Ibero-Analysen Dokumente, Berichte und Analysen aus dem Ibero-Amerikanischen Institut Preußischer Kulturbesitz Berlin Heft 28 Mai 2017 The Future of U.S.-Latin American Relations under President Donald Trump Alexander Hawley Alexander Hawley, with a B.A. in International Studies from Boston College, conducted an internship in the Research Department of the IAI while he was a fellow with the Parlamentarisches Patenschafts- Programm. E-mail: [email protected]. The Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut (IAI, Ibero-American Institute) is an interdis- ciplinary center for academic and cultural exchange between Germany and Latin America, the Caribbean, Spain and Portugal. It is home to the largest specialist library in Europe for the Ibero-American region. It is also a place of knowledge production, exchange and cultural translation. Combining an information center, a research center and a cultural center, the IAI is both a platform for cooperation and a catalyst for intercultural and transcultural dialog. The intended audience for the IBERO-ANALYSEN Series are decision-makers from politics, business fi elds, and the arts. The series confronts thematic and country- specifi c issues and provides relevant information on the politics, economy, society, and culture of different Ibero-American countries. While this information is topical in nature, it goes beyond the mere scope of day-to-day politics. IBERO-ANALYSEN is a forum in which recognized experts present contextualized knowledge in an ac- cessible manner, thereby stimulating and supporting the inter-cultural dialogue be- tween Germany and the Ibero-American region. The Ibero-American Institute (IAI) is committed to presenting diverse viewpoints in its publications. However, these views are those of the authors and are not neces- sarily the views held by the IAI. IBERO-ANALYSEN publications are intended only for personal use. Material may be reprinted only with the proper approval of the IAI and with a full citation identifying the source. The IBERO-ANALYSEN Series can be accessed as PDFs through the IAI Homepage: (http://www.iai.spk-berlin.de/publikationen/ibero-analysen/bisherige-ausgaben.html). Redaktion Dr. Peter Birle Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut Preußischer Kulturbesitz Forschungsabteilung Potsdamer Straße 37 10785 Berlin Telefon: 030 – 266 45 3000 Telefax: 030 – 266 35 1550 e-mail: [email protected] http://www.iai.spk-berlin.de Satz: Patricia Schulze 1. Aufl age 2017 © Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Potsdamer Straße 37, 10785 Berlin ISBN 978-3-935656-69-6 This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Namensnennung-NichtKommerziell-KeineBearbei- tung 3.0 Deutschland License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by-nc-nd/3.0/de/. The online version of this work can be found at: <http://www.iai.spk-berlin.de/publikationen/ibero-analysen.html> The Future of U.S.-Latin American Relations under President Donald Trump Alexander Hawley A Fledgling Presidency glect. Because it is not a source of strategic threats, Latin America With the publication of far-reach- languishes at the bottom of the ing executive orders, President United States’ long list of foreign Donald J. Trump is making good policy priorities (Reid 2015: 46). on the promises he delivered on the U.S. presidential campaign What exactly the Trump presi- trail. From mandating reform on dency will mean for relations immigration and border securi- between the U.S.A. and Latin ty to walking back international American countries (LACs) is still trade and commercial agree- to be seen. Rather than jumping ments, the Trump presidency directly into rash prognostica- has drawn both ire and confusion tions and divinations without any from its counterparts south of the context or base knowledge, this Rio Grande. The first 100 days analysis would first benefit from of the Trump presidency have an investigation into the things now elapsed, and much of Latin that are known: Obama’s ac- The first 100 American society finds itself em- complishments and failures and days of the Trump presi- boldened to take on the discor- the rhetoric that Trump vocalized dency have now dant rhetoric emanating from the during the presidential campaign. elapsed, and much of Latin White House. Many worry that a In doing so, one can distinguish American society Trump presidency will usher in a points of departure between what finds itself em- boldened to take cooling of North-South relations, has already been said and done on the discordant or that the economies of Latin and what might be enacted under rhetoric ema- nating from the American countries will suffer Trump. White House. from less favorable trade deals or taxation of remittances. However, Out of his eight years as presi- the variable in this equation is the dent, Barack Obama’s most well- amount of attention given to Latin known Latin American foreign America by Trump. Will a Trump policy accomplishment would White House really promulgate certainly be the re-establishment all of their promised policies? Or of diplomatic relations with Cuba. rather, will they choose to pursue Two additional bilateral trade a policy of (benign or malign) in- agreements with Colombia and difference? As Michael Reid says Panama were also signed into upon analyzing Obama’s relation- force, and the Obama adminis- ship with Latin America: tration claimed some credit fol- lowing the historic signing of the For U.S. presidents, Latin America Colombian Peace Agreements, usually offers more frustrations to which Obama had an envoy than foreign policy triumphs. The region’s leaders gripe about both sent. President Obama also criti- U.S. interference and U.S. ne- cized the Maduro administration Ibero-Analysen 28 · Mai 2017 3 in Venezuela for its undemocratic figure should be presented in the practices, even going through the proper context – Bush and Clin- motions of castigating the regime ton had incredibly higher rates by means of international insti- for border apprehensions and tutions, i.e. the Organization of returns – it has not stopped the American States (OAS). All in all, designation of Obama as “De- it can be safely said that Obama’s porter-in-Chief”. Despite allocat- tenure did not mark a substantial ing funds for programs like Plan departure from the neoliberal/ Colombia and the Mérida Plan, liberal internationalist policies of Obama also failed to recalibrate past presidencies. The bungling the failing “War on Drugs”. While of the 2009 Honduran coup and it could be argued that the Obama subsequent provisional elections administration should be held ac- seemed like just another blip in countable for major failings in re- a long line of dubious regime gard to its Latin American foreign changes supported, whether im- policy, the one thing that Presi- plicitly or explicitly, by the U.S.A. dent Obama can be conclusively (Reid 2015: 49). Not all of these credited with is his refusal to en- aforementioned “successes” can gage in the racially charged and be unanimously claimed as wins, xenophobic rhetoric disseminated While it could be however. What Obama heralded by Trump. This rhetoric, designed argued that the as an accomplishment, the Cuban to provoke and dehumanize those Obama admin- istration should opening, many viewed as a con- residents who are in the U.S.A. be held account- cessional sign of weakness and without proper documentation able for major failings in re- a betrayal of democratic values. or who possess Hispanic and/or gard to its Latin More so, many have criticized Latino heritages, is undoubtedly American foreign policy, the one Obama’s failure to definitively one key difference between the thing that Presi- act in regard to the Venezuelan two presidents (Aguilar Valenzu- dent Obama can be conclusively quagmire. Obama’s hands-off de- ela 2017). credited with meanor has also allowed China is his refusal to engage in the to cement their foothold in Latin Throughout his campaign, and racially charged American economies, which has even into the first three months and xenophobic rhetoric dissemi- subsequently resulted in an over- of his presidency, Trump has not nated by Trump. all loss of U.S. influence on the been afraid to express the “po- continent (Reid 2015: 47-48). litically incorrect”. At a rally on Furthermore, Obama oversaw the June 16, 2015, Trump said “When removal of some 3,094,208 im- Mexico sends its people, they’re migrants during his tenure, more not sending their best […] they’re than the Clinton and Bush ad- bringing drugs. They’re bring- ministration combined (Chishti/ ing crime. They’re rapists. And Pierce/Bolter 2017).1 While this some, I assume, are good peo- ple” (Edelman 2016). A Tweet he 1 As Migration Policy says, the Obama sent in 2015 criticized Jeb Bush’s administration also focused, “less on outreach to the Latino-American increasing absolute numbers of over- all deportations and [put] a higher community: “So true. Jeb Bush is priority on targeting the removals crazy, who cares that he speaks of recently-arrived unauthorized im- migrants and criminals. The admin- Mexican, this is America, Eng- istration also placed a much lower priority on removing those who had and had no criminal records” (Chishti/ established roots in U.S. communities Pierce/Bolter 2017). 4 Ibero-Analysen 28 · Mai 2017 lish!!”. It goes without saying that restrictions, that latter of which Bush’s Spanish is misclassified, claims a provenance that stretch- almost purposefully, as Mexican. es back decades and includes A third example can be seen in multiple presidential administra- The lack of co- his ad hominem attacks made tions of both parties as support- herent policy against U.S. District Judge Gonza- ers. Latin America can expect a or power hier- archies at the lo Curiel (Edelman 2016). Trump more stringent retrenchment on executive level said that there was no way Curiel these policies, along with a presi- combined with a revolving door could remain unbiased in his hear- dential rhetoric more forthcoming of advisors mean ing of the Trump University fraud in its nationalistic and xenophobic that the actions taken by the case due to the fact that he, as tones. What now must be done is Trump White a “Mexican”, would be inherently determine how rhetoric will trans- House are dif- ficult to predict against the wall Trump promised form into action and how ideas at a structural to build and would therefore be will become policy. level. Despite such uncertainty, tempted to take his anger out on however, Latin Trump via the courtroom (Edel- The lack of coherent policy or America has an alternative to the man 2016). Irrelevant to Trump, power hierarchies at the execu- “wait-and-see” apparently, was the fact that Cu- tive level combined with a revolv- approach. riel is a U.S. citizen, born in Indi- ing door of advisors mean that the ana. While in office, he has stated actions taken by the Trump White his support for controversial and House are difficult to predict at a arguably inhumane plans, includ- structural level. Despite such un- ing the splitting up of Central certainty, however, Latin America American families detained af- has an alternative to the “wait- ter illegally crossing the border and-see” approach. Currently in as an attempt to deter migra- the midst of a decade marked by tion and the creation of an office enhanced regional coordination that publicizes crimes committed and economic cooperation, Latin by unauthorized immigrants: the American countries find them- latter being “a reflection of the selves in a unique position to take old strain of American intolerance on a possibly hostile White House. that brought us [the U.S.A.] in- The existence of new opportuni- ternment camps and miscegena- ties is not something restricted tion laws” (The New York Times to Latin America, however; the Editorial Board 2017). This short Trump presidency also finds it- snippet of background informa- self in a position to enliven the tion presented in the past para- relatively stagnant policy stances graph has hopefully placed the taken by past presidents of all comments and actions of the past stripes – should it feel obliged two presidents in a comparative to do so. Realistically, the Trump context. It should be noted that presidency seems to portend the U.S. foreign policy on Latin Amer- return of semi-isolationism and ica will not magically transform protectionism to U.S. foreign pol- overnight, changing from good to icy, but should the U.S.A. decide evil. What is much more likely to to abdicate its role of global arbi- take place are deviations to pre- ter, the subsequent power vacu- existing policy: policies like the um will surely not favor its global “War on Drugs” and immigration security and economic interests. Ibero-Analysen 28 · Mai 2017 5 Trump’s Role in Latin amplify its cross-Pacific relation- American Politics ships. The question that this piece hopes to expound upon can be boiled Since the turn of the decade, down to the following: What does the pink-tide that previously had a Trump Presidency mean for swept over Latin America has Latin America, and what are the receded. Leftist governments in policy options available to Latin Honduras, Paraguay, Argentina, America in terms of mitigating a and Brazil have all been pushed Trump presidency? Latin America out of office, and center to right- is anything but a homogenous wing governments have taken entity: that is clear. Recognizing charge (Main 2017). In the next the plurality and heterogeneity of two years, nine Latin American Latin America, this piece hopes nations will hold presidential elec- to stress the positive externali- tions: Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, ties that enhanced sociopolitical Venezuela, Chile, Ecuador, Costa and economic cooperation can Rica, Paraguay, and Honduras. provide for the region. Moving In the era of a Trump presidency, further afield than protracting the fate of these elections could failed neo-liberal economic re- very well depend on the Latin forms, meaningful coordination American populisms fired up by could prove to be beneficial for the “caudillo yanqui” to the north a continent trying to balance its (Tharoor 2017).2 One such exam- In the next two years, nine Latin own oscillations between popu- ple can be found in Mexico, where American nations lisms from the left and right. With Andrés Manuel López Obrador will hold presi- dential elections: the creation of the Union of South has seen his polls rise in the four Brazil, Mexico, American Nations (UNASUR) in months since Trump’s election Colombia, Vene- zuela, Chile, 2008, the Pacific Alliance (PA) in (Moreno 2017).3 In a poll con- Ecuador, Costa 2011, and the Community of Lat- Rica, Paraguay, 2 “Caudillo yanqui” is a dual reference and Honduras. in American and Caribbean States to “caudillo” or the Latin American In the era of a strongman ruler, and “yanqui” the His- (CELAC) in 2011, Latin America Trump presi- panicization of Yankee, a name used dency, the fate of has begun a promising, if not at for U.S. Americans in Latin America. these elections 3 Poll numbers can be found in this least symbolic, process of deep- could very well graphic provided by El Financie- depend on the ening interdependency. While this ro through the following webpage: Latin American <http://graficos.elfinanciero.com. interconnectedness cannot possi- populisms fired mx/2017/encuestas/enc-01febre- up by the “caudi- bly neutralize a trade dependence ro17/index.html> (08.05.17); the llo yanqui” to question that was asked of participants on the U.S.A. that many South the north. was: “Si los candidatos a la Presiden- and Central American countries cia de la República en 2018 fueran los siguientes, ¿por quién votaría usted? claim – a dependency that will (% EFECTIVO)”. In English, it can be certainly temper potential efforts translated to: “If the candidates for the 2018 election for the Presidency of regionalization – Latin America of the Republic were the following, can nonetheless seek out possi- for whom would you vote?”. Since the PAN candidate had yet to be officially ble ameliorations. That is to say, decided, the poll asked hypotheticals, while Mexico cannot incite a trade wherein Zavala and Anaya were alter- natively the nominated candidate, to war with the U.S.A., Mexico’s #1 gauge fluctuations in opinions across import and export market, it can other candidates. Between November 2016 and February 2017, López Ob- certainly look to expand its com- rador gained four points in the polls, mercial reach southward and climbing from 29 % to 33 %, when 6 Ibero-Analysen 28 · Mai 2017 ducted by El Financiero between perhaps laudable attempts at ini- the 19th and 25th of January, tiating a regional dialogue, but 2017, López Obrador saw notable their constituent countries have gains in popularity – regardless yet to imbue these organizations of the electoral field – when com- with any substantial power or ca- pared to the same survey in No- pacities that can endure between vember of 2016 (Moreno 2017). presidencies. That is to say, the Many attribute his rise in popu- frameworks exist and are already larity to the populism that blos- in place, but there has not been somed in the United States lead- an attempt to fully utilize the true ing up to the 2016 presidential potential of these institutions. Ad- election. The anti-immigration, ditionally, without permanent or The anti-immi- anti-Mexican, and overall anti- binding institutions, new regimes gration, anti- Mexican, and Latin American rhetoric that sur- and governments are in no way overall anti- rounded Trump’s rise to power beholden to the resolutions draft- Latin American rhetoric that sur- has only served to reinvigorate ed by these bodies. While pos- rounded Trump’s anti-U.S. sentiment in Mexico; sible solutions may lie in the re- rise to power has only served to “Trump – with his brash pledges gionalization of cooperation, the reinvigorate anti- to rewrite Nafta [sic] and stick utility of these institutions should U.S. sentiment in Mexico. Mexico with the bill for building be taken with a grain of salt. For the wall – has created the perfect now, they are hopeful glimpses climate for an anti-Trump south of what a more cooperative and of the border” (Gamboa 2017; integrated future might look like. Cattan 2017). Riding the wave of The immediate future, however, discontent brought on by Trump’s appears to look a bit different; statements, López Obrador has President Danilo Medina of the moved to the front of the pack. Dominican Republic said the fol- Indeed, it seems that the Trump lowing at the CELAC Summit that presidency will continue to have a took place in Punta Cana in Janu- palpable impact on the numerous ary of 2017: elections occurring in Latin Amer- The phantom of protectionism ica within the next two years. and closure of borders would have grave consequences. We must do In conclusion, the political un- everything we can to prevent a return to the past […] We are fac- certainty in Latin America, as ex- ing an adverse international sce- emplified by Mexico, represents nario. We need to stick together one of the many difficulties that to defend our alliance (Newman the aforementioned internation- 2017). al blocs and organizations must confront. CELAC and UNASUR are This need to “stick together” in light of “an adverse internation- Margarita Zavala was hypothesized as the PAN candidate. Zavala fell from al scenario” might be something 29 % to 27 % and Miguel Ángel Osorio that these nations share, but with Chong fell from 26 % to 20 %; in an- other poll, where Ricardo Anaya was Trump’s presidency kicking into hypothesized to be the PAN candi- high gear, it is a sentiment that date instead of Zavala, López Obrador gained five points, climbing from 31 % must also be backed up with ac- to 36 %, whereas Anaya maintained tion. 23 % and Osorio Chong fell from 27 % to 21 %. Ibero-Analysen 28 · Mai 2017 7 Looking Backwards: during the interwar period” (Of- Comparisons of U.S. fice of the Historian 2017a). This Isolationism and Nativism economic uncertainty combined Across Time with the desire to protect U.S. Before diving into specific charac- producers and their goods soon teristics of a Trump-led Western coalesced into the Hawley-Smoot Hemisphere, it is first worth the Tariff of 1930. “Raising the aver- effort to contextualize Trump’s age tariff on dutiable imports by promises and actions vis-à-vis nearly 20 percent”, the Hawley- an historical comparison. First, Smoot Tariff garnered deep inter- and most importantly, it is cru- national resentment for the United cial to note that Trump’s “America States, “particularly [seeing] as First” worldview is hardly a new the United States was an interna- phenomenon in the U.S.: while tional creditor and exports to the it may be extraordinarily short- U.S. market were already declin- First, and most sighted, it is not radical in any ing” (Eichengreen/Irwin 2010: importantly, it is sense of the word. Before its use 875). As the Great Depression crucial to note that Trump’s as Trump’s rallying cry, “America worsened and international trade “America First” First” was brandished as the slo- shrunk, the U.S. enacted one of worldview is hardly a new gan of a U.S. organization found- the most protectionist tariffs in its phenomenon in ed during the beginning of World history. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff, the U.S.: while it may be extra- War II that advocated for U.S. “provoked retaliatory responses, ordinarily short- non-interference. Susan Dunn, notably from its largest trading sighted, it is not radical in any a professor at Williams College, partner, Canada, as well as from sense of the classifies the America First Com- a handful of European countries” word. mittee as “isolationist, defeatist, (Eichengreen/Irwin 2010: 875). and anti-Semitic” (Dunn 2016). These types of reactions are un- Urging the U.S. government to fortunately not relics of a distant appease Hitler, the America First past. As North American Free Committee was willing to disre- Trade Agreement (NAFTA) rene- gard the atrocities of fascist re- gotiations get underway via the gimes if that meant avoiding en- inauguration of the Trade Promo- tanglements in a war across the tion Authority (TPA) process, and Atlantic. Similarities also abound as the U.S.A. steps out of the in- between Trump’s semi-isolationist ternational “free-trade” limelight, and nativist policies and those of the United States’ protectionist Hoover during the interwar peri- past merits re-examination and od. The justification for decreased recognition (Woody 2017). From U.S. involvement on the global January 1929 to January 1933, scale during the Inter-War Period world trade fell from US $5.3 bil- bears striking, if not eerie, paral- lion to US $1.8 billion – a con- lels to the modern U.S. American traction of 66 % (The Economist political context: “Disillusionment 2008).4 Naturally, the Hawley- with World War I, international Smoot Tariff cannot bear all of the commitments that could lead to blame – the Great Depression and another war, and economic un- 4 Numerical values taken from figure certainty discouraged ambitious entitled “Down the plughole” in the article appearing in The Economist. U.S. involvement in global affairs Data sourced from League of Nations’ World Economic Survey 1932-1933. 8 Ibero-Analysen 28 · Mai 2017 deflation were also root causes. ing those of Japanese and Filipino However, it “certainly made a descent – and any person of Arab bad situation worse”, and led to descent would be denied admit- the almost universal agreement tance to the United States on the that, going forward, a policy of basis of their race and national- With a cur- sory look back free-trade would be in U.S.’s best ity. While the Naturalization Act into the United interests (Bartlett 1997: 14-15). of 1870 allowed “aliens of African States’ past, this much is clear: Whether or not this sentiment will nativity and […] persons of African the tripartite set endure through the rest of the descent”, to become naturalized, of symptoms – nativism, semi- 21st century is now up for discus- this act excluded all non-white, isolationism, and sion; if this mutually agreed upon non-African persons from attain- protectionism – described above strategy is upended by the Trump ing naturalization, and therefore, seems to be administration, the world eco- it simultaneously excluded these re-emerging in a contemporary nomic order could begin to show groups (Asians and Arabs) from context. signs of increased instability. immigrating to the U.S.A. follow- ing the Immigration Act of 1924 The analysis of the Inter-War (Office of the Historian 2017c; Period by the U.S. Office of the United States Code § 254 sec. 7 Historian goes onto say that, “by 1870).5 These race-based restric- the mid-1920s […] a general feel- tions would by and large remain ing of economic uncertainty re- in effect up until the Immigration inforced isolationist tendencies and Nationality Act of 1952 (Unit- and encouraged new legislation ed States Code § 66 Stat. 163 that placed severe limits on im- 1952).6 With a cursory look back migration to the United States, into the United States’ past, this particularly from Asia” (Office of much is clear: the tripartite set the Historian 2017a). In 1882, of symptoms – nativism, semi- the Chinese Exclusion Act was isolationism, and protectionism – enacted, marking the first time described above seems to be re- in American history the govern- emerging in a contemporary con- ment placed “broad restrictions text. on immigration” by barring Chi- nese laborers from immigrating Despite the recovery of the U.S. to the United States (Office of economy since the Great Reces- the Historian 2017b). Over the sion, the country is still deeply un- following 35 years, this discrimi- sure of what the future will bring. nation of the “Other” would only In 2017, the story is the same, it intensify, culminating in the Im- is just the players who are differ- migration Acts of 1917 and 1924. ent: the Muslim Middle East and These acts respectively barred, Mexico take the place of (East) “entry [from] anyone born in a Asia, and the Hawley-Smoot Tar- geographically defined ‘Asiatic iff is replaced by the threat of Barred Zone’ except for Japanese 5 United States Code § 254 sec. 7 and Filipinos”, and then excluded (1870) available online at <http:// entry for, “any alien who by virtue legisworks.org/sal/16/stats/STAT- UTE-16-Pg254a.pdf> (08.05.17). of race or nationality was ineligi- 6 United States Code § 66 Stat. 163 ble for citizenship”, which meant (1952) available online at <https:// www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STAT- that in theory all Asians – includ- UTE-66/pdf/STATUTE-66-Pg163.pdf> (08.05.17) Ibero-Analysen 28 · Mai 2017 9 huge hikes in import tariffs for Chamber of Deputies and mem- Mexican goods, the U.S. with- ber of the conservative National drawal from future multinational Action Party (PAN) – called on Rather than Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), Latin American ambassadors to taking Trump’s speeches as like the Trans-Pacific Partnership sound their, “clear and resound- unadulterated (TPP), and the renegotiations of ing rejection of all the xenophobic truth, one must take Trump’s pre-existing FTAs, such as NAFTA expressions from the president of public rhetoric (Office of the United States Trade the United States, Donald Trump” and temper it with reality of Representative 2017; Brander (Xinhua 2017). This call for a re- the Trump ad- 2017). What makes these prom- ignited Pan-Latin-Americanism ministration. Rather than ises so troubling is not the lack of in light of a Trump Presidency is Trump hold- precedent, but rather that Trump in no way exclusively Mexican in ing unanimous decision-making is endeavoring to rehash century- origin. Calls for a consolidation power behind the old decisions within a drastically in regional commercial and politi- U.S.A.’s relation- ship with Latin different global context. One can cal organizations like the Bolivar- America, it is his certainly debate the risks posed ian Alliance for the Peoples of Our team of advi- sors and cabinet by the TPP to workers’ rights and America (ALBA), the Common members that the environment and discuss the Southern Market (MERCOSUR), will certainly take the reins in negative effects of NAFTA on a low and the Pacific Alliance (PA), navigating this income American factory worker. have originated from many gov- uneven diplo- matic terrain. However, Trump’s unilateralism ernments, both progressive and and unwillingness to fully recog- conservative. nize the complex interdependen- cies at play make these decisions Internal Dynamics and Power reasonably worrisome. Even Hierarchies within the Trump though Trump may not advocate Administration for an outright immigration ban Before diving into how Latin for all Mexicans or Muslims, the America can react to Trump’s leg- restrictions that he hopes to place islation and diplomacy, one must on the movement of certain eth- first try to forecast what exactly nic and religious groups mark a this legislation and diplomacy pronounced departure from the might look like. Rather than taking last several administrations – Trump’s speeches as unadulterat- though, as is seen, it is not with- ed truth, one must take Trump’s out presidential precedent. When public rhetoric and temper it with the aforementioned plans and reality of the Trump administra- orders are considered en masse, tion. Rather than Trump holding Trump’s desire to positively and unanimous decision-making pow- productively engage with Latin er behind the U.S.A.’s relationship America is called into question. with Latin America, it is his team Many of Trump’s adherents would of advisors and cabinet members argue these doubts are restricted that will certainly take the reins only to the most liberal of U.S. in navigating this uneven diplo- American political circles, yet, matic terrain. Who exactly makes the Latin American Right and Left up this team? With key posts in are undoubtedly taking heed. On the State Department still empty, February 21, Javier Bolaños – the this is a question that continues current president of the Mexican to puzzle many. Therefore, it may 10 Ibero Analysen 28 · Mai 2017