Contributions To Phenomenology 81 Peer F. Bundgaard Frederik Stjernfelt Editors Investigations Into the Phenomenology and the Ontology of the Work of Art What are Artworks and How Do We Experience Them? Contributions to Phenomenology In Cooperation with The Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology Volume 81 SeriesEditors NicolasdeWarren,KULeuven,Belgium DermotMoran,UniversityCollegeDublin,Ireland EditorialBoard LilianAlweiss,TrinityCollegeDublin,Ireland MichaelBarber,St.LouisUniversity,MO,USA ElizabethBehnke,Ferndale,WA,USA RudolfBernet,HusserlArchive,KULeuven,Belgium DavidCarr,EmoryUniversity,GA,USA Chan-FaiCheung,ChineseUniversityHongKong,China JamesDodd,NewSchoolUniversity,NY,USA LesterEmbree,FloridaAtlanticUniversity,FL,USA AlfredoFerrarin,UniversitàdiPisa,Italy BurtHopkins,SeattleUniversity,WA,USA JoséHuertas-Jourda,WilfridLaurierUniversity,Canada Kwok-YingLau,ChineseUniversityHongKong,China Nam-InLee,SeoulNationalUniversity,Korea RosemaryR.P.Lerner,PontificiaUniversidadCatólicadelPerú,Peru DieterLohmar,UniversityofCologne,Germany WilliamR.McKenna,MiamiUniversity,OH,USA AlgisMickunas,OhioUniversity,OH,USA J.N.Mohanty,TempleUniversity,PA,USA JunichiMurata,UniversityofTokyo,Japan ThomasNenon,TheUniversityofMemphis,TN,USA ThomasM.Seebohm,JohannesGutenberg-Universität,Germany GailSoffer,Rome,Italy AnthonySteinbock,SouthernIllinoisUniversityatCarbondale,IL,USA ShigeruTaguchi,HokkaidoUniversity,Japan DanZahavi,UniversityofCopenhagen,Denmark RichardM.Zaner,VanderbiltUniversity,TN,USA Scope Thepurposeoftheseriesistoserveasavehicleforthepursuitofphenomenological research across a broad spectrum, including cross-over developments with other fields of inquiry such as the social sciences and cognitive science. Since its establishmentin1987,ContributionstoPhenomenologyhaspublishedmorethan80 titlesondiversethemesofphenomenologicalphilosophy.Inadditiontowelcoming monographs and collections of papers in established areas of scholarship, the series encouragesoriginal work in phenomenology.The breadth and depth of the Series reflects the rich and varied significance of phenomenological thinking for seminalquestionsofhumaninquiryaswellastheincreasinglyinternationalreach ofphenomenologicalresearch. The seriesis publishedin cooperationwith TheCenter forAdvancedResearch inPhenomenology. Moreinformationaboutthisseriesathttp://www.springer.com/series/5811 Peer F. Bundgaard (cid:129) Frederik Stjernfelt Editors Investigations Into the Phenomenology and the Ontology of the Work of Art What are Artworks and How Do We Experience Them? Editors PeerF.Bundgaard FrederikStjernfelt CenterforSemiotics HumanomicsCentre AarhusUniversity DepartmentofArtsandCulture Aarhus,Denmark UniversityofCopenhagen Copenhagen,Denmark ISSN0923-9545 ISSN2215-1915 (electronic) ContributionstoPhenomenology ISBN978-3-319-14089-6 ISBN978-3-319-14090-2 (eBook) DOI10.1007/978-3-319-14090-2 LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2015941152 SpringerChamHeidelbergNewYorkDordrechtLondon © TheEditor(s) (if applicable) and TheAuthor(s) 2015. Thebook is published with open access at SpringerLink.com. OpenAccessThisbookisdistributedunderthetermsoftheCreativeCommonsAttributionNoncom- mercialLicense,whichpermitsanynoncommercialuse,distribution,andreproductioninanymedium, providedtheoriginalauthor(s)andsourcearecredited. All commercial rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned,specificallytherightsoftranslation,reprinting,reuseofillustrations,recitation,broadcasting, reproductiononmicrofilmsorinanyotherphysicalway,andtransmissionorinformationstorageand retrieval,electronicadaptation,computersoftware,orbysimilarordissimilarmethodologynowknown orhereafterdeveloped. Theuseofgeneraldescriptivenames,registerednames,trademarks,servicemarks,etc.inthispublication doesnotimply,evenintheabsenceofaspecificstatement,thatsuchnamesareexemptfromtherelevant protectivelawsandregulationsandthereforefreeforgeneraluse. Thepublisher,theauthorsandtheeditorsaresafetoassumethattheadviceandinformationinthisbook arebelievedtobetrueandaccurateatthedateofpublication.Neitherthepublishernortheauthorsor theeditorsgiveawarranty,expressorimplied,withrespecttothematerialcontainedhereinorforany errorsoromissionsthatmayhavebeenmade. Printedonacid-freepaper SpringerInternational PublishingAGSwitzerlandispartofSpringerScience+Business Media(www. springer.com) Contents Introduction ...................................................................... 1 PeerF.Bundgaard TemporalAspectsofLiteraryReading........................................ 15 DavidS.Miall MemoryandMentalStatesintheAppreciationofLiterature.............. 31 MarisaBortolussiandPeterDixon TemporalConflictintheReadingExperience................................ 51 CathrineKietz TheAestheticExperiencewithVisualArt“AtFirstGlance”............... 75 PaulJ.Locher WhatIsaSurface?IntheRealWorld?AndPictures?...................... 89 JohnM.KennedyandMartaWnuczko The Idiosyncrasy of Beauty: Aesthetic Universals andtheDiversityofTaste ....................................................... 109 PatrickColmHogan WhyWeAreNotAllNovelists.................................................. 129 ShaunGallagher AestheticRelationship,Cognition,andthePleasuresofArt................ 145 Jean-MarieSchaeffer MoreSeeing-in:SurfaceSeeing,DesignSeeing,andMeaning SeeinginPictures ................................................................ 167 PeerF.Bundgaard Depiction.......................................................................... 191 JohnHyman v vi Contents Green War Banners in Central Copenhagen: A Recent Political Struggle Over Interpretation—And Some ImplicationsforArtInterpretationasSuch .................................. 209 FrederikStjernfelt TheAppropriationoftheWorkofArtasaSemioticAct.................... 225 FrancisÉdelineandJean-MarieKlinkenberg Sculpture,Diagram,andLanguageintheArtworkofJosephBeuys...... 243 WolfgangWildgen Index............................................................................... 259 Introduction PeerF.Bundgaard Thepurposeofthe presentvolumeis toinvestigatethe multifariousaspectsofthe relationbetweenanartwork(visual,literary,ormusical),itsobjectiveproperties,the meaningfulexperienceofit,andthecognitiveskillsandactsinvolvedinthelatter. Eachofthese aspectsis a genuineandirreduciblepartofwhatI herewillcallthe “aesthetic complex,”and each of them thus constitutes an autonomousdomainof researchoranobjectofscholarlyinterest:thatcertainvisualorcognitivecapacities areactivatedintheinteractionwithaestheticobjects;thattheexperienceofaesthetic objects has a particular phenomenology, either because it is accompanied by an appreciativejudgment(orarewardingfeeling)orbecauseitisaboutaspecifickind of object (artful objects); that artful objects have properties that plain objects— naturalaswellascultural—donothave;and,finally,thataestheticobjectsmanifest or represent a meaning in that they give shape to or embody an artistic meaning intention.Thepsychology,the phenomenology,the ontology,andthe semioticsof the artworkeach aims to lay downthe abovecharacteristicsin each their domain, witheachtheirmethods. Thecontributorstothisvolumearephilosophers,psychologists,literarycritics, and semioticians. As such, they address only one or just a couple of the above- mentioned aspects. Each chapter will show, however, that the inquiry into one of the essential aspects of the aesthetic complex naturally raises research questions relatedtooneoftheotheressentialaspects.Itisthusdifficulttoconsidermeaning- makingin art withoutconsideringthose structuresand propertiesin artworksthat embody that meaning or produce that meaning effect. Similarly, it is difficult to lay bare the essential properties of artworks (or of artful representation) without analyzingtheminlightofthosepropertiesofthehumancognitivesystemorofthe P.F.Bundgaard((cid:2)) CenterforSemiotics,AarhusUniversity,Aarhus,Denmark e-mail:[email protected] ©TheAuthor(s)2015 1 P.F.Bundgaard,F.Stjernfelt(eds.),InvestigationsIntothePhenomenology andtheOntologyoftheWorkofArt,ContributionsToPhenomenology81, DOI10.1007/978-3-319-14090-2_1 2 P.F.Bundgaard visualbrainthatmakemanparticularlyresponsivetosuchqualities.Inshort,even though scholars, for obviousreasons, distribute their efforts selectively and focus their attention on one of the aspects of the aesthetic complex, these domains of inquiryarecomplementary. Withthisvolumewethereforehopenotonlytogivethereaderaccesstorecent researchwithintheontology,thephenomenology,andthesemioticsoftheartwork, butalsotomanifestthecomplementarityofworkdoneineachofthesedomains. IntheremainderofthisIntroduction,Ishallfirstgointosomemoredetailswith regardsto the differentaspects of what I have called the “aesthetic complex” and nextgiveashortintroductiontoeachofthechaptersofthevolume. As the subtitle of this volume suggests—What are Artworks, and How Do We Experience them?—onecan distinguish two correlates in the aesthetic complex:a subjectivecorrelate,encompassingwhateverrelevantpropertiesoftheexperiencing subject or whatever relevant goings-on in the cognitive system; and an objective correlate, concerning whatever relevant properties of the object likely to elicit a characteristicsubjectiveresponse. The emergence of Aesthetics as a philosophical discipline is coextensive with thediscoveryofthesensitivesubjectasthepivotalelementofaestheticexperience. Theobjectofinquirybecomes—alreadyfromAlexanderBaumgarten’sAesthetics (1750)and definitely with Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790)—the subjectivecorrelateoftheaestheticcomplex,i.e.,thecognitivedynamicsactivated in the viewer when perceiving artworks or when experiencing things considered beautiful,valuable,or ofaesthetic interest.When Kantcharacterizesbeautyin his Third Critique, he defines it not as a property of an object but as a feeling that is the outcome of a certain “harmony of the faculties,” a specific balance between certaincognitivecenters(ImaginationandReason).Or,tousepresentdayterms,a characteristicwayofprocessinginformationthatdiffersbothinfunctionandcontent fromthewaynon-aestheticinformationisprocessed. Inthesamevein,Kantpinpointsanotheressentialaspectofaestheticexperience thatisexclusivelysubjective(notin the“relativistic” sense, butinstead pertaining totheexperiencingsubject):thementalsetinwhichtheobjectisattendedto,which is“disinterested”in thatitdoesnotpursueanytheoretical(epistemic)or practical (moral)interest,nordoesitpursuethefulfillmentofanydesireofanysort. Whether Kant is right or not in claiming the disinterested nature of aesthetic experienceisnotimportanthere.Whatmattersarethetwobasictenetsofwhatcould becalledtheKantianlegacyinaestheticswritlarge:(1)aestheticexperienceshould be defined not in terms of the object that elicits the feeling of beauty but instead in termsof particularactivationof thecognitivesystem;(2)subjectscanattendto aesthetic objects—or objects deemed beautiful—within an intentional framework (or a mind set) that is different from the framework through which we relate to objectsfor epistemic or moralpurposes;(3) since aesthetic experienceshouldnot be understoodand explained with reference to certain propertiesof an object and thereforedoesnotrequireaspecificcompetenceforcapturingthoseproperties(both perceptuallyandintellectually),itisnottheprivilegeofaparticularlyaptortrained sectionofthepopulation—theaestheticsubjectisageneralsubject. Introduction 3 The philosophical and scientific enquiry into aesthetic experience which has developedinthewakeoftheThirdCritiquehas,ofcourse,notbeenKantianthrough and through: the apriorism proper to Kant’s system, the complex mechanics that keep the harmony of the faculties together have not been part of most, if any, of the research programs in this domain. Many such programs can nevertheless be consideredpost-Kantianbecause:(1)theexperiencingorsensitivesubjectisbrought to the fore; (2) the feeling of beauty—or, independently of the feeling of beauty, the experience of artworks—is considered as being a specific cognitive response resting on general propertiesof the human “mind,” the visuo-cognitivesystem or human“sensitivity” in general,and thereforeamenableto descriptionor scientific description. Marshaling such general positions, of course, does not warrant any unity, nor does it define a research program.With regardsto point (2), there is considerable differencebetweenapproachingtheresponsetobeautywithinFechner’sempirical aesthetics (Fechner 1876) or present day neuroaesthetics (Zeki 1999; Chatterjee 2010;IshizuandZeki2011;NadalandSkov2013)andaddressingaestheticexpe- rience in terms of those perceptualstructures that are meaningful(not necessarily beautiful)forthevisualbrain(Arnheim1954,1969;Petitot2009;Bundgaard2009, 2014).Yet,howeverdifferentsuchresearchprogramsmaybe,theyaddressaseries of issues that are all related to the subjective correlate of aesthetic experience broadly taken (both as an experience accompanied by a rewarding feeling and as an experience of a specific kind of objects, namely artworks). Some of these questions are: if we attend to aesthetic objects differently than to plain everyday objects, then what characterizes this intentional attitude or mindset? If there is a difference between the phenomenology of seeing three apples, a photo of three apples,andapaintingofthreeapples,thenwhatcharacterizesthephenomenology of aesthetic experience? If artworks affect us perceptually by virtue of their qualitative(visual,textual,oracoustic)layoutordesign,whatarethephenomenalor qualitativepropertiesthatareparticularlysignificantforusandhowdoweprocess visualinformation(e.g.,howdowereconstructrepresentedobjectsfromdepicting surfaces)?Whatattractsourattentionorfacilitatesourmemorywhenperceivingor readingartworks?If artworksaffectus by virtue of givenpropertiesof ourvisuo- cognitive system, then what are the relevant propertiesexploited to that effect? If thereisaspecificphenomenologyofaestheticexperience,doesitfollowthatthere isageneralbrainstateoraneuraldynamicsthatcorrespondtothatphenomenology? Ifthefeelingofbeautyindeedoftenaccompaniesaestheticexperience,thenhowis ittobedescribed?Isitaunitaryresponse,triggeredoffbythesamekindofstimuli for natural or biological reasons? Is it conventionally or socially imposed or is it idiosyncratic? As already mentioned, the subjective correlate of aesthetic experience is nev- ertheless only one part of the full story. It is—and has indeed been—difficult to maintain an exclusive focus on the subjective aspect of aesthetic experience. If the feeling of beauty is considered a response to a given object or state of affairs, it seems naturalto ask if certain typesof states of affairs or designscause such responses. This is the hypothesis that drove Fechner’s seminal research in