(cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:7)(cid:15)(cid:16)(cid:12)(cid:7)(cid:16)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:7)(cid:17)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:20)(cid:8)(cid:20)(cid:13)(cid:7)(cid:11)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:19)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:25)(cid:26)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:12)(cid:27)(cid:9)(cid:7)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:28)(cid:2)(cid:29)(cid:4)(cid:30)(cid:30)(cid:30)(cid:7)(cid:5)(cid:31)(cid:32)(cid:5)(cid:8)(cid:17) C.A. No. 12-56638 In the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit JANE DOE NO. 14, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INTERNET BRANDS, INC., D/B/A MODELMAYHEM.COM, Defendant-Appellee, On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Case No. 12-cv-3626-JFW The Honorable John F. Walter, United States District Judge DEFENDANT-APPELLEE INTERNET BRANDS, INC.’S PETITION FOR REHEARING AND REHEARING EN BANC Wendy Giberti Daniel P. Collins IGENERAL COUNSEL, P.C. MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP 9595 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 900 355 South Grand Avenue, 35th Floor Beverly Hills, CA 90212 Los Angeles, CA 90071-1560 Telephone: (310) 300-4082 Telephone: (213) 683-9100 Facsimile: (310) 300-8401 Facsimile: (213) 687-3702 Jonathan H. Blavin MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP 560 Mission Street, 27th Floor San Francisco, CA 94105-2907 Telephone: (415) 512-4000 Facsimile: (415) 512-4077 Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee Internet Brands, Inc. (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:7)(cid:15)(cid:16)(cid:12)(cid:7)(cid:16)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:7)(cid:17)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:20)(cid:8)(cid:20)(cid:13)(cid:7)(cid:11)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:19)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:25)(cid:26)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:12)(cid:27)(cid:9)(cid:7)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:28)(cid:2)(cid:29)(cid:4)(cid:30)(cid:30)(cid:30)(cid:8)(cid:5)(cid:31)(cid:32)(cid:5)(cid:8)(cid:17) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION AND RULE 35(b) STATEMENT .............................................. 1 BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................... 3 I. Plaintiff’s Complaint ............................................................................. 3 II. The District Court’s Dismissal .............................................................. 4 III. The Panel’s Opinion .............................................................................. 5 REASONS WHY REHEARING SHOULD BE GRANTED ................................... 7 I. The Panel Erred by Allowing Plaintiff Effectively to Amend Her Complaint on Appeal and Deciding an Unbriefed Issue Raised Thereby ...................................................................................... 7 II. The Panel Erred in Holding That Publication of Subscriber Content Is Insufficient to Trigger the CDA’s Immunity ....................... 9 A. The Panel Overlooked That Internet Brands’ Alleged Duty to Warn Rests Critically on Its Publishing of Plaintiff’s Third-Party Content—Her Profile ............................. 9 B. The Panel’s Decision Conflicts With Settled Case Law .......... 13 C. The Panel’s Decision Too Narrowly Construed the Policies Behind the CDA and Could Significantly Impact Website Operators ......................................................... 15 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 18 Panel Opinion ......................................................................................... Addendum A Statutory Addendum .............................................................................. Addendum B - i - (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:7)(cid:15)(cid:16)(cid:12)(cid:7)(cid:16)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:7)(cid:17)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:20)(cid:8)(cid:20)(cid:13)(cid:7)(cid:11)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:19)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:25)(cid:26)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:12)(cid:27)(cid:9)(cid:7)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:28)(cid:2)(cid:29)(cid:4)(cid:30)(cid:30)(cid:30)(cid:12)(cid:5)(cid:31)(cid:32)(cid:5)(cid:8)(cid:17) TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page FEDERAL CASES Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009) .....................................................................passim Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) ............................................................................ 17 Beckman v. Match.com, 2013 WL 2355512 (D. Nev. May 29, 2013), appeal pending, No. 13-16324 (9th Cir.) ........................................................... 14 Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) ...................................................................... 15, 17 Doe v. SexSearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719 (N.D. Ohio 2007), aff’d on other grounds, 551 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2008) ........................................ 14 Ecological Rights Found. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 713 F.3d 502 (9th Cir. 2013) ............................................................................ 2, 8 Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) ............................................................................ 14 Galvan v. Alaska Dep’t of Corr., 397 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2005) .............................................................................. 9 George v. Morris, 736 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2013) ................................................................................ 7 Jane Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008) ................................................................ 5, 8, 13, 18 Jane Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843 (W.D. Tex. 2007) .............................................................. 13 Merritt v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 759 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2014) .............................................................................. 9 - ii - (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:7)(cid:15)(cid:16)(cid:12)(cid:7)(cid:16)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:7)(cid:17)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:20)(cid:8)(cid:20)(cid:13)(cid:7)(cid:11)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:19)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:25)(cid:26)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:12)(cid:27)(cid:9)(cid:7)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:28)(cid:2)(cid:29)(cid:4)(cid:30)(cid:30)(cid:30)(cid:17)(cid:5)(cid:31)(cid:32)(cid:5)(cid:8)(cid:17) TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Cont’d) Page United States v. Flanders, 752 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2014) ............................................................................ 4 Vincent v. Trend Western Tech. Corp., 828 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1987) ............................................................................ 7, 8 STATE CASES Julie Doe II v. MySpace, Inc., 175 Cal. App. 4th 561 (2009) ..................................................................... 5, 8, 18 Marois v. Royal Investigation & Patrol, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d 193 (1984) .............................................................................. 11 McGettigan v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 57 Cal. App. 4th 1011 (1997) ............................................................................. 12 Nally v. Grace Community Church, 47 Cal. 3d 278 (1988) ......................................................................................... 12 FEDERAL STATUTES 47 U.S.C. § 230 .................................................................................................passim TREATISES RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A, cmt. c. .................................... 10, 11, 12 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM, § 40, cmt. f .............................................. 12 - iii - (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:7)(cid:15)(cid:16)(cid:12)(cid:7)(cid:16)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:7)(cid:17)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:20)(cid:8)(cid:20)(cid:13)(cid:7)(cid:11)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:19)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:25)(cid:26)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:12)(cid:27)(cid:9)(cid:7)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:28)(cid:2)(cid:29)(cid:4)(cid:30)(cid:30)(cid:30)(cid:10)(cid:5)(cid:31)(cid:32)(cid:5)(cid:8)(cid:17) INTRODUCTION AND RULE 35(b) STATEMENT In its published opinion, the panel erroneously reached—and incorrectly resolved—a critical issue concerning the scope of the protection that section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230, affords to website operators. The panel’s opinion contravenes the language and policy of the CDA, conflicts with decisions of this and other courts, and creates potentially significant liabilities and burdens for a wide range of website operators. Rehearing and rehearing en banc should be granted. Plaintiff Jane Doe, an aspiring model, created a profile on ModelMayhem.com, a networking site for models, make-up artists, stylists, and photographers run by Defendant-Appellee Internet Brands, Inc. She seeks to hold Internet Brands liable for a horrific crime perpetrated by two men who contacted her “through ModelMayhem.com” and arranged a “fake audition” at which she was raped. (Excerpts of Record (“ER”) 13.) The district court dismissed the complaint as barred by the CDA, which preempts liability based on any “duty” that “derives from the defendant’s status or conduct as a ‘publisher or speaker’” of “content provided by another,” Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009). (ER7-8.) In reversing, the panel committed two crucial errors. First, after Plaintiff at oral argument belatedly changed the complaint’s - 1 - (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:7)(cid:15)(cid:16)(cid:12)(cid:7)(cid:16)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:7)(cid:17)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:20)(cid:8)(cid:20)(cid:13)(cid:7)(cid:11)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:19)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:25)(cid:26)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:12)(cid:27)(cid:9)(cid:7)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:28)(cid:2)(cid:29)(cid:4)(cid:30)(cid:30)(cid:30)(cid:11)(cid:5)(cid:31)(cid:32)(cid:5)(cid:8)(cid:17) factual theory, the court decided an unbriefed issue raised by Plaintiff’s improper de facto amendment. Both Internet Brands and the district court explicitly understood Plaintiff’s allegation that the perpetrators contacted her “through ModelMayhem.com” (ER13, emphasis added) to mean that they communicated with her using the website. But at argument, Plaintiff contended for the first time that the men instead contacted her “outside the website,” using contact information she had posted on her profile. The panel should not have allowed Plaintiff’s belated shift, which contravenes the settled rule that a party “‘may not try to amend [its] complaint through [its] arguments on appeal.’” Ecological Rights Found. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 713 F.3d 502, 511 (9th Cir. 2013). And even if the change is allowed, the proper course would be to vacate the judgment and remand for the filing of an amended complaint and a new motion to dismiss. Second, the panel incorrectly resolved the critical issue raised by Plaintiff’s about-face, i.e., whether the CDA barred Plaintiff’s claim on the ground that it sought to hold Internet Brands liable for acting “as the ‘publisher or speaker’ of user content by hosting [Plaintiff’s] user profile.” (Op. 11, emphasis added.) In answering that question in the negative, the panel mistakenly focused only on causation and held that the but-for causal role played by Internet Brands’ publication of Plaintiff’s profile was not enough to trigger the CDA. (Op. 12.) The panel overlooked the fact that the separate element of “duty” here “derives - 2 - (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:7)(cid:15)(cid:16)(cid:12)(cid:7)(cid:16)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:7)(cid:17)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:20)(cid:8)(cid:20)(cid:13)(cid:7)(cid:11)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:19)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:25)(cid:26)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:12)(cid:27)(cid:9)(cid:7)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:28)(cid:2)(cid:29)(cid:4)(cid:30)(cid:30)(cid:30)(cid:27)(cid:5)(cid:31)(cid:32)(cid:5)(cid:8)(cid:17) from the defendant’s status or conduct as a ‘publisher or speaker.’” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102. Specifically, Plaintiff’s claim that she had a “special relationship” with Internet Brands giving rise to a duty to warn rests critically on the allegation that Internet Brands published Plaintiff’s profile. The panel’s erroneous holding conflicts with every decision addressing a comparable claim, contravenes the CDA’s purposes, and threatens significantly to expand the potential scope of liability for website operators. BACKGROUND I. Plaintiff’s Complaint Plaintiff alleges that, in February 2011, she was contacted “through ModelMayhem.com” by a person fraudulently posing as a “talent scout.” (ER13.) When Plaintiff arrived for a “fake audition” in Florida, the men conducting the “audition” (Lavont Flanders and Emerson Callum) surreptitiously drugged Plaintiff, after which Callum raped her while Flanders videotaped it. (ER13-14.) The men then marketed the videotape as pornography. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that, prior to this assault, Internet Brands was aware that Flanders and Callum had “used ModelMayhem.com to lure other users in this sexual battery scheme,” and that it therefore had a duty to “warn Plaintiff[] and other ModelMayhem.com users.” (ER11, 17.) Internet Brands’ alleged knowledge arose only from its awareness, “no later than August 2010,” that in - 3 - (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:7)(cid:15)(cid:16)(cid:12)(cid:7)(cid:16)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:7)(cid:17)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:20)(cid:8)(cid:20)(cid:13)(cid:7)(cid:11)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:19)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:25)(cid:26)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:12)(cid:27)(cid:9)(cid:7)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:28)(cid:2)(cid:29)(cid:4)(cid:30)(cid:30)(cid:30)(cid:13)(cid:5)(cid:31)(cid:32)(cid:5)(cid:8)(cid:17) 2007 Flanders and Callum had been “arrested and charged with luring and victimizing at least five women.” (ER15.)1 Plaintiff does not allege any facts showing that Internet Brands was aware, in 2011, that the men had brazenly resumed their criminal scheme while being prosecuted by the State of Florida. United States v. Flanders, 752 F.3d 1317, 1326 (11th Cir. 2014) (after their 2007 state arrests, the two men “were released on bond and continued their scheme until their [federal] arrests in 2011”). The state case was later dropped in favor of a federal prosecution that resulted in life sentences for both men. Id. at 1341-42. II. The District Court’s Dismissal In moving to dismiss, Internet Brands noted that it had to take as true Plaintiff’s allegation that Flanders and Callum contacted her “through” ModelMayhem.com. (Clerk’s Record (“CR”) 12 at 1; ER13.) Parenthetically, however, Internet Brands explained that it believed this allegation to be false: its understanding of the true facts was that Plaintiff “post[ed] her personal contact information” on ModelMayhem.com—which the website cautioned against doing—and that she “was contacted directly by her assailants,” who obtained her contact information from her profile. (CR26 at 2 n.1 & 5 n.11.) But accepting Plaintiff’s allegation that “the communication occurred through the [w]ebsite” (id. 1 Plaintiff alleges that, in August 2010, Internet Brands sued the prior owner of ModelMayhem.com, who failed to disclose Flanders’ and Callum’s pre-arrest crimes when the company was sold to Internet Brands in 2008. (ER15-16.) - 4 - (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:7)(cid:15)(cid:16)(cid:12)(cid:7)(cid:16)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:7)(cid:17)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:20)(cid:8)(cid:20)(cid:13)(cid:7)(cid:11)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:19)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:25)(cid:26)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:12)(cid:27)(cid:9)(cid:7)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:28)(cid:2)(cid:29)(cid:4)(cid:30)(cid:30)(cid:30)(cid:20)(cid:5)(cid:31)(cid:32)(cid:5)(cid:8)(cid:17) at 5 n.11), Internet Brands argued that the complaint was plainly barred by section 230 under Jane Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008), and Julie Doe II v. MySpace, Inc., 175 Cal. App. 4th 561 (2009). (CR12 at 3-5; CR26 at 2-5.) Plaintiff’s opposition did not explicitly disavow this understanding of her complaint, arguing instead that, in her view, it was irrelevant what communications “Internet Brands may or may not have allowed or ‘published’ on its modelmayhem.com website.” (CR22 at 11.) The district court granted the motion to dismiss. (ER5.) The court confirmed its similar understanding of the complaint, noting there was no “dispute that the ‘information content’ was provided by another ‘information content provider,’” i.e., the perpetrators. (ER7; see also ER8 (Plaintiff’s theory rested on “risks associated with content provided by third parties”).) Plaintiff’s theory was “barred by the CDA,” the court held, because the alleged duty to warn “derives solely from [Internet Brands’] status as a publisher of that content.” (ER8.)2 III. The Panel’s Opinion Plaintiff’s Opening Brief (“POB”) again argued that her failure-to-warn theory “has nothing to do with communications or content that Internet Brands may or may not have allowed or ‘published’ on its modelmayhem.com website.” 2 The district court did not address the parties’ arguments as to whether California law imposed a duty to warn and whether Plaintiff had pleaded proximate causation. - 5 - (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:7)(cid:15)(cid:16)(cid:12)(cid:7)(cid:16)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:7)(cid:17)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:20)(cid:8)(cid:20)(cid:13)(cid:7)(cid:11)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:19)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:22)(cid:25)(cid:26)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:5)(cid:12)(cid:27)(cid:9)(cid:7)(cid:14)(cid:5)(cid:28)(cid:2)(cid:29)(cid:4)(cid:30)(cid:30)(cid:30)(cid:7)(cid:15)(cid:5)(cid:31)(cid:32)(cid:5)(cid:8)(cid:17) (POB25.) Although Plaintiff also vaguely stated that “Flanders and Callum are not alleged to be responsible for any content on modelmayhem.com” (POB29, emphasis added), it was not until oral argument that Plaintiff first claimed that the men never communicated with Plaintiff through ModelMayhem.com. When asked whether Plaintiff responded to a posting by the perpetrators, Plaintiff’s counsel stated that this was “not correct” and that Plaintiff instead contended that, after she “posted her information on the website,” the “perps then contacted [her] outside the website, frankly.” (http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view.php?pk_id= 0000012268 (“Oral arg.”) at time-stamp 4:24-4:39.) In its opinion, the panel stated that it understood Plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim as not resting upon any allegation “that Model Mayhem transmitted any potentially harmful messages between [Plaintiff] and Flanders or Callum” or that the men had otherwise “posted anything themselves.” (Op. 8, 11.) Based on this understanding, the panel held that Plaintiff did not “seek to hold Internet Brands liable as a ‘publisher or speaker’ of content someone posted on the Model Mayhem website” (Op. 8), and that the CDA did not apply. (Op. 12-13.) The panel also briefly addressed, and rejected, the view that the CDA preempted Plaintiff’s claim on the ground that Internet Brands’ alleged liability rested upon Defendant being deemed “the ‘publisher or speaker’ of user content by hosting Jane Doe’s user profile.” (Op. 11, emphasis added.) - 6 -