Individual criminal liability for the international crime of aggression Gerhard Kemp Dissertation presented for the Degree of Doctor of Law at Stellenbosch University Promoter: Prof MG Erasmus Co-promoter: Prof SE van der Merwe March 2008 Declaration By submitting this dissertation electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the owner of the copyright thereof (unless to the extent explicitly otherwise stated) and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification. Date: 19 February 2008 Copyright © 2008 Stellenbosch University All rights reserved ii Summary Aggression is regarded as one of the core crimes under customary international law, but the definition of aggression is still contentious. At present there is no international instrument that provides for effective individual criminal liability for the crime of aggression. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) provides for the inclusion of the crime of aggression within the court’s jurisdiction, but the Statute needs to be amended to include a definition of aggression and conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC. This dissertation seeks to identify the elements of the international crime of aggression, for purposes of individual criminal liability. It is submitted that the creation of the ICC provides the international community with an historic opportunity to establish effective jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. Part A puts the research problem in its proper context. The international political and legal system, based on state sovereignty, provides the background to the analysis. The problem of individual criminal liability for aggression is also put in the context of the evolving system of international criminal law. In Part B the normative roots of the criminalisation of aggression are analysed. Collective security and the jus contra bellum (the international prohibition of the use of force) form part of the normative framework in terms of which the criminalisation of aggression has to be understood. These features of the international system are also protected interests underlying the criminalisation of aggression. It is argued that collective security (as an institutional/political iii response to aggression and other threats to peace and security) must be seen as complementing the criminal justice response to aggression. Part C deals with the history of the criminalisation of aggression, in particular the post-Second World War trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo. These trials resulted in important judgments that form the essential core of the crime of aggression under customary international law. The trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo were followed by various attempts to find a suitable definition for aggression. None of these attempts (analysed in Chapter 4) were successful. In Part D the crime of aggression is analysed in the context of the application of international (criminal) law in national legal systems. In the absence of international tribunals with effective jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, the possibility to prosecute aggression in national courts is investigated. The customary international law status of aggression is explored. It is argued that, although aggression can indeed be regarded as a crime under customary international law, there are a number of doctrinal, constitutional and other legal problems that impede the prosecution of aggression in national courts. National legislation would be needed to remedy (some) of these problems. The adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998 provides states party with an opportunity to adopt a suitable definition of aggression. In turn, this will be an impetus for states to provide for aggression in domestic criminal law. The diplomatic and legal drafting processes concerning the amendment of the Rome Statute to provide for a definition of aggression and for conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC, are dealt with in Part E. The conclusion arrived iv at and submissions made in Part F are that any definition of aggression for purposes of the ICC jurisdiction must have a rational basis. The essential elements and protected interests underlying the criminalisation of aggression are identified. It is submitted that the interests of peace and security are best served by acknowledging the different (but complementing) political and criminal justice responses to aggression. A realistic definition of aggression and conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC that acknowledges the role of the institutions of collective security will furthermore result in a framework for states to provide for aggression as a crime in domestic law. v Opsomming Aggressie word as een van die kern misdade in die internasionale gewoontereg beskou. Die definisie van aggressie is omstrede. Daar is tans nie ‘n internasionale konvensie wat voorsiening maak vir individuele strafregtelike aanspreeklikheid vir die misdaad aggressie nie. Die Rome Statuut van die Internasionale Strafhof bepaal dat die misdaad van aggressie binne die hof se jurisdiksie val, op voorwaarde dat die Statuut gewysig word om voorsiening te maak vir ‘n definisie van aggressie en vir voorwaardes vir die uitoefening van jurisdiksie. Hierdie proefskrif het ten doel om die elemente van die internasionale misdaad van aggressie (vir doeleindes van individuele strafregtelike aanspreeklikheid) te identifiseer. Daar word aan die hand gedoen dat die totstandkoming van die Internasionale Strafhof ‘n historiese geleentheid vir die internasionale gemeenskap bied om effektiewe jurisdiksie oor die misdaad van aggressie te vestig. Deel A plaas die navorsingsprobleem in behoorlike konteks. Die internasionale politieke en regsstelsel wat op soewereiniteit van state gebaseer is, vorm die agtergrond tot die analise. Die probleme rondom individuele strafregtelike aanspreeklikheid vir aggressie word ook in die konteks van die ontluikende stelsel van internasionale strafreg gestel. In Deel B word daar ondersoek ingestel na die normatiewe basis vir die kriminalisering van aggressie. Kollektiewe sekerheid en die jus contra bellum (die internasionale verbod op die gebruik van geweld) vorm deel van die normatiewe raamwerk waarbinne die kriminalisering van aggressie beskou moet word. Die kenmerke van die internasionale stelsel is ook die beskermde belange wat die kriminalisering van aggressie onderlê. Daar word aan die hand gedoen dat vi kollektiewe sekerheid (‘n institusionele/politieke reaksie op aggressie en ander bedreigings vir vrede en veiligheid) beskou moet word as aanvullend tot die strafregtelike reaksie op aggressie. In Deel C word die geskiedenis van die kriminalisering van aggressie (in die besonder die post-Tweede Wêreldoorlogse verhore te Nuremberg en Tokyo) behandel. Hierdie verhore het gelei tot die belangrike uitsprake wat in essensie die kern van die gewoonteregtelike misdaad van aggresssie uitmaak. Na die verhore te Nuremberg en Tokyo was daar verskeie pogings om ‘n geskikte definisie van aggressie te formuleer. Hierdie pogings (wat in Hoofstuk 4 behandel word) was grootliks onsuksesvol. Deel D behels die toepassing van internasionale strafreg in nasionale regstelsels. Aangesien daar tans geen internasionale tribunale is met jurisdiksie oor die misdaad aggressie nie, is dit nodig om vas te stel of dit moontlik is om die misdaad in nasionale howe te vervolg. Die gewoonteregtelike status van aggressie word vir die doel ondersoek. Ten spyte van die gewoonteregtelike status van die misdaad aggressie is daar tog etlike dogmatiese, grondwetlike en ander regswetenskaplike redes wat die vervolging van aggressie in nasionale howe bemoeilik. Nasionale wetgewing sou van die probleme kan aanspreek. Die aanvaarding van die Statuut van Rome bied aan state wat partye is tot die Statuut die geleentheid om by te dra tot die proses om ‘n geskikte definisie vir aggressie te formuleer. Hierdie proses kan help dat state ook op nasionale vlak voorsiening maak vir die misdaad aggressie. vii In Deel E word daar ondersoek ingestel na die diplomatieke en regsskrywende prosesse tov die wysiging van die Statuut van Rome. Dit het ten doel om ‘n definisie van aggressie en voorwaardes vir die uitoefening van jurisdiksie deur die Internasionale Strafhof te formuleer. Daar word tot die gevolgtrekking gekom en die voorstel word in Deel F gemaak dat enige definisie van aggressie vir doeleindes van jurisdiksie van die Internasionale Strafhof ‘n rasionele basis moet hê. Die wesenlike elemente en beskermde belange onderliggend aan die kriminalisering van aggressie word identifiseer. Daar word aan die hand gedoen dat die belange van vrede en sekerheid die beste gedien word deur aanvaarding van die verskillende (maar aanvullende) politieke en strafregtelike reaksies op aggressie. ‘n Realistiese definisie van aggressie en voorwaardes vir die uitoefening van jurisdiksie deur die Internasionale Strafhof wat die rol van die instellings wat gemoeid is met kollektiewe sekerheid erken, sal bydra tot ‘n raamwerk waarbinne state vir die misdaad van aggressie in nasionale reg voorsiening kan maak. viii For my parents; and for Andra Soli Deo Gloria ix Acknowledgements A number of individuals and institutions have supported me in this project. I would like to acknowledge in particular: • Andra, for her love and support; • My supervisors, Prof MG Erasmus and Prof Steph van der Merwe, for their guidance and critical input; • My parents and sisters, for their support and encouragement; • Prof Christine van den Wyngaert (Judge of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; Professor of International Criminal Law at the University of Antwerp), for introducing me to the fascinating and fast developing field of international criminal law, and for her continued support and friendship; • Prof Erik Jurgens (Professor of Law at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and former member of the Dutch Parliament) for his support during my research visit to the Netherlands in 2004; • My colleagues in the Department of Public Law, Stellenbosch University, for their support and encouragement; • Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and Stellenbosch University for financial and research assistance. x