arab uprisings Jordan, Forever on the Brink May 9, 2012 11 POMEPS Briefings Contents Introduction Jordan, Forever on the Brink . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Jordan’s Current Crisis Jordan’s fictional reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Just what does Jordan’s Abdullah understand? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Identity and corruption in Jordanian politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Jordan’s “open door” policy for Syrian refugees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 The implications of Jordan’s new electoral law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Jordan’s prime ministerial shuffle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Prelude to Stalemate Jordan’s new electoral law: reform, reaction, or status quo? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Jordan’s Islamists lose faith in moderation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Post-democratization lessons from the Jordanian “success story” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 The revolt of Jordan’s military veterans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Jordan’s boycott and tomato woes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 The day after tomorrow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Déjà vu all over again? Jordan’s 2010 elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Jordan’s troubling new parliament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Jordan in the Arab Spring Why Jordan isn’t Tunisia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Don’t forget about Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Jordan’s stubborn regime hangs in the balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 The King’s Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Jordan Goes Morocco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Fragile hopes for Jordan’s new prime minister . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Online Article Index Jordan’s Current Crisis Jordan’s fictional reforms http://mideast .foreignpolicy .com/posts/2011/11/09/jordans_fictional_reforms Just what does Jordan’s Abdullah understand? http://mideast .foreignpolicy .com/posts/2012/01/17/just_what_does_jordan_s_abdullah_understand Identity and corruption in Jordanian politics http://mideast .foreignpolicy .com/posts/2012/02/09/identity_and_corruption_in_jordanian_politics Jordan’s “open door” policy for Syrian refugees http://mideast .foreignpolicy .com/posts/2012/03/01/jordan_s_open_door_policy_for_syrian_refugees The implications of Jordan’s new electoral law http://mideast .foreignpolicy .com/posts/2012/04/13/the_implications_of_jordans_new_electoral_law Jordan’s prime ministerial shuffle http://mideast .foreignpolicy .com/posts/2012/04/30/jordans_prime_ministerial_shuffle Prelude to Stalemate Jordan’s new electoral law: reform, reaction, or status quo? http://mideast .foreignpolicy .com/posts/2010/05/24/jordan_s_new_electoral_law_reform_reaction_or_status_quo Jordan’s Islamists lose faith in moderation http://mideast .foreignpolicy .com/posts/2010/06/30/islamic_action_fronts_new_leader_can_be_an_opportunity_for_ the_jordanian_regime Post-democratization lessons from the Jordanian “success story” http://mideast .foreignpolicy .com/articles/2010/06/15/post_democratization_lessons_from_the_jordanian_success_story The revolt of Jordan’s military veterans http://mideast .foreignpolicy .com/articles/2010/06/15/the_revolt_of_jordans_military_veterans Jordan’s boycott and tomato woes http://mideast .foreignpolicy .com/posts/2010/11/07/jordan_s_boycott_and_tomato_woes The day after tomorrow http://mideast .foreignpolicy .com/posts/2010/11/08/the_day_after_tomorrow_prospects_for_real_electoral_reform_in_ jordan Déjà vu all over again? Jordan’s 2010 elections http://mideast .foreignpolicy .com/posts/2010/11/15/jordanians_go_to_the_polls Jordan’s troubling new parliament http://mideast .foreignpolicy .com/posts/2011/01/06/jordans_troubling_new_parliament?hidecomments=yes 2 Jordan’s Current Crisis Jordan in the Arab Spring Why Jordan isn’t Tunisia http://mideast .foreignpolicy .com/posts/2011/01/18/why_jordan_isn_t_tunisia Don’t forget about Jordan http://mideast .foreignpolicy .com/posts/2011/02/02/don_t_forget_about_jordan_a_regime_caught_between_contagion_ and_consent Jordan’s stubborn regime hangs in the balance http://mideast .foreignpolicy .com/posts/2011/03/31/jordans_stubborn_regime_hangs_in_the_balance The King’s Speech http://mideast .foreignpolicy .com/posts/2011/06/17/the_kings_speech Jordan Goes Morocco http://mideast .foreignpolicy .com/posts/2011/08/19/jordan_goes_morocco Fragile hopes for Jordan’s new prime minister http://mideast .foreignpolicy .com/posts/2011/10/24/fragile_hopes_for_jordan_s_new_pm The Project on Middle East Political Science The Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS) is a collaborative network which aims to increase the impact of political scientists specializing in the study of the Middle East in the public sphere and in the academic community . POMEPS, directed by Marc Lynch, is based at the Institute for Middle East Studies at the George Washington University and is supported by the Carnegie Corporation and the Social Science Research Council . It is a co-sponsor of the Middle East Channel (http://mideast .foreignpolicy .com) . For more information, see http://www .pomeps .org . 3 Jordan, Forever on the Brink The sudden, unprecedented resignation by Jordan’s Prime crafting of a “National Pact” for a democratic monarchical Minister Awn Khasawnah last week threw a sudden system, now seems a distant memory . Then-King Hussein spotlight on the ongoing shortcomings of political reform began rolling back the new freedoms in the middle of the in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan . The deficient new 1990s, as he moved to conclude an unpopular peace with election law rolled out last month, like every step the king Israel . A new election law designed to curb the power has taken over the last year and a half, did too little, too late of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Islamic Action Front Party to respond to the concerns of Jordanian citizens . Limited produced a series of weak, ineffectual parliaments too reforms have done little to stem a rising tide of protest often dissolved early at the whim of the palace . across the towns of the south, a deeply struggling economy, loud complaints of corruption, and an intensifying edge of Since replacing his father, the current King Abdullah has political anger . Add in the potential impact of the ongoing not behaved like a leader deeply committed to democratic crisis in Syria or of a new escalation in the West Bank, and procedures or credible about reform . Palace officials often concerns for Jordan’s political future seem merited . argue that he is a true reformer frustrated by the slow pace of change, but if so then he has remarkably little to show Veteran observers of the region can be excused for rolling for more than a decade’s effort . He suspended parliament their eyes ever so slightly at reports of instability in Jordan, soon after taking the throne and ruled by emergency law of course . The kingdom has seemed on the political brink for several years . Reform initiatives such as the National virtually constantly for many decades, its stability always Agenda disappeared without a trace . The political history questioned and the monarchy’s command doubted (often, of the last decade has been a depressing litany of failed admittedly, by me) . And yet the Hashemite monarchy governments, incompetent parliaments, and frustrated has survived . Warnings about political crisis in Jordan civil society . The last elections, in November 2010, ranked therefore sound just enough like boys crying wolf or among the worst in the kingdom’s history . Chicken Littles shouting about falling skies . That long history of frustrated protest and successfully navigated That frustration has been exacerbated by grinding challenges should caution anyone predicting a real economic problems, which have largely wiped out the explosion . But it would be equally wrong to dismiss the middle class and badly hurt the poor . Cuts to government signs of a rapidly escalating political crisis to which the spending or the state bureaucracy, meanwhile, tend palace seems unable or unwilling to respond . to disproportionately hurt the East Bankers who have generally been favored by the state for political reasons . This post previews a new POMEPS Briefing, “Jordan, The ostentatious new wealth on display in parts of Amman Forever on the Brink,” which collects 20 articles from the only fueled the simmering resentment, as ever more open last three years explaining the nature of the kingdom’s talk of corruption at the top permeated political society . . . political crisis, the shortcomings of its attempted reforms, and circulated freely through new social media and in and the current political state of play . every day conversation . I still remember being shocked a few years back at being regaled in public by near strangers The context of last year’s Arab uprisings adds urgency with stories of Queen Rania’s new private jet and the to Jordan’s problems, but its political stalemate has been backers of a new big dig in central Amman . Official efforts developing for many years . The democratic opening, which to censor and control such information are long since followed an outbreak of social protests in 1989, including hopeless . press liberalization, freely contested elections, and the 4 Introduction The Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings inspired as much has been the traditional moves to polarize society around enthusiasm and popular protest energy in Jordan as they the Jordanian-Palestinian conflict to divide and distract did elsewhere in the region . Jordanian youth mobilized opposition — but even that strategy holds risks for the large protests, while traditional opposition movements monarchy under current conditions . As Laurie A . Brand also gathered strength . Jordan’s impressive community of and Fayez Hammad recently asked, “what exactly does the online activists pushed the boundaries of public debate, king understand?”   with unusual criticism of corruption at the highest levels - even (or especially) Queen Rania . Perhaps more troubling Some hopes had been placed in the appointment of the to the regime, discontent spread relentlessly into the south respected liberal jurist Khaswaneh as prime minister . With as a protest culture took hold . Military veterans spoke out his departure, that hope too has been frustrated . The long in unprecedented ways, signaling potential problems at history of the regime’s surviving such frustrated hopes and the very heart of the regime . And Jordanian-Palestinian failed reforms would suggest that this too shall pass . But identity politics, always at the center of Jordanian politics Jordan’s palace should not be so confident . The spread of and society, played out in ever more intense forms .   protest into new constituencies, the rising grievances of the south, the intensifying identity politics, the struggling The king’s responses have been consistently behind the economy, and the pervasive fury at perceived official curve, suggesting a failure to appreciate the full extent corruption create a potent brew . The violent dispersal of of the regime’s problems . The dismissal of several prime an attempted Amman sit-in last March shocked activists ministers in succession were dismissed as the mere and broke their momentum, but the protest movement has shuffling of deck chairs with little practical significance . proven resilient and creative . I would rank Jordan today The king’s speech in June disappointed activists hoping only below Bahrain as at risk of a sudden escalation of for more concrete and far reaching promises of political political crisis — at which point the impossible would in change . Promised constitutional reforms compared retrospect look inevitable indeed . poorly to even those limited changes offered in Morocco . By November, oft-promised reforms remained largely Marc Lynch, Director of POMEPS “fictional,” in Sean Yom’s incisive verdict . More effective May 7, 2012 5 jordan’s current crisis Jordan’s fictional reforms By Sean Yom, November 9, 2011 Compared to recent dramatic events — Qaddafi’s demise to stumble — and popular cabinets do not get sacked . in Libya, Tunisia’s groundbreaking elections, the Coptic When their inability to deliver generates an inevitable crisis killings in Egypt — Jordan’s latest cabinet shuffle barely of public confidence, the king ritualistically intervenes . registered as a news blip . Indeed, King Abdullah’s dismissal of wildly unpopular Prime Minister Marouf Bakhit had been Such essential reboots allow the palace to maintain its fictive expected as early as this summer . Still, many analysts greeted distance from the political fray by sympathizing with (and, new Premier Awn Khasawneh with hope and anticipation . in theory, defusing) popular frustration, while promoting In a country that has simmered with growing unrest, the another loyal retainer into the top spot . Parliament ironically appointment of a new government explicitly charged with lubricates this cycle because the imbalanced electoral rejuvenating a moribund political reform process may system favors independent MP’s who, bound by no party, represent a decisive royal concession . As opposition protests raucously echo their constituents’ displeasure because it enter their eleventh month, perhaps the monarchy has wins votes . The historical record exposes the dispensability realized that democratization can wait no longer . of cabinets: this is the 61st premiership since the 1950s, and the ninth government since Abdullah’s 1999 ascension . Such an appraisal is admirably optimistic, but it is a Either Jordanian prime ministers are all incompetent, or convenient fiction produced for Western consumption . else cabinet stability — the institutional foundation for any Scryers of Jordan must look beyond any given cabinet to sustained policy change — is not the goal . understand that although the Hashemite palace trumpets the cause of democracy, its goal during the Arab Spring Analysts should thus use the latest session of the musical has been to preserve autocratic supremacy . A transition chairs game to consider the direction of royal strategy . It to constitutional monarchy exists more as fantasy in the starts with the logic of selection . During his half-century minds of liberals than a goal supported by the palace . Yet of rule, King Hussein placed trust in a small coterie of East that is the logical endgame of Jordanian democratization: a Bank advisors and loyalists . They often rotated between the near-absolute monarchy devolving power to a fairly elected official cabinet and royal court (a parallel government of parliament, alongside a General Intelligence Directorate sorts), and many served as prime minister multiple times that no longer interferes in public life . given the King’s confidence in their skill . By contrast, King Abdullah’s strategy has been to experiment more diversely, Despite the heroic assumptions of reformists expecting plucking out new political talent from a broader network of progress toward such transformation, Khasawneh’s new clients . At times this backfired . For instance, conservative government is designed to fail . Why? It is not simply tribal supporters still bitterly recall the King’s early that Khasawneh’s task is Herculean . (Starting off by endorsement of Bassem Awadallah, a Palestinian technocrat promising no more rigged elections, given that every past who gained unparalleled authority and prominence — it election was declared free and fair, does not inspire much was their ferocious criticism that eventually forced his confidence .) Rather, in Jordan cabinet changes are signals resignation from the royal court in 2008 . rather than causes of major policy shifts . While prime ministers have always been executors of royal imperatives, However, such eclecticism now makes sense now in a since the political opening of 1989 they have become part context of weekly protests and social tension . With his of a new system of cyclical management . Premiers are quiet credentials as an international jurist, Khasawneh appointed with impossible jobs because they are expected lacks domestic experience and political baggage — the 6 jordan’s current crisis former would have kept him unknown under Hussein, but liberals . They occasionally march with Islamists, the latter makes him Abdullah’s newest superstar . He will manipulate the Palestinian issue to benefit their cause, and pursue whatever limited reforms the palace suggests, such often focus on material demands like halting economic as the recently ratified constitutional amendments and privatization . Yet like other Jordanians, they are furious tepid changes to the elections and political parties laws . about corruption, frustrated with economic stagnation, Thus, he is the ideal successor to Bakhit, who was the only and disappointed with Abdullah’s reign . Towns like Tafileh prime minister to serve twice under Abdullah but whose have witnessed repeated protests, and East Bank activists reputation had been irrevocably decimated by scandals — have spearheaded the creation of new opposition fronts . e .g ., the Casino-Gate corruption hearings, tribal agitations Most of all, public disparagement of the monarchy has that forced the postponement of municipal elections, and become startlingly brazen, far more so than in 1989 . Much violent attacks against opposition demonstrations . as condemnation of Queen Rania broke a major taboo last year, reports of tribal gatherings openly criticizing both Given the inevitable collapse of this government, the king and crown have become common . changeover’s real benefit has been to give the palace time to regroup . The sheer volume of public discontent floored However, the regime’s old method of preserving East royal insiders this year, and they will use the next several Banker support — sacrificing its fiscal health to maintain months to rebuild relations with opposition forces . For the institutions that employ them and the welfare that example, the Islamists were offered several posts in the assists them — is invoking untenable costs . The absurd new government, and have been encouraged to reenter sacking of Central Bank Governor Faris Sharaf is a case the political scene after they boycotted the last general in point . Among other reasons, his insistence on fiscal elections . Khasawneh met with the professional syndicates austerity threatened the price subsidies, public salary and to their approval pledged to improve relations with increases, and other grant programs promised this past Hamas . Urban youth activists disgusted with their brutal year . Only Saudi aid grants have prevented the budget treatment by riot police and anonymous thugs received deficit from swelling further, but such expectations are invitations to royal summits and other high-level gestures . unsustainable given the king’s acknowledgement that living conditions precede democracy . Simply put, the regime Notably, what surprised the regime was that many of lacks the financial resources to continue its lavish public those youth activists, such as the March 24 Shabab, were spending spree . not Palestinian but rather hailed from tribal backgrounds . That hostility from East Bankers has grown immensely Politically, the new opposition is using the Sharaf significant . After all, the Jordanian “street” does not controversy to decry the overreach of the regime’s threaten the monarchy when it encompasses the Muslim security apparatus . In doing so, they have highlighted an Brotherhood, professional associations, and leftist parties uncomfortable fact: that the monarchy is either unwilling — predictable actors easily contained through targeted or unable to downsize the mukhabarat’s interference in repression and legal constriction . Existential danger political affairs . Western analysts often assume the palace instead emerges when dissent emanates from the very and mukhabarat are inseparable, but this is not always true . social forces that staff the state, man the army, and operate Both institutions seek to preserve authoritarian order, but the mukhabarat (GID) . over the past year the latter has exhibited an independent resistance to even half-hearted reforms that surprised the That danger has become tangible in recent years, King himself . Not coincidentally, Khasawneh’s installment as prominent regime veterans and disaffected tribal as prime minister coincided with the appointment of a new communities have loudly complained about the status GID director, General Feisal Shobaki, alongside a royal quo . They are neither traditional opposition nor lockstep promise to review the agency’s role . 7 For the Jordanian monarchy, maintaining stability depends paradox of Jordanian politics: the monarchy shall succeed on whether it can demobilize East Bank dissent while when its government fails . checking traditional opposition forces . It must accomplish these goals by foreclosing genuine democratic reforms, Sean L. Yom is an assistant professor of which would endanger its capacity to command the social political science at Temple University. policies central to its survival . Herein lays the current Just what does Jordan’s Abdullah understand? By Laurie A. Brand and Fayez Y. Hammad, January 17, 2012 “Fahimtkum,” meaning “I get it,” (literally, “I have current state of affairs in the kingdom? Concern, indeed, understood you”) became famous this time last year when anxiety is widespread and palpable in Jordan these days, then-Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali cynically not only over the direction of the country and its future proclaimed it in a speech, a last ditch effort to convince the stability, but also concerning who is actually making Tunisian people that he had heard their discontent and was decisions, and what recent developments reveal about ready to make serious changes . possible conflicts between unspecified “centers of power .” Awn Shawkat al-Khasawneh, the third prime minister In late summer 2011, a new Jordanian political satire taking in a year, and a respected international lawyer, has its name — “Al`an fahimtkum” (“Now I understand you”) recently taken what appear as bold steps to respond to — from the same phrase of Ben Ali’s, began running on the growing demands for greater accountability . Old scandals stage of the Concord Theatre in Amman . Using the family thought put to rest have been reopened . For example, of a Jordanian of modest means who works as a driver for a there is Casinogate, the project for a gambling complex government minister, Abu Saqr, the play’s successive scenes at the Dead Sea that was signed by an earlier prime address a range of the country’s current political scandals minister, Ma`ruf al-Bakhit, without proper government and woes: from repeated references to the government’s approval . There is also the case of the business tycoon, questionable sales of state land and assets, to mocking Khalid Shahin, convicted for bribery in a corruption case the process by which government ministers are chosen, regarding the Jordan Petroleum Refinery Company, who to raising questions about just who has been sending the was released from prison for a trip abroad for medical baltajiyyah (thugs) to beat up protesters at opposition treatment only to be spotted in London dining with his meetings and demonstrations over the past year . In family at a fancy restaurant . December, demand for tickets increased dramatically after King Abdullah II attended and reportedly much enjoyed However, toward year’s end, new “irregularities” came the play .  to light on nearly a weekly basis . Most notably was the revelation of the title transfer of thousands of acres of What does this play and its reception, both by the state land to the king’s name, which the royal court Jordanian public and the palace, indicate regarding the attempted to explain away as a move simply intended to 8 Jordan’s Current Crisis avoid cumbersome bureaucratic procedures that could or unwilling to provide security . slow down their disposition for development purposes . Khasawneh is also apparently opening investigations into All of this may seem relatively tame for those who look the privatization of numerous state enterprises, cases that to Jordan’s neighbor to the north and compare the use are likely to involve at best mismanagement and at worst of force in Syria with that in the Hashemite Kingdom . criminal profit at state expense . While cracking down on But Jordan’s population is much smaller than Syria’s and, corruption has certainly been central among protestors’ superficial appearances notwithstanding, still largely based demands, the way new cases are being announced raises in tribal structure . In such a setting, the state cannot get important questions . Is this the beginning of a serious away with the use of deadly force, particularly not against process? Is it an unrepresentative sample of characters an opposition which to date is overwhelmingly composed intended to serve as sacrificial lambs? Or are we about to of Transjordanians, not Jordanians of Palestinian origin . witness a period of account settling among various power centers by denouncing certain figures for corruption?  Hence, recent regime behavior raises many questions . Who within it supports Prime Minister Khasawneh’s Adding to the sense of uncertainty regarding what is attempts at reform? Who feels most threatened by happening and who is responsible, some forces in the demonstrations calling for an end to corruption? Who is regime seem to believe that sending in goon squads to making the decisions to send in the thugs, and how long intimidate critics or opponents calling for reform can will it take before someone with an ounce of wisdom be accomplished with no trail leading back to them as realizes that such crude attempts at repression, generally long as the perpetrators don’t wear government-issued by Transjordanians against other Transjordanians, have uniforms . In the past, behind-the-scenes intimidation by serious potential to spin out of control? (And can we finally the mukhabarat (internal intelligence) or, more recently, by put to rest the tired canard about Jordanians of Palestinian the baton-wielding Darak (gendarmerie) forces has been origin being the source of potential unrest or threat to the used in such situations, generally achieving the desired system?) effect . But for the last several months, some center(s) of power — perhaps from within the security services or, King Abdullah apparently enjoyed “Al`an Fahimtkum,” according to other speculation, even the palace, (given smiling throughout the entire production . If so, one the king’s special forces background) — have sponsored can only wonder, has he really understood? Even seemingly unaffiliated baltajiyyah to intimidate opposition more important, exactly what is it that he thinks he meetings and protests . In some cases they have merely understands? There is no shortage these days of open attacked peaceful protesters while uniformed state and direct criticisms of the king, including references security forces look on . M; more recently, following a to his inability to understand his people because of march by the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in the northwest his poor Arabic . While the play’s critiques all attribute town of Mafraq, they upped the ante by setting the MB responsibility for the country’s problems to “the headquarters on fire . If the intent was to intimidate government,” several of its references should have hit the Brotherhood, the assault backfired miserably, as home with the monarch personally . In any case, few Khasawneh responded by returning the influential and Jordanians believe corruption stops at the ministerial charitable Islamic Center Society to Brotherhood control . level . Just as serious, much popular anxiety is a direct The Brotherhood responded by organizing a major result of Jordanians’ no longer believing the king has demonstration in downtown Amman the last Friday of the control of the situation or that he is capable of steering year featuring a martial display of young demonstrators Jordan effectively through the current regional and intended to clearly send the message that it is capable of domestic turmoil . Indeed, he is increasingly seen as part defending itself against the baltajiyyah if the state is unable of the problem . The palace called for a meeting this past 9