SWP Research Paper Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Felix Heiduk Indonesia in ASEAN Regional Leadership between Ambition and Ambiguity RP 6 April 2016 Berlin All rights reserved. © Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2016 SWP Research Papers are peer reviewed by senior researchers and the execu- tive board of the Institute. They reflect the views of the author(s). SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 10719 Berlin Germany Phone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 www.swp-berlin.org [email protected] ISSN 1863-1053 (English version of SWP-Studie 17/2015) Table of Contents 5 Issues and Conclusions 7 Ambition and Ambivalence: Indonesia’s Historic Role in ASEAN 10 Indonesia in ASEAN 10 Indonesia and the APSC: Conflict- and Crisis Management 11 Regional Agreements 11 Who Sets the Regional Agenda? 12 Indonesia’s Perception and Position 13 Implementation in Indonesia 13 Indonesia in the APSC: Counter-Terrorism 14 Regional Agreements 15 Who Sets the Regional Agenda? 15 Indonesia’s Perception and Position 16 Implementation in Indonesia 17 Indonesia in the AEC: The ASEAN Single Aviation Market 17 Regional Agreements 18 Who Sets the Regional Agenda? 18 Indonesia’s Perception and Position 19 Implementation in Indonesia 20 Indonesia in the AEC: Labour Mobility 20 Regional Agreements 21 Who Sets the Regional Agenda? 22 Indonesia’s Perception and Position 23 Implementation in Indonesia 25 Indonesia in the ASCC: Disaster Management 25 Regional Agreements 26 Who Sets the Regional Agenda? 27 Indonesia’s Perception and Position 27 Implementation in Indonesia 28 Indonesia in the ASCC: Haze and Air Pollution 28 Regional Agreements 29 Who Sets the Regional Agenda? 30 Indonesia’s Perception and Position 31 Implementation in Indonesia 33 Recent Developments under the Jokowi Administration 36 Conclusions and Recommendations 38 Abbreviations Dr. Felix Heiduk is an Associate in SWP’s Asia Division The field research for this study was kindly funded by the Fritz Thyssen foundation. Issues and Conclusions Indonesia in ASEAN Regional Leadership between Ambition and Ambiguity Supporting regional integration processes within the framework of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is an integral part of Europe’s stra- tegic interests in South-East Asia. Hereby, Indonesia is viewed as Europe’s most important partner in the region and primus inter pares within ASEAN. Such a view is based first and foremost on the country’s sheer territorial dimension, its population of more than 240 million, its vast domestic market, and its historical role as a founding member of the organisation. Addi- tionally, it is Indonesia’s strategic location at the Strait of Malacca – one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes – which accounts for its importance. But more impor- tantly, it has been Jakarta’s claim to exert regional leadership and its role as a driver of regional integra- tion processes in ASEAN that have made Jakarta ap- pear to be a crucial partner for Europe. The recurrent concepts of “ASEAN centrality” as well as ASEAN being the “cornerstone” of Indonesian foreign policy have been used by Indonesian academics and policy-makers to shape the understanding of Indonesia’s role in ASEAN, domestically and internationally. Under the administration of Joko Widodo (“Jokowi”), however, indications seem to be growing stronger that Indonesia is “turning away” from ASEAN. This is because a new narrative about Indonesia’s role in ASEAN has apparently emerged in Jakarta since Jokowi’s ascent to office in October 2014. This narrative gives priority to Indonesia’s national interests over other long-standing hallmarks of Indonesian foreign policy – most notably the concept of “ASEAN centrality”, which, along with other foreign policy hallmarks, is to be rigorously scrutinized in terms of its compatibility with Indonesia’s national interests. Such apparent change, at least on the rhetorical level, sparked fears within the region and beyond over Indonesia disavow- ing ASEAN shortly before the regional organisation met for the establishment of the ASEAN Community on 31 December 2015. Bear in mind that many of the ideas behind the formation of the ASEAN Community in no small part were crafted by Indonesia itself during previous administrations. Moreover, if Indonesia were to turn away from ASEAN, it would also have poten- tially negative effects on the implementation of the SWP Berlin Indonesia in ASEAN April 2016 5 Issues and Conclusions ASEAN Community’s Post-2015 Vision and its objective from inert to negative – and largely failed to launch of further deepening the regional integration process any ideas or policy initiatives regarding the deepening by 2022, as it had been assumed that Indonesia would of regional economic integration in ASEAN. Out of lead the process. Fears have been raised that, without (often well-founded) fears that Indonesia’s national active participation by Jakarta, the regional integra- economy would be unable to compete with competi- tion process could effectively become stalled. tors from regional economic powerhouses such as In order to be able to gauge changes in Indonesian Singapore and Malaysia, regional agreements have foreign policy towards ASEAN under Jokowi, this either been implemented in a very patchy manner research paper traces the role that ASEAN has played or not been implemented at all. Moreover, there are in Indonesian foreign policy – from the fall of Suharto indications that Jakarta’s defensive demeanour and up to the present day. Hereby, Indonesia’s contribu- foot-dragging with regard to the AEC could further tions to the regional integration process since the mid- increase under the Jokowi administration. 2000s are of special importance to the analysis. The Yet, Indonesia’s ambiguity towards ASEAN is, as paper seeks to answer research questions via a com- the paper shows, not at all new or a unique feature of parative policy analysis. The selection of the six policy the Jokowi administration. Quite to the contrary, the areas analysed in this study follows the three pillars paper finds strong continuities in Indonesia’s attitude of the ASEAN Community. Two policy areas were towards – and behaviour in – ASEAN across different selected from each pillar: national administrations. Despite the common view  ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) – “con- that Indonesia returned to its “natural” position at the flict- and crisis-management” and “counter-terror- helm of ASEAN and quickly came to be regarded as ism” the main driver of regional integration processes with  ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) – “ASEAN Single Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s (who often went by his Aviation Market (ASAM)” and “labour mobility” initials SBY) ascent to power, Jakarta continued to be  ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) – “dis- a difficult partner in the AEC, while at the same time aster management” and “haze and air pollution” exercising regional leadership in the APSC. Those fear- The analytical approach hereby is twofold. In a first ing that Indonesia will turn away from ASEAN tend step, the analysis seeks to determine whether Indo- to overlook many of the continuities present in Indo- nesia has acted as a visionary and agenda-setter at the nesia’s role in ASEAN over the last decade or so. More- regional level. In a second step, the analysis tries to over, because of Jakarta’s self-portrayal as the regional assess whether the country has implemented regional primus inter pares, any outright foreign policy change agreements domestically. regarding ASEAN seems unlikely for the time being. The results indicate that Indonesia’s role differs Nonetheless, it is apparent that Indonesia, under markedly from one policy field to the next. At times, the Jokowi administration, has yet to develop new these findings are starkly at odds with Jakarta’s self- ideas and derive new policy initiatives for the future proclaimed role as the motor of ASEAN and driver of development of ASEAN. It is against this background regional integration. It is mostly with regard to the that Europe would be well advised to expand coopera- first pillar – particularly in the area of regional secu- tion with Indonesia as well as continue to beckon rity –that Indonesia has developed key ideas for the Jakarta to act as the motor of regional integration for region, served as one of the main architects behind the ASEAN Community post-2015. the APSC, and backed up its own leadership role through a flurry of diplomatic activities. Indonesia’s leadership role in the APSC is based on the conviction – held by many in Jakarta, past and present – that only a well-integrated, functional ASEAN community can guarantee regional security and stability in South-East Asia. Furthermore, large parts of Indonesia’s political elites share the view that Indonesia’s global standing and influence is closely tied to its regional leadership position in ASEAN. At the same time, however, Jakarta has displayed attitudes towards the AEC – ranging predominantly SWP Berlin Indonesia in ASEAN April 2016 6 Ambition and Ambivalence: Indonesia’s Historic Role in ASEAN The founding of ASEAN itself in 1967, as well as Indo- included a security component. Regional integration nesia’s role during and after ASEAN’s founding, are was seen as a tool to foster peaceful, cooperative inextricably linked to Indonesia’s foreign policy during relations with Indonesia’s neighbours. Moreover, it the era of President Suharto (1965–1998). From the was seen as a tool to reduce the influence of external late 1950s onwards, Jakarta’s foreign policy had been powers in South-East Asia. It is especially the latter significantly shaped by two processes: its rapproche- aspect that has impacted the political elites’ thinking ment with the Soviet Union and China, and its grow- about regional security until today. ing hostility (“konfrontasi”) towards the Federation of From the perception of the Suharto regime, it was Malaya (later reconstituted as Malaysia), which was Indonesia – as the biggest state in South-East Asia and denounced by Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, to a founding member of ASEAN – that was to play a key be a bulwark of British imperialism and neo-colonial- role in the development of ASEAN and the fostering of ism. These processes raised fears that Indonesia’s regional integration. Indonesia’s pretension to act as increasingly assertive, aggressive demeanour under primus inter pares in ASEAN notwithstanding, a gap has the leadership of President Sukarno could destabilise existed since ASEAN’s founding between Indonesia’s the region. After General Suharto took power in 1965, claim to regional leadership on the one hand, and its Indonesian foreign policy underwent significant inability or reluctance to govern regional affairs on the changes. Under Suharto, it was not the fight against other.5 The reasons for this gap are to be found in the imperialism and neo-colonialism but rather regional norms and the modus operandi of ASEAN, as well as stability and cooperation that were deemed to be the Indonesia’s often highly ambivalent realpolitik vis-à-vis prime foreign policy objectives of Indonesia. Winning the organisation. Besides a commitment to neutrality back the trust of Indonesia’s neighbours and the – in order to extract the organisation from the Cold West, reviving economic development through close war imbroglio – a number of other basic principles are relations with Western donors, as well as the overall commonly referred to as the “ASEAN Way”. These in- rehabilitation of Indonesia became key priorities.1 clude the principles of non-interference in the domes- Accordingly, Indonesia played a key role during tic affairs of other member states, of peaceful conflict ASEAN’s founding, and then-Foreign Minister Adam resolution, and of consensus decision-making (instead Malik referred to the organisation as the “corner- of majority voting). The principles of non-interference stone” of Indonesian foreign policy.2 Suharto viewed and consensus decision-making, however, have ham- ASEAN as the right tool to tackle the tainted image of pered not only deeper regional integration but also post-“konfrontasi” Indonesia.3 Hence, Jakarta’s the strengthening of regional institutions. As such, behaviour during and after ASEAN’s founding has ASEAN has remained a strictly intergovernmental been shaped significantly by a desire to win back the body, and there is no indication of interest in shared trust of its neighbours via displays of self-restraint. sovereignty and strong supranational institutions Accordingly, Indonesia sought to portray itself as a among its members. Hence, the organisation lacks any moderate, peaceful, and reliable partner in the region ability to sanction member states that break regional and beyond.4 Next to rehabilitating Indonesia as a agreements. At the same time, the principle of con- reliable partner, regional integration for Suharto also sensus decision-making enables smaller states to with- stand the interests and policy preferences of regional 1 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and heavyweights such as Indonesia. Regionalism (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Taking this into consideration, the ASEAN Way mas- [ISEAS], 1994). sively impacts the manner in which member states 2 Adam Malik, In the Service of the Republic (Singapore: Gunung can exert regional leadership. Member states’ material Agung, 1980), 272. power resources – be they military, economic, or any- 3 Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN (see note 1), 287. 4 Michael Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy (London: Allen & Unwin, 1983). 5 Ibid., 181. SWP Berlin Indonesia in ASEAN April 2016 7 Ambition and Ambivalence: Indonesia’s Historic Role in ASEAN thing else – and the exercise of power through threat tion has been viewed and understood.8 In retrospect, it of coercion or through coercive power have taken is necessary to acknowledge that Indonesia’s commit- a backseat in favour of “softer” aspects of regional ment to ASEAN – as well as its willingness to push for, leadership, such as agenda-setting, mediation, and or procrastinate against, regional integration – has dif- innovation. Regional leadership in South-East Asia fered significantly across policy fields. The extent of this is therefore primarily to be understood as a “social commitment has largely hinged on whether greater category”.6 Member states that take on a leadership integration of Jakarta into ASEAN has been viewed as role in ASEAN do so on the basis of common norms being beneficial or harmful to Indonesia’s perceived and values rather than coercion. They are able to best national interests.9 Nonetheless, Indonesia’s general exercise leadership if their behaviour is viewed as image as regional leader and primus inter pares was coherent with the perceived identities and interests never challenged outright during the Suharto era. as well as the objectives of the other member states.7 This changed with the fall of Suharto. Indonesia’s That said, from the beginning, Indonesia’s ambigu- “natural” leadership position in ASEAN was severely ous stance towards greater regional integration brought into question during a multitude of domestic has often been viewed as being inconsistent with the challenges in the wake of the Asian crisis of 1997/98.10 country’s self-perception as a regional leader and the These challenges led Suharto’s successors Habibie, declaration of ASEAN as being the “cornerstone” of Wahid, and Megawati to focus primarily on domestic Indonesian foreign policy. Especially in the field of affairs, which in turn contributed less energy and economic integration, already during the Suharto era fewer resources towards the exercising of regional Indonesia began actively blocking or procrastinating leadership in ASEAN.11 Indonesia’s leadership crisis about any measures that would deepen regional inte- was – at least partially – overcome by the mid-2000s gration. To explain Indonesia’s ambivalence and am- under the presidency of Yudhoyono, when improved biguity with regard to regional integration, one has to domestic stability and economic growth enabled it to consider at least three interrelated factors. First of all, return to a more active role in the region. During the economic interdependence between Indonesia and its Bali summit in 2003, the member states decided to neighbours is limited, and so are the potential benefits deepen regional integration in order to transform of further regional economic integration for Indo- ASEAN into the ASEAN Community. Especially with nesia’s national economy. Second, there is a view on regard to the security aspects of the ASEAN Communi- economic cooperation in Jakarta that extends beyond ty, Indonesia did play a leading role. Besides, against the region in its search for potential partners. Third the background of its own successful democratisation are the diverging interests of member states with process, the country pushed for a stronger normative- regard to the key aspects of regional integration. For ly orientated community by introducing a number Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore, the dominant of initiatives to strengthen the protection of human prism through which regional integration has been rights in ASEAN. For example, it was due to the initia- viewed has traditionally been economic. For Indone- tive of Indonesia that the 2007 ASEAN charter pro- sia, however, security aspects of regional integration – vided for the establishment of a human rights com- especially regional stability and regional resilience mission. At the same time, Jakarta also pushed for an against the influence of external powers – have been overhaul of ASEAN’s traditional decision-making pro- the dominant prisms through which regional integra- cess with the aim of altering the principle of consen- sual decision-making. Among other things, Jakarta also pushed for the introduction of a mechanism to 6 Daniel Flemes and Detlef Nolte, “Introduction”, in Regional apply sanctions and increased financial contributions Leadership in the Global System. Ideas, Interests and Strategies of Regional Powers, ed. Daniel Flemes (Ashgate: Farnham, 2010): 1–14; Dirk Nabers, “Power, Leadership, and Hegemony in Inter- 8 Anthony L. Smith, Strategic Centrality: Indonesia’s Changing Role national Politics: The Case of East Asia”, Review of International in ASEAN (Singapore: ISEAS, 2000), 24. Studies 36, no. 4 (October 2010): 931–49. 9 Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN (see note 1), 277. 7 Daan van Knippenberg and Michael A. Hogg, “A Social Identity 10 These included the secession of East Timor (Timor Leste), the Model of Leadership Effectiveness in Organizations”, Research in eruption and escalation of several violent secessionist and inter- Organizational Behavior 25 (2003): 243–95; Oran R. Young, “Politi- communal conflicts in various parts of the country, a manifest cal Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of economic crisis, newly emerging terrorist threats, and a far- Institutions in International Society”, International Organization reaching political transformations after 1998. 45, no. 3 (June 1991): 281–308. 11 Smith, Strategic Centrality (see note 8), 875. SWP Berlin Indonesia in ASEAN April 2016 8 Ambition and Ambivalence: Indonesia’s Historic Role in ASEAN by the member states to the ASEAN secretariat to im- eign policy initiatives, Jakarta’s successful mediation prove the dire financial resources of the secretariat. during the Thai–Cambodian border conflict in 2011 However, Indonesia’s return to the fore of ASEAN and its diplomatic initiatives in the wake of Cyclone during the Yudhoyono presidency also revealed the Nargis, which led to an end of the blockade of humani- continued existence of a gap between Jakarta’s am- tarian aid by Myanmar’s military junta, can be seen as bitious rhetoric and realities on the ground. It was evidence for Indonesia’s continued aspiration to act indeed Jakarta that heavily influenced ASEAN’s reform as a regional leader under the Yudhoyono administra- agenda and drove demands for a deepening of regional tion.16 Moreover, against this backdrop of an evolving integration, thereby performing in line with its self- Sino–U.S. rivalry over hegemony in South-East Asia, ascription as the region’s norm entrepreneur and agenda- ASEAN was increasingly ascribed a central position in setter.12 Yet, when engaging with the concrete formu- Yudhoyono’s quest towards the creation of a “dynamic lation of regional policies and their implementation, equilibrium”17 in the region.18 What is nonetheless the limits of Indonesian leadership became apparent. striking is that the attribution of a regional leadership Almost all reform initiatives fell victim to resistance role to Indonesia is, by and large,19 based on the coun- from other ASEAN member states. Similarly, the 2007 try’s policy initiatives in the fields of foreign policy adoption of the ASEAN charter did not involve an and security and defence.20 Indonesian contributions overhaul of the ASEAN Way. Quite the contrary, estab- to other policy fields, namely in the AEC and ASCC, lished norms and structures were, in fact, maintained have remained largely unconsidered. This study aims and further codified.13 to close this apparent gap through a comparative Dissatisfaction over the cumbersome regional policy analysis of six different policy fields. integration process led to an intra-Indonesia contro- versy over the extent to which the country’s foreign policy should be pegged to ASEAN, ASEAN’s overall significance, and Jakarta’s future role in the organisa- tion. Some observers described ASEAN as a golden cage for Indonesian foreign policy and called for an eman- cipation from ASEAN.14 Demands for a post-ASEAN foreign policy, however, did not materialise into yono, the President of the Republic of Indonesia, before the 13th actual policy during the Yudhoyono administration. General Assembly of the Veterans Confederation of ASEAN Coun- The administration did not disavow ASEAN as the tries, State Palace” (Jakarta, 28 April 2010), http://www.kemlu. cornerstone of Indonesian foreign policy – even when go.id/Pages/SpeechTranscriptionDisplay.aspx?Name1=Pidato& Name2=Presiden&IDP=642&l=en (accessed 23 October 2014); the country started to display a more global orienta- “Remarks by Dr. R. M. Marty M. Natalegawa, Minister for Foreign tion and increased activism on the global stage (e.g. Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, at the Ceremony for the Transfer through the establishment of the Bali Democracy of Office of the Secretary-General of ASEAN” (Jakarta: ASEAN Sec- Forum or its G 20-membership).15 Among other for- retariat, 9 January 2013), http://www.kemlu.go.id/Pages/Speech TranscriptionDisplay.aspx?Name1=Pidato&Name2=Menteri& 12 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, “Indonesia’s Role as a Regional IDP=792&l=en (accessed 23 October 2014). and Global Actor”, Wilton Park Annual Address (London, 2 Novem- 16 Erlina Widyaningsih and Christopher B. Roberts, Indonesia in ber 2012), http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/president-yudhoyonos- ASEAN: Mediation, Leadership and Extra-mural Diplomacy (Canberra: speech-at-our-annual-address/ (accessed 3 April 2015). Australian National University, May 2014), http://nsc.anu.edu.au/ 13 Sebastian Bersick and Felix Heiduk, Im Krebsgang nach vorn: documents/Indonesia-Article13.pdf (accessed 24 September 2015). Die Asean hat sich eine Charta gegeben, SWP-Aktuell 65/2007 (Berlin: 17 A Conversation with Marty Natalegawa, Washington D.C.: Coun- Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, December 2007). cil on Foreign Relations, 27 September 2011, http://www.cfr.org/ 14 Jusuf Wanandi, “Indonesia’s Foreign Policy and the Meaning indonesia/conversation-marty-natalegawa/p26047 (accessed 23 of ASEAN”, PacNet 27, 15 May 2008, http://csis.org/files/media/ October 2014). csis/pubs/pac0827.pdf; Rizal Sukma, “Indonesia Needs a Post- 18 See Seng Tan, Indonesia among the Powers: Should ASEAN Still ASEAN Foreign Policy”, The Jakarta Post (online), 30 June 2009. Matter to Indonesia? (Canberra: Australian National University, 15 “Statement by H. E. Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Presi- May 2014), http://nsc.anu.edu.au/documents/Indonesia-Article14. dent of the Republic of Indonesia, as the ASEAN Coordinator, at pdf (accessed 24 September 2015). the Opening Ceremony of the Sixth ASEM Summit and Celebra- 19 Smith, Strategic Centrality (see note 8). tion of Ten Years of ASEM” (Helsinki, 10 September 2006), http:// 20 Ralf Emmers, “Indonesia’s Role in ASEAN: A Case of Incom- www.kemlu.go.id/Pages/Speech TranscriptionDisplay.aspx? plete and Sectorial Leadership”, The Pacific Review 27, no. 4 (2014): Name1=Pidato&Name2=Presiden&IDP=266&l=en (accessed 543–62; Donald E. Weatherbee, Indonesia in ASEAN. Vision and 23 October 2014); “Remarks by H. E. Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudho- Reality (Singapore: ISEAS, 2014). SWP Berlin Indonesia in ASEAN April 2016 9 Indonesia in ASEAN Indonesia and the APSC: Indonesia’s political elites that ASEAN should be at Conflict- and Crisis Management the centre of South-East Asia’s regional security archi- tecture in order to minimise the influence of external Statistics show that the ASEAN region has been rather actors and to enable the development of regional, successful in preventing inter-state conflicts from ASEAN-led solutions for regional security challenges. escalating into full-blown wars. Compared to the pre- However, with the end of the Cold War – and the ASEAN period, casualty rates from armed conflicts subsequent changes at the international and regional have been reduced by 93 per cent, and no outright levels – the region was quickly facing new challenges. inter-state war has taken place since the founding of For one, ASEAN membership expanded due to the four the organisation. This does not equate to a complete Communist states of the south-east mainland joining absence of inter-state armed conflicts in the region, the organisation. Moreover, many states in the region but all of them have remained below the threshold were confronted with a wide range of so-called new of inter-state warfare. The recent Thai–Cambodian security threats, including terrorism, intra-state con- border conflict is a case in point. Hence, it is not flicts, and pandemics. Also, the perception of Indo- ASEAN’s ability to resolve conflicts that best character- nesia as the backbone of regional security was brought ises the region’s “long peace”, but rather its ability to into question by a number of domestic issues, such as prevent them from escalating into full-blown wars.21 the difficult and cumbersome transition to democracy, Within this context, Indonesia has come to play a an escalation of secessionist conflicts, and the terror noteworthy role. attacks of the Islamist Jemaah Islamiyah network. As Before the founding of ASEAN, a number of coun- a result, Indonesia appeared instable, weak, and to tries that would later become member states were some, even at the brink of disintegration.24 involved in military conflicts with each other. Above Likewise, the rise of China and the associated Sino– all, it was the military conflict between Malaysia and American competition over power and influence in Indonesia during the konfrontasi period between 1963 South-East Asia put the regional security architecture and 1966 that had caught the attention of observers to the test.25 Within the region, the ASEAN states and policy-makers at the time. In many ways, ASEAN’s responded by tightening intra-regional cooperation. establishment was a reaction to Indonesia’s konfrontasi Beyond South-East Asia, they were able to maintain policy under Sukarno. Indonesia’s self-restraint and ASEAN’s position at the centre of the regional security integration into ASEAN – and the pre-eminence of the architecture by embedding the United States, China, principles of non-intervention and peaceful conflict and other external powers into ASEAN-led multilateral resolution – brought a change in perceptions about institutions. Most notably, these include the ASEAN Indonesia. The country went from being regarded as Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS), and the leading cause of regional instability to being a the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus.26 “backbone” of the regional security architecture.22 This view correlated with Indonesia playing a big part 24 Tim Huxley, Disintegrating Indonesia? Implications for Regional in the search for a diplomatic solution to the Cam- Security (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002). bodian civil war at the end of the 1980s in the lead-up 25 Lee Jones, “Still in the ‘Drivers’ Seat’, But for How Long? to the Paris peace conference.23 Aiding the change ASEAN’s Capacity for Leadership in East-Asian International in perception was the widespread conviction among Relations”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 29, no. 3 (2010): 95–113. 21 Timo Kivimäki, “Southeast Asia and Conflict Prevention. Is 26 Rizal Sukma, “The Accidental Driver: ASEAN in the ASEAN ASEAN Running out of Steam?”, The Pacific Review 25, no. 4 (2012): Regional Forum”, in Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific. The ASEAN 403–27 (409). Regional Forum, ed. Jürgen Haacke and Noel M. Morada (London: 22 Emmers, “Indonesia’s Role in ASEAN” (see note 20), 5. Routledge, 2010): 111–23; Hassan Wirajuda, “Keynote Address on 23 Amitav Acharya, Indonesia Matters. Asia’s Emerging Democratic ‘Regional Integration in the Asia-Pacific’” (Jakarta, 7 December Power (Singapore: World Scientific, 2014), 53. 2007), http://www.kemlu.go.id/Pages/SpeechTranscription SWP Berlin Indonesia in ASEAN April 2016 10