StudEastEurThought(2016)68:85–99 DOI10.1007/s11212-016-9250-0 Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz on the concept of the world- view and the rationality of religious beliefs Dariusz Łukasiewicz1 Publishedonline:29February2016 (cid:2)TheAuthor(s)2016.ThisarticleispublishedwithopenaccessatSpringerlink.com Abstract The aim of the paper is presentation and critical analysis of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s concept of the world-view. Ajdukiewicz’s philosophy was strongly inspired by the rationalism of Kazimierz Twardowski as well as by some ideas of the Vienna Circle. However, in contrast to the latter’s logical empiricism, Ajdu- kiewicz could be interpreted as holding that beliefs constituting our world-view have both logical value and cognitive content—they cannot be construed as mere expression of some emotions. Keywords Belief (cid:2) Ethics (cid:2) Religion (cid:2) Rationalism (cid:2) World-view TheaimofthispaperistopresentKazimierzAjdukiewicz’sviewsontheconceptof world-view and rationality of religious beliefs.1 The following presentation is closelyrelatedtohis‘‘unitythesis’’,formulatedbyAjdukiewiczhimselfwhoclaims that there are close connections among the basic philosophical disciplines: epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics.2 It is worth noting at this point that the 1 KazimierzAjdukiewiczisregardedasoneofthemostprominentrepresentativesoftheLvov–Warsaw School(Cf.‘‘[Ajdukiewicz]isourmosteminentphilosopherofthelastcentury’’(Jadacki2013,459). 2 Thoughtheproblemoftheworld-viewdoesnotbelongtotheleadingsubjectsconsideredbythemost eminent representatives of the Lvov–Warsaw School, Kazimierz Twardowski, Tadeusz Czez_owski, Tadeusz Kotarbin´ski, Jo´zef Maria Bochen´ski and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz wrote on the topic (Broz_ek 2011). & DariuszŁukasiewicz [email protected] 1 Bydgoszcz,Poland 123 86 D.Łukasiewicz unity thesis provides further evidence of the great influence Franz Brentano and Bernard Bolzano exerted on Polish philosophy. Both thinkers renewed some classical ideas in nineteenth century philosophy one essential feature of which was the close connection of basic philosophical disciplines. Such a non-reductive approach to philosophy was rejected by the positivist movement, pragmatism as well as Marxism, all of which shared an anti-metaphysical and anti-philosophical orientation. A short synthetic look at Ajdukiewicz’s concept of world-view will enable us, in the next part of the paper, to understand better his ideas concerning religious beliefs. Logical rationalism Perhaps the best way to describe Ajdukiewicz’s philosophical views in a synthetic way, as well as the views of the School founded by Kazimierz Twardowski to which Ajdukiewicz belonged, is by saying that the program of the Lvov–Warsaw School was similar in some respects to logical positivism. To be sure, the Lvov– Warsaw School was not a Polish version of the Wiener Kreis, nevertheless, it did espouse to some extent a number of important positivist assumptions, viz., that many (but not all) metaphysical controversies were due to the semantic vagueness of language and careless use thereof (Wolen´ski 1989, 298). In addition, they held the view that scientific orientation of philosophy is possible only if philosophical language is precise andclear and philosophyitselfdoes notinclude anyunjustified beliefs. It was Ajdukiewicz who in 1934 coined the term ‘‘logical anti-irrationalism’’ as the name for this philosophical program [Pearce and Wolenski (1987) used another label, ‘‘logical rationalism’’, to express the main idea of the School]. The main idea of logical rationalism was that philosophical investigations should be carried out with the help of modern logic. Logic, however, was meant to be not only an efficient tool for doing science and philosophy, but it also had a social, political, and even existential meaning. The social and political meaning of logic, and of logical culture in particular, was that logic could help to stop proliferation of irrational doctrines which might inspire various kinds of evil in human and social life. This intellectual project alluded to a classical view defended already by Socrates according to which anyone who thinks logically will act in a morally right way. The argument has it that someone who thinks logically will know what is morally right, and someone who knows what is morally right will act in a morally right way. If this project of logical rationalism were realized in the world, human societies would lead peaceful lives free from conflicts and wars. Tadeusz Czez_owski, another eminent pupil of Kazimierz Twardowski, expressed this faith in the power of logic as follows: A society whose members represent high logical culture becomes unanimous andunitednotbyexternalforcebutbylogicwhichsavesitfrompassionsand disintegration. (Czez_owski 1969, 190) 123 KazimierzAjdukiewiczontheconceptoftheworld-view… 87 Logic and logical rationalism—apart from its social importance—had also an existential meaning. Someone who holds justified beliefs and holds them with the assertive force proportional to the degree of their justification will do no harm to himselforothers.Inturn,someonewhodoesnoevilwillliveahappylifeprovided thatotherunexpectedfactorslyingbeyondhiscontrolwillnotdestroyhislife.And ifthereisapersonwhodedicatedhislifetoscholarlyactivity,i.e.anactivitywhich implements logical rationalism, then such a person will live the noblest life accessible to a human being (Ajdukiewicz 1985a, 316). Ajdukiewicz himself expressed the idea of the social and existential importance of logical culture as follows: Byspreadinglogicalculture,wepreparethefoundationforascientificworld- view and by doing this we enable development (Ajdukiewicz 1985b, 142). Thus,thePolishlogicalrationalistsfromTwardowski’sSchoolheldideasrelated not only to the Wiener Kreis, but also to Aristotle, who regarded theoretical contemplation of eternal truths as the greatest happiness possible for humans. However, contrary to the Austrian and German positivists, the Polish philosophers, though they believed in logic, did not reduce philosophy to logic or to the logical analysis of scientific language. This is evident in the foregoing unity-thesis that connections obtain among three basic philosophical disciplines: metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics (Ajdukiewicz 1973, 160). It follows from this that philosophy cannot be reduced only to a useful tool of formal and natural sciences. Ajdukiewicz’s conception of world-view Whendevelopinghisargumentfortheunitythesis,Ajdukiewicz,firstofall,pointed out the relations between a world-outlook and ethics. Ethics as a normative discipline concerning human actions is founded upon evaluations, i.e. axiological propositions. There are two kinds of axiological propositions which are morally important for human beings: eudemonic evaluations and moral evaluations. The subject matter of eudemonic evaluations is the value we attach to actions and objectswhenweconsiderthemfromthepointofviewoftheircapacity tobringus happiness (Ajdukiewicz 1973, 162). Moral evaluations in turn point to norms and dutieswhichweshouldfollowandfulfillinordertobeinagreementwithmorality (Ajdukiewicz 1973, 162). Evaluations are based on feelings (emotions or ‘‘emotional reference’’). Axiological propositions are—like propositions based on sense perception—true or false, justified or unjustified, and since they are fallible, they can be verified (Ajdukiewicz 1985a, 347). ItisaninterestingpointinAjdukiewicz’sconceptionofemotionsthatheclaims that there are no pure emotions, i.e., emotions lacking some conceptual or intellectual input. This is so because our emotions pertaining to a given object depend upon our knowledge thereof (Ajdukiewicz 1973, 162–163). In the case of eudemonic and moral evaluations, it is knowledge composed of our most general beliefs regardingthe worldasawhole andhumanbeingsinparticularwhich really 123 88 D.Łukasiewicz matters. We call such a set of beliefs a world-view. In brief, we can say that, according to Ajdukiewicz, evaluations are based on emotions and emotions are shapedandmotivatedbyaworld-view.Inthiswayethicsisdependentonaworld- view. In Ajdukiewicz’s view, it is important that a world-view be unshakeable and unchanging, because it guarantees stability of moral evaluations and moral judgments, which people maintain and which have direct influence on the quality of social and political life. A given world-view is ultimate and unshakeable—as K. Ajdukiewicz believed—if its thought-horizon is broad and sufficiently rich. A thought-horizon is simply a set of all beliefs which we hold or which we would be ready to accept as true and our own. A world-view is a subset of a thought- horizon and this subset is circumscribed by its role in giving rise to moral and eudemonic propositions. A world-view can be provisional and limited or ultimate and large. It is provisional and limited if axiological propositions change when the horizon is enlarged (Ajdukiewicz 1973, 162). A world-view is ultimate if any broadening of its thought-horizon entails no revision of eudemonic and moral evaluations. Such an ultimate world-view is a guarantee of the stability of moral judgements and the predictability of individual and social actions. Next, if we take into consideration how a world-view comes into being, we can divideworld-viewsintotwobasickinds:thoseacquireduncriticallyfromatradition (for example, a religious world-view) and those formed critically in the course of our own reflection. There are at least three important features of Ajdukiewicz’s theory of world- view which make his conception quite original and interesting. Firstly, Ajdukiewicz’s emotional theory of axiological experience is rooted in his doctrine of radical conventionalism. According to the latter, there are no experimental data independent of a conceptual apparatus (Wolen´ski 1989, 206). It is not possible to separate conceptual and empirical components of our world-view: evaluations are based on emotions but emotions depend on knowledge which we have about the object evaluated. Secondly,Ajdukiewicz’s theory ofworld-viewis acognitivetheoryinthe sense that a world-view, as composed of beliefs which have a logical value, can be a descriptionoftheworld.Suchacognitiveanddescriptivetheoryofworld-viewwas typicalofallrepresentativesoftheLvov–WarsawSchoolandstoodinoppositionto the non-cognitive conceptions of Wilhelm Dilthey and Georg Simmel. Dilthey and Simmel regarded world-views as the expression of individual personality, which shouldnotbeevaluatedintermsoflogicastrueorfalse,orinepistemologicalterms as rational or irrational, but only in terms of psychology as ‘‘authenthic’’ or ‘‘inauthentic’’. Thirdly,inAjdukiewicz’sconstructionofaworld-viewitisepistemologywhich plays the crucial role. This is so because epistemological considerations lead to metaphysicalconclusionswhichhavedirectimportanceforaxiologicalevaluations. The meaning of Ajudkiewicz’s epistemology for his conception of a world-view involves two points. The first point was that—according to his epistemological analysis—theonlyreallyandproperlyexistentworldistheworldofourexperience. 123 KazimierzAjdukiewiczontheconceptoftheworld-view… 89 The second point was that there is no world which can be a bearer and source of values other than the world of our experience. However, we must keep in mind that Ajdukiewicz held, along with other membersoftheLvov–WarsawSchoolandincontrasttologicalpositivists,abroad notion of experience. This broad notion of experience embraces sense perception (extraspection) as well as inner perception (introspection) and axiological experi- ence (including moral andaesthetic experience).Theexperience ofvalues givenin feelings (emotions) is a foundation of eudemonic and moral evaluations which are essential elements of ethics. The philosophical realism and empiricism defended by Ajdukiewicz played a crucial roleinhistheoryofworld-viewaswellasinhisownworld-view.Theidea was that if everything that really exists is given or can be given in our (broadly conceived)experience,thenaworld-viewshouldbebuiltonscience.Scienceisour best device to attain knowledge about the world of experience. Thus, an ultimate world-viewshouldbebuiltonscienceandonlysuchaworld-viewcanguarantee— becauseofthevastnessofitsthought-horizon—the stability andintegrityofethics. Solidethicsinturncancontributetothemoralintegrityandpredictabilityofactions of individuals and societies. The foregoing has been a sketchy presentation ofKazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s idea of world-view.3 This idea can also be regarded as an exemplification of his unity thesismentionedatthebeginningofthepaper.Epistemology implies metaphysical conclusions which belong to a world-view or are part of its thought-horizon, and a world-view ‘‘determines’’ or shapes feelings (emotions) on which, in turn, eudemonic and moral evaluations are based. In this way epistemology is a foundation of metaphysics and ethics. Ajdukiewicz’s own world view Ajdukiewicz tried to be neutral when discussing different world-views—whether based on religion, on Marxist philosophy, or on spiritualist metaphysics— nonethelesshedidshowsympathywithsomeviews andpointed totheweaknesses 3 OnemaywonderwhetherAjdukiewicz’sideasregardingtheworld-viewareofinterestandrelevance today.Theconceptofworld-viewishardlyonphilosophers’agendastodayhavingbeenreplacedbyother conceptssuchas‘scientificparadigm’,‘Denkstile’,‘socialconstructionism’,‘episteme’,etc.Itistruethat theworld-viewunderstoodasthemostgeneraltheoryoftheworldlostitsmeaningforphilosophers,the majorityofwhomdonotbelieveinany‘grandnarrative’(Jean-Franc¸oisLyotard‘sterm).However,one shouldkeepinmindthateveniftheconceptofworld-viewissomewhatforgottenbyphilosopherstoday, itisstillimportantelsewhere.Theterm‘world-view’,translatedfromGermanWeltanschauung,isstillin use by non-philosophers—in common language as well as in psychology, sociology, and in cognitive science. The importance of great monotheistic religions (Islam, Christianity, Judaism) and religious beliefsintheglobalworldisunquestionable—theyimposetheirownworld-views.Furthermore,alsoin philosophy there is what we could label a new grand narrative called ‘‘naturalism’’, which is a comprehensivetheoryoftheworldbasedonscience.ItseemsthatAjdukiewicz‘sconceptofthescientific world-viewcanberegardedasacounterpartofnaturalismincontemporaryphilosophy.Thus,theworld- view is a concept which does refer to something important and valued; on the one hand, there are religiousworld-viewsrootedingreatmonotheisticreligionsand,ontheother,wehavenaturalism,which isascientificworld-view. 123 90 D.Łukasiewicz ofothers(Wolen´ski2003,8).Hence,itispossibletosaysomethingnotonlyabout his idea of a world-view but also about his own world-view, at least in a general way.Firstofall,asmentionedabove,herecommendedascientificworld-viewand not a world-view based on religion. He wrote that: Ifhe[themetaphysician]takesanempiricistpositioninregardtothesourceof knowledge and a realist one in regard to the limits of knowledge, he will see no need or even possibility of seeking a world-view other than that provided by science as based on experience. If he inclines towards an aprioristic position,orevenmore,ifheisconvincedbytheargumentsofirrationalists,he willseekhisworld-viewinanaprioristicway,orhewillappealtointuitionor mystical experience (Ajdukiewicz 1973, 166–167). Ajdukiewiczhimselfsubscribedtorealisminregardtothelimitsofknowledgeand to empiricism in regard to the source thereof. He was also quite explicit that ethics shouldnotbebasedonmetaphysicalpremisessuchasGod,thefreedomofthewill, and immortality of the soul (Ajdukiewicz 1973, 159). A normative ethics which does not derive its norms and principles from metaphysics is called ‘‘independent ethics’’. When discussing some metaphysical problems arising from investigating nature (determinism, finalism, mechanism) and religion (God’s existence, divine providence in the world, the freedom of the will, and immortality of the soul), Ajdukiewicz suggested clearly enough that there are metaphysical propositions(let us call them theistic beliefs or, more generally, religious beliefs) bearing on God, the immortal human soul, and the freedom of the will, understood in a libertarian andnon-compatibilistway,thoughtheyarenotsufficientlyjustified.Ifwetakeinto considerationanumberofhisshortremarksaboutthesemetaphysicalpropositions, wecouldsaythatAjdukiewiczregardedsometheisticbeliefsnotonlyasunjustified but unclear as well—due to the vagueness and mutability of the concept of God (Ajdukiewicz1973,157).However,Idonotthinkthathewasreadytoregardthem as nonsensical in the way logical positivists did. In order to support this interpretation, let us consider some possible objections to the view that Ajdukiewicz’s stance could be described as agnostic. Someonecould argue that Ajudukiewicz regarded theistic beliefs aslacking any factual meaning but possessing an emotional meaning. This would be consistent with the positivist approach to metaphysics, according to which metaphysical propositions (theistic beliefs included) are not entirely nonsensical since they have an emotional sense. Nonetheless, they have no cognitive meaning because they cannot be verified by any valid (scientific) experience. In support of the emotional interpretation of the value of theistic beliefs, one could resort to Ajdukiewicz’s description of religious feelings connected with metaphysical concepts. Having discussed various concepts of deity occurring in different monotheistic religions, Ajdukiewicz writes: What then is the content of the concept of God common to all monotheistic religions? What remains, it seems, is only the emotional content: the highest enthusiasmandrespect,humilityandsubmissiveness(Ajdukiewicz1973,152) 123 KazimierzAjdukiewiczontheconceptoftheworld-view… 91 Thus, the ‘‘emotional content’’ could be regarded as the meaning of theistic and religiousbeliefs.Ifthiswerethecase,theisticandreligiousbeliefswouldbeneither true nor false. My point is that such an interpretation is not consistent with other views defendedbyAjdukiewicz.First,Ajdukiewicz,asweknow,believedinthecognitive characterofaxiologicalbeliefs:eudemonicandmoralbeliefs havecognitive sense, they refer to objective values, and are true or false. Logical positivists rejected the cognitivenatureofaxiologicalpropositions.Thus,theyhaveforAjdukiewiczbotha factual and an emotional sense. Why not treat metaphysical beliefs based on religiousexperiences(mysticalexperiences)inthesameway?Second,Ajdukiewicz defendedtheclassicaltheoryoftruth.Propositionswhicharenotcontradictoryand, therefore,necessarilyfalsecanbetrueorfalse.Thelastideacanbeexpressedinthe language of modern semantics by saying that every non-contradictory proposition has itsmodel.Thetruth ofthepropositionis notreducibletoempiricalverification or justified assertability. In other words, a proposition is true or false regardless of whetheritcanbeverifiedbyanyexperience.Theonlyproblemwhichwemeethere is that we do not know whether propositions are true or false because we have no indubitable criteria of truth (Cf. Ziemin´ska, in this issue). Thus, Ajudkiewicz’s position in regard to theistic beliefs would be a kind of agnosticism rather than the emotivism put forward by the positivists. Someone could still object to the above interpretation of Ajdukiewicz’s standpoint on religious beliefs by saying that theistic beliefs are neither true nor false because they lack any factual meaning—and they cannot have any factual meaningatall.ThereasonforthelattercouldbethattheconceptofGodisnotclear enough and it is mutable; therefore, propositions including this concept have no definite sense. However, it seems that Ajdukiewicz’s conclusions, drawn from his analysisofthecontentoftheconceptofGodinallmonotheisticreligions(Judaism, Islam andChristianity),viz., (a) there is nocommon factual, descriptivecontent of thisconcept,and(b)theconcepthasnocognitivecontentatall,arenotsufficiently convincing. In regard to (a), we can observe that all three religions claim, for example, that God is a person, that God is the Creator of the world, God is omniscientandomnipotent.Howcoulditbethatallthesemonotheisticpropositions havenocommoncontent?Inregardto(b),wecouldsaythatevenif(a)weretrue,it wouldnotentailthetruthof(b).Evenifbasictheisticbeliefsconcerningthedivine nature hadnocommoncontent,whichIdonotthinkistrue,theysurelyhave some content.If,say,divine omniscienceisunderstooddifferentlyinJudaism,Islamand Christianity,itdoesnotfollowthatwearenotdealingwithstillthesameconceptof divine omniscience whose extension is divine knowledge. In other words, even if the concept of God is not unambiguous, it is still possible to construct a class of possible interpretations of propositions including this concept in such a way that everyinterpretationwillbeunambiguous.Naturally,Ajdukiewiczisperfectlyaware that such an operation is possible. He writes that: All through these attempts to give the traditional concept of God a more explicit content philosophers did not mind if, in making the content more 123 92 D.Łukasiewicz explicit,theydepartedfromtheoriginal,highlyemotionallycharged,concept of deity (Ajdukiewicz 1973, 154). Thus, theistic beliefs can be formulated in a more precise way, and they have not only an emotional but also a cognitive content. However, the position defended by AjdukiewiczisthatiftheconceptofGodisconstructedinaformallybetterway(so thatitscontentispreciseandclearenough),thenitlosesitsemotionalsense.Ifthe conceptofGodhasanemotionalsense,itdoesnothaveanycognitivesense,andif ithasacognitivesense,thenithasnoemotionalsense.Butwhyshouldthisbeso?If religious people, Ajdukiewicz seems to suggest, do not understand to whom they pray, they nevertheless pray truly, authentically, and they feel ‘‘the highest enthusiasm and respect, humility and submissiveness’’. But suppose that they acquire more conceptual and propositional knowledge about God, such as, for example, the kind of knowledge expressed in theological books. If this happens, according to Ajudkiewicz, they could stop feeling ‘‘the highest enthusiasm and respect,humilityandsubmissiveness’’.Thispositionappearssomewhatstrangeand surprising, because it is Ajdukiewicz himself who, as said above, argued for the inseparability of emotional and cognitive components of axiological experience. Why in the case of religious experience is the situation so completely different? This position is not only surprising but, I think, untenable as well. It is so for the simple reason that if a person understands that a being to whom he prays is the omnipotent Lord and Creator of absolutely everything (meaning that God can do whateverhewants),thenitispsychologicallyhighlyprobablethathewillfeel‘‘the highest enthusiasm and respect, humility and submissiveness’’. Thus, a believer gains knowledge about his deity by and through religious feelings just as an independent ethicist gains his moral knowledge by and through moral emotions. Of course, propositions based on religious experiences are as true or false as moral propositions based on moral feelings. Summingup,themostcoherentinterpretationofAjdukiewicz’sview ontheistic and religious beliefs in general outlined thus far seems to be agnosticism: theistic beliefshavelogicalvalues:theyaretrueorfalse,butwedonotknowtheseandwe do not have sufficiently justified knowledge regarding the transcendent and supernatural world. The last claim could also be supported by Ajdukiewicz’s remarks on the proofs of God’s existence. He observes, following Kant, that the main theistic proofs (cosmological, ontological, teleological) are not sound and valid.But,ofcourse,evenifitistruethatproofsarenotvalid,itdoesnotfollowthat the thesis that God exists is obviously false. According to the classical theory of truth, to which Ajdukiewicz subscribed, the truth of a proposition is not equivalent to its provability: a proposition can be true even if it cannot be proved. The last possible objection to my interpretation of Ajdukiewicz’s agnostic standpointonreligiousbeliefsishismetaphysicalrealismbasedonepistemological considerations. As we said earlier in this paper, he drew metaphysical conclusions fromtheanalysisofcognition,namely,thattheworldgiveninourexperienceisthe only existent world and the only reality. If this is the case, then there is no other worldthantheworldofourexperienceandtheworldofourexperienceisidentical withtheworldofsciencebasedonexperience.Insum,thereisnoGod,ifwemean 123 KazimierzAjdukiewiczontheconceptoftheworld-view… 93 by God a supernatural being outside the world of science. This view is, of course, not agnosticism but simply atheism. But even if it is a plausible interpretation of Ajdukiewicz’sposition,oratleastmoreconvincingthantheagnosticapproach,then my general point that religious beliefs have cognitive (factual sense) is still valid. The point now is that theistic beliefs are false and we have sufficient epistemic evidence to take them to be false.4 The problem of rationality of religious beliefs Ajdukiewicz’s conception of a world-view and religious beliefs leads to some further questions. Let us mention four problems. The first is the problem of compatibilityofpropertiesbelongingtoaworld-view.AccordingtoAjdukiewicz’s logical rationalism, a world-view should be rational and ‘‘ultimate’’. The latter characteristicshouldguaranteethateudemonic andmoral evaluationsaresolidand unshakable,whichisimportantbecauseitguaranteesthestabilityandpredictability of human actions. Rationality is important because it helps to protect society from nonsense and falsehood (Ajdukiewicz 1973, 46). The problem is that rational (scientific) cognition cannot be ultimate. Beliefs based on rational cognition, a scientific world-view included, can be revised and replaced by other beliefs based onrationalcognition.Arationalattitudeincludestheabilitytochangebeliefsandto strive continuously to broaden one’s thought-horizon. This can naturally change a world-view,and,inconsequence,changemoralandeudemonicevaluations.Wecan speculate that in response to this remark Ajdukiewicz could say that if a thought- horizon is large enough and its beliefs are sufficiently justified, then moral and eudemonicevaluationsbasedonsuchaworld-viewaremoresolidandstable.Thus, anultimateworld-viewcanberational.What’smore,solidityandrationalitydonot exclude each other but, on the contrary, are mutually dependent. Second, rationality of beliefs, as Ajdukiewicz stressed, consists in their being intersubjectively‘‘controllable’’andcommunicable(Ajdukiewicz1973,46).Beliefs which are not controllable are not rational. If so, and this is the core of our second doubt, close connection between rationality of beliefs and their control does not have to disqualify a religious world-outlook as necessarily irrational. InhisProblemsandTheoriesofPhilosophy,Ajdukiewiczpresentedsomeresults of such control by claiming that religious beliefs are neither formulated clearly 4 Ajdukiewicz’satheism—ifitisakindofatheism—isbasedonepistemologicalconsiderations,thebest availablescienceofhisday,andonhiscriticismofthetraditionalargumentsfortheexistenceofGodand immortalityofthehumansoul.WellafterAjdukiewicz’sdeaththeredevelopedaninterestingdebatein contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of religion concerning the theistic claim that God exists, referring to arguments provided by scientific knowledge. Perhaps the most interesting approach in defence of theism is the so-called ‘theology of chance’ which attempts to show that neither quantum mechanicsinphysicsnorthetheoryofevolutioninbiologyareinconflictwiththethesisthatGodexists, andthatHetakescareofeveryindividualhumanbeing.Themostimportantproponentsofsuchaview are R. D. Bartholomew and Michał Heller. Ajdukiewicz’s claim that there is a conflict, or a big gap, between science and religion seems to be too strong a thesis, at least from the point of view of the theologyof chance.Accordingto the latter,chance events are partof the divine plan and providence (Łukasiewicz2015). 123 94 D.Łukasiewicz enoughnorsufficientlywelljustified.5However,ifitispossibletoclaimrationally that religious beliefs are not clearly formulated and well justified, then it follows that they can be intersubjectively controlled, at least to a certain degree, and, therefore, that they can be rational. There are some possible strategies how one could respond to this point. One could say, for example, that beliefs which cannot be communicated in an intersubjective way, i.e. literally, without recourse to metaphors and analogies, cannotbecontrolledinanintersubjectiveway.Iftheycannotbecontrolledbecause they arenotexpressibleliterally, theyare irrational. Inotherwords, intersubjective controlofbeliefsconcernsnotonlytheirepistemicform(thelinguisticformoftheir expression)buttheircontentaswell.Thus,thefactthatweareabletoassessabelief asnotrational(becauseofitslinguisticform)willnotturnthatbeliefintoarational belief. In other words, saying that a belief is not rational on linguistic grounds disqualifies the belief as rational tout court. If we say that ‘‘God is the father of all humans’’ we cannot control this belief because we do not know what the precise meaning of the concept of ‘‘God the father’’ is. We can only control the linguistic formofthisbelief,notingthatitemploysthemetaphorofGodthefather.Butwhen logical rationalists speak about rational control of beliefs they mean their content and not only their form. Thus, religious beliefs are irrational because of their linguistic form, which renders impossible any external, intersubjective, i.e. experiential and logical test and control of their content. Someone could argue that at least some religious beliefs are controllable and hence rational if expressed by propositions in which the concept of God is defined precisely. Only mystical experience cannot be controlled in the way recommended bylogical rationalism,i.e.controlledwithrespecttoitscontent.Propositionsabout God could be regarded as controllable in case the concept of God is precisely defined or described without metaphors and analogies. Ajdukiewicz’s possible response to the foregoing might be that it is not the religiousbeliefsinthemselves(formulatedinacorrectway)thatareirrationalinthe senseofcontrollabilitybutthebehaviorofabelieverwhoassertsagivenbeliefwith aforce toostronginrelationtothe evidencesupportingtheassertion.Ifareligious beliefisassertedwithaforceproportionaltotheevidence,thensuchanassertionis notnecessarilyirrational.6Clearlyandpreciselyformulatedreligiousbeliefscanbe weakly asserted as metaphysical hypotheses or theoretical constructions (surmises, assumptions). The theistic belief that ‘‘God exists’’ (provided that ‘God’ means a being characterized in a literal and not metaphorical way—if possible) can be regardedasarationalbeliefwhenitsassertiveforceisproportionaltoitsevidence. Ifso,itcanberegardedasrationalinthesensepostulatedbylogicalrationalismand defendedbyAjdukiewicz.7Nevertheless,religiousbeliefscouldhardlybeincluded 5 Considerationsconcerningtherationalityofreligiousbeliefsleadusawayfromthemaintopicofthis paper;IonlywishtoemphasizehowradicalAjdukiewicz’sconceptoftherationalityofbeliefis. 6 We must keep in mind that here we have two meanings of rationality: rationality of beliefs and rationalityoftheassertionofbeliefs. 7 Such a program of metaphysical investigations concerning the concept of God was undertaken in PolandbytheCracowCircleinspiredbyJanŁukasiewicz andcarriedoutbyJ.M.Bochen´ski,Fr.Jan Salamucha,FranciszekDrewnowski,andBolesławSobocin´ski(Policki2005,45). 123