This article was downloaded by: [Canadian Research Knowledge Network] On: 27 April 2011 Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 932223628] Publisher Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37- 41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Journal of Human Rights Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713431618 The State of “Sorry”: Official Apologies and their Absence Alice MacLachlana a York University, York, UK Online publication date: 19 August 2010 To cite this Article MacLachlan, Alice(2010) 'The State of “Sorry”: Official Apologies and their Absence', Journal of Human Rights, 9: 3, 373 — 385 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/14754835.2010.502085 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14754835.2010.502085 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. 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JournalofHumanRights,9:373–385,2010 Copyright©2010Taylor&FrancisGroup,LLC ISSN:1475-4835print /1475-4843online DOI:10.1080/14754835.2010.502085 Review Essay The State of “Sorry”: Official Apologies and their Absence ALICEMACLACHLAN 1 1 0 2 l i r Ap TheAgeofApology:FacingUptothePastbyMarkGibney,RhodaE.Howard-Hassman, 27 Jean-MarcCoicaud,andNiklausSteiner,Editors.Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvania 7 0 Press,2008.344pp.$26.50,paperback. : 0 2 : The Politics of Official Apologies by Melissa Nobles. New York: Cambridge University t A ] Press,2008.214pp.$24.99,paperback. k r o tw Resentment’sVirtue:JeanAme´ryandtheRefusaltoForgivebyThomasBrudholm.Philadel- e N phia:TempleUniversityPress,2008.256pp.$24.95,paperback. e g d le The late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have been called the age of apol- w o n ogy by a number of academics and political figures. Exact numbers vary, but even at a K ch conservativeestimate,therehavebeenover50officialapologiesofferedbyheadsofstate, r ea governmentrepresentatives,aswellastheleadersofchurches,corporations,andothernon- s Re governmentalorganizationsinthelastseveraldecades.1Andthelistofactualapologiesis n ia ofcoursemuchshorterthanthelistofindividualsandgroupswhohavedemandedapology d na during the same period, but whose demands have thus far been denied or ignored: infa- a C [ mousexamplesofnon-apologiesincludetheTurkishgovernment’srefusaltoapologizefor : By theArmeniangenocideof1915,andtheAmericangovernment’srefusaltoapologizefor ed slavery.2Apologiesandtheirabsencehaveemergedandremainedinfocuswithinbroader d oa effortstorespondmorallyandpoliticallytohistoricalinjustices,postcoloniallegacies,and l n w authoritarian rule, as well as the atrocities of genocide, crimes against humanity, and the o D violenceofcivilandethnicconflict. Despite this phenomenon, the academic literature on apologies has only just begun to catch up to the literature on various other aspects of repair following serious wrong: forgiveness, reconciliation, amnesty, andpardons. Priorto2008, therewereonlyahand- ful of book-length treatments, most notably by sociologist Nicolas Tavuchis (1991) and psychologist Aaron Lazare (2004). Philosopher and legal scholar Nick Smith was able to open his 2008 monograph, I Was Wrong: The Meaning of Apologies, with the bold, if entirely plausible, claim that his was the only philosophical monograph dedicated solely tothetopicofapologiessinceMaimonides’HilchotTeshuvah,circa1170.Moreover,the interdisciplinaryvolumeTheAgeofApology(Gibneyetal.2008)discussedinthisessay is,tomyknowledge,thefirstofitskind. AddresscorrespondencetoAliceMacLachlan,YorkUniversity.E-mail:[email protected] 373 374 AliceMacLachlan Thedearthofbooksonapologiesisparticularlystrikingifweconsiderthatonlythe apology,fromamongtheconceptslistedabove,makesitsprimarydemandoftheperpetrator andnotthevictimofwrongdoing.Thecallforanofficialapology,andthusforachangein theauthoritativehistoricalrecord,canbereadasanimportantcontinuationofthepolicyof “speakingtruthtopower,”originatinginQuakercommunitiesandtakenupbythehuman rightsandcivilrightsactivistsinthetwentiethcentury.Atthesametime,manyobservers arecynicalofthenewpoliticsofapology,dismissingitascheap,“gesturalpolitics”awash inself-interestandcrocodiletears,whichenablegovernmentsandleaderstodefuseangry minoritygroupswithoutcommittinganyactualresourcestotheproblemsofinjusticeand exclusion(Cunningham2004). Neither the optimism nor the cynicism surrounding apologies appear entirely mis- placed: In one recent example, the Australian government officially apologized to Aus- tralian Aboriginal peoples for a history of government policies that included the forcible 1 removalof“half-caste”Aboriginalchildrenfromtheirfamilies,forthepurposesofsaving 1 0 2 and“whitening”them.Thiswasahard-wonvictoryforAboriginalpeoplesandtheirallies, l ri as the previous Liberal government, led by Prime Minister John Howard, had refused to p A endorsewhatHowardcalleda“blackarmbandviewofhistory”foralmostadecade,evenin 7 2 7 thefaceofwidespreadpublicsupportforanofficialapologyandgrassrootsmovementslike 0 0: national“SorryDay”andthesigningof“Sorry”books.Yet,whileLabourPrimeMinister 2 : KevinRuddacknowledgedinhisspeechthe“theindignity,thedegradation,andthehumil- t A ] iation these laws embodied” and the “families and communities whose lives were ripped k or apart by the actions of successive governments under successive parliaments,” there was w t e no compensation package for victims and their families attached to the much-publicized N ge apology(Rudd2008).Whatcommitmentstheapologydidmaketowardimprovingthema- d le terialconditionsoflifeforAustralia’sAboriginalpeopleswereleftvague andultimately w o n fellshortofthoserecommendationsmadebytheBringingThemHomereport,whichhad K ch initiatedthedriveforapologytenyearsearlier.3 r ea Howthencantheoristsandobserversbestmakesenseofthesuddenproliferationof s e R apologies on the political stage? Given the solemn weight of history apologies seem to n ia carry,andthepassionwithwhichvictimizedgroupsdemandthem,subjectingapologiesto d na criticalanalysiscanfeelinappropriate,evenblasphemous.Atthesametime,thereremains a C [ significantconfusionoverwhat,exactlyaparticularapologyismeanttoachieveoroffer, : By andbywhatstandardsweoughttoevaluateit.Giventhekindsofseriousandlongstanding ed wrongs for which state actors and public figures are called upon to apologize, what—if d oa anything—could possibly qualify as a good or satisfying apology? What is it exactly l n w that a public apology is meant to do or accomplish? Apologies—as well as the needs, o D rights, attitudes, and responses of victims that lead to demands for apologies—require contextualization and thematization. This task is taken up, in various ways, by the three booksdiscussedinthisessay. The essays collected in The Age of Apology explore the emerging practice of public apologiesbyprimarilyWesternnationsfromavarietyofdisciplinaryperspectives.Theaim ofthecollection,itseditorsexplain,isnotonlytoaccountfortherapidproliferationofpublic apologiesoverthelast20yearsbuttosituatetheriseofthepublicapologythematically: connecting it to postcolonial relationships between former colonizers and the colonized, to the rise of social movements like the civil rights movement, and indigenous people’s demands for sovereignty, and to difficult questions of collective and intergenerational responsibilityforpastwrongs. TheAgeofApologyconsistsof20individualessays,dividedintofivesections.Thefirst section addresses the meaning of apologies from the perspective of contemporary legal, ReviewEssay 375 political,andethicaltheory,withsomecross-culturalcomparison.Theremainingsections present, collectively, a typology of public apologies: They cover, in turn, “internal” state apologies—that is, government apologies to minority groups in their own population, internationalapologiesbetweenstates,andapologiesbynonstateactors(papalapologies andcorporateapologies).Thefinaltwoessaysaddress“thewaronterror”asanapparent exception to all categories; a decision that itself is suggestive of the limits to any such typology.4 The cases chosen to illustrate these different types of public apology range geographically and historically: from the Treaty of Waitangi settlement process between NewZealand’sgovernmentandtheindigenousMaoripeople,totheGermanministerfor economic cooperation and development’s apology for atrocities committed in the former GermanSouth-WestAfrica(Namibia),to“quasi-apologies”bytheCanadiangovernment, andaperceivedlackofapologybyJapantoitsSouthAsianneighbors,mostnotablyChina andKorea,foratrocitiescommittedduringtheSecondWorldWar. 1 Becauseofitsinterdisciplinaryanditscollectivenature,TheAgeofApologycanuse- 1 0 2 fully be seen as a representative example of the present state of academic literature on l ri apology. Several features are worth noting—first and foremost, the wide view taken of p A whatconstitutesapublicapology.Contributorstothevolumeconsiderapologiesbycorpo- 7 2 7 rations,churchleaders,andthemedia,aswellasthosebyheadsofstateorgovernments. 0 0: This inclusive approach is exemplary of the literature as a whole, which has developed 2 : increasinglycomplexandinclusivecriteriaformappingapologies.5Theoristsarenolonger t A ] satisfiedtomarkoffapologiesascollectiveorinterpersonalbutfocusalsoonthekind of k or authority the apologizer is taken to have (whether representative, ceremonial, corporate, w t e or celebrity), on the nature and the historical location of the wrong (discrete or ongoing; N ge intherecentordistantpast)andontheidentityoftheindividualorgroupdemandingan d le apologyinthefirstplace(whetherprimaryvictims,theirpoliticalrepresentatives,orindeed w o n their descendents). The authority, the content, and the addressee of a given apology are K ch understood to be crucial in locating both its meaning and its purpose; as these elements r ea vary,sodoestheimportoftheapology. s e R Equallyexemplaryofthebroaderliteratureisthelackofconsensusoverwhatactually n ia constitutes an apology, official or otherwise. Commentators disagree over the extent to d na whichapologiesare“mere”speechandshouldbeassessedassuchor,rather,ifagenuine a C [ apology includes other meaningful actions (for example, reparation or compensation). : By Theoristsofapologyhavetendedtounderstandthemintermsofspeech-acttheory,drawing ed ontheworkofBritishphilosopherJ.L.Austin(1975)andconcludingthatthey“canonly d oa bedonewithwordsand,bycorollary,if[they]arenotdoneinthewords,[they]havenot l n w beendone”(Bavelas2004:1).Butitisnotclearthatapologiesarealwaysdoneinwords, o D oratleast,notthesamewordseachtime;thisisparticularlytrueinthepublicrealm,where “apologiescanbecommunicatedinawiderangeofways,throughverbalstatementsissued publicly,jointdeclarations,legislativeresolutions,documentsandreports,legaljudgments, pardonceremonies,apologyrituals,daysofobservance,reconciliationwalks,monuments andmemorials,evennamesbestowedonthelandscape”(Weyeneth2001:20).Furthermore, thenotionofspeechactdoesnotyetconveytheextenttowhichapologiesmayberitualistic andceremonial.SanderijnCelsarguesthatweshouldfocuslessonapologiesasspeechand more on apologies as performances, drawing on the resources of dramaturgical theory to interprettheirceremonialsignificance.6NickSmithalsoincludesperformanceamongthe elementsofwhathecallsa“categoricalapology”:theregulativeidealguidingourvarious practicesofapologizing—bothinpublicandinprivate,individuallyandcollectively(Smith 2008:74). 376 AliceMacLachlan The difficulty of categorizing apologies as speech emerges at various points in the volume.Whilemostcontributorsrelyonstandardspeech-actdefinitionsofapology,some challenge it; and one of the editors, Mark Gibney, has argued in previous works for two nonvocal performative elements, “publicity” and “ceremony,” as crucial criteria for an authentic public apology (Gibney and Rockstrom 2001). Furthermore, the tendentious relationshipbetweenspeechandactionarisesinCarlosParodi’spieceon“StateApologies UnderU.S.Hegemony.”ParodiconsidershowUSpoliticalinfluenceinLatinAmericahas complicatedlocaleffortstocometotermswithpasthumanrightsviolations.Itwouldbe tooeasy,henotes,toassumethatLatinAmericantruthcommissionsaremeretoolsofUS powerandinterestsintheregion,butheconcludesthatuntiltheUnitedStatesisincluded intheseprocessesasaresponsibleactor,apparentlybenevolentgesturessuchasPresident Clinton’s 1999 apology for American support of repressive military forces in Guatemala will have little lasting effect on the region. Apologies do not count as such without the 1 supportoftransformativeactions. 1 0 2 Similarly,RhodaHoward-HassmannandAnthonyLombardo’sempiricalresearchon l ri thereceptionofWesternapologiesbyeducatedAfricans(“WordsRequireAction:Africa p A Elite Opinion About Apologies from the ‘West”’) notes a remarkable level of consensus 7 2 7 among those they interviewed: “without actions, they believed, words are meaningless” 0 0: (Gibney et al. 2008: 218). Since apologies are at least partly normative—that is, part of 2 : what makes something an apology is the author’s intention to accomplish something of t A ] moral value—the line between whether action is required for something to be a good k or apologyorforsomethingtoevenbeanapologytendstoblur.Meaningless,empty,orfailed w t e apologiesmaynotmerelybebadapologies,theymayfailtobeapologiesatall. N ge Thereisalsosignificantdisputeovertheextenttowhichtoneandsincerityshouldaffect d le ourevaluationofapoliticalapology.Thewrongtoneorobviousinsinceritycanundermine w o n theimportofanapologybutcantherighttoneguaranteeit?J.L.Austinassignedapologies K ch totheclassofbehabitives;statementsorutterancesthatareconcerned withattitudesand r ea feelings(Austin1975:83).Butfeelingsandattitudesareclearlynottheonlythingswith s e R which apologies concern themselves. Infact,mostapologies performmultiplefunctions. n ia First, they have a narrative function: Apologies identify the wrongdoing as such, the d na apologizer as responsible for it, and the victim or addressee as wrongfully harmed by a [C it. Second, apologies communicate disavowal; in apologizing, the wrongdoer distances : By oneself from her acts even as she takes responsibility for them, repudiating the attitudes, ed motivations,andcircumstancesthatledhertoperformthem.Finally,apologiesrepresenta d oa formofcommitment,bothtotheapologizer’songoingdisavowalandhergood-faithefforts l n w torepairthewrongsassheisableandasisappropriate.Feelingsandattitudesonlyappear o D as the vehicles for these primary functions. At least in our interpersonal relationships to others,weachievedisavowalanddistancefrompastactionsthroughourattitudestowards them.Theseattitudesarewhatmotivateourcommitmenttobedifferentorbetter. Difficultiesthusariseinthepublic,politicalrealm,wherepersonalfeelingsandatti- tudesdonot(andperhapsshouldnot)playthesamemotivationalrole.Theoristsofpolitical apologyhavestruggledtoprovideappropriatemotivationalmeasuresthatmightformthe basis for evaluating “good” and “bad” public apologies, but they disagree over whether this is to be found in attached material compensation, changes to the historical record, theaffectiveresponsesofaddresseesandwitnesses,orintermsofarenegotiatedpolitical relationship between apologizer and addressee (or indeed, in all of the above). To treat the first, material compensation, as a standard seems to render the apology itself almost irrelevant,andthesecond,historicalrecord,doesnotseemtodependontoneormoodbut could also, presumably, be accomplished by acts other than an apology. Yet the third is ReviewEssay 377 hardtoquantify,oreven comprehend. Thedebate remainsatanimpasse,andtheeditors ofthiscollectionremark—andrightlyso—that,forthepresent,politicalapologiesmustbe viewedwithamixtureofhopeandunease(Gibneyetal.2008:8). SeveralcontributorstoTheAgeofApologycorrectlyemphasizethatacademicanalysis ofpublicapologieshasnotyetmatured;thatis,thereislittleconsensus—or,asofyet,even structureddebate—overthemeanings,features,ordesiderataofpublicapologies.Thiscan leavetheobserverwiththevaguesensethattheoristsofpublicapologiesaretalkingpast one another. If this volume has one serious shortcoming, it is that it does little to correct thisimpression.So,forexample,Renteln’scross-culturalanalysisofapologiesnotesthat theideaofapologiesasnecessarily“sincere,heartfeltorvoluntary”maybemorelocalized than many have recognized, and that apologies may serve different purposes in societies withnormsorganizedaroundshameasopposedtoguilt(Gibneyetal.2008:68–69).Yet, intheverynextessay(Jean-MarcCoicaudandJibeckeJo¨nsson,“ElementsofaRoadMap 1 foraPoliticsofApology”)theauthorsstartfromthe—presumeduniversal—premisethat 1 0 2 “fortheofferingofapologytohavearealvalue,itisessentialthattheremorseconveyedis l ri genuine”(78).Furtherconversationamongcontributorsmightalsohaveservedtoconnect p A the theoretical discussions of apologies in Part I to the cases and examples illustrated in 7 2 7 subsequent chapters. Instead, it seemed as if each contributor was required to offer his 0 0: or her own introductory framework. Indeed, this was not always a bad thing, as some 2 : later discussions of the political and legal theory of apologies were more insightful than t A ] theopeningchapters.Buttheoverallimpressionwasoneofinconsistencyandsometimes k or incommensurability,ratherthandialogueandengagement.7 w t e The complexity described in the pages of The Age of Apology (and toward which N ge I have tried to gesture, above) demonstrates that there is not yet a conclusive method for d le understandingallinstancesofpublicapologies.Perhapswedobetter,then,whenwerefrain w o n fromasking,“Whatisthemeaningofthepublicapology?”wherethequestionistakentobe K ch general,applyingtoallcontextsandinstances.Insteadwemightask,“Whatisthemeaning r ea ofthisparticularapology,ortheseapologies,inthiscontextandinthesecircumstances?” s e R Melissa Nobles takes up the second, more focused task in her book titled The Politics of n ia OfficialApologies. d na ThePoliticsofOfficialApologiesoffersa“membershiptheoryofofficialapologies,” a C [ based on an analysis of five specific contexts in which the demand for apology has been : By made:theplightofindigenouspeoplesinAustralia,Canada,NewZealandandtheUnited ed States, as well as that of African Americans. The membership theory of apologies that d oa Nobles advocates is based on the following claim. While individual political actors may l n w havevariousindividualreasonsandmotivationsforpursuingacourseofofficialapology, o D ultimately, such apologies function as part of ongoing efforts to reshape the terms of membershipinanationalpoliticalcommunity,wheremembershipistakentohavelegal, political,andaffectivedimensions.Wecanassessthemeritsandthesuccessofparticular apologies, she argues, based on their responsiveness to and their effects on these three dimensions of the relationship between the minority in question and the larger political community(Nobles2008:36–37).Studyofthefivecasesinquestionrevealshowofficial apologieshave,onoccasion,beenabletoplaythispoliticalrole. Apologies are capable of performing the moral and political task of renegotiating membership, Nobles claims, because they officially acknowledge historic injustices and thus create grounds for rectification, the reshaping of political arrangements, and other policy changes. The effects of apologies on the affective dimensions of membership, she notes, are far less predictable: Public reaction to even the mention of apology can (and does)varywidelyfromcountrytocountry,withamajorityofCanadianstendingtosupport 378 AliceMacLachlan government apologies, for example, while in the United States, the suggestion can raise substantialbacklashandanger(Nobles2008:138).Apologiesdifferfromotherresponses towrongdoing,suchasreparations,inthattheyaresymbolicanddonotofferfinancialor materialrelief,butNoblesisrighttopointoutthattheyoughttobeevaluatedontheirown termsandnotdismissedasmateriallyuseless(143–144).Thedifficulty,asnotedabove,is determiningwhatexactlythosetermsare:Nobles’strategyistoshowtheconcreteeffects ofatleastsomeapologiestodrawoutsomemoregeneralaspectsoftheirsignificanceand function. ThecomparativeexamplesNoblesemploysarewellchosenfortheirsimilarities;be- cause all four countries are settler societies and former British colonies, the dominant (thoughnothomogeneous)Anglo-Europeancultureinallfourensuressomedegreeofcul- turalconvergenceregardingthenature,meaning,andproprietyofapologies.8Furthermore, inallcasesthedemandforapologyarisesonbehalfofasmallminorityofthepopulationand 1 isrootedingravehistoricalinjustices—theseizureofland,culturalcolonialismandappro- 1 0 2 priation,illegitimatesubjectiontothestate,violentandforcibleremoval,andslavery—as l ri wellasanongoinghistoryofformalandmaterialinequality.Yetthedifferencesbetween p A these cases are also telling: The demands of indigenous peoples tend to focus on three 7 2 7 aspects:landclaims,self-government,andculturalpreservation.ThedemandsofAfrican 0 0: Americans are somewhat different and—as Nobles notes—are concerned less “with the 2 : goalsofformalequalitythanwiththeirnonachievementandlimits”(2008:19). t A ] Furthermore,therearesignificantdisanalogiesbetweenthehistoryofindigenouspeo- k or ples in settler societies and that of African Americans. Nobles is careful to acknowledge w t e these disanalogies explicitly and their consequences for her analysis (African Americans N ge getshortshriftinthebook’smiddlechapters)notingthat“AfricanAmerican-relatedapolo- d le gies(andnonapologies)arenotamongthebook’smaincases”(2008:39),buttheresultis w o n thattheintendedscopeofheranalysisisunclear:Thatis,whetherthemembershipapology K ch ismeanttoapplytoallcasesofgovernmentapologiestooppressedinternalminoritiesor r ea onlytoindigenouspeoplesasaspecialcase.Themembershiptheoryofapologies—withits s e R focusonthelegalandpoliticaldimensionsofmembershipaswellasaffective,subjective n ia relationships—seemsparticularlycompellinginthecaseofindigenouspeoples,whosele- d na galandpoliticalstatushasbeenespeciallycomplex,ranginghistoricallyfromstate“wards” a C [ toasymmetricalnotionsof“registeredIndian”or“citizensplus”(Nobles2008:44–46)and By: which is still in debate today.9 I am not sure it would apply as cleanly to all cases of ed historicalinjustice,especiallywhenthedemandisforrecognitionandacknowledgmentof d oa adiscretepastwrong,madebycitizenswhosecurrentlegalandpoliticalstatusisrelatively l n w unproblematic,suchasUkrainianCanadiansseekingapologyforinternmentduringWorld o D WarI,orJapaneseCanadiansandAmericansseekingapologyforinternmentduringWorld WarII. The middle chapters of The Politics of Official Apologies provide detailed, nuanced yetaccessiblehistoriesoftheindigenouspeoplesofallfourcountries.Noblesoutlinesthe many individual factors, players, circumstances, and events that resulted in demands for apologyinsomecasesandnotothers,andthatledtooffersofapologyinsomecasesand notothers.Herbookisavaluableresourceforanyonelookingtoknowthedetailsofthese politicalhistories.ThehistoricalspecificityofNobles’accountrendersitvulnerableaswell as impressive, however, and, in particular, her analysis suffers from some rather unlucky timing. In 2008, the year of her book’s publication, our understanding of at least two of thecentralcasesshepresentschangeddramatically.AsImentionedabove,onFebruary13 ofthatyear,newlyelected AustralianPMKevin Rudd offeredtheapology toAustralia’s indigenouspeoplesthathispredecessor,JohnHoward,hadsostronglyresisted(andwhose ReviewEssay 379 resistanceisthefocusofmuchofNobles’analysisoftheAustraliancase,renderingmany ofherconclusionsaboutpotentialAustralianreceptiontosuchanapologypremature). The second case is perhaps of greater concern. On June 8, 2008, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper also offered an apology to Canada’s indigenous peoples for the government’scomplicityintheIndianResidentialSchools,followingyearsofcampaigning andlobbyingbyindigenousactivists,internationalpressure,and—ultimately—asuccessful lawsuit(IndianResidentialSchoolsSettlementAgreement2006).Onceagain,itissimply unfortunate that Nobles’ book publication preceded such a relevant event and thus she could not subject it to her analysis. In this case, however, the misfortune is compounded byNobles’claimthattheCanadiangovernmenthadalreadyutteredanofficialapologyto itsindigenouspeoplesforthesegovernmentpolicies.Atvariouspoints,Noblestakesthe “StatementofReconciliation”issuedin1998byJaneStewart,then(Liberal)Ministerfor IndianandNorthernAffairs,tobeanofficialgovernmentapology(2008:116). 1 Whether or not Nobles is right to treat Stewart’s Statement of Reconciliation as an 1 0 2 officialactofapologyisadifficultquestion,andonethatgetsattheheartoftheconfusion l ri surrounding the nature and purpose of political apologies. That is, it raises the issue of p A standards by which an event even counts as an apology—let alone a good or successful 7 2 7 one. A closer look at the text of the statement is instructive in this matter. Nowhere in 0 0: Stewart’s statement, for example, does she use the word “apology” or “apologize.” She 2 : indicatesthatCanadamust“recognize”and“acknowledge”theeffectsofitshistoryonits t A ] indigenouspeoples,andsheformallyexpresses“regret”attheactionsofpastgovernments, k or butthatregretisnevertransformedintotheadmittedlystrongertermsof“responsibility,” w t e “remorse,”oreven“guilt.”Thestatementexecutesagracefuldanceofequivocation,telling N ge thesurvivorsofresidentialschoolsthat“wewishtoemphasizethatwhatyouexperienced d le was not your fault and should never have happened”; a remark that—in this context—is w o n almostpatronizinganddoesnotgoontolocatefaultelsewhere.Whilethestatementdoes K ch goontosay“tothoseofyouwhosufferedthistragedyatresidentialschools,wearedeeply r ea sorry,” but “sorry” in this context is highly ambivalent (and, it appears, intentionally so); s Re it could express remorse, but, equally, it could be merely sympathetic.10 Most alarming, n ia perhaps,isthelinethatintroducestheissue:“Sadly,ourhistorywithrespecttothetreatment d na ofAboriginalpeopleisnotsomethinginwhichwecantakepride.”Theemphasisisself- a [C directed,albeitcritical;itdoesnotreachouttothepurportedaddressee.11 : By Also significant is the broader context of the 1998 statement: It was not uttered by ed PrimeMinisterJeanChretien,thentheleaderoftheCanadiangovernment.Indeed,hedid d oa notattendtheceremony,thoughhewasinOttawaatthetime.Thiscontrastsstarklywith l n w the 2008 apology, uttered by the Canadian Prime Minister in the Canadian parliament, o D followedbystatementsfromleadersofallpoliticalpartiesand—mostimportantly—bya response from Chief Phil Fontaine of the Assembly of First Nations (the political body representing over 50 native tribes) in full ceremonial headdress, alongside leaders from Canada’sMe´tisandInuitpopulations.Thiswasthefirsttimeindigenousleadershadbeen invited onto the floor of the house in their capacity as representatives of nations and had been granted permission to speak in that capacity.12 The evidence that this was an act of apology,and—moreover—anofficialone,isoverwhelming. NoblesnevercommentsontheambiguoustitleofStewart’sstatement,ortheabsence ofwordsandphraseswetypicallytaketosignalthefunctionsofapology.Relyingprimarily onmediaaccountsfromthattime,whichnotedbroadpublicacceptancethatthegovernment hadindeed“apologized,”shetreatsitasasurprisinglyunproblematicexampleandsubjects the statement to less scrutiny than is warranted. Here Nobles might fruitfully enter into conversation with Matt James, one contributor to The Age of Apology (“Wrestling with 380 AliceMacLachlan thePast:Apologies,Quasi-Apologies,andNon-ApologiesinCanada”).Jamesarguesthat the novelty and ambiguity surrounding the so-called “politics of apology”—and the lack of a properly political set of criteria for evaluating them—have allowed various levels of Canadian government to represent themselves as more apologetic than is warranted. He differentiates apparent cases into apologies, quasi-apologies, and non-apologies, noting how a preponderance of the latter two has led Canadian observers to overestimate their nation’s commitment to redressing the past. What emerges is the sense that determining thenatureofa“true”or“genuine”apologyisnotmerelyspeculativeconceptualanalysis butmayhaveconcreteimplicationsforthepoliticsofapologyontheground. Nobles is not necessarily wrong in her appraisal and James right in his: There are grounds for arguing that insofar as those involved take a statement to be an apology, it can reasonably be read as such. There is some evidence that the Canadian government intendedthestatementtobeapologetic,oratleastsufficientlyapologetic,and—asNobles 1 cites—mainstreammediasourceswerequicktonameitso.Butontheotherhand,response 1 0 2 byindigenousleadersandactivistswasmixed,aswasthehistoricalrecordovertime.Itis l ri hardlycoincidentalthatinthetextofhisofficialresponsetothe2008governmentapology, p A Chief Phil Fontaine leaves one, rather emphatic, phrase to stand alone, without qualifier: 7 2 7 “Finally,wehaveheardCanadasayitissorry”(2008). 0 0: Thecaseofthe1998CanadianStatementwouldhavebeenanexcellentopportunityfor 2 : adiscussionofapologycriteria:Aretheseinternaltothetextortotheperformance?Should t A ] theybedeterminedsituationallyormorebroadly?Towhatextentaretheydescriptive,or k or do they include normative aspects (the extent to which the apparent apology is able to w t e achieve its moral and political function, for example)? As noted by Weyeneth (2001) N ge above, apologies have taken any number of forms. Moreover, there are reasons to avoid d le highly determinate, strict criteria, insofar as these might fail to represent actual practices w no andinstancesofapologizing,butNoblesdoesnotinvokethese.13 K ch Ofcourse,theapologeticornon-apologeticnatureofStewart’sstatementmightwell r ea have remained a matter of interpretive speculation, had the Canadian government not s e R offeredanunambiguousapologycoveringmuchofthesamehistory,severalmonthsafter n ia the release of Nobles’ book. Furthermore, in offering a “theory” of apologies, Nobles is d na not engaging in conceptual analysis but political explanation: why people seek them, the a C [ conditions under which governments offer them, and what they provide to the broader : By political venture of responding to past injustice. Indeed, her account as a whole focuses ed moreonanalyzingtheconceptofpoliticalmembership—thatis,itsmeaning,dimensions d oa and expression as revealed in the histories of four former British colonies —than she l n w does on the concept of apology, or, for that matter, the qualifier “official.” As a result, o D theseconceptsremainundertheorized,attimestothedetrimentofherbook’smainclaims. But this lack of analysis does not undermine what I take to be a unique strength of the book: that is, the clear, detailed, and consistently engaging comparative histories of the indigenous peoples of four countries, and the careful detailing of the complex variables involvedintheirongoingstrugglesforrecognitionandpoliticalchange,asthesemakeup thebulkofthemiddlechapters.Thisbookisperhapsmostusefultoscholarsofindigenous rightsandindigenoushistories,andnottoscholarsofapologies,butthatisnoinsignificant achievement. The interpretive difficulties faced by Nobles and others in determining just when an apology has taken place raise interesting questions about the relevance of non-apologies in assessing the politics of apology. As the case with the 1998 Canadian Statement of Reconciliation, we can learn a great deal about what a well-timed apology might have meant or accomplished, by studying those instances in which one was not offered, or in ReviewEssay 381 which what has been offered should not qualify as an apology proper. Non-apologies or quasi-apologies teach us about the potential moral and political work of apologies, by showingus—sometimesviscerally—whereandhowtheyareunsatisfying.Noblesherself notes that the long list of apologies offered or demanded is dwarfed next to the almost “incalculable”numberofinstancesinwhichapologiescould beappropriatelyofferedbut areeitherrefusedornotdemanded(5).Whatisleftforthevictimsofwrongdoing,when nosatisfyingapologyismade—orindeed,whennosatisfyingorsufficientapologycould everbemade? OnewaytoreadThomasBrudholm’stext,Resentment’sVirtue:JeanAme´ryandthe RefusaltoForgive,isasanextendedmeditationonthedangersofmovingtooquicklyfrom thequestionsofapology,responsibility,andacknowledgmentofwrongdoing,toissuesof forgiveness,resolution,andreconciliation—oreven,ofassumingtooquicklythatthemove mustbemade.Brudholm’spurpose,hewrites,isto“provid[e]aconstructivecomplement 1 to writings that dismiss various kinds of resentment and refusals to forgive only as the 1 0 2 negativetobeovercome”(Brudholm2008:171).Heaimsbothtorehabilitateresentment l ri as a potentially moral response to serious wrongdoing, and to caution against what he p A takestobetheoverenthusiastic,andattimescareless,promotionofforgivenessinrecent 7 2 7 writingsontransitionaljustice.Ofcoursethesetwoaimsarenotunconnected;Brudholm 0 0: seesthecurrentpromotionforgivenessasacatchallforrespondingtomoralandpolitical 2 : wrongdoing taking place at the expense of legitimate expressions of anger, resentment, t A ] and other morally laden reactive attitudes. Insofar as forgiveness is glorified, anger is k or necessarily condemned. This zero-sum game approach is, for Brudholm, exemplified in w t e theworkings—andinsubsequentanalyses—oftheSouthAfricanTruthandReconciliation N ge Commission(TRC). d le Brudholm’sapproachtohistopicissomewhatunconventional.Thebookdividesintwo w o n parts,whicharedividedintheirfocus,theircontent,andtheirhistoricalera.Thefirsthalfof K ch Resentment’sVirtueisasustainedcritiqueoftheTRCand,inparticular,thesubtleandless r ea subtlewaysinwhichArchbishopDesmondTutupraised,promotedandencouragedvictims s e R whoforgave,attimestothepointofemotionalmanipulation.Resentfulvictimswerenot n ia actually coerced into forgiveness, of course, and forgiveness was not part of the official d na mandateoftheTRC.Allthesame,Brudholmdemonstrates,resistancetoforgivenesswas a C [ interpretedastemporary,unfortunate(bothforthemandforsociety),orevenpathologized : By as a burden they must eventually remove. What emerged was a normative “discourse of ed reconciliation”(Verdoolaege2006). d oa Yet however miraculous the push for harmony and reconciliation at all costs might l n w havebeenatminimizingtheviolenceandinstabilityintheSouthAfricantransitionfrom o D apartheid,itsitsintensionwiththerecognition thattransitionfromevilisnotresolvable without“moralremainder,”inthewordsofClaudiaCard;thatis,that“imbalances,debts,or unexpiatedwrongs...remainevenafterwehavedonewhatcanbedonetoputthingsright” (Card2002:169).Drawingontranscripts,mediareports,narrativesbyvictims,andTutu’s own autobiographical account of theTRC,Brudholm gives acompelling and convincing critique of what he himself acknowledges was nevertheless a powerful phenomenon. He concludesattheendofPartIthatanexcessivefocusonforgivenessactuallyshutsdownour abilitytoacknowledgeandrespondappropriatelytothemoralremaindersofevil,violence, and serious wrongdoing. It also does significant, perhaps irreparable, damage to victims engagingmorally—andviscerally—withthesame.SomeonewishingtoquibblewithBrud- holm’sassessmentofforgivenessasamoralconceptmightnotethatTutu’sunderstanding is not universal, or even dominant, in philosophical and psychological discussions of the topic.Thereareotherapproachestoforgivenessthatlessenitssilencingorcoerciveeffects