IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GUAM KAMLESH K. HEMLANI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MANU and ANITA MELWANI, JETHMAL K. MELWANI, ISHWAR P. HEMLANI, VINOD I. and YOGITA V. HEMLANI, RADHI P. HEMLANI ESTATE, PARAMANAND MELWANI ESTATE, RADHI’S FOUNDATION, RADHI PURAN TRUST, RADHI FAMILY TRUST, PACIFIC RAINBOW, INC., SAFETY 1ST SYSTEMS INC., PACIFIC AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE & ESCROW COMPANY, VASUDEV B. HEMLANI, P.D. HEMLANI FOUNDATION, LTD., CHITRA HEMLANI, SONA HEMLANI, PADI DARYANANI, and DOES 1-95, Defendant-Appellees. Supreme Court Case No.: CVA15-023 Superior Court Case No.: CV1527-13 OPINION Cite as: 2016 Guam 33 Appeal from the Superior Court of Guam Argued and submitted on May 25, 2016 Hagåtña, Guam Hemlani v. Melwani, 2016 Guam 33, Opinion Page 2 of 18 Appearing for Plaintiff-Appellant: Appearing for Defendant-Appellees P.D. Thomas M. Tarpley, Esq. Hemlani Foundation, Ltd. and Vasudev B. Thomas McKee Tarpley Law Firm Hemlani: 414 W. Soledad Ave., Ste. 904 Rodney J. Jacob, Esq. Hagåtña, GU 96910 Calvo Fisher & Jacob LLP 259 Martyr St., Ste. 100 Hagåtña, GU 96910 Appearing for Defendant-Appellees Manu P. Melwani, Anita Melwani, Jethmal Melwani, Ishwar Hemlani, Vinod Hemlani, Yogita Hemlani, Estate of Parmanand Melwani, Radhi Puran Trust, Radhi Family Trust, Pacific Rainbow, Inc., Safety 1st Systems, Inc., Pacific American Title Insurance & Escrow Company, Chitra Hemlani, Sona Hemlani, Padi Daryanani, and Does 1-95: Bill R. Mann, Esq. Berman O’Connor & Mann 111 Chalan Santo Papa, Ste. 503 Hagåtña, GU 96910 Appearing for Defendant-Appellee Radhi P. Hemlani Estate: Rawlen M.T. Mantanona, Esq. Cabot Mantanona LLP 929 S. Marine Corps Dr., Ste. 200 Tamuning, GU 96913 Appearing for Defendant-Appellee Radhi’s Foundation: Louie J. Yanza, Esq. Yanza Flynn Timblin LLP 446 E. Marine Corps Dr., Ste. 201 Hagåtña, GU 96910 Hemlani v. Melwani, 2016 Guam 33, Opinion Page 3 of 18 BEFORE: ROBERT J. TORRES, Chief Justice; F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO, Associate Justice; KATHERINE A. MARAMAN, Associate Justice. MARAMAN, J.: [1] Plaintiff-Appellant Kamlesh K. Hemlani (“Kamlesh”) appeals the Superior Court’s final judgment dismissing his complaint for lack of standing and disposing of all claims therein. The lower court found that Kamlesh could not have standing as trustee following trust termination and that a separate lis pendens fell within the statutory sham exception, foreclosing sanctions and fees. For the reasons contained herein, we reverse both of these rulings. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND [2] This case is a continuation of a longstanding familial dispute among these parties over a trust established by P.D. Hemlani (“P.D.”) and Radhi Hemlani (“Radhi”), husband and wife, both now deceased. The Defendant-Appellees in this action are Manu P. Melwani and associated appellees1 (the “Manu Appellees”), the Radhi P. Hemlani Estate (the “Estate”), Radhi’s Foundation, and Vasudev B. Hemlani and the P.D. Hemlani Foundation, Ltd. (“PDHF/Vashi”). A. The Radhi Puran Trust [3] Over the course of their lifetimes, P.D. and Radhi accumulated assets worth millions of dollars. Their estate plan centered on the creation of the Radhi Puran Trust (the “RPT”), a Guam private trust. The RPT was to be overseen by its trustees, which were initially P.D. and Radhi. [4] Under the RPT instrument (the “Instrument”), Jack Hemlani, Ishwar Hemlani (“Don”), and Vashi were to be appointed successor co-trustees upon the death of the last surviving initial 1 The associated appellees are Anita Melwani, Jethmal Melwani, Ishwar Hemlani, Vinod Hemlani, Yogita Hemlani, Estate of Parmanand Melwani, Radhi Puran Trust, Radhi Family Trust, Pacific Rainbow, Inc., Safety 1st Systems, Inc., Pacific American Title Insurance & Escrow Company, Chitra Hemlani, Sona Hemlani, Padi Daryanani, and Does 1-95. Hemlani v. Melwani, 2016 Guam 33, Opinion Page 4 of 18 trustee. If any one of the three successor co-trustees died, resigned, was removed, or was incapacitated, the remaining two successor co-trustees were to appoint a third successor co- trustee so that there would always be three successor co-trustees. A majority of the successor co- trustees was required to bind the trust for all purposes. The trust agreement was subsequently altered by P.D. and Radhi, amending the successor co-trustees to be Kamlesh, Don, and Vashi. [5] Under sections 5.02(A) and (B) of the Instrument, after one settlor’s death, a Survivor’s Trust and a Residuary Trust were meant to be created. Under section 5.05(B), the Instrument provided, “Upon the death of the Surviving SETTLOR, the TRUSTEE shall distribute the balance then remaining of the Residuary Trust to the RADHI FOUNDATION, a Guam not for profit corporation.”2 Record on Appeal (“RA”), tab 1, Ex. 6 at V3 (The Radhi Puran Trust, 1997). B. Vashi’s 2009 Lawsuit, the Memorandum of Settlement and the Creation of the PDHF [6] P.D. passed away on March 12, 2004, leaving Radhi as the sole remaining trustee. Radhi then amended the trust several times and eventually, on September 4, 2009, she revoked the Survivor’s Trust. After allegations of misconduct regarding the validity of Radhi’s amendments and revocation of the trust, Vashi filed suit, naming Radhi, Manu, Don, Radhi’s Foundation, and others as defendants. The issue in that case was determining what portion of the trust assets constituted Radhi’s share in the community property such that she could claim the property as a result of revoking the Survivor’s Trust. In July 2011, the parties entered into a Memorandum of Settlement and the entire action was dismissed with prejudice by Stipulation and Order of the Superior Court. The Memorandum of Settlement called for the restoration of certain assets to 2 The identity of Radhi’s Foundation referred to in the RPT Instrument may be in doubt. However, this determination is unnecessary for resolution of the issues on appeal. Hemlani v. Melwani, 2016 Guam 33, Opinion Page 5 of 18 Radhi, the Radhi’s Foundation or the RPT and for the creation of the PDHF “with the same charitable purpose as Radhi’s Foundation . . . consistent with the charter it filed in 1991.” RA, tab 1, Ex. 26 at 1 (Mem. of Settlement, July 2011). Under the Memorandum of Settlement, the PDHF was to operate as a separate charitable entity and immediately receive assets. 1. The Guardianship Proceeding [7] On November 7, 2011, after the Memorandum of Settlement was executed, Kishore Hemlani filed a petition for guardianship over Radhi. The Guardianship Court appointed the Office of the Public Guardian (“OPG”) as trustee ad litem of the RPT, but noted that it was not making a finding regarding Radhi’s capacity. 2. Kamlesh’s First Lawsuit [8] On June 25, 2012, Kamlesh filed a complaint in the Superior Court, alleging that Radhi was incompetent and that he had become a successor co-trustee to the RPT as a result of Radhi’s alleged incompetence. In that matter, the Superior Court found that Radhi had not been determined to be incompetent, and as a result “she remains the sole trustee of the Radhi Puran Trust; and so she shall remain unless and until one of the conditions provided for in the trust instrument is satisfied.” Kamlesh K. Hemlani v. Radhi P. Hemlani, et al., CV0758-12 (Dec. & Order at 5, July 9, 2013). The court therefore concluded that Kamlesh did not have standing at that time and dismissed his complaint. Kamlesh did not appeal this decision. Subsequently, Radhi died on August 18, 2013. 3. Kamlesh’s Present Lawsuit [9] Kamlesh filed this case, claiming to be a successor co-trustee to the RPT as a result of Radhi’s death and asserting multiple causes of action on the basis that he therefore has standing as trustee. Following the completion of discovery, the trial court dismissed Kamlesh’s complaint Hemlani v. Melwani, 2016 Guam 33, Opinion Page 6 of 18 for lack of standing, granting defendants’ motions for summary judgment. Kamlesh appeals this ruling. [10] The Manu Appellees had also previously filed a counterclaim against Kamlesh for malicious prosecution. This claim alleged the wrongful recording of a notice of lis pendens against certain property owned by Manu, in Kamlesh’s previous lawsuit. Kamlesh filed a motion to dismiss the malicious prosecution counterclaim and for attorney’s fees, costs, and sanctions under Guam’s Citizen Participation in Government Act (“CPGA”), arguing the counterclaim was a violation of Guam law. The trial court granted Kamlesh’s motion to dismiss the malicious prosecution counterclaim, but denied Kamlesh’s request for attorney’s fees, costs, and sanctions under the CPGA, reasoning that such remedy was barred by failure to comply with the notice of lis pendens statute. Kamlesh now also appeals the trial court’s denial of sanctions and fees under the CPGA. II. JURISDICTION [11] This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 48 U.S.C.A. § 1424-1(a)(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. 114-248 (2016)) and 7 GCA §§ 3107 and 3108(a) (2005). III. STANDARD OF REVIEW [12] We review the trial court’s granting of a motion for summary judgment de novo. Zahnen v. Limtiaco, 2008 Guam 5 ¶ 8 (citing Paulino v. Biscoe, 2000 Guam 13 ¶ 12). When deciding on a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw inferences and view the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Bank of Guam v. Flores, 2004 Guam 25 ¶ 7 (citing Edwards v. Pac. Fin. Corp., 2000 Guam 27 ¶ 7). Our “ultimate inquiry is to determine whether the ‘specific fact’ set forth by the non-moving party, coupled with undisputed background or contextual facts, are such that a rational or reasonable jury might return a verdict in its favor Hemlani v. Melwani, 2016 Guam 33, Opinion Page 7 of 18 based on that evidence.” Edwards, 2000 Guam 27 ¶ 7 (quoting Iizuka Corp. v. Kawasho Int’l (Guam) Inc., 1997 Guam ¶ 8). [13] “A trial court’s decision on whether a party has standing is reviewed de novo.” Macris v. Guam Mem’l Hosp. Auth., 2008 Guam 6 ¶ 8 (quoting Benavente v. Taitano, 2006 Guam 15 ¶ 10). Determining standing presents questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact, both of which are reviewed de novo. See Hawaiian Rock Prods. Corp. v. Ocean Hous., Inc., 2016 Guam 4 ¶ 13 (citing Lujan v. Lujan, 2012 Guam 7 ¶ 18 (questions of law are reviewed de novo); Gutierrez v. Guam Power Auth., 2013 Guam 1 ¶ 8 (mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed de novo)). [14] Our review also requires interpretation of the CPGA and notice of lis pendens statutes. “The interpretation of a statute is a legal question subject to de novo review.” Guerrero v. Santo Thomas, 2010 Guam 11 ¶ 8 (citing Apana v. Rosario, 2000 Guam 7 ¶ 9). IV. ANALYSIS [15] The parties expend much effort in arguing factual allegations that played no role in the trial court’s decision and are largely inapplicable to the issues on appeal. By way of clarity, the only meaningful inquiries for this appeal are whether Kamlesh had standing for his lawsuit as trustee of the RPT and whether the trial court erred in denying Kamlesh anti-SLAPP relief when dismissing Manu’s counterclaim. A. Standing [16] The trial court’s dismissal rested on the finding that Kamlesh had no standing to prosecute the RPT’s claims. Kamlesh first appeals this ruling, arguing that as trustee, he had power to bring claims on behalf of the RPT as part of his winding up capabilities. Appellant’s Br. at 13-24 (Feb. 16, 2016). Hemlani v. Melwani, 2016 Guam 33, Opinion Page 8 of 18 [17] Standing is a requirement of subject matter jurisdiction that must be determined as of the date of filing of the complaint. Taitano v. Lujan, 2005 Guam 26 ¶ 15 (citation omitted); Wilbur v. Locke, 423 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Kitty Hawk Aircargo, Inc. v. Chao, 418 F.3d 453, 460 (5th Cir. 2005)), abrogated on other grounds by Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. 413 (2010); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 570 n.4 (1992) (“The existence of federal jurisdiction ordinarily depends on the facts as they exist when the complaint is filed.” (citation omitted)). A plaintiff cannot rely on events unfolding after the filing of a complaint to establish his or her standing. Wilbur, 423 F.3d at 1107. Where a plaintiff has no standing, the trial court has no subject matter jurisdiction and its only course of action is to announce that it has no jurisdiction and dismiss the case. DFS Guam L.P. v. A.B. Won Pat Int’l Airport Auth., 2014 Guam 12 ¶ 14 (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998)). Therefore, a party lacking standing necessarily lacks the ability to prosecute a claim. See Taitano, 2005 Guam 26 ¶ 15. [18] This court has adopted traditional standing requirements, meaning parties must possess either statutory or common law standing.3 Benavente, 2006 Guam 15 ¶¶ 16-18 (citations omitted). Standing is not merely a pleading requirement, but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case; thus, it must be supported in the “same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561 (1992) (citations 3 The parties do not allege that there is a statutory basis for standing. To establish constitutional common law standing, a party must show: (1) it has suffered an “injury in fact” that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Pia Marine Homeowners Ass’n v. Kinoshita Corp. Guam, Inc., 2013 Guam 6 ¶ 16 (citation omitted). Hemlani v. Melwani, 2016 Guam 33, Opinion Page 9 of 18 omitted). Therefore, at the summary judgment stage of litigation, a plaintiff carries the burden of establishing standing by setting forth evidence of specific facts. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148-49 (2013) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the crucial inquiry at hand is whether Kamlesh set forth sufficient evidence of specific facts to establish standing as trustee of the RPT for his claims. [19] A trustee acts on behalf of the trust, and generally has standing to bring claims on its behalf during the life of the trust. See 18 GCA § 66301 (2005) (“A trustee is a general agent for the trust property. . . . His acts, within the scope of his authority, bind the trust property to the same extent as the acts of an agent bind his principal.”). However, it does not necessarily follow that a trustee remains cloaked in trust authority where he takes action after the trust has ended, during the winding up phase. Because Kamlesh initiated legal proceedings after P.D. and Radhi passed away, the circumstances of this case beget a determination of the end of the RPT, and an analysis as to the extent of a trustee’s winding up powers. 1. The Ending of the RPT [20] Guam law provides that “[a] trust is extinguished by the entire fulfillment of its object, or by such object becoming impossible or unlawful.” 18 GCA § 66501 (2005). Courts interpret trusts as contracts and, therefore, the intent of the parties to a trust instrument, like a contract, is generally restricted by the plain meaning of the trust instrument terms. See Goldin v. Bartholow, 166 F.3d 710, 715 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); Wasson v. Berg, 2007 Guam 16 ¶ 10 (citations omitted). It is therefore incumbent to review the RPT’s object or purpose and determine when this was fulfilled. [21] The trial court reasoned that the RPT Instrument is unambiguous in stating that upon Radhi’s death, the successor co-trustees were to distribute the Residuary Trust balance to the Hemlani v. Melwani, 2016 Guam 33, Opinion Page 10 of 18 Radhi’s Foundation. RA, tab 334 at 4-6 (Dec. & Order, July 14, 2015). Citing Salvation Army v. Price, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 925, 928 (Ct. App. 1995), for the principle that the trustee’s title ceases when the trust’s objects are performed, the trial court found that given the RPT’s purposes of caring for P.D. and Radhi and distributing their property, the only remaining task was to wind up the RPT upon their deaths. Id. at 6-7. As for standing, the trial court found that upon Radhi’s death, the trust terminated and the only power the trustees had left was to convey trust property to the Radhi’s Foundation. Id. at 8. Citing Goldin, 166 F.3d at 718, the trial court found that “when a trust terminates, the trustee no longer has any personal, substantial interest in the outcome of a litigation involving the trust.” Id. at 8. Therefore, the trial court reasoned that the trust terminated when Radhi died, and Kamlesh did not have standing to bring suit. Id. [22] A trust will terminate by relevant operation of law upon the expiration of a period or happening of an event as provided in the trust, or when the trust purpose is fulfilled. See Ball v. Mann, 199 P.2d 706, 708-09 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 61 (2003). The RPT was established: [T]o provide for the orderly disposition of the SETTLORS’ property upon the SETTLORS’ deaths and the efficient administration of the trust assets in the event of incapacity. During the SETTLORS’ lives, the SETTLORS retain full power to control the use, enjoyment and management of the Trust and shall be the primary beneficiaries of this Trust. RA, tab 1, Ex. 6 at Preamble (The Radhi Puran Trust, 1997). Section 5.05(B) of the Instrument states that “[u]pon the death of the Surviving SETTLOR, the TRUSTEE shall distribute the balance then remaining of the Residuary Trust to the RADHI FOUNDATION.” Id. at V-3. Thus, the object and purpose of the RPT was to manage its assets and provide for the settlors during their life, and then distribute remaining assets upon death of the last remaining settlor, which was Radhi. When the object and purpose were complete, the RPT would end.