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Title: Japan and the Pacific And a Japanese View of the Eastern Question Author: Manjiro Inagaki Release Date: January 7, 2020 [eBook #61126] Language: English Character set encoding: UTF-8 ***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK JAPAN AND THE PACIFIC*** E-text prepared by Richard Tonsing, MFR, and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) from page images generously made available by Internet Archive (https://archive.org) Note: Images of the original pages are available through Internet Archive. See https://archive.org/details/japanpacificandj00inagrich JAPAN AND THE PACIFIC Japan & the North Pacific. JAPAN AND THE PACIFIC, AND A JAPANESE VIEW OF THE EASTERN QUESTION. BY MANJIRO INAGAKI, B.A. (Cantab) WITH MAPS London T FISHER UNWIN PATERNOSTER SQUARE MDCCCXC TO JOHN ROBERT SEELEY M.A. Hon. LL.D. Regius Professor of Modern History Fellow of Gonville and Caius College Cambridge THIS BOOK IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED IN GRATEFUL ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF HIS KINDNESS AND IN ADMIRATION OF HIS QUALITIES AS A HISTORIAN BY THE AUTHOR PREFACE. I feel that some explanation is due when a Japanese ventures to address himself to English readers; my plea is that the matters on which I write are of vital importance to England as well as to Japan. Though I feel that my knowledge of English is so imperfect that many errors of idiom and style and even of grammar must appear in my pages, yet I hope that the courtesy which I have ever experienced in this country will be extended also to my book. My aim has been twofold: on the one hand, to arouse my own countrymen to a sense of the great part Japan has to play in the coming century; on the other, to call the attention of Englishmen to the important position my country occupies with regard to British interests in the far East. The first part deals with Japan and the Pacific Question: but so closely is the latter bound up with the so-called Eastern Question that in the second part I have traced the history of the latter from its genesis to its present development. Commencing with a historical retrospect of Russian and English policy in Eastern Europe, I have marked the appearance of a rivalry between these two Powers which has extended from Eastern Europe to Central Asia, and is extending thence to Eastern Asia and the Pacific. This I have done because any movement in Eastern Europe or Central Asia will henceforth infallibly spread northwards to the Baltic and eastwards to the Pacific. An acquaintance with the Eastern Question in all its phases will thus be necessary for the statesmen of Japan in the immediate future. I have confined my view to England and Russia because their interests in Asia and the North Pacific are so direct and so important that they must enter into close relations with my own country in the next century. I cannot claim an extensive knowledge of the problems I have sought to investigate, but it is my intention to continue that investigation in the several countries under consideration. By personal inquiries and observations in Eastern Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia, China, and the Malay Archipelago, I hope to correct some and confirm others of my conclusions. I have to thank many members of the University of Cambridge for their help during the writing and publication of my book. To Professor Seeley especially, whose hints and suggestions with regard to the history of the eighteenth century in particular have been so valuable to me, I desire to tender my most hearty and grateful thanks. To Dr. Donald Macalister (Fellow and Lecturer of St. John’s College) and Mr. Oscar Browning, M.A. (Fellow and Lecturer of King’s College) I owe much for kindly encouragement and advice and assistance in many ways, while I am indebted to Mr. G. E. Green, M.A. (St. John’s College), for his labour in revising proofs and the ready help he has given me through the many years in which he has acted as my private tutor. The chief works which I have used are Professor Seeley’s “Expansion of England,” Hon. Evelyn Ashley’s “Life of Lord Palmerston,” and Professor Holland’s “European Concert in the Eastern Question.” The latter I have consulted specially for the history of treaties. M. INAGAKI. Caius College, Cambridge, April, 1890. 9 10 11 12 CONTENTS. PART I. PAGE JAPAN AND THE PACIFIC 21 England and Asia—The Persian war—The Chinese war—Russian diplomacy in China—Singapore and Hong Kong—Labuan and Port Hamilton—Position of Japan; its resources—Importance of Chinese alliance to England—Strength of English position in the Pacific at present—Possible danger from Russia through Mongolia and Manchooria—Japan the key of the Pacific; her area and people; her rapid development; her favourable position; effect of Panama Canal on her commerce—England’s route to the East by the Canadian Pacific Railway—Japanese manufactures—Rivalry of Germany and England in the South Pacific—Imperial Federation for England and her colonies—Importance of island of Formosa —Comparative progress of Russia and England—The coming struggle. PART II. THE EASTERN QUESTION. I. Foreign Policy of England during the Sixteenth, Seventeenth, and Eighteenth Centuries 73 The Spanish Empire, its power, and its decline—Commercial rivalry of England and Holland—The ascendency of France; threatened by the Grand Alliance—The Spanish succession and the Bourbon league—England’s connection with the war of the Austrian succession—The Seven Years’ War—Revival of the Anglo-Bourbon struggle in the American and Napoleonic wars. II. Foreign Policy of Russia during the Reigns of Peter, Catherine, and Alexander 95 Peter the Great, and establishment of Russian power on the Baltic—Consequent collision with the Northern States and the Maritime Powers—Catherine II. and Poland—First partition—Russia reaches the Black Sea—Russo-Austrian alliance against Turkey opposed by Pitt—Second and third partitions of Poland—Rise of Prussia—Alexander I. and the conquest of Turkey—Treaty of Tilsit—Peace of Bucharest—Congress of Vienna—French influence in the East destroyed. III. The New European System 114 The concert of the Great Powers; its aims—It does not protect small states from its own members, e.g., Polish Revolution—How far can it solve the Turkish question? IV. Greek Independence 120 The Holy Alliance—The Greek insurrection—Interference of the Three Powers—Battle of Navarino— Treaty of Adrianople—The policy of Nicholas I.; Treaty of Unkiar Ikelessi—Turkey only saved by English and French aid—Palmerston succeeds to Canning’s policy. V. The Crimean War 131 13 14 15 Nicholas I. alienates France from England by the Egyptian question—Mehemet Ali and Palmerston’s convention against him—Nicholas I. in England—The Protectorate of the Holy Land; breach between Russia and France—Proposed partition of Turkey—War of Russia and Turkey—The Vienna Note— Intervention of France and England to save Turkey—Treaty of Paris; Russia foiled—Correspondence between Palmerston and Aberdeen as to the declaration of war—National feeling of England secures the former’s triumph—French motives in joining in the war. VI. The Black Sea Conference 164 French influence destroyed by the Franco-Prussian War—Russia annuls the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris—Condition of Europe prevents their enforcement by the Powers—London Conference; Russia secures the Black Sea; England’s mistake—Alsace and Lorraine destroy the balance of power. VII. The Russo-Turkish War of 1878 172 Bulgarian atrocities—The Andrassy Note; England destroys its effect—The Berlin Memorandum; England opposes it—Russia prepares for a Turkish war—Conference of Constantinople—New Turkish Constitution—Russo-Turkish War—Treaty of San Stefano—Intervention of the Powers—The Berlin Congress—Final treaty of peace. VIII. Remarks on Treaty of Berlin 195 The position of affairs—The Salisbury-Schouvaloff Memorandum and its disastrous effect on the negotiations at Berlin—Russia’s gain—England and Austria the guardians of Turkey—Austria’s vigorous and straightforward Balkan policy—Thwarted in Servia but triumphant in Bulgaria—Relations of Greece to Austria—Solution of the Crete question—Neutrality of Belgium threatened—Importance of Constantinople to Russia; the Anglo-Turkish Convention—England’s feeble policy in Asia Minor—The question of Egypt—A new route to India by railway from the Mediterranean to Persian Gulf—England’s relation to Constantinople. IX. Central Asia 227 Rise of British power in India—Rivalry of France—Aims of Napoleon—Russian influence in Central Asia —Its great extension after the Crimean War—And after the Berlin Congress—Possible points of attack on India—Constantinople the real aim of Russia’s Asiatic policy—Recent Russian annexations and railways in Central Asia—Reaction of Asiatic movements on the Balkan question—Dangerous condition of Austria—Possible future Russian advances in Asia—England’s true policy the construction of a speedy route to India by railway from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf—Alliance of England, France, Turkey, Austria, and Italy would effectively thwart Russian schemes. 16 LIST OF MAPS. 1. JAPAN AND THE NORTH PACIFIC Frontispiece 2. THE PACIFIC AND ITS SEA ROUTES 46 3. THE EXPANSION OF RUSSIA IN EUROPE 97 4. EASTERN EUROPE AND WESTERN ASIA 115 5. THE EXPANSION OF RUSSIA IN ASIA 233 17 PART I. JAPAN AND THE PACIFIC. England and Asia—The Persian war—The Chinese war—Russian diplomacy in China—Singapore and Hong Kong—Labuan and Port Hamilton—Position of Japan; its resources—Importance of Chinese alliance to England—Strength of English position in the Pacific at present—Possible danger from Russia through Mongolia and Manchooria—Japan the key of the Pacific; her area and people; her rapid development; her favourable position; effect of Panama Canal on her commerce—England’s route to the East by the Canadian Pacific Railway—Japanese manufactures—Rivalry of Germany and England in the South Pacific—Imperial Federation for England and her colonies—Importance of island of Formosa—Comparative progress of Russia and England—The coming struggle. Without doubt the Pacific will in the coming century be the platform of commercial and political enterprise. This truth, however, escapes the eyes of ninety-nine out of a hundred, just as did the importance of Eastern Europe in 1790, and of Central Asia in 1857. In the former case England did not appreciate the danger of a Russian aggression of Turkey, and so Pitt’s intervention in the Turkish Question failed. It was otherwise in the second half of the nineteenth century, when the Crimean War and the Berlin Congress proved great events in English history. In 1857 the national feeling in England was not aroused as to the importance of defending Persia from foreign attack. Lord Palmerston had written to Lord Clarendon, Feb. 17, 1857, “It is quite true, as you say, that people in general are disposed to think lightly of our Persian War, that is to say, not enough to see the importance of the question at issue.” How strongly does the Afghan question attract the public attention of England at the present day? It is very evident that in 1857 very few in England were awake to the vital importance of withstanding Russian inroads into the far East, viz., the Pacific. After defeating Russia miserably in the Crimean War and driving her back at the Balkans by the Treaty of Paris, Lord Palmerston’s mind was now revolving and discussing the following serious thought: “Where would Russia stretch out her hands next?” I think I am not wrong in stating the following as Lord Palmerston’s solution of the problem:— (a) That Russia was about to strike the English interests at Afghanistan by an alliance with Persia. (b) That she would attack the Afghan frontier single-handed. (c) That an alliance would be formed with the Chinese, and a combined hostility against Britain would be shown by both. (d) She would extend her Siberian territory to the Pacific on the north, thereby obtaining a seaport on that ocean’s coast, and make it an outpost for undermining English influence in Southern China. Therefore in 1856 Lord Palmerston declared war against Persia remarking that “we are beginning to reveal the first openings of trenches against India by Russia.”[1] This policy proved a winning one. The Indian Mutiny of 1857, however, scarcely gave Palmerston time to mature his Afghan Frontier scheme, consequently his views with regard to that country were to a great extent frustrated by Russia. In the autumn of 1856, the Arrow dispute gave Palmerston his long-wished for opportunity of gaining a stronghold in the South China Sea. He declared war on China. The causes of this dispute on the English side were morally unjust and legally untenable. Cobden brought forward a resolution to this effect—that “The paper laid on the table failed to establish satisfactory grounds for the violent measure resorted to.” Disraeli, Russell, and Graham all supported Cobden’s motion. Mr. Gladstone, who was also in favour of the motion, said, at the conclusion of his speech, “with every one of us it rests to show that this House, which is the first, the most ancient, and the noblest temple of freedom in the world, is also the temple of that everlasting justice without which freedom itself would only be a name, or only a curse, to mankind. And I cherish the trust that when you, sir, rise in your place to-night to declare the numbers of the division from the chair which you adorn, the words which you speak will go forth from the halls of the House of Commons as a message of British justice and wisdom to the farthest corner of the world.” Mr. Gladstone, it certainly seems to me, only viewed the matter from a moral point of view. If we look at it in this light, then the British occupation of Port Hamilton was a still more striking example of English “loose law and loose notion of morality in regard to Eastern nations.” Palmerston was defeated in the House by sixteen votes, but was returned at the general election by a large majority backed by the aggressive feelings of the English nation. He contended that “if the Chinese were right about the Arrow, they were wrong about something else; if legality did not exactly justify violence, it was at any rate required by policy.”[2] He described this policy in the following way—“To maintain the rights, to defend the lives and properties of British subjects, to improve our relations with China, and in the selection and arrangement of those objects to perform the duty which we owed to the country.” This is easy to understand, and showed at any rate a disposition, in fact a wish, for the Anglo-Chinese alliance. The Treaty of Pekin was finally concluded in 1860, the terms of which were—Toleration of 21 22 23 24 25 26 Christianity, a revised tariff, payment of an indemnity, and resident ambassadors at Pekin. Whatever might have been the policy of Palmerston in the Chinese War, Russia took it as indirectly pointed at herself. General Ignatieff[3] was sent to China immediately as Russian Plenipotentiary. It is said that he furnished maps to the allies, in fact did his very best to bring the negotiations to a successful and peaceful close, and immediately after the signing of the agreement, he commenced overtures for his own country, and succeeded in obtaining from China the cession of Eastern Siberia with Vladivostock and other seaports on the Pacific (1858). Lord Elgin asked Ignatieff why Russia was so anxious to obtain naval ports on the Pacific. He replied: “We do not want them for our own sake, but chiefly in order that we may be in a position to compel the English to recognize that it is worth their while to be friends with us rather than foes.” Here began the struggle between England and Russia in the Pacific. In 1859 Russia obtained the Saghalien[4] Island, in the North Pacific, from Japan, in exchange for the Kurile Island, while England was bombarding[5] Kagoshima, a port in South Japan (1862), but the English were virtually repelled from there. Previous to this period the English policy in Asia was to establish a firm hold of Indian commerce with the South China Sea, for she could not find so large and profitable a field of commerce elsewhere. Therefore the English attention for the time being was entirely directed in that quarter. In 1819 the island of Singapore, as well as all the seas, straits, and islands lying within ten miles of its coast, were ceded to the British by the Sultan of Johor. It then contained only a few hundred piratical fishermen, but now it is on the great road of commerce between the eastern and western portions of Maritime Asia, and is a most important military and naval station. Hong Kong, an island off the southern coast of China, was occupied by the English, and in 1842 was formally handed over by the Treaty of Nankin. It has now become a great centre of trade, besides being a naval and military station. In 1846 Labuan, the northern part of Borneo, was ceded to Great Britain by the Sultan of Borneo, and owing to the influence of Sir James Brooke a settlement was at once formed. Now it also, like Singapore, forms an important commercial station, and transmits to both China and Europe the produce of Borneo and the Malay Archipelago. Owing to the opening of seaports in Northern China for foreign trade in 1842, the growing Russian influence in the Northern Pacific and many other circumstances caused England to perceive the necessity of having a naval depôt and commercial harbour on the Tong Hai and on the Yellow Sea. England was doubtless casting her eyes upon the Chusan Island or some other island in the Chusan Archipelago, but did not dare to occupy any one of them lest she should thereby offend the chief trading nation of that quarter, viz., China. However, in 1885 England annexed Port Hamilton, on the southern coast of the Corea, during the threatened breach with Russia on the Murghab question. “Port Hamilton,” said the author of “The Present Condition of European Politics,”[6] “was wisely occupied as a base from which, with or without a Chinese alliance, Russia could be attacked on the Pacific. It is vital to us that we should have a coaling station and a base of operations within reach of Vladivostock and the Amoor at the beginning of a war, as a guard-house for the protection of our China trade and for the prevention of a sudden descent upon our colonies; ultimately as the head station for our Canadian Pacific railroad trade; and at all times, and especially in the later stages of the war, as an offensive station for our main attack on Russia.” Port Hamilton forms the gate of Tong Hai and the Yellow Sea; it cannot, however, become a base of operations for an attack on the Russian force at Vladivostock and the Amoor unless an English alliance is formed with Japan. The above writer shows an ignorance of the importance of the situation of Japan in the Pacific question. Japan holds the key of the North China Sea and Japan Sea in Tsushima.[7] She has fortified that island, and placed it in direct communication with the naval station of Sasebo, also with the military forces of Kumamoto. She also can send troops and fleets from the Kure naval station and the garrison of Hiroshima. She would also, if required, have other naval stations on the coast of the Japan Sea ready for any emergency. In this manner she would be able to keep out the British fleet from attacking Vladivostock and the Amoor through the Japan Sea. Even if she might not be able to do this single-handed she certainly could by an alliance with Russia. If also Japan occupied Fusan, on the south-eastern shore of the Corea, the Japan Sea would be rendered almost impregnable from any southern attack. Again, Port Hamilton would be useless as a head station for the Canadian Pacific Railway trade without an Anglo-Japanese alliance. If you look at the map, you can easily appreciate the situation. Japan, with many hundreds of small islands, lies between 24° and 52° in N. lat., its eastern shores facing the Pacific and cutting off a direct line from Vancouver’s Island to Port Hamilton. It must therefore depend mainly upon Japan as a financial and political success. Japan is now divided into six military districts, while the seas around it are divided into five parts, each having its own chief station in contemplation. The Government are now contemplating establishing a strong naval station at Mororan in Hokkukaido, for the defence of the district and also the shore of the northern part of the mainland, especially of the Tsugaru Strait. The strait of Shimonoseki also has been fortified and garrisoned on both sides, and has close communication from the Kure naval station, and with Hiroshima, and Osaka. Railway communication has also made great strides during the last few years, and rapid transit has consequently greatly improved throughout the empire. 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 If the Kiushiu, the Loo Choo, and the Miyako Islands are well looked after by the Japanese fleet from the Sasebo naval station, then Japan would be able to sever the communication between Vancouver’s Islands and Port Hamilton, and also between the former place and Hong Kong to a certain extent. The San-Francisco-Hong Kong route would be injured, and Shanghai-Port-Hamilton line would be threatened. Without doubt Japan is the Key of the Pacific. Reviewing the discussion, we find that Port Hamilton is rather useless with regard to the Japan Sea and the Canadian Pacific railway road without a Japanese alliance, but it would be of immense importance in withstanding a Russian attack on the British interests from the Yellow Sea through Mongolia or Manchooria. It is also an excellent position for any offensive attack upon China in case of war breaking out. The British occupation of Port Hamilton was very galling to the Chinese nation, in fact, quite as disagreeable as the occupation of Malta and Corsica was to Italy, and the annexing of the Channel Islands and Heligoland to France and Germany. It has therefore somewhat shaken the Anglo-Chinese alliance. A Chinese alliance, however, is of far greater importance for English interests than the occupation of Port Hamilton. If relations became strained a severe blow would be dealt to English trade and commerce in that part. The main portion of the commercial trade of China is with the United Kingdom and her colonies; for instance, in 1887, the imports of China from Great Britain, Hong Kong, and India amounted to about 89,000,000 tael, while the exports to the same countries were 48,000,000 tael. It is hardly possible to find two countries more closely connected by trade than England and China.[8] The Hamilton scheme was wisely abandoned in 1887, and the English Government obtained a written guarantee from China against a Russian occupation in future years. Viscount Cranbrook said in his reply to a question asked by Viscount Sidmouth: “That the papers to which he referred did contain a written statement, and a very long written statement on the part of the Chinese Government giving the guarantee in question. It was not a mere verbal statement by the Chinese Government, but a very deliberate note. It was found that the Chinese had received from the Russian Government a guarantee that Russia would not interfere with Corean territory in future if the British did not, and the Chinese Government were naturally in a position, on the faith of that guarantee by the Russian Government, to give a guarantee to the British Government. The Marquess of Salisbury, on the part of her Majesty’s Government, had accepted it as a guarantee in writing from the Chinese Government.” This policy was undoubtedly an exceedingly wise and good one. By this England not only regained a firm and complete commercial alliance, but also maintained and strengthened a political alliance against Russian attacks from the Corea and indirectly from Manchooria and Mongolia. England also saved money by the abandonment of the Port Hamilton scheme, and saved her fleet from being, to a certain degree, scattered in such a far-off quarter of the globe. England now holds complete sway both commercially and navally in the Pacific. Lord Salisbury’s policy is worthy of all praise, together with Mr. Gladstone’s original scheme. If the scheme had never been originated there would not have been so firm an Anglo-Chinese alliance as there now is. England’s power at the present time is three times as great as that of Russia in the Pacific; in fact Russia has always been overweighted in that respect. Therefore it is selfevident she could never be able to withstand the combined Anglo-Chinese fleets. It seems to me that the only feasible plan for a Russian attack on Anglo-Chinese alliance would be from Mongolia and Manchooria by means of an alliance with the Mongolian Tartars. This would be preferable to coping with England face to face in the Pacific. Chinese history plainly tells us that the Chinese could not withstand an attack of the brave Mongol Tartars from the north, and that they have proved a constant source of dread to them. The Great Wall which stretches across the whole northern limit of the Chinese Empire from the sea to the farthest western corner of the Province of Kansal, was built only for the defence of China against the northern “daring” Tartars. Ghenghis Khan (1194), the rival of Attila, in the extent of his kingdom, who overran the greater part of China and subdued nearly the whole of N. Asia, who carried his arms into Persia and Delhi, drove the Indians on to the Ganges, and also destroyed Astrakhan and the power of the Ottoman, was a Mongolian Tartar. In the thirteenth century Kokpitsuretsu invaded China from Mongolia and formed the Gen dynasty which ruled over the whole eastern part of Asia except Japan (1280 to 1368). The founder of the present Chinese dynasty was a Manchoorian. Both, however, were of Mongolian extraction, and well kept up the fame of the Tartars for boldness and general daring. Since their times the Tartars have fully maintained their title of being the most warlike tribe in Asia. Therefore if Russia were allied with the Mongol Tartars she would be able at least to reach the Yellow Sea, even if she were not able to do China serious harm. Her best policy would be to extend the Omsk-Tomsk Railway[9] to Kiakhta viâ Kansk and Irkutsk, and from there to Ust Strelka and Blagovestchensk through Nertchinsk; a branch also might be thrown off from Kiakhta to Oorga, in the direction of Pekin, the metropolis of China; two branches might also be constructed from Nertchinsk—(a) to Isitsikar, through the western boundary of Manchooria, with the ultimate object of reaching some convenient harbour on the Gulf of Leaotong, or the Yellow Sea, viâ Kirin[10] and Moukden—(b) to L. Kulon through the northern boundary of Mongolia in the direction of Pekin; and to construct a branch line from Blagovestchensk to Isitsikar viâ Merghen. By these means Russia would not only open sources of untold wealth in Siberia, but also secure a larger field of commerce in Manchooria and Mongolia than she has done by the opening of the Trans- 35 36 37 38 39 40 Caspian Railway. It is clear that there would be more political and strategical advantages in this quarter, than in Central Asia. Should Russia ever be able to get possession of a seaport in the Gulf of Leaotong or in the Yellow Sea, she would deal a heavy blow against the Anglo-Chinese alliance, and ultimately frustrate, to a great extent, British aspirations in the East. Russia, however, has worked in quite a different way, and is strengthening the defences at Vladivostock both in military and naval forces, and is acting towards the Corea in a gradually-increasing aggressive spirit, which had succeeded in Europe and Central Asia previously for more than one hundred and fifty years. Lord Derby well described the Russian tactics in the following speech:—“It has never been preceded by storm, but by sap and mine. The first process has been invariably that of fomenting discontent and dissatisfaction amongst the subjects of subordinate states, then proffering mediation, then offering assistance to the weaker party, then declaring the independence of that party, then placing that independence under the protection of Russia, and finally, from protection proceeding to the incorporation, one by one, of those states into the gigantic body of the Russian Empire.” But Russia should remember that a Russian annexation of Corea—“the Turkey” in Asia—would necessitate an alliance of England, China, and Japan, who all possess common interests in the Pacific and Yellow Sea; also that it might cause a second Crimean war in the Pacific instead of on the Black Sea. Japan was comparatively unknown until Commodore Perry, of the United States, introduced her to European society in 1854. Since that date a “wonderful metamorphosis” has taken place in every branch of civilization. The total area of Japan is about 148,742 square miles, or nearly a quarter greater than that of the United Kingdom, while the population is about 38,000,000. The climate is very healthy, while the natural resources are many. Japanese patriotism is very keen, and their love of country stands before everything; they are brave, honest, and open-minded. The following facts bear out the above statement: In 1281 the “Armada of Mongol Tartars” reached the Japanese shores, only to be easily repulsed in Kiushiu by the Japanese fleet. Hideyoshi in the sixteenth century conquered the Corea, and General Saigo defeated and subjugated eighteen of the resident chiefs with all their followers in Formosa (1873). One of the great traits in the Japanese character is that they never hesitate to adopt new systems and laws if they consider them beneficial for their country. Feudalism was abolished in 1871 without bloodshed. In 1879 city and prefectural assemblies were created, based on the principle of the election. The new Constitution was promulgated in 1889, and new Houses of Peers and Commons will be opened this year (1890). Railways are rapidly growing, over 1,000 miles already having been laid, and soon the whole country will be opened out by the “iron horse.” All the principal towns are connected by telegraph[11] with one another and with Europe. The postal system[12] is carried out on English lines, while the police force is strong and very efficient. The standing army consists of about forty-three thousand men, which, however, could be quickly increased to two hundred thousand in case of war, all trained and equipped under the European system. The navy consists of thirty-two ships, including several protected cruisers, and in this or next year it will be reinforced by three more ironclads and five or six gunboats. The Japanese navy is organized chiefly upon the pattern of the English navy. The Pacific & Its Sea Routes. The geographical situation and condition of Japan are very favourable to her future prosperity, both commercially and from a manufacturing point of view. Look at a map of the world—the country lies between two of the largest commercial nations, viz., the United States and China, the former[13] being England’s great commercial rival of the present day, while the latter offers a large field for trade and commerce. If M. de Lesseps’ scheme of the Panama Canal should happen to be completed on his Suez Canal line, undoubtedly the Pacific Ocean would be revolutionized in every way. Up to now the waterway from Europe to the Pacific has been from the West, viz., viâ the Suez Canal, or the Cape of Good Hope. But in case of the “gate of the Pacific” being open, then European goods could be transported in another direction, and the nations in the Pacific would have two sea routes. Japan would be placed practically in the centre of three large markets—Europe, Asia, and America—and its commercial prosperity would be ensured. If, however, the Panama scheme failed from one cause or another there would be another sea route.[14] In 1887 the American Senate sanctioned the creation of a company for the construction of a maritime canal across Nicaragua,[15] and the actual work was begun in October, 1889. The President of the country, which has a surplus of 57,000,000 dollars, alluding to the commencement of the Nicaragua Canal said in his message to the Senate:— “This Government is ready to promote every proper requirement for the adjustment of all questions presenting obstacles to its completion.” It is therefore pretty sure, sooner or later, to be completed, and would take the place of the Panama Canal and give the same advantages with regard to the Pacific and Japan. “In the school of Carl Ritter,”[16] said Professor Seeley, “much has been said of three stages of 41 42 43 44 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 civilization determined by geographical conditions—the potamic, which clings to rivers; the thalassic, which grows up around inland seas; and lastly, the oceanic.” He also traced the movements of the centre of commerce and intelligence in Europe, and at last found out why England had attained her present greatness. Without doubt, since the discovery of a new world the whole world has become the oceanic. But the discoveries of Watt and Stephenson, seem to me to have added another stage to general civilization, viz., the railway; and it seems also to me that we might call the present era “the railway- oceanic.” The Canadian Pacific Railway scheme was completed in 1887. It has a total length of at least 3,000 miles, starting from Quebec and finishing at Vancouver’s Island on the Pacific. Its marvellous success will also considerably change the general tenor of the Pacific even more than the Panama or Nicaragua scheme will do. An express train can cross in five days, while the voyage from Vancouver to Yokohama in Japan, would only occupy twelve days steaming at the rate of fourteen or fifteen knots an hour. From England the whole journey to Shanghai and Hong Kong by this route would take only thirty-four or thirty-five days, and Australia now has direct communication with the mother country through a sister colony. Last of all, Japan would have much better communication with the European markets generally than is possible at the present time, if the English proposed[17] mail steamers should run, and it is said that the Canadian Pacific route would bring Japan within twenty-six or twenty-seven days’ reach of England. On the other hand, if the Russian Siberian Railway scheme should be carried out to the Pacific at Vladivostock, it would open a very large field of trade and commerce with inland Siberia to Japan. It would be still more so if the Chinese railways were extended so as to open the entire empire.[18] Japan has not only a splendid future before her with regard to commercial greatness, but has every chance of rising to the head of manufacturing nations. In the latter respect she has advantages over Vancouver’s Island and New South Wales, her rivals on the Pacific. She is known to possess valuable mineral resources, having good coal mines at Kiushiu and Hokkukaido. The climate of Japan varies in different localities, but on the whole is exceedingly healthy. Consisting as the country does of numerous islands she has many good harbours and trading ports. Wages are low though they might rise if a corresponding increase of labour is required. The credit system is fairly well carried out[19] and is growing day by day. There are about four hundred banks, including the Bank of Japan; and the medium of exchange has a regular standard. The principal exports are silk, tea, coal, and rice. Japan is not the producer of raw goods for manufacturing purposes, but simply works them up. Her area is not in comparison with the commercial greatness which she will attain in the future. She may import raw goods from America, Australia, and the Asiatic countries, in the same way that England does. Her position enables her also to obtain wool from Australia and California, also cotton from China, Manchooria, India, and Queensland. All these imports are worked up into different manufacturing goods. She has an advantage here over England, for she has not so far to send her manufactured goods, and does not need, like England, to send them all round the world. Thus we see Japan has ample scope from a commercial point of view, and has plenty of friendly countries close at home for the production of her raw material, and has great advantages in sea routes to America and Australia. The Japanese are born sailors, being islanders. There are several large steamship companies[20] whose ships are continually plying along her own shores[21] and also to the mainland of China, and one company contemplates shortly opening communication with North and South America. It has often puzzled me why Japan does not hold closer relations with Australia, especially as Australia is becoming one of her most important neighbours in commerce. I can certainly predict that if this suggestion comes to pass, that together they will in the future hold the key of the Pacific trade. Australia and her near colonies have already begun to play an important part in the affairs of the Pacific; and why should she not, considering their natural wealth and general progress? European Powers have begun to take great interest, both commercially and diplomatically, in these colonies. England, France, Spain, and Holland long ago saw the advantage of having secured coaling stations in the Pacific, and England and France have always taken great care in selecting posts in the immediate vicinity of the sea route between America and Australia; and since the working of the Canadian Pacific Railway and the Panama Canal, they have begun to annex those islands which lie near the route from Panama to the Australian colonies, and from the latter to Vancouver. The French occupation of Tahiti and the Rapa (both containing good harbours) in 1880 was with the distinct object of controlling the sea route from Panama to Sydney, Brisbane, and Auckland. England also began to fortify Jamaica in 1887, and she is now casting her eyes on Raratonga. The dispute regarding the New Hebrides and the Samoan Conference[22] were simply for the protection of the Vancouvan-Australian-San-Franciscan sea-ways. England has lately annexed the Ellice Islands and undoubtedly will shortly occupy the Gilbert and Charlotte Islands. Germany also has been considering the Asiatic-Australian routes, foreseeing that the whole Pacific question rests on that basis. In 1884 she annexed New Guinea, and the Bismarckian policy proved a severe blow to the British power in the North and West Pacific. There are three great sea routes from New South Wales to Hong Kong and other parts of the North Pacific; one travels eastward of the Solomon Islands and New Caledonia (6,000 miles) and the other two westward of the above-mentioned islands (5,500 and 5,000 miles). The German occupation of New Guinea actually resulted in her having the entire control of these three important sea routes. The English possession of the Treasury Islands, the depôt made there, and of the 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 Louisiade Archipelago is certainly not strong enough to protect these routes, though they are very important for the defence of the Australian colonies. Even the trade route from Vancouver’s Island to Brisbane has to a certain extent been endangered. It would be policy on England’s part to annex the Solomon Islands if she means to regain the prestige which she has lost owing to the Germanic policy of annexation in the Pacific. In order to firmly establish her power in this quarter, Germany, in 1885, raised a quarrel with Spain concerning the sovereignty of the Caroline and Pelew Islands, but this quarrel was composed by the mediation of the Pope. Frederick the Great “preferred regiments, as a ship cost as much as a regiment.” Bismarck preferred “the Greater Germany,” and his policy was “the German trade with the German flag” (i.e., the German flag shall go where German trade has already established a footing). This policy proved very successful, not only in the West Pacific, but also in the North Pacific and the eastern coast of Africa. Germany now is the chief colonizing rival of England. In 1883 Mr. Chester annexed all the parts of New Guinea with the adjacent islands lying between 141 deg. and 155 deg. of E. long. Lord Derby; however, annulled this annexation, regarding it as an unfriendly act, and he also assured the Colonial Government that “Her Majesty’s Government are confident that no foreign power contemplates interference in New Guinea.” This occurred in May, 1884. But this prognostication did not prove true, for in November of the same year Germany occupied New Guinea. This caused much public indignation in the English colonies against the Home Government, and the public of England recognized that the reasons and complaints of the Australian Colonies were right and just. The movement of Imperial Federation sprang up in England, the chief object of which was “a closer association between the Colonies and Great Britain and Ireland for common national purposes such as colonial and foreign policy, defence and trade.” The result of this was the Colonial Conference in 1887; and Lord Salisbury, offering a hearty welcome to the Colonial delegates, said: “I do not recommend you to indulge in schemes of Constitution making;” but also said: “It will be the parent of a long progeniture, and distant councils of the empire may, in some far-off time, look back to the meeting in this room as the root from which their greatness and beneficence sprang.” The following subjects were submitted for discussion: (1) The local defence of ports other than Imperial coaling stations; (2) the naval defence of the Australian Colonies; (3) measures of precaution in relation to the defences of colonial ports; (4) various questions in connection with the military aspects of telegraph cables, their necessity for purpose of war, and their protection; (5) questions relating to the employment and training of local or native troops to serve as garrisons of works of defence; and, lastly (6), the promotion of commercial and social relations by the development of our postal and telegraphic communication. Thus, by means of this Conference, the military federation of the British Empire was established. By its efforts the English squadron in the China Sea and in the Australian seas are more closely connected together than they have been before, and, if needed, the English forces in the North Pacific would be reinforced by Australian troops. We saw an instance of this in the late Egyptian campaign. One more question remains to be ventilated, viz., whether England is able to secure absolute power in the North Pacific with the naval and military forces she has at her command there, using Hong Kong as the centre of war preparations. I answer in the negative. It could be maintained only by an occupier of the Island of Formosa, the “Malta” of the North Pacific, which lies between the North China Sea and the South China Sea. Its area is estimated at 14,978 square miles. It has a healthy climate, tempered by the influence of the sea and its mountains. Coal is to be found in considerable quantities, although not of the best quality. Its natural products are plentiful, such as sugar, tea, and rice. It possesses several good harbours, one of which, Tam-sui, or Howei, is surrounded by hills upwards of 2,000 feet high, and has a depth of 3½ fathoms with a bar of 7½ feet. From this island, with a good navy, any power almost might be exerted over the North and South China Seas, and over the Pacific highways from Hong Kong to Australia, Panama, Nicaragua, San Francisco, Vancouver, Japan, Shanghai. All these are in fairly close proximity to Formosa, and the Shanghai route to Hong Kong actually runs between the island and the China mainland. There remain still two or three more facts which must not be neglected in order to obtain a fair view of this important question. (a) It is a fine post for any offensive attack upon China, and also a stronghold for an attack upon the British power in the Pacific. If fortified and defended by a navy from any other power, Formosa would prove a great rival to Hong Kong, which would lose at least half of its importance, commercially and strategically, and which has already been somewhat weakened by the French occupation of Cochin China, in 1882.[23] (b) In case of Asiatic complications, England would naturally expect reinforcements from Australia, and from the mother country by the Canadian Pacific Railway, but after they arrive at Vancouver, and are on transport, they will be at the mercy either of Japan or the occupier, whoever it may be, of Formosa. Even the Bismarckian policy re New Guinea would be broken down, i.e., all commercial and strategical communication between Hong Kong and Australia would be seriously incommoded by the occupation of Formosa. (c) If China herself occupied Formosa thoroughly,[24] and allied with Japan who occupies the Loo Choo Islands, they would be impregnable in the sea above 20° of N. lat. 60 61 62 63 64 65 66