BAYLOR UNIVERSITY REJUVENATING APOLOGETICS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: TAKING HINTS FROM SØREN KIERKEGAARD BY JOHN DEPOE WACO, TX 4 DECEMBER 2002 Many people have abandoned Christian apologetics because of its allegedly innocuous effect. Take for example the testimony of Robert J. Miller. Miller tells that he was once convinced that apologetics could rationally defend and explain the truth of Christianity and Catholicism to any person who was willing to reason carefully through well-constructed arguments. Reflecting upon his former outlook he says: This mind-set held together until I went to graduate school at secular universities and got to know people who had different religions. For the first time in my life, I got to know people who took other religions as seriously as I took mine. I knew these people were well educated and highly rational, and I could tell from our arguments that they were sincere…. Yet none of them was persuaded by my apologetics. It took several years, but gradually I accepted the fact that informed, intelligent, sincere, and spiritual people are almost never persuaded by apologetics to change their core beliefs. Looking back, I can now see that a big reason for this is that most apologists use assumptions that only insiders take for granted. It is usually only from an outsider’s perspective that one can see how problematic these assumptions really are.1 Ultimately, Miller concludes: In summary apologies almost never reach outsiders. When they do, they are almost never taken seriously; when they are, they are almost never persuasive. So, if the purpose of apologetics is to convince outsiders to adopt new beliefs, then apologies are almost always abject failures.2 Today Miller is a voting member of the Jesus Seminar and an advocate of a “Christianity” that is largely indifferent to the historical facts of the first century. This shift to a history-free and unevangelistic faith is likely the result (among other factors) of abandoning his apologetic methodology when faced with his utter failure in it. Even though I believe Miller’s complaint can be legitimately criticized on several levels, I want to take seriously his lament that Christian apologetics seems to fail. I suggest that 1 Robert J. Miller, “What do the Stories About the Resurrection(s) Prove?” in Will the Real Jesus Please Stand Up? ed. Paul Copan (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1998), 87. 2 Ibid. 2 incorporating the manner of the Danish existentialist, Søren Kierkegaard, can rejuvenate a seemingly dead and failing defense of the faith that critics like Miller find unsatisfying and impotent. Unfortunately, many evangelical Christians reject anything related to Kierkegaard. So, below I will not only argue that incorporating Kierkegaard’s apologetic tactics will benefit the contemporary apologist, but furthermore, I will attempt to patch up some misunderstandings evangelical Christians may have with the Danish philosopher. Kierkegaard’s Christian Apologetics I imagine some people will find it incredulous to suggest that Kierkegaard exercised anything remotely similar to apologetics.3 In fact, many apologists assume that one role for apologetics is to overcome Kierkegaard’s philosophy. Take, for example, Francis Schaeffer who suggests that Kierkegaard dangerously introduced the idea that a “leap of faith” must be made to bring meaning to life because of the failure of reason to provide an answer. Schaeffer writes: As a result of this [Kierkegaard’s “leap of faith”], from that time on, if rationalistic man wants to deal with the really important things of human life (such as purpose, significance, the validity of love), he must discard rational thought about them and make a gigantic, nonrational leap of faith. The rationalistic framework had failed to produce an answer on the basis of reason, and so all hope of a uniform field of knowledge had to be abandoned.4 Now Schaeffer is correct in noting that the French existentialist movement of the mid-twentieth century was influenced by Kierkegaard’s philosophy, however, he is 3 However, see C. Stephen Evans, “Apologetic Arguments in Philosophical Fragments” in International Kierkegaard Commentary: Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1994), 65-72. He locates at least three, if not four, apologetic arguments within Philosophical Fragments that Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Johannes Climacus employs. 4 Francis A. Schaeffer, The God Who is There, in The Complete Works of Francis Schaeffer, vol. 1, (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 1982), 17. 3 wrong to suppose that Kierkegaard was an enemy of rationality or applying rigorous thought to Christianity. In a similar vein, Paul Helm claims that Kierkegaard should be characterized with the likes of Tertullian because they both supposedly deny that reason should have anything to do with faith.5 More will be said about Kierkegaard’s views on faith and reason below, but two points are in order at the present time. First, the phrase “leap of faith” is never found in any of Kierkegaard’s numerous writings.6 The burden of proof weighs on those who claim that Kierkegaard is claiming that something like the “leap of faith” they are attributing to Kierkegaard is representative of his philosophy. In some cases, like Schaeffer’s, this is fallaciously done by appealing to one of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous writings (like Fear and Trembling) and attributing the surface understanding of the text to Kierkegaard himself. A second reason to reject a reading of Kierkegaard that denies any connection with faith and reason is that it wholly ignores what Kierkegaard was aiming to accomplish with his philosophical writings. It may be the case that Kierkegaard does not have a robust view of faith and reason that many apologists endorse today, and there is possibly room to improve upon Kierkegaard’s thoughts on faith and reason, yet it would be an egregious mistake to attribute to Kierkegaard a non-rational approach to faith. After all, Kierkegaard wrote for a reason, and that reason was to convince his fellow 5 Paul Helm, Faith and Understanding (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), 14-15. 6 M. Jaimie Ferreira, “Faith and the Kierkegaardian Leap” in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard ed. Alastair Hannay and Gordon D. Marino (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 207: “The popular association of the leap with Kierkegaard is often couched in terms of the leap of faith. It is worthwhile to be reminded, however, and interesting to note, that Kierkegaard never uses any Danish equivalent of the English phrase ‘leap of faith,’ a phrase that involves circularity insofar as it seems to imply that the leap is made by faith.” 4 Danes that something was wrong with their life-view. In a broad sense, this is Christian apologetics because it employs arguments to convince an audience to abandon their way of life for the Christian faith. How Kierkegaard makes his case for Christianity has been ignored, misunderstood, or forgotten by many in the evangelical Christian community, so that is what I shall turn to next. To some extent, I am sympathetic with those who have misinterpreted Kierkegaard. First, there is the issue of indirect communication. Aside from his journals, Kierkegaard rarely speaks forthrightly about his own views. Instead, he pushes his readers to see the value of genuine Christian faith through the various voices of his pseudonyms. Second, there is a cultural equivocation of terms like subjective and objective. When Kierkegaard speaks of objective truth, he only rejects it as a Hegelian point of view. Regarding the objective correspondence theory of truth, Kierkegaard does not reject it. However, he does claim that it is limited in certain ways. As for subjectivity Kierkegaard does not employ the term as a synonym for relativism, which is what subjectivity means for some apologists today. Rather, subjectivity in the Kierkegaardian sense is how one believes, which is not necessarily divorced from truth in today’s objective sense. A final equivocation to clear up is Kierkegaard’s attack upon Christianity. This attack is not against orthodox Christianity. Kierkegaard’s battle is with the institutionalized, dispassionate, detached, Hegelian-synthesized Christianity. To the chagrin of many twentieth century existential theologians and philosophers, Kierkegaard endorsed orthodox Christian doctrine up to the time of his death. At minimum it can be said that Kierkegaard saw no conflict of interest with his methodology and orthodox Christian belief. 5 The first tactic I believe Christian apologetics could integrate from Kierkegaard is to move one’s audience indirectly to the Christian faith. Kierkegaard’s earlier writings like Either/Or and Stages on Life’s Way exemplify this. Kierkegaard saw his fellow Danes existing in three possible stages of life. First is the aesthetic sphere, which values pleasure in the moment, artistry, ironic humor, and lacks any substantial meaning. The next stage is the ethical, which embraces one’s duties to life through vocation, marriage, and possibly even religion up to a certain point. The final stage which deals with one’s guilt and sin and requires passionate faith is the religious stage. Kierkegaard used various pseudonyms to exemplify these life-views and to point his readers to accept the Christian life. Mark C. Miller has noted that apologists can have an advantage reaching Generation X using Kierkegaard’s tactic of indirect communication. Generation Xers feel alienated and apathetic to the world around them due to the epidemic of broken families the majority of them emerge from. Furthermore, Xers have been targeted their whole lives by various marketing and advertisement ploys. As a result, they are cynical and impenetrable to the traditional style of evangelism and apologetics that the church has traditionally employed. Miller believes that Kierkegaard’s apologetic method is just what this generation needs to be reached: Xers need the gospel like everyone else. And Søren Kierkegaard is the philosopher-evangelist to give it to them. I submit that if the church is to communicate meaningfully with Generation X, it must adopt the strategies employed and the convictions passionately held by Kierkegaard.7 7 Mark C. Miller, “The Hipness Unto Death: Søren Kierkegaard and David Letterman – Ironic Apologists to Generation X,” Mars Hill Review 7 (Winter/Spring 1997). Available online at: http://www.leaderu.com/marshill/mhr07/kierk1.html. 6 Among other reasons, Miller suggests that Kierkegaard is perfect for the job because he overcomes the cynical detachment of Generation Xers through irony, a method they will understand. Kierkegaard’s approach may be required to reach those who are stuck in apathy and cynicism like the members of Generation X. Other apologists have subsumed Kierkegaard’s message into their works. For example, William Lane Craig uses the philosophy of Kierkegaard to make a case that life is meaningless without God (as an indirect method of evangelism).8 C. Stephen Evans exemplifies Kierkegaard’s indirect approach in his book Existentialism: The Philosophy of Despair and the Quest for Hope by highlighting the immanent despair in secular life and the hope found in Christian existence. After showing the disparaging picture of reality that life gives us, Evans offers a Christian hope using three criteria for choosing: 1) it answers human need, 2) it corresponds with reality, and 3) it is a livable framework.9 Ironically, this is approximately the same method used by Francis Schaeffer who loudly denounces Kierkegaard’s philosophy. Schaeffer’s method of demonstrating the strength of the Christian worldview by pointing out the despair of non-Christian systems is one of his most celebrated accomplishments. Where Schaeffer’s approach to apologetics has succeeded, it has resembled Kierkegaard’s methodology of indirect communication. A second lesson the contemporary apologist can learn from Kierkegaard is his non-evidentialist approach to apologetics. Kierkegaard never makes a serious attempt to prove the existence of God. Instead, he works with the perspective that his audience 8 William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 1994), 55-56. 9 C. Stephen Evans, Existentialism: The Philosophy of Despair & The Quest For Hope (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1984), 113-18. 7 currently exists in. For the majority of nineteenth century Danes, the problem was not trying to show them that God exists. The problem, for this context, was that they did not exist in proper relation to those beliefs. Furthermore, Kierkegaard was skeptical about what a “proof” for God’s existence would amount to should a cogent, universal demonstration be found. These criticisms of the evidentialist approach offer valuable insight for the contemporary apologist. Although independent of Kierkegaard, Alvin Plantinga has defended a non-evidentialist epistemology that takes into account certain “properly basic beliefs,” which would include the Christian belief in God. Plantinga’s theory has profoundly influenced an ongoing shift in moving contemporary apologetics towards a non-evidentialist framework as well.10 Apologists who have incorporated non- evidentialist principles may find that this humbler case for Christianity may strike a wary, cynical culture as more honest and compelling than conventional approaches to apologetics that try to prove with certainty all the philosophical and historical claims of Christianity in a manner that is supposedly plain and clear to everyone. The non- evidentialist approach not only sheds doubt upon achieving such an enterprise, but furthermore suggests that such substantiation is not necessary to establish the rational validation of Christian theism. Kierkegaard’s non-evidentialist message can be an advantageous ally for contemporary apologists and evangelists to heed today. A third tactic to be learned from Kierkegaard’s style of apologetics is to incorporate humor as part of sharing Christianity. People often have tacit “non- 10 For example, see Ronald H. Nash, Faith & Reason: Searching for a Rational Faith (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1988), 72-78. For more on a Christian non- evidentialist perspective see Kelly James Clark, Return to Reason (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990). 8 arguments” against Christianity. I believe one of these “non-arguments” claims that Christianity is boring and consequently false. While the connection that something “boring” necessarily must not be true is obviously fallacious (although it is a growing sentiment in our entertainment focused culture), the fact that people generally find Christianity to be boring is often the fault of Christians who live and communicate the gospel unbecomingly. Kierkegaard draws upon humor to enrich and illustrate his writings. Irony, jokes, and witty anecdotes permeate his compositions. Kierkegaard regularly tells jokes in his books as a refreshing demonstration for whatever point he may be making. Not only does Kierkegaard employ humor as a style in his writing, but he also uses humor in a technical sense as a boundary zone between the ethical and the religious stages of life. Of course, when I suggest the contemporary apologist can glean effective styles of apologetics from Kierkegaard, I am referring to his use of humor in style, not necessarily his philosophical doctrine as a boundary zone. Some Christians may be wary of humor, fearful that it may be antithetical to the serious nature of God, salvation, and the like. Kierkegaard obviously did not find that to be an obstacle. In fact, some of Kierkegaard’s humor requires seriousness to life.11 As Robert C. Roberts plainly explains, “Humor is not incompatible with being ultimately serious about life; indeed an ultimate orienting seriousness about life gives one’s sense of humor a depth and integrity and scope that it will not otherwise have.”12 So, there is 11 C. Stephen Evans, “Kierkegaard’s View of Humor: Must Christians Always Be So Solemn?” Faith and Philosophy 4 (April 1987), 183-84. 12 Robert C. Roberts, “Smiling With God: Reflections on Christianity and the Psychology of Humor,” Faith and Philosophy 4 (April 1987), 168-69. 9 good reason to believe that humor is at least permissible for Christians to exercise in evangelism and apologetics, and I have suggested the stronger claim that humor is to be preferred when presenting the gospel.13 If apologists apply humor to their cases for Christianity, it would make apologetic literature more accessible, memorable, and enjoyable without necessarily compromising the standard of academic work that has historically characterized the literature. Additionally, humor can give a glimpse to those examining Christianity that there is more to the Christian view of life than academic propositional belief. One of the problems implicit in previous eras of apologetics was that it approached all disagreements with Christianity as purely intellectual. It may be the case that some problems people have against becoming Christians are not intellectual at all. As C. Stephen Evans explains: I also think that Kierkegaard is right in warning us not to allow the modern unbeliever to get away with his claim that his difficulties with Christianity are purely intellectual. If people in “modern” or “post-modern” society have trouble developing Christian faith, the reason may not be at all that we are too intelligent or learned to believe as people of past ages did. The problem may lie in our constricted understanding of what our essential task is as human beings and our impoverished attempts to become selves. It is not that we are too intelligent and learned to become Christians, but that we have deceived ourselves into thinking that intellectual achievements are what human life is all about.14 So humor is important not only in order to communicate more clearly the truth of the Christian faith, but it is also integral for communicating the content of the Christian faith. 13 It is noteworthy to examine cases of humor in the Bible like Balaam’s talking donkey (Number 22:21-35) and when Peter escapes from prison and the believers praying for this very act refuse to believe the servant girl who tells them Peter is at the gate (Acts 12:6-17). Unfortunately, I do not have room to discuss the stronger case that can be made for humor evidenced by texts such as these. 14 C. Stephen Evans, Søren Kierkegaard’s Christian Psychology (Vancouver: Regent College Publishing, 1990), 119.