LLoouuiissiiaannaa SSttaattee UUnniivveerrssiittyy LLSSUU DDiiggiittaall CCoommmmoonnss LSU Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School 2002 IItt ccaammee ffrroomm oouutteerr ssppaaccee:: tthhee vviirruuss,, ccuullttuurraall aannxxiieettyy,, aanndd ssppeeccuullaattiivvee fificcttiioonn Anne-Marie Thomas Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations Part of the English Language and Literature Commons RReeccoommmmeennddeedd CCiittaattiioonn Thomas, Anne-Marie, "It came from outer space: the virus, cultural anxiety, and speculative fiction" (2002). LSU Doctoral Dissertations. 4085. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/4085 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please [email protected]. IT CAME FROM OUTER SPACE: THE VIRUS, CULTURAL ANXIETY, AND SPECULATIVE FICTION A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in The Department of English by Anne-Marie Thomas B.A., Texas A&M-Commerce, 1994 M.A., University of Arkansas, 1997 August 2002 TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii Chapter One The Replication of the Virus: From Biomedical Sciences to Popular Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Two “You Dropped A Bomb on Me, Baby”: The Virus in Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Three Extreme Possibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 Four To Devour and Transform: Viral Metaphors in Science Fiction by Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 Five The Body Electr(on)ic Catches Cold: Viruses and Computers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148 Six Coda: Viral Futures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208 Appendix: Letter of Permission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 Vita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220 ii ABSTRACT This study seeks to explore and interrogate the “viral reality” of the 1990s, in which the virus, heavily indebted to representations of AIDS for its metaphorical power, emerged as a prominent agent in science and popular culture. What becomes apparent in both fictional and non-fictional texts of this era, however, is that the designation of “virus” transcends specific and material viral phenomena, making the virus itself a touchstone for modern preoccupations with self and other. As constituted by the human body’s interaction with pathogenic agents, the binary of self and other may be deconstructed by an interrogation of the virus itself, a permeable and mutable body that lends itself to any number of interpretive possibilities. A uniquely liminal agent, the virus refuses categorization as either life or non-life. However, it is not the liminality of the pathogen that allows for this deconstruction, which serves to frustrate such boundaries in the first place. Rather, the notion that viruses are (always) already a part of who we are as human beings, and that “self” is not necessarily a self-enclosed autonomous entity, suggests that the binary cannot hold. A virus is unique; an insider/outsider that crosses artificial boundaries, it destabilizes the boundaries themselves, and thus the traditional framework of self and other. Examining viral accounts in popular science writings, film, television, advertisements, philosophy, science fiction, and naturalistic fiction, this study examines the ways in which science and popular culture have characterized both the virus and its psychological and material effects, and suggests that the pathogen-as- signifier may be read in ways that point to the virus’s utopian potential as a theoretical category. iii CHAPTER ONE THE REPLICATION OF THE VIRUS: FROM BIOMEDICAL SCIENCES TO POPULAR CULTURE “Biological science relentlessly pushes the level of its analysis down to a scale below the level of lived human experience, to the microscopic level of microbes, cells, or genes.” –Emily Martin, Flexible Bodies “All the amazement that’s left in the world is microscopic.” –Don DeLillo, White Noise “Today is the day of the virus” (9), proclaims Ann Giudici Fettner in Viruses: Agents of Change, according the pathogen a hyped status that is echoed not only in scientific circles, but also in popular culture. “Viral discourse” permeates contemporary American culture, suddenly ubiquitous in the age of AIDS and replete with metaphors from virology. The virus, as Susan Sontag suggests in “AIDS and Its Metaphors,” has largely replaced cancer as an agent of debilitating spread.1 “This is a cultural virus,” declares Colorado Governor Bill Owens in response to the Columbine High shooting. “We are a virus with shoes,” comments comedian Bill Hicks, referring to Americans’ greed and uncontrolled breeding habits. And Seinfeld, the much-loved cultural signpost, features an irritated Elaine utilizing viral metaphors to disparage George: “He's like a virus. He attaches himself to a healthy host company, and the next thing you know, the entire staff's infected” (“The Little Kicks”). Metaphors and analogies such as these stem from concrete depictions of viruses, which may be found in numerous fictional and non- fictional texts, films, and even the local newscast that spotlights the latest Ebola outbreak. Far from metaphorical, smallpox, or rather the threat of smallpox, currently dominates the popular press, shoving Ebola and other life-threatening viruses out of the limelight and displacing other, more immediate concerns. And yet the smallpox virus itself is a locus for metaphorical 1 attachments; as I illustrate, smallpox is associated in the public imagination with Soviet manufacture, Arab deployment, and, possibly, domestic terrorism. More than merely representative of these things, the virus is figured as an agent of them; it is constructed as a pathogen with intent. Thus, simply by interrogating the smallpox virus we gain an insight into our current fears and preoccupations. If we are not being regaled with tales of “killer viruses” that drastically alter the state of the human body, then we are being reminded to inoculate the nervous system of the human body’s most precious extension, the computer, against its artificial counterpart. And while popular viral accounts may be distinguished in many ways from scientific accounts, the lines of influence from science to popular culture may not be as clear-cut as we might suppose. As Paula Treichler argues, “boundaries among popular culture, science, policy, and media are fairly permeable, each offering discursive archives–linguistic or semantic reservoirs–that furnish resources (and perhaps legitimacy) to the others. Popular culture borrows elements from science, while science borrows elements from popular culture” (321). That the virus assumes such prominence in science and popular culture is perhaps due to its own permeability as a signifier. It has been persuasively argued by philosophers of science that objects of scientific knowledge are unavoidably theory-laden, and the virus is no exception. That is, the virus is colored by the values of the scientists who study it, who imbue it with qualities (phallic, feminine, nuclear) that are not inherent.2 As I illustrate in this study, a profusion of “others” are manifested through the locus of the virus, which is frequently gendered, historicized, and nationalized in texts ranging from popular fiction to science writings. 2 As illustrated by Governor Owens’ appropriation of the term to describe violence in schools, the virus has been used to describe any number of cultural phenomena. Usually, it is a metaphor for simple replication, suggesting that such replication has a diseased, and hence negative, quality. In many of the texts I examine, certain economic systems are likened to viruses–for example, the term is used both as a metaphor for capitalism and communism (or collectivism), suggesting that these systems “infect” the denizens of societies that employ them. Terrorism, violence, fashion, feminism, illiteracy–these have all been referred to as viruses, and the term is often used uncritically to describe anything that spreads quickly and successfully. The connotations are not always negative, as I illustrate, but by and large the association with disease is tacitly acknowledged. One difference between cancer as an agent of debilitating spread and the virus as a similar kind of agent is that we tend to imagine the virus as a single entity that replicates itself. As a disease, cancer is amorphous, with many tendrils snaking out to generate tumors in the body. Magazines may feature cancer cells on their covers, but the virus is frequently featured by itself, particularly in the early days when HIV was first isolated. HIV itself had a pretty high wattage of star power, no doubt owing, in some part, to the Hollywood star power that backed AIDS research in the 1980s. This emphasis on the “individuality” of the virus contributes significantly to its personification in texts, both fictional and non-fictional. That is not to say that the virus is the first such agent to be personified, but it can be perceived as the contemporary successor to other such agents, such as Death. Death itself, however, is less an individual entity than it is a state of being (or non-being) and thus is individualized in the sense that it becomes a character in fictional texts and lore. The virus, however, is a character–an individual with intent–that appears in texts ranging from novels to scientific journal articles. 3 Both a construction of scientific discourse and a material object, the virus is also an historical subject that invites numerous attachments and connotations, some of which are contradictory: “A virus–any virus–is a constructed entity, a representation, whose legitimacy is established and legitimized through a whole series of operations and representations, all highly stylized” (Treichler 159). One might argue that bacteria or cells or genes invite similar investments, but the virus is unique in that its very existence has been characterized as liminal, affording it an even greater permeability. For many scientists, the virus–defined by biologist and Nobel laureate Peter Medawar as a piece of nucleic acid surrounded by bad news–straddles the fence between the living and non-living. It cannot reproduce on its own, relying on a host cell to produce viral “copies” once the pathogen has integrated its genetic material into the host cell: “it enters a cell and, with the help of a the cell itself, synthesizes what it needs and reassembles these elements into new virus particles” (Gallo 49). Most other animal cells and microorganisms reproduce by division, so the fact that the virus does not calls into question its status as a living entity. Tellingly, after years of debate, scientists have mostly resigned themselves to the virus’s liminal state. Posing the question “Are viruses alive?” virologist and co-discoverer of HIV Luc Montaigner answers with, “Not exactly, since they only exist as parasites inside cells” (86), while his partner Robert Gallo seems content to let go of the whole matter: “We do not know the origin of viruses, but happily the old arguments that tried to settle whether they are living or nonliving must have grown tedious because we no longer hear them” (52). The suggestion here is that the virus cannot be categorized in terms of binaries, and scientists are only now beginning to feel comfortable with that notion. As The Hot Zone, Richard Preston’s popular account of the Ebola virus illustrates, the notion has filtered into popular culture: 4 Some biologists classify viruses as “life forms,” because they are not strictly known to be alive. Viruses are ambiguously alive, neither alive nor dead. They carry on their existence on the borderlands between life and nonlife. Viruses that are outside cells merely sit there; nothing happens. They are dead . . . . Virus particles that lie around in blood or mucus may seem dead, but the particles are waiting for something to come along. . . . Viruses may seem alive when they multiply, but in another sense they are obviously dead, are only machines, subtle ones to be sure, but strictly mechanical, no more alive than a jackhammer. (83-85) “Viruses are ambiguously alive,” “They are dead,” “Viruses may seem alive,” “they are obviously dead”–Preston here explores the ambiguity that he argues is the defining characteristic of the virus. Central to the very “nature” of virus, then, is a paradox, and it is one that I argue is a starting point for rethinking traditionally held assumptions about certain binaries that circulate in contemporary American culture. In particular, I examine how the binary of self and other, as constituted by the human body’s interaction with pathogenic agents, may be deconstructed by an interrogation of the virus itself, a permeable and mutable body that lends itself to any number of interpretive possibilities. It is not the liminality of the pathogen that allows for this deconstruction, which serves to frustrate such boundaries in the first place; rather, as I illustrate, the notion that viruses are (always) already a part of who we are as human beings, and that “self” is not necessarily a self- enclosed autonomous entity, suggests that the binary cannot hold. A virus is unique; an insider/outsider that crosses artificial boundaries, it destabilizes the boundaries themselves, and thus the traditional framework of self and other. While I discuss at length the “constructed” nature of the virus, I do not wish to minimize the virus as a material object that has discernible, material effects upon those who may be infected by it. In other words, real people become ill or die as a result of being infected with real viruses. It must be said, however, that the vast majority of viruses don’t affect humans one way 5 or another–only the particularly “virulent” get our attention. And it is only at the extreme ends of the viral spectrum, where we find Ebola, HIV, and other life-threatening viruses, that we get narratives that imbue these viruses with malevolent intent. For the most part, we exist in harmony with viruses, a balance that goes unrecorded in much of popular literature. My goal here is to examine the ways in which science and popular culture have characterized both the virus and its psychological and material effects, and to suggest that the pathogen-as-signifier may be read in ways that do not simply reinforce the central binary of self and other, but rather point to the virus’s utopian potential as a theoretical category. The virus may be the tool by which we begin to negotiate what Donna Haraway calls “the problematic multiplicities of postmodern selves” (225). In its potential for blurring boundaries by emphasizing the permeability of all boundaries and thus exposing the lie of unitary subjectivity, and in its capacity for mutation, the virus invites a multiplicity of interpretations that illuminate a particular cultural moment. That “moment,” I suggest, is the decade of the 1990s, in which the virus was such a popular and pervasive figure in American culture. However much the pathogen may be dismissed as just one element in the larger narrative of disease, we cannot deny the “viral reality” of the 1990s, in which the virus was ubiquitous. A touchstone for postmodern preoccupations with self and other, the post-AIDS discovery virus both affirms and challenges the cultural narrative of the viral invader that must be prevented from rupturing the integrity of the human body at all costs. For over fifty years, immunologists have held that the fundamental purpose of the immune system is to distinguish between self and non-self, and to defend the body against non- self.3 The self/non-self model is the central orthodoxy of immune systems discourse, and while 6