OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,24/3/2015,SPi Ideas, Evidence, and Method OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,24/3/2015,SPi OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,24/3/2015,SPi Ideas, Evidence, and Method Hume’s Skepticism and Naturalism concerning Knowledge and Causation Graciela De Pierris 1 OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,24/3/2015,SPi 3 GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP, UnitedKingdom OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford. ItfurtherstheUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship, andeducationbypublishingworldwide.Oxfordisaregisteredtrademarkof OxfordUniversityPressintheUKandincertainothercountries #GracielaDePierris2015 Themoralrightsoftheauthorhavebeenasserted FirstEditionpublishedin2015 Impression:1 Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedin aretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,withoutthe priorpermissioninwritingofOxfordUniversityPress,orasexpresslypermitted bylaw,bylicenceorundertermsagreedwiththeappropriatereprographics rightsorganization.Enquiriesconcerningreproductionoutsidethescopeofthe aboveshouldbesenttotheRightsDepartment,OxfordUniversityPress,atthe addressabove Youmustnotcirculatethisworkinanyotherform andyoumustimposethissameconditiononanyacquirer PublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyOxfordUniversityPress 198MadisonAvenue,NewYork,NY10016,UnitedStatesofAmerica BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationData Dataavailable LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2014953017 ISBN 978–0–19–871678–5 Printedandboundby CPIGroup(UK)Ltd,Croydon,CR04YY LinkstothirdpartywebsitesareprovidedbyOxfordingoodfaithand forinformationonly.Oxforddisclaimsanyresponsibilityforthematerials containedinanythirdpartywebsitereferencedinthiswork. OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,24/3/2015,SPi In memory of my parents, Teresa F. de De Pierris and Carlos Alberto De Pierris OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,24/3/2015,SPi OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,24/3/2015,SPi Preface IaimtoreorientourunderstandingofHume’scentralplaceinthetraditionofearly modern philosophy and thereby reorient our understanding of this tradition more generally.Ifocuson BookIofATreatiseofHuman Nature (andrelatedtexts)and thus primarily on Hume’s epistemology. In the context of Hume’s new science of humannature,however,hisepistemologicalviewshavebroaderphilosophicalimpli- cations,someofwhichIaddressinthecourseofmyargument. I pay special attention to Hume’s relationship to his predecessors, and the main figuresIfocusonareDescartes,Locke,Leibniz,andNewton.Descartes,Locke,and Leibniz provide the framework for my reinterpretation of Hume’s appropriation of the early modern theory of ideas. Hume develops his version of the theory by radicalizingwhatIcallthepresentational-phenomenologicalmodelofapprehension andultimateevidenceasitdevelopsfromDescartestoLocke.Yettheprecisenature of Hume’s radicalization can only be properly understood, I argue, if we explicitly contrast this model with what I take to be the opposing logical-conceptual model articulated by Leibniz. For example, some recent scholars have rightly emphasized the fact that the conception of demonstrative (a priori) knowledge developed by Descartes,Locke,andHumeisquitedifferentfromtheformalconceptionoflogical deduction within an axiomatic system familiar to us. Nonetheless, by ignoring Leibniz’s explicit criticisms of both Descartes’s and Locke’s versions of the theory ofideas,thesescholarsfailtoappreciate thewayinwhichHume’sradicalizationof the Cartesian-Lockean model contributesto Hume’s skeptical arguments regarding demonstrativeknowledge. More generally, my understanding of Hume’s skeptical arguments as framed by hisradicalizedversionofthepresentational-phenomenological model concernsnot only demonstrative knowledge but also causation. Hume’s focus on demonstrative knowledgeandcausation,Iargue,makesitclearthathisradicalskepticismdoesnot depend, in particular, on the traditional veil of perception prominent in Descartes andLocke,whereskepticismconcerningourknowledgeofarealmofexternalobjects “behind”ourideasisprimary.Thispointismissed,forexample,bydefendersofthe currentlypopularskepticalrealistinterpretation,accordingtowhichHumebelieves that there are mind-independent necessary causal connections in nature, but we foreverremainignorantofsuchconnectionsbecausewecanneverhaveinsightinto the hidden internal structures of bodies. To attribute such a view to Hume is to assimilate his skepticismconcerning causation far too closely to Locke’s skepticism concerningourknowledgeofthe“realessences”ofbodies.Humedoesnotpostulate, in advance of experience, the existence or nature of in principle unobservable structures.Thus,Hume’scausalskepticism,Iargue,isentirelydifferentfromLocke’s. OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,24/3/2015,SPi viii PREFACE Hume’sskepticismisfirstdirectedatbothDescartes’sandLocke’sembraceofatruly demonstrative (a priori) knowledge of causalrelations, even (in Locke’s case) as an unattainableideal.Inthisrespect,HumeisinagreementwithNewton,whosepicture ofscientificknowledgedecisivelybreakswiththemethodologicalassumptionsofthe mechanicalnaturalphilosophy.YetHume’scausalskepticismisalsodirectedatthe Newtonian inductive methodology he himself adopts in his naturalistic study of humannature,outsidehisradicallyskepticalpointofview. For Newton, inductive “proof” of causal relations can be obtained—but only obtained—by properly regulated inductive inferences from manifest phenomena, whichalwaystakeprecedenceoverspeculativehypotheses(“conjectures”)concern- inghiddenunobservablestructures.Itispreciselythismethodologicalcommitment that frames my understanding of Hume’s naturalism: Hume’s normative endorse- ment of the refined methodological reasoning of the “wise man” or the scientist as opposedtotheunreflectiveinferencesofthe“vulgar.”Humeconsistentlyappliesthe Newtonianinductivemethodfromthisnaturalisticpoint ofview.Hedoessowhen heconceivescausalnecessityassimplyaprojectionofthenormativityofthismethod onto nature in the pursuit of (provisionally) exceptionless laws relating observable phenomena and, accordingly, when he rejects the supernatural claims of religion such as the belief in miracles. Hume’s naturalism, I argue, is not an anticipation of our current preoccupation with cognitive psychology but rather amounts to an unwavering commitment to one of the two competing scientific methodologies of thetime—whichisalsotobeappliedtohisownnewscienceofthehumanmind. I argue, in addition, that Hume’s famous argument concerning causation and inductioninPart3ofBookIoftheTreatiseisindeedradicallyskeptical.ForHume here calls into question the principle of the uniformity of nature underlying both Newton’s and his own commitment to the inductive method. Hume does this, moreover,onthebasisofhisradicalizedversionoftheCartesian-Lockeanpresenta- tional-phenomenological model of apprehension and ultimate evidencethat results in an equally radical skepticism concerning demonstrative knowledge. I support theseclaimsbyadetailedreadingofBookIoftheTreatisethatrevealsacontinuous development ofthought fromthe argument concerningcausationand inductionin Part 3 through Hume’s concluding skeptical melancholy at the end of Part 4. The upshot, I argue, is that, for Hume, only the permanent availability of this kind of radical skepticism can balance out and therefore guard against our permanent temptation to ascend to the supernatural—a temptation against which even the bestNewtonianmathematicalnaturalscientistsofthetimehadnotbeenimmunized. IowethankstoalltheHumeinterpretersIciteinthisbook;Ihavegreatlyprofited from coming to terms with their views. My work benefitted, in addition, from the challenges raised by commentators and audiences at Hume Society and other conferences,whereIpresentedearlierversionsofideasinthisbook.Iamespecially grateful to the support and encouragement I received from Edwin McCann, in particularduringdiscussionsconcerningLocke.HenryAllisonreadandcommented OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,24/3/2015,SPi PREFACE ix on an earlier draft; I would like to thank him for generously acknowledging my accounts of what I call the presentational-phenomenological model and of the epistemological normativity in Hume’s naturalistic standpoint. I am grateful to Allen Wood for providing philosophical support, encouragement, and guidance— especiallyduringdifficulttimes.ThanksarealsoduetoPaulTulipanaforhelpwith preparingtheIndex. Aboveall,IowealargephilosophicaldebttoMichaelFriedman,withwhomIhave had the privilege of maintaining daily discussions on many philosophical topics, including my views on Hume and Kant, for many years. My work has enormously improved due to Friedman’s penetrating criticisms and insistence on clarity and precision,aswellastohisdeepandimmediateinsightintovirtuallyanyphilosoph- ical topic presented to him—including those, like Hume’s epistemology, which are not in his areas of expertise. Friedman has also provided immensurable emotional support, love, and companionship that have helped me to overcome what at times appearedtobealmostinsurmountablestruggles.