IRAQ & T H E E V O L U T I O N O F AMERICAN STRATEGY R T P B ELATED ITLES FROM OTOMAC OOKS Defiant Superpower: The New American Hegemony by Donald E. Nuechterlein Diplomacy Lessons: Realism for an Unloved Superpower by John Brady Kiesling John Warden and the Renaissance of American Air Power by John Andreas Olsen Strategic Challenges: America’s Global Security Agenda edited by Stephen J. Flanagan and James A. Schear War & Destiny: How the Bush Revolution in Foreign and Military Affairs Redefined American Power by James Kitfield IRAQ & T H E E V O L U T I O N O F AMERICAN STRATEGY STEVEN METZ POTOMAC BOOKS, INC. WASHINGTON, D.C. Copyright © 2008 Potomac Books, Inc. Published in the United States by Potomac Books, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission from the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Metz, Steven, 1956- Iraq and the evolution of American strategy / Steven Metz. — 1st ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-59797-196-6 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. United States—Foreign relations—Iraq. 2. Iraq—Foreign relations—United States. 3. Iraq—Strategic aspects. 4. United States—Military policy. 5. National security—United States. 6. United States—Foreign relations—1989- 7. Iraq—Foreign public opinion, American. 8. Public opinion—United States. I. Title. E183.8.I57M48 2008 327.730567—dc22 2008009001 ISBN: 978-1-59797-196-6 (alk. paper) Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper that meets the American National Standards Institute Z39-48 Standard. Potomac Books, Inc. 22841 Quicksilver Drive Dulles, Virginia 20166 First Edition 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 C O N T E N T S Foreword by Colin S. Gray vii Preface xi Acknowledgments xv Introduction xvii 1 Ascent of an Enemy 1 2 The Test of Battle 15 3 Transformation and Containment 49 4 Terrorism and Force 73 5 Decision and Triumph 101 6 Counterinsurgency 145 Conclusion 191 Notes 205 Selected Bibliography 235 Index 251 About the Author 262 F O R E W O R D by Colin S. Gray S teven Metz is one of the rare people who understands the military and its cultures, while remaining a civilian scholar of high repute. Although he has worked for the U.S. Army for many years he has never lost his independence of mind. Among other attributes, Dr. Metz’s writings and behavior have shown a deep commitment to the proposition that strategic knowledge needs to be useful in the real world. When he theo- rizes, he does so for the clear constructive purpose of helping the realm of strategic practice. Carl von Clausewitz’s disdain for scholars who theorize seemingly for its own sake, and who weave ever more elaborate architec- tures of theory, does not apply to Dr. Metz. Unlike many of today’s strategic theorists and commentators, Steven Metz has not staged a recent arrival in the messy and complex realm of insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN), terrorism and counterterrorism (CT). He made his mark as an innovative analyst and theorist of the irregu- lar forms of violence long before it was fashionable to do so. Unfortunately, what has happened is that the global security context and U.S. policy, grand strategy, military strategy, operations, and tactics have caught up with him. To people such as Steven Metz, who is truly expert in the principles, the practice and the malpractice of COIN and CT many years prior to 9/11, it has to be galling to observe the rediscovery of familiar nostrums by the broad defense community. Dr. Metz has owed his talent and experience a major book, and here it is. This superb work attempts and achieves no less than three tasks. First, it unravels the tangled skein of U.S.-Iraqi relations since the early 1980s. In vii viii ——————————————————————————––––——— F O R E W O R D great detail, the whole background to the contemporary troubles is explained. The book is especially revealing on the roots and continuing causes of mu- tual misunderstanding between Americans and Iraqis. Repeatedly, Dr. Metz advises wisely that the manifestation of culture on both sides has a great deal to answer for. With the publication of Iraq & the Evolution of American Strategy, there can be no excuse for anyone to remain baffled as to why and how the tragedy occurred. It is important to note that Dr. Metz has not written an angry book but rather a calm and balanced one. He recognizes that good American intentions have a way of producing undesired results. Second, the book probes and exposes the problems Americans have with strategy. Indeed, the work is really as much about strategy making and execution in the American political and cultural contexts as it is about the U.S.-Iraqi nexus. The text can be read as a lengthy treatise on Americans and strategy, an analysis illustrated profusely by Iraq as a case study. It is somewhat ironic that America’s strategy deficit, as I have termed it elsewhere, should be revealed today in so unmistakable a form vis-à-vis Iraq and Af- ghanistan. The irony lies in the fact that in the contemporary United States, “strategy has become an industry.” Dr. Metz proceeds to argue that “[a]ll told this is truly a golden age of strategic discourse in the United States (if not of strategy itself).” If he is correct in this claim, one would expect Ameri- can would-be strategic behavior to generate more benign effect than has been revealed thus far by events. Of course, it is entirely possible that al- though there is, or may be, a large and ever-growing band of American stra- tegic cognoscenti, the country is prevented from achieving high strategic effectiveness by its culture. Specifically, it is not implausible to argue that America’s public culture, strategic culture, and military institutional cultures work to constrain strategic, and hence political, effectiveness in some classes of conflict. The traditional American “way of war,” to risk oversimplification, has favored regular over irregular warfare and a quest for decisive military victory. The conduct of complex and protracted conflict, where a military outcome appears impossible to secure, has not been the U.S. forte. As re- cently as 2003–06, it was commonplace to hear American soldiers complain that in Iraq they were committed to a struggle whose forms they did not understand and for which they were not properly trained, suitably armed, or appropriately organized. Matters have improved recently, but as the maxim has it, time lost is irretrievable. The grasp of doctrine required for effective COIN and CT behavior that is now widespread in America’s military institu- tions does not enable Americans to reset the game clock back to 2003. F O R E W O R D ——————–——————–—————–——————————— ix Third, Dr. Metz’s book is a profound study of strategy itself. The his- torical subject happens to be the American experience with, and in, Iraq, but the text can be read as an extensive exploration of all aspects of the making and execution of strategy. The concept of strategy can be as hard for some people to understand as its attempted practice can be thwarted by a myriad of difficulties. Strategy is far more challenging to design, adapt, and carry into effect than is policy or operations or tactics. The latter categories are each substantially “pure” in military content, at least they should be. Policy sets political goals that operations and tactics should attain courtesy of the directing genius of strategy. If policy is about political judgment, while tactics are about fighting, and operations are concerned with the aggrega- tion of tactical events into a campaign whole, what is strategy? Plainly, it is neither policy nor fighting. Instead, strategy is the bridge between the two. It is where theory and practice meet. Speculative policymaking, with prob- ably a shifting set of political goals, has to be translated into behavior by the military instrument via strategy. The job of the strategist is to decide on the probable exchange rate of successful military threat and employment for political returns. When phrased thus, it becomes rapidly apparent why strat- egy is exceedingly difficult to do well. History abounds with cases of countries leaping from policy decision to active military behavior, with little, if any, attention paid to strategy. Fre- quently it is just assumed that a heap of anticipated tactical victories will assume an operational significance that must, miraculously almost, produce the desired strategic result. It should be needless to add that this astrategic approach to the use of force for policy ends is near criminally irresponsible, even though it can succeed occasionally. Dr. Metz’s Iraq & and the Evolution of American Strategy is a book for which we have been waiting. This is a landmark text. Even though the strate- gic muddle of America’s involvement in Iraq is far from over, Dr. Metz’s history and analysis should stand the test of time. COLIN S. GRAY