LEGAL RESOLUTION OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION DISPUTES How viable is the resolution of nuclear non-proliferation disputes throughtheInternationalCourtofJusticeandinternationalarbitration? James Fry examines the compromissory clauses in the IAEA Statute, IAEA safeguards agreements and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material that give jurisdiction to these fora and analyzes recent jurisprudence to demonstrate how legal resolution can handle such politically sensitive disputes. In sum, legal resolution of nuclearnon-proliferationdisputesrepresentsanoptionthatStatesand commentators have all too often ignored. The impartiality and pro- cedural safeguards of legal resolution should make it an acceptable option for target States and the international community, especially vis-à-vistheproceduralshortcomingsandgeneralheavy-handednessof SecurityCouncilinvolvementundertheUNCharterChapterVII. James D. Fry isAssistantProfessorofLawattheUniversityofHong Kong Faculty of Law, where he is also Director of the LL.M. program, Deputy Director of the Japan and Korea program and Warden of Lee ShanKeeHall. This publication has been made possibleby agenerous grantfrom the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,China(ProjectNoHKU744310H). LEGAL RESOLUTION OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION DISPUTES JAMES D. FRY UniversityPrintingHouse,CambridgeCB28BS,UnitedKingdom PublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyCambridgeUniversityPress,NewYork CambridgeUniversityPressispartoftheUniversityofCambridge. ItfurtherstheUniversity’smissionbydisseminatingknowledgeinthepursuitof education,learning,andresearchatthehighestinternationallevelsofexcellence. www.cambridge.org Informationonthistitle:www.cambridge.org/9781107041295 ©JamesD.Fry2013 Thispublicationisincopyright.Subjecttostatutoryexception andtotheprovisionsofrelevantcollectivelicensingagreements, noreproductionofanypartmaytakeplacewithoutthewritten permissionofCambridgeUniversityPress. Firstpublished2013 PrintedintheUnitedKingdombyCPIGroupLtd,CroydonCR04YY AcataloguerecordforthispublicationisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary LibraryofCongressCataloguinginPublicationdata Fry,JamesD.,1975– Legalresolutionofnuclearnon-proliferationdisputes/JamesD.Fry. pages cm ISBN978-1-107-04129-5 1. Nuclearnonproliferation 2. Disputeresolution(Law) 3. Diplomaticnegotiations ininternationaldisputes. I. Title. KZ5675.F79 2013 341.7′34–dc23 2013013388 ISBN978-1-107-04129-5Hardback CambridgeUniversityPresshasnoresponsibilityforthepersistenceoraccuracyof URLsforexternalorthird-partyinternetwebsitesreferredtointhispublication, anddoesnotguaranteethatanycontentonsuchwebsitesis,orwillremain, accurateorappropriate. OptimusParentibus CONTENTS part i Introduction 1 1 Foundationalelementsofthestudy 3 1.1 Theproblemandsolution 3 1.2 Outline 7 1.3 Methodology 12 1.4 Audience 14 1.5 Originalityofthisstudy 16 2 Definitions,delimitationsanddisclaimersofthestudy 19 2.1 Thenuclearnon-proliferationregime 20 2.1.1 Treatiescomprisingtheregime 23 2.1.2 Nuclearweapons 28 2.2 Focusonlegalresolution 34 2.2.1 Varietyindisputesettlementmechanisms 34 2.2.2 Legalresolutioninthisstudy 43 2.3 Pragmatismoverutopianism 47 part ii SecurityCouncilinvolvementwithnuclear non-proliferationdisputesunderUNCharter ChapterVII 53 3 ExploringpotentialproblemswithSecurityCouncil involvement 55 3.1 Introduction 55 3.1.1 Structureofthischapter 59 3.1.2 Disclaimersforthischapter 60 3.1.3 MethodsofinterpretingSecurityCouncilresolutions 61 3.1.4 BindingresolutionsoftheSecurityCouncil 75 3.2 SecurityCouncilChapterVIImeasures 87 3.2.1 Resolutions255and984:establishingsecurityassurances 88 3.2.1.1 PositivesecurityassurancesofResolution255 89 3.2.1.2 PositivesecurityassurancesofResolution984 93 vii viii contents 3.2.1.3 Negativesecurityassurancesoftheunilateral statements 95 3.2.1.4 Internationalestoppelandsecurityassurances 96 3.2.1.5 Legalnatureoftheseassurances 101 3.2.1.6 BindingpermanentmembersoftheSecurity Council 103 3.2.1.7 BindingtheSecurityCouncil 105 3.2.2 Resolution487andIsrael’sattackonIraq 107 3.2.3 The1991GulfWarandResolution687 110 3.2.3.1 Cease-fireagreementontheground 111 3.2.3.2 NucleardisarmamentobligationsofResolution 687 112 3.2.3.3 UNSCOMandUNMOVICunderResolution 687 114 3.2.3.4 Iraq’sacceptanceofResolution687 121 3.2.3.5 UNSCOM’sstrength 122 3.2.3.6 Due-processconcernswithSecurityCouncil proceedings 123 3.2.3.7 Reiteratingtreatyobligations 131 3.2.3.8 SuspendingIraq’sNPTrights 133 3.2.4 India,Pakistan,andResolution1172 135 3.2.5 NorthKoreaandvariousSecurityCouncilresolutions 144 3.2.5.1 ImposingtreatyobligationsonNorthKorea 152 3.2.5.2 ImposingtreatyobligationsonallStates parties 154 3.2.6 IranandvariousSecurityCouncilresolutions 154 3.2.7 WMDterrorismandResolution1540 163 3.2.7.1 Newobligationsconcerningnon-Stateactors 167 3.2.7.2 Newobligationsconcerninglegislation 167 3.2.7.3 Newobligationsinpreventingtradeinnuclearweapons andmaterial 169 3.2.7.4 Shiftingtosupply-sidenon-proliferationmeasures throughimposition 171 3.3 Conclusionforthispart 173 part iii Legalresolutionandnuclearnon-proliferation disputes 179 Introduction 181 4 Thehistoryoflegalresolutionofsimilarlysensitivedisputesas nuclearnon-proliferationdisputes 197 4.1 EarlydebatesbetweentheUSandtheUSSRovertheroleoflegal resolution 200 4.2 Military-relatedarbitrationfromancienttimes 203 4.3 Military-relateddisputesbeforethePCIJandtheICJ 212