LanguageandMind This is the long-awaited third edition of Chomsky’s outstanding collection ofessaysonlanguageandmind.Thefirstsixchapters,originallypublished inthe1960s,madeagroundbreakingcontributiontolinguistictheory.This new edition complements them with an additional chapter and a new pref- ace, bringing Chomsky’s influential approach into the twenty-first century. Chapters1–6presentChomsky’searlyworkonthenatureandacquisitionof languageasageneticallyendowed,biologicalsystem(UniversalGrammar), throughtherulesandprinciplesofwhichweacquireaninternalizedknowl- edge(I-language).Overthepastfiftyyears,thisframeworkhassparkedan explosionofinquiryintoawiderangeoflanguages,andhasyieldedsome majortheoreticalquestions.Thefinalchapterrevisitsthekeyissues,reviewing the“biolinguistic”approachthathasguidedChomsky’sworkfromitsorigins tothepresentday,andraisingsomenovelandexcitingchallengesforthestudy oflanguageandmind. noam chomsky isProfessorofLinguisticsatMassachusettsInstituteof Technology.HismanybooksincludeNewHorizonsintheStudyofLanguage andMind(CambridgeUniversityPress,2000)andOnNatureandLanguage (CambridgeUniversityPress,2002). Language and Mind Third Edition NoamChomsky MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology    Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo Cambridge University Press TheEdinburghBuilding,Cambridge,UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridg e.org /9780521858199 © Noam Chomsky 2006 Thispublicationisincopyright.Subjecttostatutoryexceptionandtotheprovisionof relevantcollectivelicensingagreements,noreproductionofanypartmaytakeplace withoutthewrittenpermissionofCambridgeUniversityPress. 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Contents Prefacetothethirdedition page vii Prefacetothesecondedition xiii Prefacetothefirstedition xvii 1 Linguisticcontributionstothestudyofmind:past 1 2 Linguisticcontributionstothestudyofmind:present 21 3 Linguisticcontributionstothestudyofmind:future 57 4 Formandmeaninginnaturallanguages 88 5 Theformalnatureoflanguage 102 6 Linguisticsandphilosophy 143 7 Biolinguisticsandthehumancapacity 173 Index 186 v Preface to the third edition Thefirstsixchaptersthatfollowarefromthelate1960s,mostlybasedontalks forgeneraluniversityaudiences,hencerelativelyinformal.Thefinalchapteris from 2004, based on a talk for a general audience. This recent essay reviews the “biolinguistic approach” that has guided this work from its origins half a centuryago,someoftheimportantdevelopmentsofrecentdecades,andhow thegeneralapproachlookstoday–tomeatleast. Thedominantapproachtoquestionsoflanguageandmindinthe1950swas thatofthebehavioralsciences.Asthetermindicates,theobjectofinquirywas taken to be behavior, or, for linguistics, the products of behavior: perhaps a corpus obtained from informants by the elicitation techniques taught in field methodscourses.Linguistictheoryconsistedofproceduresofanalysis,primar- ily segmentation and classification, designed to organize a body of linguistic material, guided by limited assumptions about structural properties and their arrangement.TheprominentlinguistMartinJooshardlyexaggeratedina1955 expositionwhenheidentifiedthe“decisivedirection”ofcontemporarystruc- tural linguistics as the decision that language can be “described without any preexistent scheme of what a language must be.”1 Prevailing approaches in the behavioral sciences generally were not very different. Of course, no one acceptedtheincoherentnotionofa“blankslate.”Butitwascommontosup- posethatbeyondsomeinitialdelimitationofpropertiesdetectedintheenviron- ment(a“qualityspace,”intheframeworkofthehighlyinfluentialphilosopher W.V.O.Quine),generallearningmechanismsofsomekindshouldsufficeto accountforwhatorganisms,includinghumans,knowanddo.Geneticendow- mentinthesedomainswouldnotbeexpectedtoreachmuchbeyondsomething likethat. Theemergingbiolinguisticapproachadoptedadifferentstance.Ittookthe objectofinquirytobe,notbehavioranditsproducts,buttheinternalcognitive 1 Chapter3,note12.Jooswasreferringexplicitlytothe“Boasiantradition”ofAmericanstruc- turalism,andhadonlyafew–ratherdisparaging–remarksaboutEuropeanstructuralism.But theobservationscarryoverwithouttoomuchchange. vii viii Prefacetothethirdedition systemsthatenterintoactionandinterpretation,and,beyondthat,thebasisin ourfixedbiologicalnatureforthegrowthanddevelopmentoftheseinternalsys- tems.Fromthispointofview,thecentraltopicofconcerniswhatJuanHuarte,in thesixteenthcentury,regardedastheessentialpropertyofhumanintelligence: thecapacityofthehumanmindto“engenderwithinitself,byitsownpower,the principlesonwhichknowledgerests,”2ideasthatweredevelopedinimportant waysinthephilosophical–scientifictraditionsoflateryears.Forlanguage,“the principlesonwhichknowledgerests”arethoseoftheinternalizedlanguage(I- language)thatthepersonhasacquired.Havingacquiredtheseprinciples,Jones hasawiderangeofknowledge,forexamplethatglinkbutnotglnikisapossible lexicalitemofEnglish;thatJohnistooangrytotalkto(Mary)meansthatJohn istobetalkedto(ifMaryismissing)butJohnistodothetalking(ifMaryis present);thathimcanbeusedtorefertoJohninthesentenceIwonderwhoJohn expectstoseehim,butnotifIwonderwhoisomitted;thatifJohnpaintedthe housebrownthenheputthepaintontheexteriorsurfacethoughhecouldpaint thehousebrownontheinside;thatwhenJohnclimbedthemountainhewentup althoughhecanclimbdownthemountain;thatbooksareinsomesensesimul- taneouslyabstractandconcreteasinJohnmemorizedandthenburnedthebook; andsoonoveranunboundedrange.“Thepowertoengender”theI-language principles on which such particular cases of knowledge rest is understood to bethecomponentofthegeneticendowmentthataccountsfortheirgrowthand development. Linguistics, so conceived, seeks to discover true theories of particular I- languages (grammars), and, at a deeper level, the theory of the genetic basis forlanguageacquisition(universalgrammar,UG,adaptingatraditionalterm toanewusage).Othercognitivesystems,itwasassumed,shouldbeconceived along similar lines, each with its own principles, and powers of engendering them. Within this framework, cognitive systems are understood to be, in effect, organsofthebody,primarilythebrain,tobeinvestigatedinmuchthemanner ofothersubcomponentswithdistinctivepropertiesthatinteractinthelifeofthe organism:thesystemsofvision,motorplanning,circulationoftheblood,etc. Along with their role in behavior, the “cognitive organs” enter into activities traditionallyregardedasmental:thought,planning,interpretation,evaluation, andsoon.Theterm“mental”hereisinformalanddescriptive,prettymuchon aparwithsuchloosedescriptivetermsas“chemical,”“electrical,”“optical,” and others that are used to focus attention on particular aspects of the world thatseemtohaveanintegratedcharacterandtobeworthabstractingforspe- cialinvestigation,butwithoutanyillusionthattheycarvenatureatthejoints. Behavioranditsproducts–suchastexts–providedatathatmaybeusefulas 2 Chapter1,pp.8–9. Prefacetothethirdedition ix evidencetodeterminethenatureandoriginsofcognitivesystems,buthaveno privileged status for such inquiries, just as in the case of other organs of the body. The general shift of perspective is sometimes called the “cognitive revolu- tion”ofthe1950s.However,forreasonsdiscussedintheearlyessaysthatfollow, Ithinkitmightmoreproperlybeconsideredarenewalandfurtherdevelopment ofthecognitiverevolutionoftheseventeenthcentury.Fromthe1950s,many traditionalquestionswererevived–regrettably,withoutacquaintancewiththe tradition,whichhadbeenlargelyforgottenormisrepresented.Alsorevivedwas theviewthathadbeencrystallizingthroughtheeighteenthcenturythatproper- ties“termedmental”aretheresultof“suchanorganicalstructureasthatofthe brain”(chemist–philosopherJosephPriestley).Thisdevelopmentof“Locke’s suggestion,” as it is called in the scholarly literature, was a natural, virtually inevitable,concomitantoftheNewtonianrevolution,whicheffectivelydisman- tledtheonlysignificantnotionof“body”or“physical.”Thebasicconclusion waswellunderstoodbythenineteenth-century.Darwinaskedrhetoricallywhy “thought,beingasecretionofthebrain,”shouldbeconsidered“morewonder- fulthangravity,apropertyofmatter.”Inhisclassicnineteenth-centuryhistory ofmaterialism,FriedrichLangeobservesthatscientistshave“accustomedour- selvestotheabstractnotionofforces,orrathertoanotionhoveringinamystic obscuritybetweenabstractionandconcretecomprehension,”a“turning-point” inthehistoryofmaterialismthatremovesthesurvivingremnantsofthedoctrine farfromtheideasandconcernsofthe“genuineMaterialists”oftheseventeenth century,anddeprivesthemofsignificance.Theyneedbeofnospecialconcern inthestudyofaspectsoftheworld“termedmental.” Itisperhapsworthnotingthatthistraditionalunderstandingisstillregarded ashighlycontentious,andrepetitionofit,almostinvirtuallythesamewords, isregularlyproposedasa“boldhypothesis”or“radicalnewidea”inthestudy ofthedomains“termedmental.”3 Anothersignificantfeatureoftheoriginalcognitiverevolutionwastherecog- nitionthatpropertiesoftheworldtermedmentalmayinvolveunboundedcapac- itiesofalimitedfiniteorgan,the“infiniteuseoffinitemeans,”inWilhelmvon Humboldt’s phrase. The doctrine was at the heart of the Cartesian concept of mind. It provided the basic criterion to deal with the problem of “other minds”–todeterminewhethersomecreaturehasamindlikeours.Descartes and his followers focused on use of language as the clearest illustration. In a rather similar vein, Hume later recognized that our moral judgments are unboundedinscope,andmustbefoundedongeneralprinciplesthatarepartof ournature–geneticallydetermined,inmodernterms.Thatobservationposes 3 For examples and discussion, see my New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind (Cambridge,2000).