, but includes all that may be needful for her comfort and happiness according to her rank and station in society. In determining the extent of the husband's liability, it is always proper to consider the wife's social position and the circumstances and condition of the family, and these will, of course, vary in each particular case. It has been held that jewelry is included in the term necessaries and that attorney's fees in divorce proceedings by the wife, can be recovered from the husband. If the wife is compelled to leave her husband because of cruel and improper conduct on his part, the husband is still presumed to have extended to her a general credit for necessaries, such as meat, drink, clothes, medicine, etc., suitable to his degree and circumstances. Contracts may be made by a wife and liabilities incurred, and the same enforced by or against her to the same extent and in the same manner as if she were unmarried [§3404.] By this provision a wife is clothed with the same rights enjoyed by her husband, and must, therefore, assume the same liabilities. She has the same freedom to contract in reference to her property, or other matters, and will be held to the same strict accountability. The law will enforce her obligations with the same impartiality, whether such obligations are express or implied. She may contract with reference to all kinds of property, including real estate, and may mortgage her property as security for the debt of another, in precisely the same manner that her husband could do in similar cases. The expenses of the family and the education of the children are chargeable upon the property of both husband and wife, or of either of them, and in relation thereto they may be sued jointly or separately. [§3405.] Both husband and wife are personally responsible for family expenses. The credit may be extended to the husband and the contract made with him alone, and the wife will be liable though she may have no knowledge of the purchase and has given no consent thereto. It is sufficient to show that the articles were used, or kept for use in the family, and a judgment may be rendered against the wife alone. But the husband cannot subject the property of his wife to any liability for articles for family use when it appears that such articles were not a necessity, if the wife has objected to the purchase and notified the seller that she will not pay for the same. "Expenses of the family," are not limited to necessary expenses, but whatever is kept or used in the family is included in the term. A piano, an organ, a watch and other jewelry, a cook stove and fixtures, have all been held to come within the term "family expense," for which the property of the wife is liable. But a reaping machine, though used by the husband in the business by which he supports his family, is not a legitimate item of family expense, nor can a plow be included therein. The expense of treatment of a wife at a hospital for the insane, has been held not to be a family expense. Money borrowed by the husband and used in the purchase of articles which, if obtained on credit, would Wages of wife. Property of one not liable for debts of the other. Contracts of wife. Family expenses. constitute items of family expense, cannot itself form such an item of family expense, that the wife may be held liable, unless the money was furnished at her request, and the account assigned to the party furnishing the money. If a merchant with whom the husband has no account is notified in writing, not to sell goods to the wife and charge them to him, the merchant cannot hold the husband responsible, unless it appears that the latter fails to provide necessaries otherwise for his family. If the family is supported in whole, or in part, by the wife, she cannot recover back the money thus expended, from her husband or his estate, as the law places such duty equally on both. Neither husband nor wife can remove the other, nor their children from their homestead without his or her consent, and if he abandons her, she is entitled to the custody of their minor children, unless the district court, upon application for that purpose, shall, for good cause, otherwise direct [§3406.] When either the husband or wife is insane, and incapable of executing a deed, and relinquishing or conveying his or her right to the real property of the other, the sane person may petition the district court of the county where such petitioner resides, or of the county where said real estate is situated, setting forth the facts and praying for an order authorizing the applicant or some other person to execute a deed of conveyance and thereby relinquish the interest of either in the real property of the other [§3407.] Upon such application the court has power to appoint some person or attorney guardian of the person alleged to be insane, who shall ascertain as to the propriety, good faith and necessity of the prayer of...