LLooyyoollaa UUnniivveerrssiittyy CChhiiccaaggoo LLooyyoollaa eeCCoommmmoonnss Philosophy: Faculty Publications and Other Faculty Publications and Other Works by Works Department 2010 LLaattee PPrraaggmmaattiissmm,, LLooggiiccaall PPoossiittiivviissmm,, aanndd TThheeiirr AAfftteerrmmaatthh David Ingram Loyola University Chicago, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/philosophy_facpubs Part of the Continental Philosophy Commons, Epistemology Commons, Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, History of Philosophy Commons, Philosophy of Language Commons, and the Philosophy of Science Commons Author Manuscript This is a pre-publication author manuscript of the final, published article. RReeccoommmmeennddeedd CCiittaattiioonn Ingram, David. "Late Pragmatism, Logical Positivism, and their Aftermath." In vol. 5 of The History of Continental Philosophy, ed. David Ingram and Alan D. Schrift (London: Acumen Press, 2010), 281-299. This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications and Other Works by Department at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy: Faculty Publications and Other Works by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. © 2010 David Ingram 1 Chapter 12 [revised- Dec. 2009] Late Pragmatism, Logical Positivism, and Their Aftermath David Ingram Introduction Developments in Anglo-American philosophy during the first half of the 20th Century closely tracked developments that were occurring in continental philosophy during this period. This should not surprise us. Aside from the fertile communication between these ostensibly separate traditions, both were responding to problems associated with the rise of mass society. Rabid nationalism, corporate statism, and totalitarianism (Left and Right) posed a profound challenge to the idealistic rationalism of neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian philosophies. The decline of the individual – classically conceived by the 18th-century Enlightenment as a self-determining agent – provoked strong reactions. While some philosophical tendencies sought to re-conceive the relationship between individual, society, and nature in more organic ways that radically departed from the subjectivism associated with classical Cartesianism, other tendencies sought to do just the opposite. This is one way of putting the difference between the two major movements within Anglo-American philosophy that I will be discussing in this essay. American pragmatism, which achieved the pinnacle of its popularity prior to 1940, traces its lineage back to empiricism as well as German Idealism. With the exception of William James, who is best known for his defense of radical empiricism, the other two important 20th century pragmatists, John Dewey (1859–1952) and George 2 Herbert Mead (1863–1931), embraced a post-metaphysical version of Hegelian dialectics that was starkly antithetical to both Cartesian rationalism and atomistic empiricism. By contrast, logical positivism, which maintained a lively hold on Anglo-American thought as late as the sixties, reacted against Hegelian philosophy in all its forms, and accordingly resurrected both the Cartesian method of conceptual (logical) analysis as well as its atomistic ontology. In this respect, positivism is closer in spirit to Husserlian phenomenology and French structuralism, while pragmatism is closer in spirit to Heideggerian existentialism and its French progeny (the outstanding exception being Sartre’s early Cartesian existentialism). As a general rule, the pragmatists’ embrace of methodological holism served as counterpoint to the positivists’ endorsement of methodological individualism. However, in contrast to their continental counterparts, pragmatists and positivists shared the naturalistic approach to philosophical explanation that had been the hallmark of Anglo-American philosophy since Bacon. Pragmatism In order to understand the complex relationship between Anglo-American philosophy and continental philosophy during the inter-War years, we would need to trace the genealogy of logical positivism and American pragmatism back to their late- 19th-century continental antecedents. This dimension has been so thoroughly explored by others that little need be said here about this fascinating chapter in Western 3 philosophy.1 Aside from some notable exceptions – such as Husserl’s positive reaction to some of William James’s earlier ideas concerning experiential psychology (including Jame’s notion of an experiential “fringe,” which Husserl credits as a precursor to his own Deleted: Suffice it to say notion of “horizon”) -- the reception of American pragmatism by English, German, and Deleted: , French philosophy in the early decades of the 20th century was clouded by prejudicial misunderstanding that was partly abetted by the very philosopher who gave this movement its name. The German translation of William James’s Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking (1907) by Wilhelm Jerusalem in 1908 catapulted pragmatism into the central topic of discussion at the World Philosophical Congress held at Heidelberg that very same year. James’s assertion in that book that “the true … is only the expedient in the way of our thinking”2 – led many of his German contemporaries to dismiss this “new fad in philosophy … from the land of the dollar” as (in the words of one critic) a degradation of “the truth to the level of expediency, just as in days gone by, a similar way of thinking was imported to us from the land of shopkeepers [i.e., Britain] preaching the reduction of morality to utility.”3 The crassest misrepresentations of pragmatism spawned by this untimely reception have been the subject of a withering critique by Hans Joas. These include the view that pragmatism reduces truth to utility; 1 See Joas, Pragmatism and Social Theory. 2 James, Pragmatism, p. 222. 3 Gutberlet, “Der Pragmatismus,” Philosophisches Jahrbuch 21 (1908), pp. 437, 445, quoted in Joas, p. 98. 4 endorses Cartesian subjectivism; and represents a mishmash of Ernst Mach’s empirico-criticism, Friedrich Nietzsche’s perspectivalism and will to power, and German Lebensphilosophie.4 These misconceptions about pragmatism continued to inform German philosophy for the next four decades, as can be seen from Max Scheler’s and Horkheimer’s unsympathetic comments.5 Strikingly absent from this reception is any mention of the profound impact 4 Ibid., p. 99. 5 In his book Erkenntnis und Arbeit (1926), Scheler reduced pragmatism to a “knowledge of productivity,” which he distinguishes from a knowledge of culture (Bildungswissen) and a knowledge of redemption (Erlösungswissen). More tellingly, he equated this knowledge of productivity with a “knowledge of domination” that in his mind was largely indistinguishable from the kind of narrow instrumentalism that characterized positivism. Scheler’s interpretation of pragmatism served as the dominant reference point for Max Horkheimer’s dismissive treatment of Dewey’s philosophy in The Eclipse of Reason, written almost twenty years later. Although Horkheimer takes note of the “many schools of thought” that have criticized pragmatism, he himself cites only Hugo Münsterberg’s Philosophie der Werte and Scheler’s “Erkenntnis und Arbeit” in [Scheler’s] Wissenformen und die Gesellschaft” (Eclipse of Reason, p. 170). 5 Deleted: u of Charles Sanders Peirce on James’s thought.6 Indeed, Peirce’s signal contribution to the social philosophies of James’s most prominent successors in the pragmatist tradition (most notably Mead and Dewey) consists in his anti-Cartesian, anti-phenomenalist linkage of meaning and knowledge to action. More precisely, it was Peirce’s genetic linkage of instrumental action undertaken by a single intelligent being to social action undertaken by a community of knowers that would later inspire the progressive politics of Mead and Dewey. So central to the thought of Mead and Dewey (and, to a lesser extent Karl Popper) is this linkage of reflective natural adaption and social community that it would later ground their view that free and fully inclusive democracy is central to the full development of the kind of creative intelligence that is so necessary for progressive problem solving of any kind. Peirce expressly derived his notion of “pragmaticism” from Kant’s use of pragmatisch in the Critique of Pure Reason (II, ch. 2, sec. 3) and the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (Sec. II), where Kant equates it with instrumental (prudential) action guided by hypothetical (conditional) rules, in contrast with moral (practical) action guided by categorical (unconditional) imperatives. Peirce himself was mainly interested in showing how the meanings of many if not most general ideas (or signs) could be interpreted in terms of general (counterfactual) conditionals. Such conditionals prescribe the performance of an indefinite number of instrumental (experimental) actions that achieve definite consequences. Thus, the meaning of “this diamond is hard” would be 6 For further discussion of Peirce, see Douglas R. Anderson, “Peirce and Pragmatism: American ‘Schellingeanism,’” in History of Continental Philosophy. Volume 2: The Revolutionary Age and/as Responses to Hegel, ed. Daniel W. Conway. 6 explicable by a statement of the sort “If one were to scratch, illuminate, etc., this substance, then consequences (such as failure to scratch, darken, etc.) would occur.” Especially important for later pragmatists is the way in which Peirce connects this account of meaning to an account of knowledge, truth, and logical probability. According to Pierce, the meanings of our words are constant because they signify fixed beliefs. These beliefs are acquired and confirmed in experimental situations in which the outcomes are at best statistically probable but not absolutely certain. Probability, in turn, designates a relative frequency, the average deviation from which diminishes in proportion to the number of trials. The upshot is that the constancy of a sign’s meaning is also relative to experimentally confirmed statistical frequencies produced over time. Indeed, so is truth. For on Peirce’s account, it is the experimental method – not tenacity, authority, or a priori reasoning – that enables us to approximate a lasting consensus in the fixation of belief and thereby eliminate deviations that produce doubt. More importantly, it is the experimental method as applied by an indefinite ideal community of inquirers that gradually enables us to approximate (if not reach) a true and lasting consensus over time regarding all of our beliefs, moral as well as cognitive. Peirce’s insights regarding knowledge and meaning proved seminal for Dewey and Mead. Dewey began his career as a Hegelian. During the period from 1890 to 1900, his embrace of Hegelian idealism, with its notion of conceptual holism and conceptual dialectic (or development) traversing stages of contradiction (analytic opposition and distinction) and resolution (synthetic unification and identification), underwent a profound naturalistic transformation. Under the influence of Darwin’s theory of evolution, Dewey translated this dialectic into the idiom of biological organism and 7 growth as a progressive process of environmental adaptation and change. His deeper exposure to Peirce’s and James’s pragmatism around the turn of the century added a third element to this equation: instrumentalism (or “experimental idealism” as he then formulated it). As we shall see, Dewey’s instrumentalism bears a striking resemblance to certain aspects of Heidegger’s existential phenomenology in its emphasis on the holistic and situational nature of human understanding (or inquiry, as Dewey dubbed it). For Dewey, human understanding involves an embodied attunement to an environment that is already meaningful (circumscribed by language and community) but never determinately so, thereby calling forth an on-going process of active interpretation (reconstruction) in light of new questions, new problems, and new possibilities. While Dewey was interested in working out the implications of instrumentalism for a theory of democracy and education, Mead was chiefly preoccupied with applying Peirce’s anti-Cartesian insights about the communal genesis of knowledge and meaning to the new fields of developmental and social psychology. As with Dewey’s pragmatism, Mead’s symbolic interactionism, which he also called social behaviorism, owes a great deal to Hegel’s dialectical philosophy, especially its account of self-certainty, conceived as a process of acquiring recognition from (internalizing the viewpoint of) another. For Mead, one becomes a full self – an “I” who as subject can reflectively relate to itself as object, or “me” – only in the course of proceeding through progressive stages of social and symbolic interaction. As socialization proceeds, so does individuation. Ultimately, the capacity of the self to internalize the impersonal and abstract role of language itself – signified by the human community (or generalized other) – enables the self to critically free itself from the particular social roles constitutive of itself as a nexus of social habits 8 (or “me”), thereby enabling it to become a uniquely creative inventor of its own values and beliefs – in short, of its own identity as an “I.” George Herbert Mead7 Mead’s entire career was informed by the Hegelian insight that “the whole is more concrete than the part.”8 The rather meager corpus of essays and fragments that constitute Mead’s oeuvre, most of which have been posthumously published in various collections, repeatedly attest to the power this idea had on his thought. Once again, it is Peirce’s notion of a community of interpretation as pivotal for understanding meaning and belief that links this idealistic notion to an account of social behavior. Darwin’s 7 Mead was born in South Hadley, Massachusetts, on February 27, 1863 and died in Chicago in April 26, 1931. He received his BA from Oberlin College (1879–83) and began doing graduate work at Harvard in 1887, although he never wrote a dissertation. In 1893 he was appointed professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago, where he served in that capacity until his death. His main intellectual influences were Adam Smith, Hegel, and Darwin. Among his most important books are The Philosophy of the Present (1932), ed. Arthur E. Murphy; Mind, Self, and Society (1934), ed. Charles W. Morris; Philosophy of the Act (1938), ed. Charles W. Morris; Selected Writings: George Herbert Mead (1964); and The Individual and the Social World: Unpublished Work of George Herbert Mead (1982). 8 Mead, Selected Writings: George Herbert Mead, p. 166. 9 Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals provided Mead with an evolutionary model for understanding the rudimentary social psychology of animal behavior. Meanwhile, Dewey’s important work on the reflex (stimulus response) arc, which in many ways anticipated Gestalt psychology as well as the phenomenology of perception and behavior developed by Merleau-Ponty a half century later, provided him with a non- atomistic (non-mechanistic) model of organic behavior, understood as an interpretative response that internalizes and reconstitutes a stimulus within a learning arc.9 Mead is chiefly concerned to show how mind and self emerge in the course of traversing logical phases in the development of social and symbolic interaction. The most primitive phase – “the conversation of gestures” – can be observed in animals, as when a dog growls in order to ward off another dog. Darwin regarded such gestures as expressions of inner emotional states, not as forms of social interaction. For Mead, the gesture possesses significance for the dog toward whom the gesture is directed. The gesture’s capacity to stimulate behavior causally depends on its being significant to its recipient. As with Dewey, the stimulus only becomes effective by being constituted and interpreted as significant. Here, however, the significance in question is established socially, as a type or pattern of response (coordination) that comes to be shared. So construed, there need not be anything like a “consciousness of meaning” on the part of the dogs in question regarding the significance of their growling. Meaning and language first emerge when the gesture becomes a “significant symbol.” That happens 9 Dewey’s “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology,” was published in the journal Psychological Review in 1896. In 1942 a committee of seventy psychologists named it the most significant contribution ever published in the journal.