ASIA IN WORLD POLITICS Series Editor: Samuel S. Kim Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait? by Ralph N. Clough China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy edited by Yang Deng and Fei-Ling Wang In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World edited by Yang Deng and Fei-Ling Wang Pacific Asia? Prospects for Security and Cooperation in East Asia International Relations by Mel Curtov South Asia in World Politics edited by Devin T. Hagerty of Asia East Asia and Globalization edited by Samuel S. Kim The International Relations of Northeast Asia dited by Samuel S. Kim North Korea and Northeast Asia edited by Samuel S. )(jm and Tai Hwan Lee International Relations of Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy Edited by by Donald E. Weatherbee Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda by Robert C. Sutter ROWMAN & L1TTLFFIELOPLJBLlSH I:. RS, IN ~ . Lanham • Boulder • New Yorll • Toronto • Plymouth, UK ROWMAN & Um..EfIELD PUBLISHERS, INC. Dedicated to Published in the United States of America Michael Leifer and Thomas W. Robinson by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. A wholly owned subsidiary ofThe Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 Cherished colleagues, friends, and pioneers www.rowmanlittlefield.com in the study of the international relations of Asia Estover Road, Plymouth PL6 7PV, United Kingdom Copyright q)) 2008 by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, eledronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data International relations of Asia j edited by David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda. p. em. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-0-7425-5695-9 (cloth: alk. paper) ISBN-IO: 0-7425-5695-6 (cloth: aJk. paper) ISBN-13: 978-0-7425-5696-6 (pbk. : alk. paper) ISBN-IO: 0-7425-5696-4 (pbk. : alk. paper) eISBN-13: 978-0-7425-5738-3 eISBN-I0: 0-7425-5738-3 I. Asia-Politics and government-21st century, 2. Asia-Foreign relations. l. Shambaugh, David L. II, Yahuda, Michael 13. DS35.2.J562008 327.5-dc22 2008023461 Printed in the United States of America @TN The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American NationaJ Standard for InJormation Sciences-Permanence of Paper for Printed Libraly Materials, ANSljNISO 239.48-1992. Samuel S. Kim 56 8. Alagappa, "International Politics in Asia," 86. 39. See IISS, NAnned Conflicts and Fatalities, 1945-1994" in The Military Balance 3 1997/98 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997). 40. Coben, East Asia at the Center, 362. 41. See Marc S. Gallichio, The Cold War Begins in Asia: American East Asian Policy and the Fall of the Japanese Empire (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). Theoretical Perspectives on 42. Bany Buzan, "The Present as a Historic Turning Point/ Journal of Peace Re­ search 30, no. 4 (1995): 386-387. International Relations in Asia 43. Mark Se.lden, "China, Japan and the Regional Political Economy of East Asia, 1945-1995," in Networll Power: Japan and Asia, ed. Peter 1. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997),306-307. Amitav Acharya 44. See Robert Jelvis, "The lmpact of the Korean War on the Cold War," Journal of ConfJict Resolution 24, no. 4 (December 1980): 563-592. 45. According to one official Chinese estimate, combat casualties were more than 360,000 (including 130,000 wounded) and non-combat casualties were more than 380,000. See Zhang Aiping. Zhonggllo renmin jiefang jun [China's People's Liberation Army), Vol. 1, Contemporary China Series (Beijing: Dangdai Zbongguo Chubanshe, 1994), 137. 6. See Kent Calder, "u.5. Foreign Policy in Northeast Asia," in The International Any discussion of theoretical perspectives on the international relations Relations of Northeast Asia, ed. Samuel S. Kim (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, (IR) in Asia confronts the paradox that much of the available Iite.rature on 2004), 225-248 the subject remains atheoretical. Whether from within and outside the re­ 47. Alagappa, "International Politics in Asia," 93-94. 48. For the rise and fall of tripolarity, see Roben S. Ross, ed., China, the United gion, students and analysts ofAsia are largely unconvinced that theory is ei- \ Stiltes, and the Soviet Union: 'TlipolaJity and Policy Making in the Cold War (Armonk. ther necessary or useful for studying Asian international relations. l Al­ N.Y.: M. t. Sharpe, 1993); and Lowell Dittmer, Sino-Soviet Normaliuaiol1 and Its in­ though interest in it is growing in the region, partirularlyin China,2 theory ternational Implications, 1945-1990 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992), is seen as too abstract, or too divorced from the daY-lo-day concerns of gov­ 147-255. ernments and peoples to merit serious and sustained pursuit. 49. Selden, "China, Japan and the Regional Political Economy of East Asia," 313. Moreover, theory is criticized by many in Asia as too "Western." Thus, 50. Robert Legvold, "Sino-Soviet Relations: The American Factor," in China, the even among those writers on Asian IR who are theoretically oriented, dis­ United States, and the Soviet Unioll: lhpolariry mid Policy Making in the Cold War, ed. agreement persists as to whether IR theory is relevant to studying Asia, given Raben S. Ross (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1993),87. its origin in, and close association with, Western historical traditions, intel­ 51. Kang. "Hierarchy in Asian International Relations," 174. lectual cliscourses, and foreign policy practices. International relations the­ 5523.. CHoahroelnd, JEaamste .As,s iAa G(Ite nthnea nC eIndteenr,t it4y8, 01. 770-1990 (New York Routledge, 1989). ory, like the disdpline itself, has been, and remains, an "American social sci­ 54. See Oksenberg, '"fhe Issue of Sovereignty in the Asian Historical Context," ence," to quote Stanley Hoffman's much quoted phrase3 -- 87,91; Amitav Acharya, "Will Asia's Past Be Its Futme?" Illtemational Security 28, no. The recent adv-ances made hy the. ':English School" and continental EU­ 3 (Winter 2003/2004): 156. ropean ConstruC'tiyism havenoLmade lR theory "univ-eTsal"; ltm@ii. have 55. See Samuel S. Kim, "Chinese Foreign Policy Face." Globalization Challenges," entrenched and broadened the Western dom.inance. The question of how in New Directions in the SN.tdy of China's Foreign Policy, ed. Alastair lain Johnston and relevant illtheory is to the study of Asian security has evoked strikingly dif- ( Roben S. Ross (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006), 276-306; David ferent responses. On the one band, Qav.id Kang has seized upon the non­ Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift: China alllt Asia's New Dynamics (Berkeley: University of realization of Realist warnings oTPostwar Asia being "ripe for rivalry" to cri­ California Press, 2005). tique not just Realism, but Western ill theory in general for "getting Asia \\'rong."4 [n ill1a1yzing Asian regionalism, Pete.r Kaiienstein -comments: "Theories based on Western, and especiallyWest""'lUIupe'm1 experience, have been of little use in making sense of Asian regionalism. "5 Although Katzcn­ slein's remarks specifically concern the l>tudy ofAsian regionalism, they can 57 58 Amitau I\charya Theorer.ical Perspectives 59 be applied to Asian IR in general. And it is a view widely shared among good deal of writings on Asian IR are generated by area specialists, who are Asian scholars. On the other side, Joll[lJkenberry and Michael Mastanduno unlikely to pigeonJlole themselves into Realist, Liberal, and Constructivist defend the relevance of Westem theorellcai frameworks In studYing the in­ slots. So theoriZing AsianlR necessarily involves generaliZing from a thin ternational relations of Asi2. While intra-Asian relationships might have conceptual base and making arbitrary judgment~ about who and what be­ had some distinctive features historically, this distinctiveness had been di­ longs where_ luted by the progressive iOlegration of the region into the modem jmerna­ tiQnal system. The international relations of Asia have acquired the behav­ ioral norms and attributes associated with the modern iot~rsrate system Table 3.1. Three Perspectives on Internalional Relations that originated in Europe and still retains much of the features of the West­ Rea/ism Libera/ism phalian model. Hence, the core concepts of international relations theory Constructivism such as I\~gemony, the distribution of power, international regimes, and po­ ,"lain Actors States States, multinational States, transnational litical identity are as relevant in the ASian context as anywhere else.6 corporations, knowledge To this observer, this debate is a healthy caveat, rather than a debilitating international communities, and constraint, on analyzing Asian international relations with the help of an organizations moral dadevmeiltotepdeldy fWroemst etrhne tWheeosrteetrinc aelx plieterrieantucree .d Too n boet saudreeq, utahteeolrye tciacpatlu praer tahdeig fmulsl I)riomf aSrtye llGeso als Puirnstueirte ostf; nPaotiwoenra l Cooperation and Coemntmreupnrietyn eur~ coordination to building through range of ideas and relationships that drive international relations in Asia. maximization achieve collective interactions and But IR tRearies-Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism, and criticalJR...theo­ (offensive goals; World shared normative ries-are relevant and useful in analyzing Asian lR prQvided they do not en­ Realism); Survival peace frameworks and security courage a selection bias in favor of those phenomena (ideas, events, trends, (defensive and relationships) that fit with them and against that which does not. IR Realism) sncohroelda rosr s ghiovuelnd s fceaerlc fer eaet tteon itdioenn tbifyy tahnedse s tpuedrysp pehcteivneosm. 'eTnIlaey t hsahto aurled e iathlseoJ" dieg­­ PreOInfertderrerenrd a tional A bsyaslatenmc e-of-power A csyosllteemct ive ~ecurity Glsoebcaul raitny d regional velop concepts and insights from the Asian context and experience, not just underpinned by underpinned by communities to study Asian developments and dynamics, but also other parts of the self-help and free trade, liberal forged through alliances to world. In other words, Western IR theory, despite its ethnocentrism, is not democracy, and shared norms and to be dismissed or expunged from Asian classrooms or seminars, but uni­ maintain institutions collective identity international versalized with the infusion of Asian histories, personalities, philosophies, order atrnaT jeooc vtdeoorrti lesyos ,,t haoennoder epmtricaucastlti cfleoasso.h ki obne,y oenxpdl itchietl yc oenmtrpiblouytiinogn st hoefo trheotiscea lw hjaor gwonri tea nidn Pribomef atIwnrvte eeMrnao cdUtieon nit s Strbidaaetecagksie cad ni nbdty em rcaailcuittsaioarnly Twbaoan-rdleg vaineintle in(rdngoa mtioensatilc) Sotchiraoluizgaht ion principled ideas making references to the theoretical literature of IR. A good deal of empiri­ and economic backed by causal and institutions power calor policy-relevant work may be regarded as Lheoretical for analytical pur­ ideas; Trade and poses because it, like the speeches and writings of policymakers, reflects other forms of functional mental or social constructs that side with different paradigms of interna­ tional relations? To ignore these in any discussion of theory would be to t\ Major Neo-Realism: instilutionaIization Variation Neo-Liberal Critical miss out on a large and important dimension of the debate on, and analysis distribution of Institutionalism: Constructivism: of, Asian fR. In the sections that follow; I examine three major perspectives power decides international challenges the on Asian international relations: Re~m, Liber.alism, and Conslrumvjsm " outcome system anarchic, stelte-centric None of these theories are coherent, singular entities. Each contains a but institutions Constructivism of \ range of perspectives and variations, some of which overlap with those of crealed by states Wendt in their self­ the others, although this complexity is seldom acknowledged in academIC interest' do debatel>. And using even these broad calegolies is not tlut simple because a ------------------co-ns-tra-in -an-arc-hy--------- - - - - - - - - - Amital' Acharya 60 a ~ madCtdlleeieoA~txvnypTmtltUe, ht iolih;otio fnhnsotp .Aa ehuc toasagheHirtrahad eoe,ap tunbtriIthec ecnoi eareddbt ol h1e r ir0indo nis0ateea s1icsdbu<dfa yisae od sis tpacnfee r una smIisRsn dmcaisd coidbaan pirroaasgeiernucl gytudbtahu sn uatmpeshdit o let eitthsln h niuiaotcrtnepresystoreep enpdu oraaetennshrtcbdeagieuaotd uolitan irmoet aeasosnrtel e ai (nattcrlt oepta aoslr lpbat fe alhl tplyaeniaeeos dtt r3sniros o.uesmp 2ngm ee)aesiv.conp t etoandtirviypf. o re hArrenseoeg ssggriii ansioiaoo nntintnhsadhs ,al en tiaoo on rhcfrg tdoaereueevnxn­­r­e­ , ·l..V:.E;sJJ.s~1: .j::.:~:l-~_.X~g.e.~i ..U:-z.:o0E~~0C~~c~ ;. 0 U «V«.J) :Q-~'.~~-~.r~=:n: -~~.1'f~us'0Nc".:::~ c g-U.~>-J:~V:~:~:I:: - . u~-=«r~-CCuo=~ ~ ~L£~~~oO..J.c O~vZD~~Dc :: E: CU.-~EE§300.£. 0 " '--~~:3o.0c-:-.r "~~-.~E!c_0_oV~ ~~..Ccg_3 --...:..V~O'aduo <"~~>}:. Q -L~.:.ccQ~~u>:~0I;J , ­ Q:0:rcLlt: J 1."(o~~:;t:.:5">. : rather than the foreign policy of Asian states. It is not intended as a survey ci ~ U u c oepisgeinsfipnrltr oatoe iahclibd n nvaeao dltai lb esnl cdlisr euteteneevouvraxre vmeatpmlialt)lo.ou to atinpBrrhojeaimoonen lrots eg hrr nene ae tv agtlbhAsaetioe otntsii unhnitroast.e en AnltI asga hns nitlie tnioadtho thnpbe enec raorisoh lrnnlh ysaaaltipe,nestp vetigra oencsbeslnte ase saaca tt i otlwnfoci ocdoreonrcen euauild nnalnroe tr trfvittieeohh nterlnheegal toosi t orsiw.rpe o eicFgibntnthiiusohgoca.rti anpthTanhl,tn heeWcta erhrAon moeeInds rososmi ytratroe ernaedruut k,noiu tcce seItnad isssidalo vo anmewmemn or o(idstieanr na e tkaeglt xie ntmersihrencsm­ ­ e­te­ "3~~-~6Z.(EQ~0.lJJI i ..g-~,E~g::::I': u~"..CgcQE~~~"- J )- " '~.8-uc0Ec2~_..> D >.~o-c .:~~.e~.oIQ[~=2_r): .. ' ~ ~ - _2~C~~~O_ l~u'6r,~.- j­; . 8EEO~J "~"e."Ougr0(U~:EDn:~l.JJ. . 0 C''725~aeV>...::'.0;I.. l. -Jg;(~§0(~~:-0j)-;. . - .:oCO§Co~Er5'lJJr-U I .J.:'O.~00.CC~~.;~~..: . O 0 C--,~~[Cv~ge~li! l .='_ir(>r~_ogul_) ~QrE:c2oJ..I0 '-Vc.,:,N<;.§;:§sO:5 ; ;~);;i and Asian exceptionalism. A fmal aspect of this chapteT is that it is oriented ~ msicnoao lmw reeehc tioeocxnhwto eamtnhrtdye r sw(eeWfocleuErckr)ti. s to ytn hs etsue sdctuiaertsiet ytoh fsa ttnuRh dEeiin AestsetL ureIndSxaycMt eioe ofdn sAa tlsh ipaaont lioitnnict eairnln teaectroinonanotaimol nyra.c lTl aphtioiosln ittsio,­ ~;''go~I;I;:I -..l!EI'(rc0CCc.xt2c!"VloiJu?Jl ­ .oU.c.(~.ECOCo":_tcI:r:J:; I. : ' l~-~(i0QUC:'cQOli:"JJi J) . . «~.~Q'E~~", i ~~­Q~cc ) 12~c>:- . ...~.c~~Oc~J ~Cc~.~~V'"'c'o""ol",.i: ' '';: ~Ci«3 III Realists take the international system to be in anarchy (no authority above ~ ac>­ ~l 0o ..>'" \ tgnwvshfuialoeisiittcm- dhistao e te-anitvdtnhthai eeselmi) v ni,arr aige ntii)arnlnoe.ab ltlTwtlyhaieoh the ibnevairyc s enri h s edci gslo sem actnnaaioo nsttzloeirsedeesp sr,er es oiara rma-tcsahsto tpiuetimohoormn ernpt t heagmortanaafianm trtpii e tnooe ahn a wbaain sncfnedoot r ow rl t usarhphustneoe ip dic wefnhg ar te acfihristnice ntatati seahntn rLeada(ns th ta iiioeantnoirvwftnoelee a unrrmmleayn nlbaoiu ncotrrditeeedo1el ymran ce otaoamsinlontk .aence iyn seIsgns ,r gctantiaeoaiternUrined­ns­­ ~~,Qt.IoQCCQt~.Iii,,.IllI I . V:~a:EcJ). no~crQ~n;. . u.~.«-~.oilucP '\~! ' : )~5-Q80t~<~!J-. - J -.I.:....V=.<~.'0g..c.-."l......l.- .~_.Q<c00f~;'P_O.l: ;) ;­ ~L~-t.r02C~r=Uou. : .c. l.u."*.{.~cc~~~;c lQ: ) ' .U.0..";QU'C<,.;i":~c::!:!~Q=J):) :=0DC@!C) o-Q.-'£6'rc"0'Eu>0g""o'j., - : - -;~s<o.fl"'%;EE:Q:"~~:;:lJ . tions operate on the margins of great power whims and caprice. Interna­ QQ,.I '0 .~ ~ tolitiOasiofomtl nepdn,raeo"a rlvw l, e soestrurryhsd.esie esowtrresne,eim b tsonhy, ef tep vdhRsoeoeperww ea ipclenmiiesrpa mrpldlmloa,ey yraf dtiintaennhenvegenced tdelt ,oh pi spieorstie f rmid mimtb ahbaupreyiitan li cyKostatt ner ii nuonnoc fneef tedh ucpt urohobanm wylWo eampmranr,la io tcinnzpn iaeaa ptsrnnuuthddirlae ea pscm t aii(innolellggimfet dattcphr hohy"eenna tfsebeilioniarzcm-tleeatR dsrnaen. ca nbaAled ­y­ ;]N.Q2.:. ;j --<-"''o:C[J."~.".'.:. ;C -u-ur,=~~s,o~"", u'-U-<3C-cEo_c l!- !-.)C:uS~°.cC9u,~ro~l!· 'o6~­r-;::. a"-_U(oECoCr-U:) l Lo ...'V;0'~~lcC0C:=­J­0i : ,'2C~~l! :D5OJ ....~".'U~c>:0.~E."=.. . , '3;'D.>='cCv~::~"::l,lD classical Realists) or domestic pahties in international relations. More re­ :iQs,I ...,.-cc. -:cJ ~~ .. -EQ.l .Q~; ~ c~o ''"" til ~S~o cently, inua-Realist debates have revealed differences between "offensive ~ S :::::; L: '<VC; ::~ Theoretical Perspectives 63 62 mittJII AclltIrya China that became the focal point of Realist aIlXieties (delight?) about Realists" and "defensive Realists." Offensive Realists such as Mearsheimer Asian insecurity. argue that states are power maximizers: going for "all they can get" with \ "hegemony as their ultimate goal." Defensive Realists, such as Roben Jervis From a :'pow~Ltransitjon theory" perspective, Realists foresaw an in­ evitable confrontation between the status quo power (United States) and its or Jack ST!Y.der, maintain that states are generally satisfied with the status quo if their own security is not challenged, and thus they concentrate on rising power challenger (China). But paving the way for such a confronta­ tion was the logic of offensive Realism, which see~ <In inevitable tendency maintaining the balance of power. Whether academic or policy-oriented, ReaUs.ts view the balance of power in risin&powers toward regional expansionism. Jobn Mearsheimer likened as the key force shaping Asia's postwar international relations, with the the rise of China to that of the United States in the nineteenth century, where the aspiring hegemon went on a spree of acquiring adjacent territo­ United States as chief regional balancer.9 A major proponent of this view is KuanYew, Singapore's senior statesman. Lee ascribes not only Asian sta­ ries and imposed a sphere of infl~ence (0onroe Doctrine) in the wider neighborhood. Expansionism occurs not because rising powers are hard­ bility, but also its robust economic growth during the "miracle years," to the 15 U.S. military presence in the region. 1o In his view, the U.S. presence and in­ wired into an expansionist mode, but because anilli:hy. induces ~ concern tervention in Indochina secured the region against Chinese and Soviet ex­ for ~urviv.al .even among the most powerful actors. In other words, great pansion and gave the Asian states time to develop the.ir economies.1 J In the powers suffer from survival anxieties no less than weak states, and it is this wake of the commwlist takeover of South Vietnam in 1975, Seni Pramoj, concern for survival tbat drives them toward regional hegemony. The result is the paradoxical logic of "expand to survive." the leader of Thailand's Democrat Pany, described the U.S. role as the re­ gional balancer in somewhat different terms: "We have cock fights in Thai­ Since a balance of power is likely to be either unstable (if multipolarity land, but sometimes we put a sheet of glass between the fighting cocks. emerges)or absent (ifChinese hegemony materializes), is there a fole for They can peck at each other without hurting each other. In the cold war be­ multilateral institutions as alternative sources of stability? During the Cold tween MoscoW and Peking, the glass between tbe antagonists can be Wash­ War, Realists paid little attention to Asian regional institutions or dialogues, of which there were but a few: an Association of Southeast Asian Nations ington." 12 Until the end of the Cold War, Realist arguments about Asian IR were (ASEAN)yreoccupied with the Cambodia conflict, a severely anemic Soutb closer to classical Realism, rather than the neo-Realism developed by Ken­ Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (§AA.B-C), and some loose eco­ neth Waltz, which stresses the causal impact of the distribution of power. nomic frameworks such as the PacifttEconomic Cooperation Council (PI:.CC), But with the end of the Cold War accompanied by a refocusing of This has c11anged with the end of the Gold War, which..s.pelled the end of blp.o~rity.nlUs,a new Realist argument about Asian international relations ASEAN toward wider regional security issues and the emergence of new re­ is the view that the end of bipolarity spells disorder and even doom for the gional institutions such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (19-89) region. For neo-Realists, bipolarity is a illore stable international system and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF, 1~24), Realism came under chal­ vJ" than multipolarity, both in terms of the dmability of the system itself and lenge from "institutionalist" perspectives, that is, those who argued that re­ l gion~j'norms and institutions, rather than just the balance of power system, the balance between conflict and order that prevails within the system. The end of the Cold War would witness the "decompression" of conflicts have'helped to keep the peace in Cold War Asia and would playa more im­ held under dleck under bipolar management. I'! Hence, Realism paints a portant role in theregion's post-Cold War order. Realists reli'pOilded to this dark picture of Asia's post-Cold War order. In policy debates, the favorite challenge by targeting Asian reglonal institutions. Their main preoccupa­ Realist cliche in the initial post-Cold War years was the "power vacuum" tion is no longer just to highlight the crucial need for a stable balance of created by superpower retrenchment, as could be foreseen from the with­ POwer system, but also to expose the !lm~ns of regional institutions. drawal of Soviet naval facilities in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, and the dis­ Realists di§miss the capacity o(regional institutions in Asia to act as a force for peace. For them, regional order rests on bilateralism (especially the mantling orthe U.S. naval and air bases in the Philippines. Questions about a vacuum of power inevitably beg the question of who U.S. hub-and-spake system).. rather than multilateralism. During the Cold is to fill it. Initially, Realist prognosis favored a multipolar contest featuring War, Realislscholar Michael Leifer famously described Asian regional secu­ rity institutions as "adjuncts" to the balance of power.lc; While institutions a rising China, a remilitarizeCT (thanks partly to U.S. retrenchment) lapan, and India (whose potential as an emerging power was yet to be recognized). may be effective where great powers drive them (e.g., NATO), Asian institu­ But with the persistence of China's double-digit economic growth matched liom are fatally flawed because they are created and maintained by weak by double-digit annual increases in its defense spending, it was the rise of powers. One concession made to Asian institutions by their Realist critics is 64 Amitall AChlllll {j TheoreLical Perspeaives 65 for the cliche that Asians are instinctively wedded to a Realist worldview to accord them a role in smoothing the rough edges of balance of power and approach, Asian polkymake.rs, with the exception of some of those geopolitics, an argument consistent with the English School perspective. Since J"{eak. powers-are. strueu.u:ally incapable for maintaining order and who fought against colonial rule (india's 1awaharlal Nehru in particular), achie~K-s~cw:ityand prosperity on their own terms and witl21.n their own tended to be Realist (even Nehru claimed not to have been a "starry-eyed idealisl").2o Even in communist China, Hans Morgenthau's Politics among means (there can be no such thing as a "regional solution to regional prob­ Nations enjoyed a huge popularity in classrooms, matching or exceeding th lems"), the best way to manage the security dilemma is to keepaI"1 the rel­ e;.mtir~at powers involved in dle regional arena so that thevcan balance appeal of Marx or Mao. The same was true of Nehruvian India, where the indigenous idealism Gandhi and Nehru inspired scarcely formed part of IR each other's influence. teaching and learning. Such Involvement cannot be automatic, however; it has to be contrived, But, more recently, Realist perspectives on Asian JR have come under at­ and this is where regional institutions play tl1eir useful role as arenas for t'lck. TheprealCtJons of Realists about Asia's post-Cold War insecurIty have strategic engagement. Instead of great powers crealingjnstitutions and set­ ting..Q.1eir agenda, as would be normal in a Realist world, weak powers may yet to materialize.21 Moreover, Re~lism'L-causal emphasis on U.~ military !V' sOIn~times create and employ institutions with a view to engage those pow­ presence as the chief factor bel-lind Asia's stability and prosperity ign~res the I, ,..r eLS thaLare crucial to equilibrium of power.17 role of other fOrces, including Asian regional norms and institutions, eco- I) But this limited role of regional institutions notwithstanding, Realists nomic growth, and domestic politics. In a similar vein, Realism's argtunent generally Gnd Asia's international relations to be fraught with uncertainty that...the Cold War bipolarity generated regional stabil ity can be questTo~ed. China's preeminent Realist scholar of international relations, Van XuetOI1 and dangeT of conflict due to the absence of conditions in Asia that ensure of Tsinghua University, argues iliat while Cold War bipolarity might have a multipolar peace in Europe. In a famous essay,-Aaron Friedberg..argued revented war between the superpowers, it permitted numerous regional that the factors that might mitigate anarchy in Europe resulting from the conflicts causing massive death and destruction: disappearance ofbipolar stability are noticeably absent in Asia, thereby ren­ ,; dering the region "tipe for rjyalry. These mitlliating factors include oat n 18 oI1,ly suong regional institutions like the gu, but also economic in-terde­ The history of East Asia does not support the argument that the balanced strengths between China and the United States can prevent limited conven­ peudence. and shared democratic political systems. Some Realists, lil<e tional wars in East Asia. During the Cold War, the balance of power between Friedberg, have found A.IDan...e.conomic. inter.d.ep~deJ1~e to b.e thin relative the United States and the Soviet Union did prevent them from attacking each to what exists in Europe and the interdependence between Asia and the other directly in this region, but it failed to prev~t wars be.tWeentbeir allies..or West. Others, hke Buzan and Segal and GiI.Qin, argue that economic inter­ wars between one of them and the allies of the other, SUdl as the Korean War dependence cannot Keep peace and may even cause more strif~ than or­ in the ]950s. Hence, ev~Walance.ofjlQ.WfLexistedlletween China..ilnd the der.19 lronica1ly, Realists have somehow found economic interdependence United States after the C91g War, we would still not be.surellbad..the function within Asia to be either scarce or destabilizing, or both at the same time. of preventi;g limited conventional wars in this region 22 In terms of its contributions, Realism can take credit for an analytical and policy consistency io highlightiEg..the role. of the balanc~_ of 20wer in re­ The Realist eA'Planation of Asia's Cold War stability, while having the gional order. This view has been maintained both during the heydays of vlrtue of consistency, actually contradicts a key element of its foundational logic, which seeS power balancing as a universal and unexceptionable law U.S hegernouyin..the 1950s and '60s, through the course of its rfJ-ative de­ of international politics (even if Realists disagree whether it is an automatic cline in the post-Vietnam years, and in the post-Cold War "unipolar mo­ ment.;; filGhina...Realism was the one Wes~rruheo.ry--OfIR that blgke the law of nature, or has to be contrived). The notion of balance of power io. monopoly of Marxist-Leninist and Maoist thought. This would later pave Asia as understood from a Realist perspective is actually a fig leaf for U.s. the way fOf Qt.he.r perspectives on international relations, inc1uding,Uberal­ primacy, or even preponderance. Hence, what should \)e anathemaJor a ism ~nd Constructivism. R~21~.!Jl also gave a certain underlying conceptual dassical Realist23 -the discemable absence of balancing against a hege­ monic power-has acquired The status of an al1n05t normative -.2-rgurnent coherence to a great deal of atheoretical or policy writings on-Asian inter­ about Asian regional order in Realist writings on Asia. This contradiction national relations. During tbe Cold War, Realism was arguably the dql12inant perspective OIl cannot be explained by simply viewing the United States as a benign power, which can escape dlE' logic ofbalanc.ing. If Realism is true to one of its foun­ the international relations of Asia. This was true not just of the academic realm, but also in the policy world Although it is difficull to find evidence dational logics, tllen any power (benign or otherwise) seeking hegemony Theoretical Perspectives 67 AmiW11 AchaT)'a 66 In Asia....Jb.£...United States served as a benign hegemon providing the collec­ should have invited a countervalling coalition. The fact. !haL tbe United tive goods of secm}!}' against communist expansion and free acc!ss to its States has not triggered such a coalition is a puzzle that has not been ade­ vast marKet toAsia's early indusu-ializers, even at a cost to itself (in terms of quatcly explained. Adding a qualifier to their causal10gic (benign powers incurring huge defidts). The outcome was rapid economic growth in a are less likely to be balanced against than malign ones) only lends itself to number of Asian economies, which created a "perfonnance legitimacy" for the charge, raised powerfully by fohn Vasquez, of Realism as a "degenera­ the region's autocratic rulers, thereby stabilizing their domestic politIcs. At tive" theoretical paradigm14 the same time, the region witnessed a grQ..wiI)JLinterdq>endence resultillg from the pursuit of market-driven and market-friendly economic growth strategies, which furthered the prospects for regional stability and security. LlBERAUSM Liberal conceptions of the international relations of Asia have particu­ larly stressed the role of expanding interdependence as a force for peace.25 Classical Liberalism rests on three pillars: The interdependence argument wasadvanced with ever more vigor with the 1. CommeFeal bi~ralism, or the view that economic interdependence, end of the Cold War and the rise of Chinese economic power. Liberals, both Western and Asian (including many of them within China itselt), came to espedalJy free trade, reduces prospect of war by increasing its costs to view it as a crucial factor in making China's rise peaceful. Yet, the argument the parties; also invited much aiticism, espedally, as noted earlier, from Realists, who 2. Rep.ublicanliberalism, or the "democratic peace" argument which as­ often take the failure olEuropean economic inte.rdependence to prevent the sumes that Liberal democracies are more peaceful than autocracies, or -- PirstWorld War as a severe indictment ofthe "ifgoods do not cross borders, at least seldom fight one another; soldiers wiW logic. Defending against such charges, Liberals stress differ­ 3. Lib8.('a1 institutionalism, which focuses on the contribution of inter­ ences between nineteenth-century and contemporary patterns of economic national organizations in fostering collective security, managing con­ interdependence. The fonner was based on trade and exchange, while the ana flict, promoting cooperation. latter is rooted in transnational production. whidlis more "costly to break" and wh~.!-=.h has a deeper andmore. durable impact on national pQlitical aJld AmodernvariantofLiberal institutionalism is neo-Liberal institutionalism. security autonomy. Unlike classical Liberaltsm, which took a benign view of human nature, The ~nd...snaud.DLLiOOralism-demQ.ffa!icpeace theory-has found neo-Liberal institutionalism accepts the Realist premise that the interna­ very little expression in writings on Asian IR. This need /lot be surprising tional system is anarchic and tllat states are the primary, ifOot the only, ac­ since historically Asia has had few democracies to test the claims of this the­ tors in international relations. But it disagrees wltb-neo-Realism's dismissal ory meaningfuny. Moreover, Asia's democrage~ teM to_ be. of th.e "il1ib~al of international institutions. Neo-Liberals l]lllintain that intcrnatloi'1al insti­ variety," making it more plausible for LtS to speak of an "illiberal peace" in tutions,broadly defined-including regimes ..and fo..rmal QIgaruzations­ can reg~ state behavior and promote cooQeration by reducing transac­ the region (especially in Southeast Asia), whereby a group of authoritarian tion costs, fa~ating information-sharing, preventing cheating, and and semi-authoritarian states avoid conflict by focusing on economic providing avenuestor peaceful resol~ion otconflicts. ­ growth, performanceJegitimacy, and sovereignty-preserving region1iflpstl­ While Re~rn as a theory of international relations is preoccupied with tutions. Critics of democratic peace in the West, such as Jack Snyder and Ed Mansfield, have also questioned the normative claims ofdemocratic p-eace issues of semrity and order, Liberalism is more concerned with the nature by highlightioKthe danger ofwar associated with den10aatic lran~tions. In and dynamics.Q.i the.J.nternational political economy. Liberal perspedives Asia, the Liberal/democratic peace argument has found more critics than " on Asia's international relations are no exception. For Libggls,_thtlounda­ tions of the. postwar international relations of Asia ~l::.laid not by the re­ adherents, but in general it has not been an important part of the debate over the region's international relations. gion's distinctive geography or culture, or by security threats facing the re­ gion, but rather by lb-e .l2..0st-World WarJ1 international ~o~omic ~tem The neglect is as unfortunate as the criticism of democratic peace is mis­ placed. Contrary to a popular perception, democratic trallsitions in Asia under American hegemony. The United States was central to the creation of have neveT led to interstate war and only occasionally to serious domestic international tnstitutions such as the lnternational Monetary Fund (lMF), instability. The case of Indonesia post-Suharro might be an exception to the the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATr), latter, but didn't IDme people die in the transition to aUlhoritarian rule in which played a crucial TOle in diffusing the norms of economic Liberalism. 68 Amirav Acharya TheoreLical Perspectives 69 that counuv in the 1960s than from it? In South Korea, Taiwan, Cambodia, security community where the prospect of war is unthinkable. In Asia, \ the Philipp'ines, and Thailand, democratic transitions have not caused seri­ ApEC has-9El-&Iuhe..QJ.le regil1leiinstituLion thaLneo-L.iberals Ilave been most ous internal strife or interstate conflict. On the contrary, it might be argued attracted lO. But even there, and certainly in the case of the more ASEAN­ that such transitions have often yielded a "cooperative peace di';jdend," centric institutions (e.g., ASEAN, ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN + 3, and whereby the new democratic governments have pursued cooperative strate­ East Asian Summit), ~tructivism lWith its stress on the culture- and gies toward their traditional rivals. Examples...lnclude Thailand'.s "battle­ identity-derived notion of the "ASEAN v-jay") has been a more popular fietds to. marketplaces" policy in the late 19§Os that helped to break the mode of analysis than neo-Liberalism or classical Liberalism (collective sei'l. stalemate in the Cambodia conflict, Kinl Oae Jung's Sunshine Policy, and curit.Yanaregional i.ntegration). IndQ!l~ia'£ASEAN Security Community i:!litiative. Pakistan's democratic In general then, Li~ral perspectives have made little impact on tIle study breakdown under Musharra[ might have led to improved prospects for of Asia's international relations. This need not have been, or will remain, peace with India, but this was induced by a strong external element, the the-case. Liberalism is more notable as a causal theory of peace, iyst as Re­ 9/11 attacks, and the U.S.-led war on terror. Democratization fueled de­ alism focuses on the causes ofwar. In a traditionaUy Realist-dominated field mands for Taiwanese independence, thereby challenging East Asian stabil­ of Asian international relations, and with the region's domestic politics ity, but democratization has also created populist countervailing pressures landscape marked by a durable (if changing) authoritarian pattern, Liberal on Taiwan's pro-independence governments from going over the brink in conceptions of peace and democracy have found few adherents. But as inviting a Chinese military response. At the very least, there is not much ev­ noted above, the criticisms of Liberal notions of interdependence and de­ idence from Asia to support the critics' view that democratic transitions in­ mocracy on the one hand and peace and stability on the other are often tensify the danger of war, or even domestic strife. rooted in misplaced historical analogies and selective empirical evidence. The impact of the third element of the Liberal paradigm, LibersJ institu­ Lib£:J:a1jsm...h3s a brighter future-in the analvslsofAsia's int.e.malional rela­ tionalism, on Asian lR discourses is both easier and harder to establish. 00 tions as tI;e_region's historical (post-World War 11) corpbination of eco­ the one hand, the growth of regional institutions inAsja a1l9~s greater nomic nationalism, security bilateralism, and political authoritarianism space to Liberal conceptions of order-building through institutions. But the unravels and gives way to a more complex picture where economic Liberal­ Liberal understanding of how institutions come about ';nd preserve order ism, security multilateralism, and democratic politiG acquire force as de­ overlaps considerably with sodal Constructivist approaches. Indeed, insti­ terminants of (egioual order and form the basis of an "Asian universalism" tutionalism (lhe study of the role of international institutions) is no longer in lR theory. a puretynberal preserve; In Asia at least, it has been appropriated QyJ;on­ structivists who have both deepened and broadened the underst~ndings of what institutions are and how they impact on Asia's international relations. CONSTRUCfMSM Cl~al Liberal institutionaJi~m was identified with bo~ective se­ curity and, to a lesser extent, regional integration theory, which was closely For Constructivists, international relations is shaped not just by material derived from early West European integration durjruftht..22.50s ~d '60s. forces surn as power and wealth, but al~o by .subjective and il1ter-sl!bjec­ But neither type of Liberal institutionalism has had a regional application tive factorS;-including ideas, nonns,-history, culture, and identity. Con­ in Asia, where there have been no collective secutity (even if one stretches structivism takes a sociologlcal, ranier than "strategic interaction," view of the term to include collective defense) or supranational institutions. The international relations. The interests and identities of states are not pre-or­ ana newest Liberal institutionalism, neo-Liberal institutionalism, narrowed the daine.d, or a given, but emerge change through a process of mutual in­ scope of investigation into institutional dynamics (how institutions affect teractions and socialization. Conditions such as anarchy and power poli­ state behavior) considerably. It shared the Realist conception of anarchy tics are not pennaneDl or "organic" features of international relations, but while disagreeing with Realism on the importance of institutions as agents are socially constructed. State interests and identities are in important part of cooperation and change. But it gave an overly utilitarian slant to the per­ constituted by these social structures rather than given exogenously to the formance of institutions. Institutions may (but not always or necessarily) system by human nature or domestic politics. ~orms, once established, induce cooperation because they can increase infonnalion flows, reduce have a life of their own; they create and redefine state int~esls alld ap­ transaction costs, and prevent cheating. But institutions are not really trans­ proaches. For CopstructivislS, international instilutions X€ en a deep im- 'l formalive; thei.r end-product may be an intemational regime rather than a pact on the behavior of states; they not only regulate state behavior, but 70 Amitav Acharya Theoretical Perspectives 71 also constitute state identities. Through interaction and socialization, states Southeast Asia.was a product of ideational fmces, sllch as shared norms, may develop a.. "collective identity" that would enable them to Qvercome and socialization in search of a common identity. Shared norms, including power politics and the security dilemma. non-intelVention, equality of states, and avoida'!f.e of membership in great Constructivism is struggling to acquire the status of a "theory" of inter­ power military pacts were influential in shaping a deliberately weak and rel­ national relations comparable to Realism or Liberalism. Some critics view atively non·institutionalized fonn ofregionalism that came to be known as it as social theory that has no basis in LR. Constructivists are alsoaccused of the "ASEAN Way." lacking miadle-range theory and not pursuing serious empirical research Regional institutions have thus been at the core of Constructivist under­ (although this criticism would be increasingly hard to sustain as more em­ standing of Asia's postwar international relations. It is through Asian insti­ pirical studies emerge employing a Constructivist framework); some Con­ tutions tllat Constructivists have attempted to project and test their notions structivists themselves acknowledge that like rational choice, it is more of a abQut the role of ideas (for example, common and cooperative security), method than a theory per se.26 identity ("Asian Way," "ASEAN Way," "Asia-Pacific Way"), and socializa­ But Constructivism has helped to answer a number of keuu~les about tion.3D The influence of Constructivism is especially visible in attempts to Asian securil)" order. While Constructivism is essentially a post-Cold War differentiate between European and Asian regionalism, stressing the formal, theory, it has been employed to explain key puzzles of Asian international legalistic, and bureaucratic natureof the fonner with the informal, consen­ relations during the Cold War period. Constructivists sues!>-tAe-rek of col­ sual, and process·centric conception of the latter. That the European·de­ lecti.ve identities in.J:be foundation ofAsia's postwar international relations. rived criteria should not be used to judge the perfonnance and effectiveness In an important contribution, Chris Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein explain of Asian institutions has been a key element in Constructivist arguments the puzzle of ~y there is no NATO in Asia" byexamining.J:hujiffering about Asian regionalism J 1 perceptions of collective identity held by U.S. policymakers in relation to Apart from conceptualizing the distinctive nature and performance of Europe and Asia.l7 American poLicymakers in the early postwarperiod "saw Asian regional institutions, whkh are either dismissed-(by Realists) or in­ their potential Asian allies ... as part of an alien and, in important ways, adequately captured (by neo-Liberal orrationalist institutionalism), Con­ inferior community."28 This was in marked contrast to their perception of structivists have also stepped into the debate over Asia's emerging and fu­ "their potential European allies [who were seenl as relatively equal mem­ ture security order by frontally challenging the "ripe for rivalry" scenario bers of a shared community." Because the United States recognized a greater proposed famously and controversially by Aaron Friedberg.'${ David Kang, sense of a transatlantic community than a transpaciflc one, Europe rather noting that Realist scenanbs such as Frieaberg's have failed to materialize, than Asia was seen as a more desirable arena for multilateral engagement: calls for examining Asian security from the perspective ofAsia's own history hence there was no Asian NATO. While this explanation stresses the collec­ and cuI ture. lie raisesthe notion of a hierarchical regional system in Asia at tive identity of an external actor, another C::~:>nstTU~v.i.s.LQ.erspectivehigh­ the time of China's imperial dominance and the tributary system. Asia was lights dle~atjve concerns of Asian actors themselves, especiilly Asia's peaceful when China was powerful; now with the (re-)~ergence of China nationalist leaders, ~hQ delegitimized collective-defensOr vi~inK.it as a as a regional and global power, Asia_could acq,uire stability through band­ foPTI of great power intelVention through their interactions in the early wagoning with China (which in his view is occurring).33 While for postwar period, culminating in the Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung in MearSheimer, Europe's Mback to me-future.:' means heightened disorder of 1955.29 the type that-aceompanied th~ rise. of Germany .in the late nineteenth cen­ Constructivi$m also explains why a different form of regionalism waS tury, f6rl{ang, Asia's "back to the future" implies a return to nierarchy and possible in Asia, Qne that was more reflective oCthe-nornlative and cultural stability under Chinese preeminence. beliffs of the Asian states and their mllective identitiesas newly indepen­ Kan!(s thesis presents one of the most powerful Constructivist challeoges de!1t states seeking national and regional autonomy. This explains the ori­ to the Realist orthodoxy in Asian IR But his argument nas been controver­ gins and evolution ofASEAN, Asia's fust viable regional.,grouping ASEAN's sial, even among Constructivists)1 who have questioned its claim about the stablisbment in 1967, Constructivists argue, cannot be explained from a peaceful nature of tlle old tributary system, wllether China's neighbors are Realist perspective, in the absence of a common external threat perception, actually "bandwagoning" with China, -and the structural differences be­ or from a Liberal one, whicl'l. would assume substantial interdependence tween Asian regional systems during the tributary sy~tem, especially the ab­ among its members Neither of these conditions marked the relationship sence of other contenders for hegemony that can now be found in the among ASEAN's founding members at its birth. Instead, rel?ionaJism in United States, Russia, Japan, and India, and the continuing importance of