Human Rights Protocol Considerations Research Group S. Abraham Internet-Draft CIS India Intended status: Informational MP. Canales Expires: January 16, 2018 Derechos Digitales J. Hall CDT O. Khrustaleva American University N. ten Oever ARTICLE 19 C. Runnegar ISOC S. Sahib Cisco Systems July 15, 2017 Implementation Report for HTTP Status Code 451 (RFC 7725) draft-451-imp-report-00 Abstract This report describes implementation experience between various components working with the HTTP Status Code 451 [RFC7725], a risk assessment and recommendation for improvements. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on January 16, 2018. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. Abraham, et al. Expires January 16, 2018 [Page 1] Internet-Draft 451ImpReport July 2017 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust’s Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Vocabulary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Target audiences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Who is likely to implement the 451 status code? . . . . . . . 4 4.1. Server operators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.2. Intermediaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5. Who is likely to use the 451 status code data? . . . . . . . 4 5.1. Browser vendors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5.2. End users . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5.3. Researchers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5.4. Civil society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5.5. Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6. Current Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 8. Trends and observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 9. Potential negative or positive impacts . . . . . . . . . . . 6 10. What are features of a blocking reporting infrastructure that would be useful? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 11. What features of blocking events are supported by the existing 451 status code, and what features do we need to add? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 12. Appendix: Legal Realities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 13. Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 13.1. Federal Law of 27 July 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 13.2. "Yarovaya laws" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 14. Chile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 14.1. Blocking by courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 15. Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 15.1. Blocking by government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 15.2. Blocking by courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 16. India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 16.1. Blocking by the government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 16.2. Blocking by courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 16.3. Takedowns by web sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 17. United States of America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 17.1. Section 512 of the DMCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Abraham, et al. Expires January 16, 2018 [Page 2] Internet-Draft 451ImpReport July 2017 17.2. Other US-based forms of takedown . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 18. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Authors’ Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 1. Introduction This document evaluates the usage of HTTP Status Code 451, which was standardized by the IETF in February 2016 [RFC7725]. This implementation report aims to illuminate whether the status code does what it set out to do ("provide transparency in circumstances where issues of law or public policy affect server operations"), the different ways it is being used, positive and negative impacts the standard might have and we end with suggestions for improvement of the standard. 2. Vocabulary Blocking The act of making an HTTP resource inaccessible to a class of users. Resource A top-level information object served by an HTTP server (e.g., HTML page). Subresource An information object served within the context of a top-level Resource (e.g., JavaScript, Image, etc.) Server Operator An entity or an individual operating an HTTP server. HTTP status For each response, HTTP servers return a numerical status code (e.g., 400 (OK), 403 (unauthorized), etc.) described by IANA https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-status-codes/http- status-codes.xhtml. Response When an HTTP Server responds to a request, it sends a Response, made up of header fields and a body (See: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7725#section-3 Legal demand A verbal or written request grounded in law or regulation from an Authority to a Server Operator to Blocking a Resource. Authority A government or government-licensed entity mandating blocking of a resource directly or that may institute laws that indirectly require blocking of a resource. Complainant A party making a Legal demand; may or may not be an Authority (e.g., the US DMCA allows a copyright holder to demand takedown). Abraham, et al. Expires January 16, 2018 [Page 3] Internet-Draft 451ImpReport July 2017 3. Target audiences 4. Who is likely to implement the 451 status code? 4.1. Server operators Server operators that are being confronted with an order from a legal authority can use the HTTP Status Code to communicate to third parties why the resource is not available on the server. 4.2. Intermediaries Intermediaries such as Internet Service Providers, Content Distribution Networks and other might be obligated by a legal authority in their operational jurisdiction to filter certain content. The HTTP status code would add transparency to this practice. 5. Who is likely to use the 451 status code data? 5.1. Browser vendors Browser vendors might implement functionality to communicate the presence of a HTTP status code 451 to a user. 5.2. End users End users will be informed about why the information they are trying to access is not available, instead of merely concluding that the content is not available due to other reasons (e.g., 404 unavailable). 5.3. Researchers Researchers might want to scan for the prevalence of blocking, as well as trends in blocking behavior. 5.4. Civil society Civil society may want to use instances of HTTP status code 451 to highlight censorship and censorship trends, to challenge blocking. 5.5. Governments Governments might want to verify compliance with blocking orders and use HTTP status code 451 to do so on the networks in their jurisdiction. Abraham, et al. Expires January 16, 2018 [Page 4] Internet-Draft 451ImpReport July 2017 6. Current Usage 7. Overview In the majority of cases in which HTTP status code 451 is being deployed [Censys], the status code reads as follows - "451 Unavailable For Legal Reasons" or "451" or "451 Unknown Error" or "451 Error" or "451 Unavailable For Legal Reasons (burned)" or "451 OK". The Page Title could say "404 Not Found" or "Blocked" or "451 -" or "Restricted access" or "Bloqueado por ordem judicial" ("Blocked by judicial order") or "Sito censurato" ("Censored site") or "Доступ ограничен" ("Access is restricted") or "Зелёная точка - доступ к за&#10 87;рашиваемо&#1 084;у ресурсу ограничен" ("Zelenaya tochka" - Internet and TV provider - access to the requested resource is restricted")or "Violazione del bispensiero" or "Please report sexual abuse against children to the Swedish National Bureau of Investigation!" or "Copyright Notice" or "451 RKN Redirect" (RKN is likely Russia’s Roskomnadzor) or "ATTENZIONE!! - POLIZIA POSTALE E DELLE COMUNICAZIONI - PAGINA BLOCCATA" ("Attention! - Postal and Communications Policy - Blocked Page") or "451 Unavailable For Legal Reasons 本网站由于国&#2 3478;政策而不可用" (Chinese: "This site is not available due to national policy"). The hosts that were observed implementing the status code are located in Russia, United States of America, Singapore, Czech Republic, Thailand, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Ukraine, Norway, Finland, Kazakhstan, United Arab Emirates, Japan, China, Philippines and Australia. In some cases - the visitor to the website is provided some context for the block - for example, a take-down notice for copyright infringment - in other cases the visitor is encouraged to cooperate with law enforcement agencies. The page title may have information that does not always make sense in the context of the error code, for example when the title says "404 Not Found" but the page is a 451 response body. These observations are based an examination of the search results from Censys.io on 15 July 2017 which featured 526 IPv4 Hosts of which 17 were included in the list of "Top Million Websites". Abraham, et al. Expires January 16, 2018 [Page 5] Internet-Draft 451ImpReport July 2017 Several large content providers are now supporting the HTTP 451 Status Code, such as [Github] and [Reddit], whereas other content providers such as [Twitter], [Facebook], and [Youtube] are currently not using the HTTP status code to indicate the blocking or takedown of specific content. 8. Trends and observations - The majority of instance of HTTP status code 451 provide no explanation in the response body. - There have been found several cases of servers serving HTTP status code 451 with redirect another server with a central warning message of a blocking authority. - A registrar serves HTTP status code 451 when a registrant did not pay their domain fees. - There are significant observations of server serving HTTP status code 451 based on geoIP (especially for gambling sites). - There are different understandings of the ’blocked-by’ field as defined in RFC7725. Some people interpret is as the entity that is doing the blocking, others are interpreting it at the authority responsible for ordering the blocking. - HTTP Status Code 451 is thusfar only served by hosts, not by intermediaries. 9. Potential negative or positive impacts - [RFC7725] specifies a status code for web resources that are blocked for legal reasons. The HTTP status code 451 is designed to enable content providers and intermediaries (including ISPs and search engines) to notify users that their access to specific web resources has been blocked for legal reasons. The standard also recommends that the notification include an explanation. This is important because this is the detail the user needs to be able to understand why access has been blocked, and if desired, to take action to challenge the blocked access. It also helps content servers and intermediaries who have been required to block access to notify users who directed that access by blocked. - Also, as the 451 status code is machine-readable, researchers and others could use web crawlers to identity which blocked URLs or sub-resources use error code 451. This data could be used to produce a searchable open repository of all known error code 451 instances. This information could then be used to map the blocked Abraham, et al. Expires January 16, 2018 [Page 6] Internet-Draft 451ImpReport July 2017 Web and to analyze the explanations, looking for trends and anomalies. For example, one day there might be an answer to the question - "how much content is blocked for IPR reasons?" - The 451 status code can also be used for encrypted webpages, which is significant as encryption on the Web becomes more and more prevalent. A user should be able to see the error code irrespective of whether they try to access the content via HTTP or HTTPS. - This standard is a prime example of an Internet protocol enabling common policy objectives (in this case, transparency) to be implemented across the world. However, as with all IETF standards, the implementation of the 451 status code is voluntary. So, how widely it is used will likely depend on a number of factors, including a legal/political regime that does not penalize transparency, the willingness to be transparent and the capability to implement. - It is possible that status code 451 code could be used for other purposes (e.g. to mislead users as to the reason for the content being blocked), especially as "legal reasons" is not defined. - It is also possible that content providers and intermediaries who are required to block content for legal reasons to be asked or compelled to use another status code (e.g. 404). In these circumstances, content providers and intermediaries should include information in their transparency reports to indicate whether this is happening, by, for example, stating: "We have/have not been required to replace 451 by other status codes." - There may be a temptation in some cases of the implementation of status code 451 to include the ability to identify and/or track the users that visit a web resource that has been blocked. This raises significant privacy issues. - The usage of HTTP status code 451 might lead to an increase in blocking because it makes analyzing compliance easier. 10. What are features of a blocking reporting infrastructure that would be useful? - The reporting format needs to cover information enough to satisfy transparency and offer insight about possible misuse of 451 error as a vehicle for censorship. - Transparency requirement will be better served through standardization of fields and descriptions. Currently many Abraham, et al. Expires January 16, 2018 [Page 7] Internet-Draft 451ImpReport July 2017 implementations for HTTP status code 451 do not provide the reason for blocking. This could be attributed to the fact that the different needs are not sufficiently documented in RFC7725. This could be fixed by adding fields in the header. Useful categorization fields to accurately describe content blocked by legal reasons are: - Identification of the legal source on which the blocking request is based. - Identification of the complainant/requestor if is an institution (not if individual because of privacy concerns). It could be useful to identify in this field if the request comes from a private or public entity, and in if there is a judicial order involved, or a law enforcement or other type of governmental request. - Description of blocked content (example: ’Non-consensual sexually explicit imagery’). It could be helpful to have suggested fields that standardize type of content in order to make easier the analysis and the evaluation about eventual challenge of the use of error 451 for the specific content removal. - Determination of the geographical scope of the blocking. Increasingly blocks are being implemented at the level of the city or province. Therefore country codes may not be sufficient to describe the geographical scope. - Date of block order and time-period for which the block has to be enforced. - Date of start serving HTTP status code 451. - Link to the final decision (if available). Again this should only be the case when the complainant is not an individual. - Contact information for relevant authority for the purposes of verification of procedural stage and appeal or redress opportunities. 11. What features of blocking events are supported by the existing 451 status code, and what features do we need to add? - Guidance on the representation of HTTP status code for subresources in browsers - Guidance on the implementation of HTTP status code 451 could lead to an increase in adoption. RFC7725 provides high level advice but still leaves space for interpretation. An implementation Abraham, et al. Expires January 16, 2018 [Page 8] Internet-Draft 451ImpReport July 2017 guide in conjunction with an adoption campaign might lead to increased adoption. - [RFC7725] does not clarify whether HTTP Status Code 451 is only meant for respones to GET/HEAD requests or also for POST/HEAD requests. - Guidance on a HTTP link header to indicate that a resources that is linked on the page, but not loaded, is no longer available for legal reasons. 12. Appendix: Legal Realities In the light of the use cases outlined above underneath we are providing an overview of legal frameworks in a number of countries that could be used to make a blocking request. This is to show that a reference to a the description of blocked content, the legal source on which the blocking order or request is based and the authority that is makes the order or request is crucial in understanding the context and nature of the blockage. 13. Russia Blocking by the government: 13.1. Federal Law of 27 July 2006 Law No. 149-FZ on Information, Information Technologies and Protection of Information and its amendments: - "Blacklist" law 139-FZ (2012) - allowing to block websites if they appear to have dangerous information for children such as information about suicide and drugs. The blocking was often done by keyword so as a result one of the biggest wiki sites in Russia (Lukmore) was accused of drugs propaganda, an online encyclopedia (Absurdopedia) was accused of suicide propaganda and an online game was blocked because on it’s forum somebody used a word "drug". - "Anti-pirate" law 187-FZ (2013) - easier way for the government to block access to websites if they are suspected in any wrongdoing. The amendment also allows blocking by IP address. Leads to the blockage of portals such as OpenSharing.org - The law 398-FZ on immediate blockage of websites at the request of Prosecutor General (2013). Abraham, et al. Expires January 16, 2018 [Page 9] Internet-Draft 451ImpReport July 2017 - "Bloggers’ amendment" 97-FZ (2014) - bloggers with more than 3000 need to register as mass media ("information distributors") and have the same responsibilities (including on what their readers post in comments). - Data localization law 242-FZ (2015) all companies collecting personal data of the Russian citizens must store that information on the servers within Russia - The laws against extremism that have been updated throughout the past 5 years expanding the term "extremism" and making the punishment tougher (jail terms for posting and reposting) as well as blocking. These laws have been used widely after the conflict in Ukraine. Some people got jail sentences and resources were being blocked for spreading information sympathizing with the Ukrainian side. Such laws are particularly vague and "extremism" is very laxly defined. For example, "...extremist materials, as well as information propagating racial, national or religious hatred or enmity or hatred towards any social group." 13.2. "Yarovaya laws" This law was approved by the Parliament and, if passed, will oblige messaging apps to store messaging history and decrypt messages at prosecutors’ request. 14. Chile 14.1. Blocking by courts The Law No. 20.435 (Copyright Act reform from 2010) contains a notice and take down procedure, for copyright infringements under which a court order is required -instead of a private notice like happens in the DMCA- to have content taken down. A Supreme Court decision from 2016 held that it was possible to request a news oulet to remove content in its website to enforce the constitutional right of privacy, when the data is no longer relevant and it availability on the network cause harm to the data subject. The case was controversial because the information was about a public servant condemned in a pedophilia case. This decision has been used to enforce a kind of ’right to be forgotten’ for lower courts since the Supreme Court decision, but there is a lack of general legislation that clarify this cause of removals. On the other hand, the Law No. 20.453 tackles intermediary non-interference from the perspective of users by adding to the general rules within the General Telecommunications Act (Law No 18.168) new rules for internet service providers. Among those rules the internet service providers "shall not block or interfere in any way with the rights of the user to use Abraham, et al. Expires January 16, 2018 [Page 10]