UN/World Bank PCNA Review In Support of Peacebuilding: Strengthening the Post Conflict Needs Assessment January 2007 PCNA Review Report, January 2007 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY..............................................................................................................3 I. Background and Context...................................................................................................4 II: Methodology......................................................................................................................4 III: Results of Phase One.......................................................................................................5 IV: Strategic Themes and Questions......................................................................................5 A. Definitions.........................................................................................................................5 B. Five Key Themes..............................................................................................................6 V: Substantive Challenges and “Big Picture” Issues.............................................................7 A. Prevailing Context: Impact on PCNA Process.................................................................7 B. Improving on Key Aspects: The Big Picture.....................................................................9 VI. Cross-Cutting Issues......................................................................................................14 A. Review of Current Guidance and Practice.....................................................................14 B. Prevailing Context: Impact on the PCNA Process.........................................................16 C. Addressing Cross-Cutting Issues in the PCNA/TRM......................................................16 VII. Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding............................................................................17 A. Review of Current Guidance and Practice......................................................................17 B. Prevailing Context: Impact on the PCNA Process..........................................................17 C. Addressing Key Issues in the PCNA/TRM......................................................................18 VIII. Security Sector Issues....................................................................................................21 A. Review of Current Guidance and Practice......................................................................21 B. Prevailing Context: Impact on the PCNA Process.........................................................22 C. Addressing Key Issues in the PCNA/TRM......................................................................23 IX. State-Building: Support to Core State Functions...........................................................24 A. Review of Current Guidance and Practice......................................................................24 B. Prevailing Context...........................................................................................................24 C. Addressing Core State Functions in the PCNA/TRM......................................................25 X. Operational......................................................................................................................27 XI: From Assessment to Action............................................................................................30 A. Refining the PCNA..........................................................................................................31 B. Linkages with Resource Mobilization..............................................................................31 XII. CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS..............................................................................33 2 PCNA Review Report, January 2007 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The United Nations and World Bank have undertaken a joint review of four years of experience with Post Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNAs) to identify lessons and improve future exercises. The main findings and recommendations of the Review, validated in the 30 November 2006 stakeholder workshop, are: • PCNAs, and their resulting Transitional Results Matrices (TRMs), are conducted in inherently fragile settings with high risk of reversion to conflict. In future, resulting plans should more clearly articulate the stabilization measures that will address the risk of reversal into conflict and the transformation measures that will serve to re-establish the foundation for achieving MDGs. • PCNAs typically take place in post-conflict countries governed by transitional authorities with two to three year mandates, prior to elections; PCNA/TRMs need more explicitly to address the challenges of ownership, sequencing, prioritization, accountability, and legitimacy that this dynamic entails. • Appropriate balance must be struck between the urgency of producing an actionable plan to lend credibility to a fragile peace, and that plan’s comprehensiveness, inclusiveness, and national ownership. Recognizing that each country setting is different, the aim should be to present an actionable plan in a process that is completed in 4 to 6 months. To the extent this timeframe is insufficient to achieve the degree of comprehensiveness, inclusion and ownership desired, deliberate measures should be built into the TRM implementation plan to redress the shortcomings. • An explicit pre-assessment/watching phase should be introduced to include conflict/risk assessment, scenario planning, and analysis of state and non-state institutions and capacity, as a pre-cursor to the launch of a PCNA/TRM exercise when the time is right. • A conflict/risk analysis should be an early step in planning future PCNA/TRM exercises, to serve as the common platform to establish the peacebuilding storyline for critical stabilization and transformation measures to be prioritized in the initial post-peace period. • Critical cross-cutting issues should be identified in the pre-assessment and/or Concept Note stage to assure adequate resourcing from the outset, and can be integrated in the PCNA/TRM as both cross-cutting and as sub-clusters to assure relevant results carry into the TRM. • Building core state functions should become a deliberate objective of the PCNA/TRM exercise, based inter alia on a more systematic use of capacity assessments of state and non-state institutions beginning in the pre-assessment phase, taking into account the dynamics of a transitional vs. elected government. • PCNAs should outline from the outset an approach to security stabilization and transformation measures, taking into account sequencing/integration with other peace-keeping/security planning exercises, critical costing information, troop deployment and contingency planning implications for the achievement of prioritized results in the TRM. • Future exercises should be structured to produce comprehensive assessments at the cluster level and selective results at the TRM level, wherein the prioritized results in the TRM should constitute the most critical actions around which international resources and efforts must align. Once these are fully funded and underway, other needs identified in the comprehensive cluster- level assessments can also be undertaken, capacity permitting. • Future exercises will embed the TRM in an implementation platform to include a high level ‘compact’ between national and international partners, results and resources monitoring/tracking systems, and agreed governance structures (including for related financing mechanisms). • The PCNA/TRM exercise and resulting implementation platform should include a communication strategy designed for national / local populations and an information platform for the international community to clarify objectives, report on progress, elicit feedback, and manage expectations. • The UN and World Bank need to enhance in-house capacity to carry out PCNAs more efficiently and systematically, and to strengthen partnerships to better support our national partners’ efforts to consolidate peace and accelerate recovery. This Review will be followed by efforts to: 1) refine the practical guidance notes governing the PCNA and TRM; 2) launch a 2007 pilot of the watching/pre-assessment approach; and 3) strengthen internal UN and Bank policies and operational practices to assure better support to future exercises. 3 PCNA Review Report, January 2007 I. Background and Context An increasingly important element of the international community’s engagement with a country emerging from conflict is a joint process to assess needs and identify priorities, used to anchor the mobilization of human and financial resources for recovery and reconstruction. Over the last decade, donors have attributed increasing importance to providing timely and substantive support to post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding, and in this context Post Conflict Needs Assessments have been used by national and international actors as an entry point for conceptualizing, negotiating and financing a shared strategy for recovery and development in fragile, post-conflict settings. The United Nations (UN) and World Bank (Bank) in partnership have developed a particular joint approach to supporting Post Conflict Needs Assessments1, referred to historically as PCNAs, as the foundation for national recovery plans and the basis for resource mobilization at international donor conferences. In this UN-Bank “vocabulary”, the PCNA includes both the assessment and costing of needs and the prioritization of results in an accompanying Transitional Results Matrix (TRM). Between 2003 and 2006, joint UN/Bank PCNA exercises were conducted in Iraq, Liberia, Haiti and Sudan, and were underway in Somalia and Darfur. In December 2005, a series of PCNA Roundtables were held to begin to capture the key best practices and lessons learned from this body of experience; they proposed a joint program of work to improve the way that PCNAs are conducted and the prioritized needs identified in the TRM are implemented. The UN and Bank agreed to undertake a comprehensive review of recent experience with PCNAs to better understand their inputs and their outcomes, and to improve upon the existing tools and practices that the UN and Bank use; to this end, the global PCNA Review was launched in May 2006. This review of joint UN-Bank PCNAs is not an exhaustive stocktaking of Post Conflict Needs Assessments; assessments have been, and will continue to be, undertaken in conflict-affected countries with methodologies and oversight structures that differ from the UN-Bank “PCNA” approach. Countries may not always require, or desire, the UN and World Bank to manage the assessment process, and each conflict or post-conflict setting requires a context-specific approach. To the extent that lessons emerging from the joint UN-Bank experience can also inform these “non-PCNA” assessments, the findings of this PCNA Review may ultimately have a broader reach. II: Methodology The aim of the PCNA review has been to consolidate lessons learned from the PCNA process and related tools (including TRMs), and to determine what steps should be taken to strengthen these tools and their application, in particular as tools for planning, implementation, and monitoring in the post-PCNA period. This information will form the basis for more structured plans, commitments and guidance surrounding the PCNA, as well as an opportunity to better institutionalize past lessons learned and improve on the preparations, conduct, and follow-up related to the PCNA. The review was undertaken in two phases. Phase One (June to September 2006) consisted of a retrospective stocktaking and desk review of all PCNA documentation to date, with collection of supplementary information through phone and e-mail interviews, in order to complete five case studies on the PCNAs conducted in Iraq, Liberia, Haiti, Sudan and Somalia, as well as two comparison studies detailing the “non-PCNA” assessments conducted in Afghanistan and East Timor. Phase One culminated in an internal roundtable on 8 September, 2006, which finalized the strategic questions for Phase Two. Phase Two (September to December 2006) utilized the information base compiled during Phase One to investigate emerging strategic themes through field visits, key informant interviews and consultations with a wide range of stakeholders (national, institutional, donor, NGOs). The Phase Two core review team was composed of representatives from the UN Development Group Office (co-lead), World Bank (co- lead), UNDP/Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (state-building), and three consultants in the areas of cross-cutting issues, peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity, and security. 1 The history and methodology of the UN-Bank PCNA is summarized in the Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situations (2003). 4 PCNA Review Report, January 2007 The purpose of this report is to summarize the strategic and policy issues and recommendations related to the PCNA process itself and the implementation, monitoring and financing of the TRM. These findings and recommendations were discussed at the PCNA Review Validation Workshop with PCNA stakeholders including national partners, NGOs, donors, UN and Bank on 30 November 2006 in New York2. The outputs of the workshop and final recommendations were then integrated into the revisions to this report and will also be fed into the revisions to the Practical Guidebook on PCNAs and the Operational Note on TRMs. The core operational and management issues, as well as the questions examined in both Phases of the Review, are identified in the PCNA Review TORs (attached in Annex I). Major recommendations have been flagged throughout this report using the R symbol. III: Results of Phase One The five PCNAs and two comparison cases examined during Phase One confirmed that the methodology has served as an effective analytical platform for resource mobilization, but has been less successful as a focused actionable recovery plan3. The review of PCNA experiences also highlighted several strategic challenges, including: the need to clarify the core objectives of the PCNA; the lack of guidance on how to move from an assessment based PCNA to a coherent, actionable recovery plan prioritized around peacebuilding goals; the need to address the gaps that have been identified such as conflict sensitivity, the security sector and linkages to other planning processes; and the institutional and operational challenges of effectively organizing, financing, and staffing PCNAs. Phase One found that clarity on expectations and objectives at the outset is essential to mediate institutional cultures and to ensure that those expectations are publicly articulated before, during and after the PCNA. With respect to cross-cutting issues, there appeared to be little consensus on the optimum way forward to ensure that clusters sufficiently consider these issues where appropriate. In addition, while physical security and access were always a constraint in PCNA activities, the review found a significant gap in PCNA coverage and priorities where the security sector is concerned. The case studies consistently found that the dramatic needs in post-conflict settings generate pressure towards a comprehensive rather than a strategic approach. As a result, needs overwhelm capacity, the results matrix becomes over-ambitious and expectations become unrealistic. It was also apparent that a more explicit discussion of the various “definitions” of ownership was needed at the outset of each PCNA, linked to the need to set attainable objectives that contribute to peacebuilding. At the institutional level, Phase One highlighted several challenges, including the need to maintain a sustained presence and improve continuity in staff between the PCNA and post-PCNA phases to the extent possible. IV: Strategic Themes and Questions A. Definitions Consistent with the discussions at the 2005 Roundtables, this PCNA Review is based on a clear shared understanding of specific terms that are key elements of post conflict needs assessments: PCNA refers to all Post Conflict Needs Assessment exercises that follow the joint UN/Bank methodology contained in the PCNA Practical Guide. Terms such as Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) and Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) are synonymous and were used in specific country settings. TRM refers to results matrices that are produced in the context of a PCNA exercise and that follow the joint UN/Bank methodology contained in the TRM guidance note. TRMs are given specific names in each country setting (e.g., RFTF, ICF). The term ‘stabilization’ is used to cover those actions that expressly and purposefully aim to address conflict risk and minimize the chances of short-term reversion to violent conflict. The term ‘transformation’ is used to cover those actions that purposefully aim to create the longer term conditions conducive to re-establishing the foundations necessary to achieve the MDGs. 2 PCNA Review Validation Workshop Summary 3 UN/WB PCNA Review: Phase One Summary Report 5 PCNA Review Report, January 2007 The language of ‘needs’ is understood as the technical measurement of the gap between the existing situation and the desired state, whether a nationally-defined benchmark or an internationally-agreed marker (such as the achievement of an MDG). ‘Risk’ is defined as the likelihood of relapse into violent conflict. What is ‘needed’ to thwart conflict recurrence is arrived at through an analysis of the conflict itself but also includes a stocktaking of the existing, if often untapped, ‘capacities for peace’. ‘Conflict sensitivity’ is the ability to understand a context where conflict happens as well as its interaction with an intervention that is being carried out. Interventions should, as a minimum, aim to avoid unintended adverse effects on the context (‘do no harm’) but may also aim, more proactively, to stabilize, to prevent, to manage and to transform conflict (i.e., to constructive, non-violent forms). ‘Peacebuilding’ is defined broadly as the ultimate goal, and impact, of all the political, military, humanitarian and developmental interventions targeted to conflict stabilization and conflict transformation, namely those aiming “to consolidate peaceful relations and strengthen viable political, socio-economic and cultural institutions capable of mediating conflict, and to strengthen other mechanisms that will either create or support the necessary conditions for sustained peace.”4 Peacebuilding is not an activity or set of activities, but rather a framework or goal that should impose coherence and purpose, especially in the early period, on the different sorts of post-conflict interventions. In the present report, the concept of peacebuilding is closely linked to that of ‘strategic’ or ‘peacebuilding storyline’, which is taken to cover the country-specific vision for the recovery process in its two, partly overlapping, phases of conflict stabilization and conflict transformation. A cross-cutting issue is one that dynamically interacts with all or a substantial number of sectors and, therefore, requires a multi-sectoral approach. The choice to treat an issue as “cross-cutting” as opposed to “sectoral” is considered tactical and should be assessed in each country setting. While a wide range of issues can be and have been treated as cross-cutting (e.g., capacity development, conflict analysis, gender, etc.), for the purposes of this exercise the main focus has been on gender, environment, human rights and HIV/AIDS. Capacity development and conflict analysis have been dealt with separately. The term state-building describes a process of restoring (or building) the functionality of state institutions. There is no blueprint for state-building, however there is a shared understanding that a state- building approach is one that seeks a comprehensive view of transformation towards a stable and rule- based society, where state institutions are accountable and responsive to citizens. A key element of this is the identification and supporting of core state functions such as the provision of security, rule of law, basic services, infrastructure and macro-economic policy. Many of these functions go to the heart of political power and resource distribution in a society. For PCNA purposes, security stabilization and transformation will be used as follows: (cid:131) Early security stabilization measures: deployment of UN and/or other forces, integration of formerly opposing forces, command and control restructuring, and vetting, train and equip programs of the police – critical steps for establishment of minimum conditions of security for PCNA activities. (cid:131) Dealing with the legacies of conflict: DDR, mines, child soldiers, reconciliation, arms management etc., not designed as stand-alone interventions but as part of a larger recovery framework. (cid:131) Longer term security transformation (closer to SSR per OECD-DAC definition) including right-sizing, professionalism and accountability. B. Five Key Themes The results of Phase One recognized that to achieve success in post-conflict assessment and planning exercises, a broad range of measures is needed to advance security, political and economic development, and peacebuilding. Such measures are often complementary to the implementation of the formal peace settlement and require not only the support and will of all national parties involved, including civil society, but also considerable human and financial resources. Phase Two focused on the practical ways to improve the PCNA and related tools and increase understanding around the PCNA, enhance national and international stakeholders’ capacities to undertake and implement a PCNA, and intensify the international community’s coordination efforts so that national actors in transition countries are better supported. In doing so, Phase Two addressed the following five key themes that emerged from Phase One: 4 FEWER 2004: Forum on Early Warning and Early Response et al., Conflict sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Building. A Resource Pack, London, 2004, Intr., 4. 6 PCNA Review Report, January 2007 • Strategic and programmatic aspects of PCNAs, including: criteria for initiating; clarifying objectives, managing expectations; ensuring national participation and ownership; effective prioritization and sequencing; improving attention to cross-cutting issues; improving linkages to other planning processes; better management of information and communication strategies; and methods for improving the implementation, monitoring and funding of the TRM. • Peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity as it relates to the PCNA, including: identifying peacebuilding storyline and objectives early in the process and having them endorsed at an adequate level of decision-making; steps and tools needed to better inform the PCNA teams on the conflict context; using a conflict-sensitive ‘lens’ in identifying priorities for the TRM. • Security sector issues as they relate to the PCNA, including: the extent to which security sector stabilization and transformation issues could be included in PCNA priorities; and the need for improved linkages to peace-keeping mission planning. • State-building issues as they relate to the PCNA, including: consideration of the PCNA’s contribution to building effective capacity in core state functions; addressing national ownership and institutional capacity development. • Institutional and operational aspects of PCNAs, including: coordination mechanisms; roles and responsibilities of the stakeholders and technical experts; staffing and financing. Because of the importance of cross-cutting issues and the pervasive challenges with ensuring their full integration in and implementation post-PCNA, measures to address cross-cutting issues were singled out from the “strategic and programmatic aspects” for special attention. V: Substantive Challenges and “Big Picture” Issues The PCNA Guidelines (composed of The Practical Guide for Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post- Conflict Situations and The Operational Note on Transitional Results Matrices) were developed jointly by the UN Development Group (UNDG), UNDP and the World Bank and with support from GTZ, in August 2004 and January 2005. Since the Practical Guide was published, PCNAs have been completed in Haiti and Sudan and initiated in Somalia and Darfur. Following these recent evolutions of the PCNA and the December 2005 UN/Bank Roundtable, it became clear that there was a need for a review and revision of the available guidance to incorporate lessons and best practice to improve future PCNA exercises. Some of the general gaps identified from the original guidance included the need for clearer articulation of criteria for starting a PCNA; making more explicit the balance between the technical and political elements of the exercise; building in monitoring mechanisms to adjust PCNA exercises as they are conducted on the basis of political developments; strengthening coordination and support mechanisms; linkages to funding mechanisms and aid coordination structures; definition, management and implementation of priorities; building better communication strategies to help manage expectations; improving linkages with other planning processes; training the PCNA team, and staffing and supporting these exercises from an institutional perspective; and tightening up the implementation measures for prioritized results emanating from the assessments. These “gaps” were among the many topics explored over the course of Phase Two, which will conclude with the revision of the PCNA guidance and tools. A. Prevailing Context: Impact on PCNA Process (i) Typologies for international engagement in PCNAs. In reviewing the previous experience with PCNAs, substantial interest was generated in developing a typology by examining a range of factors that affect the PCNA/TRM exercise and experience. The factors identified and explored during the Review included: • Core nature of the conflict – driven by control over resources, nature of the state, territorial borders, ethnic or religious divisions • Extent of international disengagement as a result of the conflict, and hence the relative importance of a needs assessment to facilitate re-engagement • Type of 'peace' – victor's peace (Timor), negotiated ceasefire (Liberia), muddy-waters peacemaking (Somalia) • Timing vis-à-vis peace agreement – launched during negotiations or after signing 7 PCNA Review Report, January 2007 • Timing of PCNA launch vis-à-vis peacekeeping mission; UN PKO vs. other peacekeeping operation deployment • Extent of consultation with national stakeholders/degree of ownership among parties • Extent of physical security and access available, and trend of same (predictably up, predictably down, or unpredictable) • Degree of overlap of PCNA clusters/themes/pillars with key substantive themes or elements of peace agreement • Degree of state capacity, in several dimensions: technical and administrative capacity, infrastructure and “hardware”, prospects of own revenues (oil-rich Sudan vs. cash-poor Haiti) While consideration of these dimensions did not yield decisive findings with regards to the content or conduct of the PCNA, this type of analysis can provide important value by acting as a set of indicative parameters for engagement that can help inform the policy decisions to be made. In an effort to better understand the linkages between the range of topics or actions covered in the provisions in peace agreements and the PCNAs including the TRMs that follow them, a mapping exercise was undertaken to review the cluster structures of PCNA processes and the substantive actions included in the subsequent TRM, and to compare those with the provisions of that country’s peace agreement. • The mapping showed that there is no “standard” menu of provisions for peace agreements; individual peace agreements for the countries in this Review typically included fewer than 50% of the range of 37 possible provisions5. • PCNA processes, including the TRMs that were produced, generally covered only about 50% of the provisions in that country’s agreement. • In turn, they also covered a wide range of additional topics – for most PCNAs, more than half of the areas of focus including in the cluster team’s work, and more than 60% of the actions included in the TRM, were not mentioned in the peace agreement. This most likely reflects the observed fact that not all critical post-conflict priorities are usually detailed in a peace agreement. (ii) Criteria or triggers for initiating a PCNA. The review found no consensus6 on specific criteria that should underpin the decision to initiate a PCNA, evolving experience suggests the following possible “triggers”: • identifiable national counterparts (albeit transitional) and political space to engage conflict parties • interest from international community in planning for the transition beyond humanitarian aid • (when relevant) peace agreement signed, sometimes explicitly providing for a PCNA to be conducted (caveat is whether this is sufficient if open hostilities continue) • peace agreement seen as imminent, PCNA initiated before it is final to demonstrate international community’s confidence in success of negotiations − pros: national consensus building momentum built around PCNA and ability of international community to move very quickly as soon as peace agreement signed because PCNA already well underway and/or complete (ex. N/S Sudan); − cons: risk that if peace agreement particularly fragile or doesn’t include 100% of warring factions PCNA process becomes ‘tainted’ by association, or irrelevant • “safe enough” for some level of fieldwork or consultations, even if not exhaustive or across whole territory PCNAs initiated after peace agreements have been shorter (3-4 month) exercises while those initiated in advance of peace agreements have tended to last far longer, with the attendant costs and political uncertainties. The primary objective of the PCNA exercise cited in both scenarios was the desire to have a ready action plan with funding available as early as possible to lend credibility to and build confidence in the peace process. 5 The “menu” of possible provisions is drawn from Peace Processes and Statebuilding: Economic and Institutional Provisions of Peace Agreements, CMI for the World Bank and UNDP, forthcoming. 6 It should be noted that the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) is of the view that in circumstances in which governments fail in their responsibility to protect their citizens from genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity (e.g., Darfur), PCNAs should not proceed. 8 PCNA Review Report, January 2007 In order to mitigate the potential impact of political downturns, PCNA guidance could encourage more explicit focus on the phases of the PCNA process and post-PCNA implementation, and careful attention to the “decision junctures” to allow better alignment with the political context. Watching briefs, and scenario or contingency planning, are approaches to ensuring that considered decisions are taken not only to initiate PCNAs but to proceed advisedly, or not, if the political context shifts significantly. During early discussions leading to the Concept Note, parties could agree to a set of issues on political context to customize the ‘check points’ for possible redirection of PCNA exercise, for instance at these moments: • after the Concept Note is agreed but before fieldwork is launched; • after cluster assessments completed but before draft reports are distributed for comments; • after consultations/political review of reports but before donors’ conference scheduled. (iii) Objectives for the PCNA: Different actors have historically brought different objectives to their participation in the PCNA exercise; past PCNAs have had a range of explicit objectives as well as underlying motivations (seen in choices on how PCNAs are structured, prepared, staffed, and implemented): Historical Objective Rationale (explicit) or Hypothesis (implied) Describe the post-conflict situation A detailed and comprehensive view of the medium-term is needed and define long view of medium-term as the context for short-term recovery reconstruction and development Leverage agreement on priority Without agreed funded short-term actions the medium-term may not actions that support peacebuilding happen because conflict could well re-emerge and stabilize fragile transition Embed/agree structure and process Agreed framework of priority actions, built on a widely-shared for implementation and monitoring process and a mechanism for monitoring implementation, will lead regardless of financing modality to fewer deviations and more coordinated synergistic interventions Mobilize resources Get numbers based on current facts, donors feel better about pledging dollars against numbers validated by UN and Bank Build links and bridges between and Shared involvement in assessment process develops common amongst nationals and internationals diagnosis, vision, vocabulary; conflict parties find common ground; agencies and bilaterals with different agendas begin to see the whole, not just their part A key finding is that while not all historical objectives were conflicting, the lack of clarity generated by multiple, different, and unshared objectives was a substantial barrier to greater effectiveness. B. Improving on Key Aspects: The Big Picture Analysis of PCNA experience to date has led to the following six conclusions about the challenge of planning, mobilizing resources, and implementing priority actions in the fluid environment that characterizes conflict-affected countries: 1. PCNAs are employed in post-conflict settings that are inherently fragile, with a historically high risk of reversion to conflict within the first five years. Preventing that return to conflict requires the engagement of political, security, humanitarian, and development apparatus, and success is more likely if those actors combine efforts for stabilization, to render the prevailing environment less favorable for violent conflict, and then for transformation, reconstructing human and physical capital and mobilizing it to achieve nationalized MDGs. Within the timeframe of a PCNA, the central organizing principles of the transitional storyline are the risk of reversal into conflict and the opportunities that exist (albeit untapped) to overcome that risk. 2. Many PCNAs will occur in a political/operating environment characterized first by a national transitional authority (first 2 to 3 years) leading to the installation of an elected government. In these settings, deliberate attention is required to consider the implications of working with a transitional (as opposed to elected) authority: focus during the transitional years would be 9 PCNA Review Report, January 2007 primarily on ensuring national ownership, and early capacity building in core strategic functions; focus during elected government years would continue those efforts accompanied by expanded and deepened efforts in capacity development in both state and non-state institutions. 3. In the interests of sequencing and prioritization, the PCNA synthesis document is not a ‘simple’ or mechanistic consolidation of the clusters’ sectoral assessments (which will be comprehensive), but rather should communicate the strategic identification of key objectives with the TRM capturing highly selective results that focus on critical stabilization and transformation results. The strategic framework within which the assessment takes place is agreed, and the alignment of priorities with such a framework is appraised, by the key national and international actors on the basis of a shared conflict and risk analysis, the results of which should be endorsed at the highest level of decision-making. This turns the agreed ‘peacebuilding storyline’ into an effective working platform for the cluster teams’ work. Cluster assessments, costed as fully as possible, are then available in their entirety as the basis for more detailed sectoral programs to be articulated and funded over the medium-term. 4. The TRM cannot credibly foresee concrete, actionable priorities beyond a two-year window given the volatile and fragile post-conflict period. Therefore, grounding the PCNA in a scenario/contingency planning process allows actors to take account of possible changes in the political setting and their potential impact on the PCNA/TRM, particularly in settings where PCNAs are initiated without a formal peace agreement being signed. Once issued, the TRM should be subject to a structured in-country review and be up-dated accordingly. Eventually, the PCNA analytic platform will support the development of a nationally-driven medium-term plan such as an IPRSP, where the underlying PCNA analytics assembled by cluster teams are combined with other analytical and consultative work. 5. In order to serve as an actionable plan that facilitates the alignment of resources and programming, the TRM includes or is accompanied by elements that provide a platform for implementation once resources have been mobilized: a high-level articulation of accountability between national and international partners (a ‘compact’), a public communication strategy, indicators linked to TRM actions that can be monitored, and a governance structure that will monitor the key indicators, facilitate and support policy dialogue, prioritization, and national aid coordination. 6. While coverage of security sector issues in PCNAs will vary based on country-specific political contexts and on the provisions of the peace agreements, greater attention must be paid to more comprehensive coverage in the assessment phase of security sector issues, including costing, even when actions eventually identified in the TRM may be limited in number. Explicit linkages with existing security expertise and planning processes must be made in the early preparation period and throughout the conduct and implementation of the PCNA/TRM. Going forward, the proposed objective of a PCNA is to produce an actionable, prioritized and 1 sequenced plan (the TRM) where “priority results” are those with a direct impact on stabilizing the peace (addressing conflict risk) and laying the groundwork for high priority recovery/reconstruction and transformation (what actions, when and in what order, by whom, with what resources). While it is understood that the TRM is not itself a programming framework, it should in future be sufficiently well articulated to act as a more reliable guide to translating TRM results into priority programming. Going Forward: Objective Rationale (explicit) or Hypothesis (implied) Immediate and visible action post-peace agreement or post-political settlement, to support critical recovery activities, signal confidence Demonstrate confidence in new in the peace agreement, and lay foundation for state legitimacy vis- peace-time state and society à-vis population – puts premium on fast and visible action, strong communication strategy to population 10