LEARNING FROM OUR MISTAKES: THE AFTERMATH OF THE AMERICAN DIVORCE REVOLUTION AS A LESSON IN LAW TO THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND This process of learning from each other is at least as old as our nations, and its role in our development as nations has been incalculably beneficial. I would say that this process of learning from each other, far from being over, is as vital now as it has been at any point in the past. INTRODUCTION On November 24, 1995, the people of the Republic of Ireland voted in favor of ending a fifty-eight-year-old constitutional ban on divorce.2 The vote to amend the nation's 1937 constitution in order to allow divorce was secured by the narrowest margin in any Irish referendum.3 Of the 1.6 million Irish citizens who voted on the referendum, 50.3 % voted to allow divorce, while 49.7% voted against lifting the prohibition then in place.4 As a result of the vote, Ireland will amend its constitution near the end of 1996, and the Irish Parliament will enact a formal divorce bill alongside the amendment.5 Ireland's new divorce laws "will be the most conservative in Europe. "6 The Fifteenth Amendment to the Irish Constitution will do more than simply remove the constitutional ban on divorce: it will provide "the actual ground rules for divorce in Ireland. "' Specifically, before granting a divorce, an 1. Mary Robinson, ConstitutionalS hifts in Europe and the United States: Learning from Each Other, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (1996). Mary Robinson is the President of the Republic of Ireland. 2. Christine M. Goldbeck, "ForB etter orf or Worse" No More, AN SCATHAN (Dec. 1995) <http://www.underbridge.com/anseathan/issues/decemb- 1/divorce.htm>. Article 41.3.2 of the Irish Constitution states, "No law shall be enacted providing for the grant of a dissolution of marriage." IR. CONST. art. 41.3.2. 3. Golbeck, supra note 2. The vote was so close that an unprecedented recount was ordered. The "Yes" vote in favor of dropping the divorce ban had won by 7520 votes. After the recount, the margin increased to 9163 votes. Court Challenge to Vote for Divorce, NEwS OF IRELAND (visited Sept. 25, 1996) <http://www.iol.ieresource/ip/noi/ nov29- 95/divorce.htm>. 4. Goldbeck, supra note 2. 5. Id. The presentation of the divorce referendum to the Irish electorate in November 1995 represented the first time in the history of the Republic that "a full draft [bill was published alongside the wording of a constitutional amendment." Maol M. Tynan, First Divorces Expected Late Next Year, THE IRISH TIMES, June 20, 1996, at 6. 6. Goldbeck, supra note 2. 7. Anna Margaret McDonough, When Irish Eyes Aren't Smiling-Legalizing Divorce in Ireland, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 647, 656 (1996). IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. [Vol. 7:2 Irish court will have to be satisfied that at the time proceedings are initiated the spouses have lived apart for at least four of the previous five years, and that there is no reasonable prospect of reconciliation.8 The Amendment also will require that proper provisions be made for the spouses and their children.9 Furthermore, the Amendment will permit additional conditions as set out by law.10 Such additional conditions will be set forth in the Family Law (Divorce) Bill, which will address "various aspects of divorce in Ireland."" On June 27, 1996, the Bill passed its second stage in Ireland's House of Representatives (the "Dail" 2) after a day of debates.3 The following month the Bill passed through the Dail's committee stage, in which 8. Geraldine Kennedy, Spring Hopes for Substantial Majority in Poll, THE IRISH TIMES, Sept. 14, 1995, at 6. According to Ireland's Minister for Equality and Law Reform, Mervyn Taylor, there will be "no quickie divorce" under the Fifteenth Amendment, nor will there be a "divorce culture," as there has been in foreign jurisdictions where the waiting periods for divorce are much shorter. Id. 9. Id. 10. Id. The Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution Act, 1995, provides as follows: A court designated by law may grant a dissolution of marriage where, but only where, it is satisfied that- i. at the date of the institution of the proceedings, the spouses have lived apart from one another for a period or periods amounting to, at least four years during the previous five ii. there is no reasonable prospect of reconciliation between the spouses iii. such provisions as the court considers proper having regard to the circumstances exist or will be made for the spouses, and children of both of them and any other person proscribed [sic] by law iv. any further conditions proscribed [sic] by law are complied with. McDonough, supra note 7, at 656 n.60 (quoting Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution Act (1995) (Ir.)). 11. McDonough, supra note 7, at 656. The Bill, for example, will prescribe conditions on a court's jurisdiction in divorce proceedings. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 6. In general, the Family Law (Divorce) Bill, 1995, consists of the following parts: Part I. Planning and General Part II. The Obtaining of a Decree of Divorce Part IIIP.r eliminary and Ancillary Orders in or After the Proceedings for a divorce [sic] Part IV. Income Tax, Capital Acquisition Tax, Capital Gains Tax, Probate Tax, and Stamp Duty McDonough, supra note 7, at 656 n.61. 12. The Irish Parliament is called the "Oireachtas" and consists of two houses, the Senate (Seanad Eireann) and the House of Representatives (Dail Eireann). Ireland (visited Sept. 26, 1996) < http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/95fact/ei.html >. 13. Divorce Bill Passes Second Stage, THE IRISH TIMES, June 28, 1996, at 11. 1997] DIVORCE IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND it was amended.14 In October 1996, debate on the Bill was opened in Ireland's Senate (the "Seanad"), where it awaits passage."5 "The first [divorce] applications can be made three months after the Bill is signed into law," and the first divorce settlements are likely to be decreed by the end of 1997.16 Although Ireland is just now making divorce available to its citizens, the ability to divorce one's spouse has existed in the United States since the colonial period.17 From before the Revolutionary War through the first half of the twentieth century, the grounds for obtaining a divorce in the various states were fairly limited, with all states requiring a showing of some form of marital offense on the part of one of the spouses."8 The typical statutes authorized divorce for adultery, desertion, and sometimes cruelty and other offenses.'9 After World War II, however, in response to the nation's growing dissatisfaction with the existing "fault-based" divorce laws, courts in some states began to relax the statutory requirements for divorce.2' By 1969, California had enacted a statute allowing divorce without a showing of marital fault.2 Other states soon followed its lead, sparking a widespread liberalization of divorce laws in the United States.2 Although American divorce laws are statutory and vary from state to state, most states today have adopted some type of "no-fault" divorce law, in which the "irretrievable breakdown" of a marriage or "irreconcilable differences" between spouses 14. Dermot Kelly, TDs Told VAT on Divorce Fees Cannot Be Waived, THE IRISH TIMES, July 18, 1996, at 2. Various amendments to the Divorce Bill were proposed and voted on during the committee stage in the Dail. One proposed amendment, for example, "sought to require spouses to show that they had attempted reconciliation and to produce a certificate to [that] effect before a court [would grant] a divorce decree." Dermot Kelly,'Grey Area' Surrounds Marriages-hatterT, HE IRISH TIMES, July 17, 1996, at 5 [hereinafter Grey Area]. Because the Bill envisaged that counseling would be entered into on a voluntary basis, and because the amendment would add another layer of bureaucracy to divorce proceedings, the amendment was defeated by an eleven-to-nine vote. Id. 15. Counseling Urgently Needed in Cases of Marital Breakdown-Neville, THE IRISH TIMES, Oct. 11, 1996, at6. 16. Tynan, supra note 5. 17. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 11, at 283 (1968). 18. Id. 19. Id. 20. Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the DisplacedH omemaker: A Discourse on Playing With Dolls, PartnershipB uyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67, 77 (1993). After World War II, fault-based divorce laws increasingly were viewed as .annoying anachronisms" that frequently prevented divorce even when both spouses wanted one. Id. 21. Id. 22. Id. IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. [Vol. 7:2 serves as either the sole or one of several grounds for dissolving a marriage.33 As divorce has become easier to obtain, divorce rates in the United States have skyrocketed, and a "divorce revolution" has ensued. 4 Today, two people exchanging vows for the first time have only a fifty-fifty chance of staying married.' If either of them has been married previously, the odds for divorce increase.26 Furthermore, although no-fault divorce laws were designed in part to encourage the equitable division of marital property upon divorce,27 such laws frequently have had adverse economic consequences for financially dependent spouses, most of whom are women.2 Where courts have taken a no-fault approach to asset distribution and spousal support payments, the results have been especially inequitable. First, although no- fault laws seek to effect a "clean break" between spouses by encouraging a one-time division of marital property, in many cases an award of a portion (usually half) of the marital property often does not offset the future hardships associated with low income potential for women or other "displaced homemakers."29 Second, no-fault laws are based on the theory that any maintenance, or alimony, awarded should be temporary and only for 23. IRA M. ELLMAN E" AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 177 (2d ed. 1991). 24. Thomas M. Mulroy, No-Fault Divorce: Are Women Losing the Battle?, 75-NOv. A.B.A. J. 76, 76 (1989). "Except for a brief period after World War II, the divorce rate in the United States increased only gradually from 1860 to the early 1960's." LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION xvii n.* (1985). Then, "[i]n the twelve years between 1963 and 1975 the divorce rate increased 100 percent, and in each successive year until 1981 the divorce rate surpassed all previous records for this country. The actual number of annual divorces climbed to a record high of 1.21 million in 1981." Id. 25. Mulroy, supra note 24, at 76. 26. Id. 27. The elimination of both allegations of misconduct and "wrangling about guilt" from divorce proceedings was a principal aim of the no-fault laws. Such an aim "found expression not only in the substitution of the objective ground of breakdown for the former misconduct grounds, but also in ... the elimination of guilt as a determinant in the decision about property settlement, alimony, and child custody." MAX RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE AND THE LAW 379 (1972). 28. Most of the dependent spouses in American marriages are women, because more women than men have stayed out of the labor force. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that in 1991, a total of 41.8 million women stayed out of the work force for various reasons. Approximately 22.7 million of them did not want jobs because they were "keeping house." Another 1.2 million wanted jobs but did not look for them due to home responsibilities. By contrast, only 415,000 men stayed out of the work force to "keep house," and only a "small number" did not look for work because of home responsibilities. Starnes, supra note 20, at 69 n.3 (citing BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, UNITED STATES DEPT. OF LABOR, 39 EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS No. 1, at 204, Table 35 (1992)). 29. Id. at 85. "A displaced homemaker is [usually] a woman whose principal job has been homemaking and who has lost her main source of income because of divorce, separation, widowhood, [etc.] .... If she is employed at all, she works part-time or part of the year." Id. at 79 n.46. 19971 DIVORCE IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND the purpose of enabling a disadvantaged spouse to obtain suitable employment.3' Such a theory of "rehabilitative" maintenance has proven to be overly optimistic about the opportunities available to dependent spouses, because it overlooks the reality of gender-based divisions of labor within the home and the costs of those divisions to dependent spouses who must enter the work force.31 These adverse consequences of American no-fault laws have not gone unnoticed in Ireland. In Ireland, divorce opponents and supporters alike have recognized the risks that attend liberal divorce policies like those in place in the United States and other Western nations. Aware of the economic consequences of "easy" divorce and seeking to avoid a "divorce revolution" in their own country, Irish lawmakers have adopted a rather conservative approach in formulating the nation's new divorce legislation. Although the form of divorce proposed in Ireland is not fault-based, it is relatively restrictive in its other conditions.32 By American standards, Ireland's imposition of a four-year-separation requirement seems especially limiting, "given that most states in the U.S. either prohibit judicial discretion to deny a divorce, or, in the case of a contested unilateral no-fault divorce, require a period of one year or less of separation."33 While Irish legislators understandably have tried to avoid some of the problems reported in the United States and other countries where divorce is readily available, the conservative approach these lawmakers have taken may prevent divorce from becoming a workable option for ending broken marriages in Ireland. If certain court reforms are not put into place by the end of 1996, when the proposed legislation is expected to become effective, couples could "experience delays of two to three years in obtaining divorce decrees following the commencement of divorce proceedings."34 Ireland thus faces the challenge of striking a balance between making divorce a viable option for ending a marriage and enacting a divorce law that does not produce the economic inequities that are common in the United States and other liberal no-fault jurisdictions. As Ireland tackles this challenge, it should not hesitate to look to the United States as a model of both what to do and what not to do in the area of divorce law. Because 30. Id. at 85. 31. Id. at 97, 105. 32. MICHELE DILLON, DEBATING DIVORCE: MORAL CONFLICT IN IRELAND 1 (1993). 33. Id. By European standards, however, Ireland's four-year separation requirement appears less strict. "With the exception of Sweden and the Netherlands, which come closest to granting divorce on demand, other European societies take a much stricter view of marriage and its dissolution than does the United States. Id. at 1-2. For example, in the case of unilateral divorces, France requires a six-year separation. Additionally, France's dissolution statute has a "hardship" clause which permits a court to dismiss a divorce petition if divorce would cause excessive hardship to one or both of the parties. Id. at 176 n.2. 34. Tynan, supra note 5, at 6 (quoting Alan Shatter). IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. [Vol. 7:2 support for divorce itself is far from overwhelming in Ireland, and because of a strong tide of conservatism running through Irish society, Irish lawmakers may rightly regard the American no-fault laws as being too liberal for their nation. Furthermore, conservative and liberal nations alike should seek to avoid the economic hardships that accompany the no-fault approach to property distribution and spousal support payments. Nevertheless, Ireland should remember that despite the many defects of American divorce law, such law has served as a workable option for ending broken marriages by not being too restrictive in its requirements. This note considers both the recent referendum to legalize divorce in Ireland and the history and consequences of the divorce revolution in the United States. Part I begins by examining key legislation enacted by the Irish legislature between 1986, when voters rejected divorce in a similar referendum, and 1995, when a narrow majority voted in favor of divorce. This section then considers the lack of unified support for divorce in Ireland, insofar as it reflects an underlying societal conflict between the desire to guarantee individual rights and the need to protect the common good. Part II draws a parallel between Ireland's difficulty in reconciling its Catholic values with the more secular views of the European Union and the sociopolitical tensions surrounding federalism in the United States. After a discussion of the sociopolitical conflicts that are common to both nations, the section suggests that the United States may serve as a useful model to Ireland, as the latter struggles both to find its place in the modem world and to adopt divorce laws compatible with its own social values. Next, Part III explores both the history and aftermath of the divorce revolution in the United States while focusing on the adverse consequences of the no-fault approach to property distribution and maintenance. The focus then shifts back to Ireland, as Part IV begins by pointing to Ireland's awareness of the economic consequences of liberal divorce laws. This section then suggests that in order to make divorce a real option for ending broken marriages, Ireland should preserve the opportunity to alter its divorce laws in the future by not writing them into the constitution. Furthermore, in order to protect the economic interests of women, Ireland should adopt legislation that allows a no-fault ground for divorce while permitting considerations of fault to affect property distribution and maintenance awards. Finally, Part V concludes with some concerns about both the possible ramifications of legalized divorce in Ireland and the existing social schism which the result of the referendum has highlighted. 1997] DIVORCE IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND I. THE CONFLICT BEHIND THE REFERENDUM: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS V. THE COMMON GOOD A. The Road to the Referendum: Changes in Irish Family Law from 1986 to 1995 The first attempt to amend the Irish Constitution to allow divorce occurred in 1986,31 when a legislative coalition, led by the Fine Gael political party, introduced a proposal to eliminate the prohibition on divorce contained in Article 41 .6 After the government announced that its proposal would be presented to the Irish electorate in a national referendum, a national opinion poll indicated that sixty-one percent of Irish voters intended to vote in favor of the amendment.37 As the referendum approached, however, later polls revealed that the level of support for the introduction of divorce was dropping. After nine weeks of intense campaigning by both pro- and anti-divorce factions, voters rejected the referendum by nearly two to one.3" Although some supporters of the referendum blamed the reversal of public opinion on the Catholic hierarchy, which allegedly had used "scare tactics" to pressure citizens to vote against the referendum,39 others attributed 35. Although the government did not introduce a formal proposal to allow divorce until 1986, prior to that time surveys had been conducted to measure the public's attitude toward the removal of the divorce ban. In 1971, when opinion polls first posed the question, 21% of those surveyed were in favor of removing the ban. The number in favor of divorce reached a "peak of 53 percent in 1983, with 77 percent expressing support for the introduction of divorce in certain circumstances." DILLON, supra note 32, at 2. 36. Carol Coulter, Ten Year [sic] Wait is Finally Overf or Those Who Campaignedf or Divorce, THE IRISI TIMES, June 13, 1996, at 7. The amendment proposed in 1986 contained essentially the same provisions as those appearing in the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution Act, 1995. (See supra note 10 for text of the 1995 amendment.) However, the 1986 amendment required a five-year, rather than a four-year, separation period. DILLON, supra note 32, at 1. 37. DILLON, supra note 32, at 2. 38. Id. 39. McDonough, supra note 7, at 651-52. Although the hierarchy had issued a collective statement recognizing the right of Catholics to vote in good conscience in favor of divorce, several bishops individually offered their own guidance on how Catholics should vote. For example, Bishop Dominic Conway of the Elphin diocese warned people not to interpret the hierarchy's statement "too loosely." He cautioned that Catholics could not vote as they wished, but because they faced a "serious conscientious decision," they had to vote "in accordance with the law of God." DILLON, supra note 32, at 97 (quoting Bishop Conway). Such warnings and "scare tactics" by the clergy resurfaced prior to the 1995 referendum. One senior bishop claimed that divorcees were more likely to die from smoking or alcoholism and were more apt to commit suicide. John M. Brown, IrelandR eadies for Battle on Divorce, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1995, at 2. Another bishop predicted that if the referendum passed, there would be a right-wing backlash "akin to the fanaticism of the Michigan Militia in the U.S." Id. IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. [Vol. 7:2 the result to the amendment's silence on the issue of property distribution.' Whatever the reason for the referendum's defeat, the government soon began introducing legislation designed to reform existing marriage laws, the defects of which had been highlighted during the campaign.41 In the nine years between the defeat of the 1986 referendum and the approval of the 1995 referendum, the Irish parliament passed several key pieces of legislation addressing both property distribution and foreign divorce recognition.42 During the campaign before the 1995 referendum, divorce supporters, in their attempts to persuade citizens that Irish society was ready for change, often referred to the passage of such legislation. Even the President of Ireland, Mary Robinson, recognized the importance of those reforms: "What has happened since the issue (of divorce) was last before the people is a whole structure of reform of our marriage law, of various protections, of access to court remedies-a very thoughtful infrastructure has been developed."43 It is worth noting, however, that even before the legislature enacted such reforms, Ireland did provide some limited remedies for the problem of marital breakdown. For example, although the Irish Constitution prohibited divorce a vinculo matrimonii," which effects a complete dissolution of the marriage contract, a court could issue a decree of a divorce a menso et thoro,4s which results in a separation of the parties by law.46 A court could grant such a decree only on three bases: cruelty, adultery, or unnatural practices.47 If one of the parties could establish any of these wrongdoings on the part of the other spouse, the court then had the power both to determine a husband's liability to pay alimony to his wife, and to declare the "guilty" 40. McDonough, supra note 7, at 652. 41. Coulter, supra note 36, at 7. 42. McDonough, supra note 7, at 652. 43. Department of Pol. Sci., Trinity College Dublin, The Irish Divorce Referendum 1995, at 2-3 (1995) <http://www.bess.tcd.ie/polsdept/divorce.htm> (quoting Mary Robinson). 44. A vinculo matrimonii is a Latin phrase meaning "[firom the bond of matrimony." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 136 (6th ed. 1990). 45. A mensa et thoro is a Latin phrase commonly translated to mean "from bed and board." Id. at 81. 46. ALAN J. SHATrER, SHArrER'S FAMILY LAW IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND 217 (3d ed. 1986). The remedy of divorce a mensa et thoro is misleadingly named "in that it does not amount to a divorce in the popular meaning of the term but only to a judicial separation of the spouses." Id. The courts' authority to grant a decree of divorce a mensa et thoro derives from two pieces of legislation. Under Section 13 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1870, the High Court inherited jurisdiction over such decrees from the Ecclesiastical Courts. The Courts Act, 1981, conferred a concurrent jurisdiction on the Circuit Court to determine these judicial separation proceedings. Id. 47. McDonough, supra note 7, at 649. 1997] DIVORCE IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND spouse unfit to have custody of any children of the marriage.48 In addition to granting decrees of divorce a mensa et thoro, the Irish courts recognized foreign divorces in certain circumstances. 49 Before they would recognize a foreign divorce, Irish courts required both parties, at the time proceedings were initiated, to have been domiciled in the jurisdiction granting the divorce.50 Such a requirement was sexist in its application, however, because the Irish common law considered a wife's domicile to be that of her husband."' "[T]hus a husband could leave his wife in Ireland, move to England, and obtain a divorce which would be recognized as valid in Ireland. The husband would then be free to marry again."52 A wife, however, could not do the same, because her domicile would remain that of the husband she left behind in Ireland.53 Because the 1986 referendum highlighted these and other shortcomings of the courts' efforts to address marital breakdown, the Irish legislature sought to broaden and improve the remedies already existing. The legislature's first reform effort was to pass the Domicile and Recognition of Foreign Divorces Act of 1986, which replaced the common-domicile requirement with a policy requiring courts to recognize a foreign divorce if either spouse were domiciled in the foreign jurisdiction. 4 The Act further abolished the common law rule that a wife's domicile depended upon her husband's.55 Although such measures would be expected to expand divorce recognition in Ireland, other provisions of the Act, along with the actual judicial implementation of the Act, prevented such broadened recognition from occurring. First, the Act itself limited the jurisdictions from which the courts had authority to recognize divorces.56 Second, "[tihe courts place[d] a heavy burden on [those] seeking foreign divorce recognition" by requiring that a party, in order to establish a new domicile, show an intention to abandon a previous domicile, along with an intent to live indefinitely in the 48. SHATTER, supra note 46, at 227. 49. Article 41.3.3 of the Irish Constitution addresses Irish recognition of foreign divorces: No person whose marriage has been dissolved under the civil law of any other State but is a subsisting valid marriage under the law for the time being in force within the jurisdiction of the Government and Parliament established by this Constitution shall be capable of contracting a valid marriage within that jurisdiction during the lifetime of the other party to the marriage so dissolved. IR. CONST. art. 41.3.3. 50. SHATTER, supra note 46, at 255. 51. McDonough, supra note 7, at 650. 52. Id. 53. Id. 54. Id. at 652. 55. Id. 56. Id. The Act allowed courts to recognize divorces obtained in England, Wales, Northern Ireland, the Isle of Man, and the Channel Islands. Id. at 652 n.35. IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. [Vol. 7:2 foreign state. 7 Irish courts did not recognize foreign divorces when there was a failure to meet the domicile requirement.58 Thus, because of the courts' "narrow interpretation of domicile," many people who relied on foreign divorces and subsequently remarried had their second marriages declared invalid in Ireland.59 After reforming the law with respect to the recognition of foreign divorces, the legislature adopted the substance of a bill proposed by Alan Shatter of the Fine Gael party.6' Designed to "streamline[] the proceedings for judicial separation,"61 the Judicial Separation and Family Reform Act of 1989 established six grounds for granting divorce a mensa et thoro.62 The Act provided for a no-fault basis for judicial separation, along with other grounds based on a marital offense.63 The legislation also allowed all other matters, such as maintenance and custody, to be determined at the same time a decree was granted.' Although the Act provided a number of grounds for separation, the granting of a decree was not guaranteed upon application. The passage of the Act increased the number of applications for judicial separation without significantly affecting the acceptance rate; for example, couples filed 2718 57. Id. at 653. 58. Id. 59. Id. 60. Coulter, supra note 36, at 7. 61. Id. 62. McDonough, supra note 7, at 653. The Judicial Separation and Family Law Reform Act provides that: An application for a decree of separation may be made if: (1) the Respondent has committed adultery; (2) the Respondent has behaved in such a way that the Applicant cannot reasonably be expected to live with Respondent; (3) there has been desertion by the Respondent of the Applicant for a continuous period of at least one year immediately preceding the date of application; (4) the spouses have lived apart for a continuous period of at least one year immediately preceding the date of application and that the Respondent consents to a decree being granted; (5) the spouses have lived apart for a continuous period of at least three years preceding the date of application; or (6) the marriage has broken down to the extent that the Court is satisfied in all circumstances that a normal marital relationship has not existed between the spouses for a period of at least one year immediately preceding the date of the application. Id. at 653 n.44 (quoting JUDICIAL SEPARATION AND FAMILY LAW REFORM ACT § 2(1) (1989)). 63. Coulter, supra note 36, at 7. 64. Id.