3 5 866 ADA2 I I The Vies ePi d in s irat an d of ofn No la do no mmiiry mflt the vea of the Duniwmt of Dfm at may of its gmwim. Th dacummt may not bo W. ed for OPM pumlislado usi ith as bee. deajed by tie aefrmpate miiamy ANYWS or goamment qency. IN PURSUIT: MONTGOMERY AFTER ALAMEIN BY Lieutenant Colonel Charles D. McFetridge, AR Senior Service College Fellow The Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy Tufts University DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 1 May 1991 U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE WRACKS, PA 17013-5050 91-00116 .~.~.. ~.2 ]ml mm0 3_i9 m Unclassified SECURITY CLASSIFICATIOJ OF THIS PAGE (Wfien Data Entered) REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM 1. REPORT NUMBER 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER 4. TITLE (and Subtitle) 5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED In Pursuit: Montgomery After Alamein Individual Study Project 6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER 7. AUTHOR(&) 8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(*) Lieutenant Colonel Charles D. McFetridge 9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS 10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK U.S. Army War College AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050 I1. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS 12. REPORT DATE 1 May 1991 Same 13. NUMBER OF PAGES 14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS(If different from Controlling Office) 15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified 1Sa. DECL ASSI FICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE 16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered In Block 20, If different from Report) 18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) 20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side It necessary and identity by block number) Battlefield victories are common in war. It is comparatively rare that a battlefield victory is followed by a vigorous pursuit. After the Battle of el Alamein, the British Eighth Army possessed overwhelming superiority on land, sea, and air over Rommel's German-Italian Panzer Army. In addition, the British had the advantage of Ultra, the ability to decipher most German communications. Ultra gave not only a clear picture of Axis weakness, but DD I AN7 1473 EDITION OF tNOV6SISOBSOLETE Unclassified SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Date Entered) SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Dota Z iered) 1 also Rommel's tactical and operational intentions. Despite this, the Axis forces were able to withdraw across 1350 miles of open desert, delaying British forces for three months, without suffering significant loss. This paper seeks to answer three questions: (1) How did Rommel's Army escape? (2) Why did Eighth Army fail to capture or destroy the remaining enemy forces? (3) What were the results and what can we learn about these events? The consensus of the paper is that the failure lay in a combination of factors. The pursuit had neither been planned nor prepared for by the Eighth Army or its subordinate units. There was no strategic concept to end the campaign, only a series of tactical improvisations. Training in the Eighth Army was inadequate to conduct such a decentralized, highly fluid operation. The Eighth Army commander was neither audacious enough to conduct a successful pursuit, nor confident enough of his subordinate commanders to permit them to do so. The failure to crush the Panzer Army lengthened the African Campaign, permitted German reinforcement nf Tunisia and strengthening of defenses tbroughout the Mediterranean theater, and delayed the follow-up invasion of Sicily. The strategic effect was to extend the war by several months. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(Wher Data Entered) ABSTRACT IN PURSUIT: MONTGOMERY AFTER ALAMEIN Battlefield victories are common in war. It is comparatively rare that a battlefield victory is followed with a vigorous pursuit. After the Battle of El Alamein, the British Eighth Army possessed overwhelming superiority on land, sea, and air over Rommel's German-Italian Panzer Army. In addition, the British had the advantage of Ultra, the ability to decipher most German communications. Ultra gave not only a clear picture of Axis weakness, but also Rommel's tactical and operational intentions. Despite this, the Axis forces were able to withdraw across 1350 miles of open desert, delaying British forces for three months, without suffering significant loss. This paper seeks to answer three questions. (1) How did Rommel's Army escape? (2) Why did Eighth Army fail to capture or destroy the remaining enemy forces? (3) What were the results and what can we learn from these events? The consensus of the paper is that the failure lay in a combination of factors. The pursuit had neither been planned nor prepared for by the Eighth Army or its subordinate units. There was no strategic concept to end the campaign, only a series of tactical improvisations. Training in the Eighth Army was inadequate to conduct such a decentralized, highly fluid operation. The Eighth Army commander was neither audacious enough to conduct a successful pursuit, nor confident enough of his subordinate commanders to permit them to do so. The failure to crush the Panzer Army lengthened the African Campaign, permitted German reinforcement of Tunisia and strengthening of defenses throughout the Mediterranean theater, and delayed the follow-up invasion of Sicily. The strategic effect was to extend the war by several months. / ( -, I L, IN PURSUIT: MONTGOMERY AFTER ALAMEIN "...the importance of the victory is chiefly determined by the vigor with which the immediate pursuit is carried out. In other words, pursuit makes up the second act of the victory and in many cases is more important than the first." 1 -- Carl von Clausewitz. As dawn broke over the shoulder of the Eighth Army on 4 November 1942, victory was at hand. After ten brutal, grueling da~s of fighting, Panzer Armee Afrika 2 had been battered to remnants. By eight o'clock, the morning haze burned off and open desert stretched before the armored cars of the 12th Lancers. The pursuit was on. The "Benghazi Handicap" was running for the last time. 3 Three months and 1,350 miles after El Alamein, the British entered Tripoli, administrative capital of Italian Libya and goal of British offensives since 1940. It was deserted. The German and Italian defenders had withdrawn to defensive positions in Tunisia. Pursuit of Rcmmel's army was over for the moment; the soldiers on both sides rested, refitted, and regrouped for the next round of battle. The distance covered was impressive but th.e straegic result a dismal British failure. Rommel's small remnant ned escaped virtually jr,,rathed.4 The failure of Montgomery's Eighth Army to capture or destroy the Panzer Armee was deeply disappointing. However, it generally attracts only passing notice in most accounts of the war in North Africa. The pursuit, sandwiched between the great victory o El Alamein and the final triumph in Tunisia, was overshato..e d by the Allied landings on 8 November in French North Africa. Ycre dramatic events elsewhere made the pursuit seem inconsequential in the long run. 5 This is understandable. Ccmpared to the drama of El Alamein, Kasserine, and Wadi Akarit, noth.in very exciting happened. No great encirclements, no long columns of prisoners, no dramatic battlefield surrenders occurred. The post-Alamein pursuit, however, was of profound strategic importance. It was one of the few opportunities for the Western Allies to crush an Axis Army and close a theater of operation. This could have decisively influenced the course of the war. El Alamein aas also the last opportunity to score a decisive, strategic victory under exclusively British leadership. The tide of American arms and armies thereafter pushed the British into an auxiliary role. Had the pursuit been properly done, there is a strong case to be made that the Axis bridgehead would have been fatally compromised, the surrender of Italy hastened, the war shortened. 6 Such speculations are debateable. There is no disoute, however, that the Panzer Armee Afrika escaped certain annihilation, at least temporarily. 7e Axis forces that recoiled acrcss the western desert arr-ved at the Tunisian border defenses in very weak condition. -1en agter meacer rei-rrcements arrived, only 34 German and 57 2 italian tanks were available to face over 700 Sritish tanks with more coming up. Almost 1,000 Axis aircraft had been overrun or destroyed for lack of repair parts, fuel, maintenance, and crews. 7 Ammunition, fuel, and supplies were virtually ex a e d . More significant than the losses, however, was what Rommel hac saved. Ahead of the Axis rear guards had gone the consider- able infrastructure of the Panzer Armee. Supply, transport, medical units, repair depots, maintenance specialists for ground a'rd air combat equipment, engineer construction units, Allied prisoners-of-war, intelligence analysts, communications companies, and operations and logistics staffs with their records, reports, and planning tables transported by thousands of trucks reached safety. Much of the muscle had eroded, but the army's train, skeleton, and nervous systems were intact. in Tunisia they quickly reorganized. Around these unglamourous, but essential, comconents Rommel's army was rebuilt -- and quickly. Pear echelon troops had little direct fighting power. Easili destroyed, these "soft" components were nonetheless difficult to replace.8 Their technical skills, however, had to be in clace before major combat units, brigades and divisions, could effectively function. Their survival meant that the scarce air and naval transport available could be devoted to bringing in "teeth" (inantry, artillery, armor) rather than "tail" elements. > saving then, Pommel could regenerate his army and fight on in :frica until mid-May 1943. 3 Field Marshal Rommel's success was amazing by any measure. The conduct of a retreat under pressure is an extraordinarily difficult operation to successfully execute. The retreating force must use every artifice to slow the pursuer but must acandon or destroy anything that cannot be carried off. The Dursuing force has the initiative, at the very least. Anyone or anything left behind will be recovered, restored, and eventually returned to the fight. 9 General Y1o gomery had the initiative and much, much more. Allied naval suceriority was overwhelming. The Royal Air Force commatned the air, checked only by weather and supplies. The Eighth Army began the pursuit well-supplied, close to its major decots, nit7 an awesome superiority in tanks, guns, and eQuip- ment. 1C 5ritish tactical intelligence was excellent. From an increasing flow of enemy POW's, tactical signals intelligence, unchallenged aerial ohotography, 11 and front line reports, Eritish commanders should have had a much better picture of the ta tlefield than their opposite numbers in the Panzer Armee. 12 At the strategic level there was something even better. montgomery had Ultra. Though imperfect and sometimes i7:cclete, the ability to read the German Enigma machine codes gave Allied commanders a priceless, decisive advantage. In the 4Friam camoaign, almost everything of any consequence was radiced ii cipher. Ultra even provided that most difficult to csta3i in::-ation: the enemy's intentions. At 1950 hours, 2 4c/emoer, Ocmmel sent a situation report to Oberkommando des a Nehrmacht (OKAJ) giving his strength and intention to retreat. By 0555 the next morning, 3 November, the decrypted message was sent to Cairo for CDNC Middle East (General Alexander); at 0835 hours the gist ,as transmitted to all Middle East stations, including the commanding general, Eighth Army.13 Preparations for with- raal nere soon confirmed by aerial reconnaissance and tactical signal intercepts. General Montgomery knew then, a full day tefore the retreat began, of the imminent departure of Rommel's army. Given the British tactical and operational advantages, why does El Alaein not rank with Jena, Megiddo and O'Connor's 1940 offensive as strategic victories? The iisappointing results of the British pursuit have been aoc=esset by historians, biographers, even participants. Field Marsnals Pommel and Montgomery contributed their own assessments. Most commentators have dismissed the causes in a few glib and glossy phrases. Bad weather, weak subordinates, weak planning, oartially trained troops, a daring and skilled opponent, and exhaustion have all been cited. As we better understand Ultra's inoact on the oar, the "blame" has been focused more narrowly on Yo1ntgomery. Monty-bashing is popular sport. 14 His towering vamity, abrasive pettiness, arrogance, and ingratitude make him an easy and attractive target on both sides of the Atlantic. Certainly Montgomery bears the responsibility for the post- 0117eir failure of his army, as any commander must. His culpa- ti ity "-w ever, is more than passive. His personal decisions art actions seriously call into question his generalship during 5 this ceriod. Eut Montgomery deserves only partial credit for A hat haccenec. None of the explanations are comprehensive. A -ore tmcrcucn assessment is needed, not only on historical grounds, but also as a guide to better operational understanding in the future. This study cannot examine the entire operation rom -,amein to Tripoli. Proper examination of the complex movements, the air and sea components, the logistical aspects and the command structure would require a lengthy book. I intend oly to illustrate some representative actions and focus on three Key questions. How did the Panzer Armee Afrika get away? Why dii E inth A2rmy fail to bag its quarry? What were the results an: ,Ahat can we learn from this episode? hile the pursuit proper began on 4 November, it naturally f e from the results of the battle of El Alamein. The battle egan on tne night of 23-24 October under the code name Operation Zlmtfrot. Although achieving local surprise and initial suc- cess, especially in the New Zealand attack in the south, the txsn armor failed to boldly follow up the initial breaks in the ce;ense. The momentum slowed and the opportunity faded. fter hree days the attacks had failed to break through the Axis enses, and General Montgomery ordered a temporary halt to re- MMeadr shal Rommel counter-attacked, using up his fuel, armor, unsuccessfully trying to push the British ss =rc m <ey areas seized during Lightfoot. Eighth Army then :e---an7zeo, shiftin e main effort fircm the southlern half of