Loyola University Chicago Loyola eCommons Master's Theses Theses and Dissertations 1942 Human Nature According to Saint Thomas Aquinas Virginia Moore Loyola University Chicago Recommended Citation Moore, Virginia, "Human Nature According to Saint Thomas Aquinas" (1942).Master's Theses.Paper 665. http://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/665 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please [email protected]. This work is licensed under aCreative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. Copyright © 1942 Virginia Moore HUMAN NATURE ACCORDIID TO SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS BY v:riG INIA MOORE A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFIT.I:MFm OF THE REQ.UIRJiJmN!'S FOR THE DIDREE OF MASI'ER OF .ARTS IN LOYOLA UNIVERSITY AIDUST 1942 TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page . . . . . . . INTRODUCTION iii I. r!ATERI.AL BEIIDS • 1 II. SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCES 25 . . III. THE NATURE OF MAN • 42 . . IV. CONCLUSION 81 . . . . . . . . v. REFERENCES 84 . . . . VI. BIBLIOGRAPHY 85 INTRODUCTION In the teachings of St. Thomas, philosophy is not a salve to theology. He demonstrates by the principles of reason, many propositions forming a doctrine separate from theology, strictly speaking. He teaches a philosophy distinct from theology; the former, solving problems by the natural resources of the human mind; the latter, seeking its proofs in divine revelation. Both can happen to meet on the ground of the same truths, but each conserves its physiognomy, its means of research, and of argumentation. There is a system of important truths that reason can, by itself, by its own power, discover and demonstrate. For example, the existence and the perfection of God, also, the spirituality and the immorteli~ of the human soul, its free will, the rational bases and natural rules of morality, and all the attitudes which prepare, accompany or follow those dat~ acquired by the work of the intellect. The important point is to establish the crucial role of faith in revelation, and the one of philosophical knowl edge, about the same object; for example, the existence of God. If it can be proved by philosophy alone, that God exists, why do we need a revelation imposing upon us the belief in that dogma? It seems we would have to choose between science and faith. St. Thomas solves the difficulty very clearly. If faith is not absolutely necessary in order to adhere to the truths that reason can demonstrate by itself, it is evident, nevertheless, that for many men, faith is relatively necessary, or very useful, in order to assure iii iv the assent of their intelligence to those important propositions.l The study of philosophy is very long and hard. Very few minds are capable of the effort, and among those who would like to undertake that study, very many have not the leisure, or the patience or the perseverance to do it. Faith comes to the aid of that weakness--it teaches more rapidly, it enlightens more minds, it prepares the masses, it puts humanity in posses- sion of the most sublime truths. The more obscure philosophy is, the more it is sUbject to error and the more it exposes one to doubt, to hesitation, uncertitude. Faith, resting on revelation, has more assurance, firmness and guaranty, against false argu- ments. It puts the soul in a confident tranquility.2 l.rb.e Summa Theologica .2f. St. Thomas Aquinas, Literally Translated by Fathers of' the English Dominican Province, Burns, Oates, and Washbourne, Ltd., London, 1938, 3rd edition, I, q. 2, art. 1; ad. 1: To know that God exists in a general and contused way is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is Man's beatitude. For man naturally desires happiness, and what is naturally desired by man must be naturally known to him. This,· however, is not to know absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone is approaching is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching, even though it is Peter who is approaching; for many there are who imagine that man's perfect good which is happiness, consists in riches, and others in pleasures, and others in something else. Zrbid., q. 1, art. 2: Sacred doctrine is a science. We must bear in mind ~there are two kinds of sciences. There are some which proceed from a principle known by the natural light of the intelligence, such as arithmetic and geometry and the like. There are some which proceed from principles known by the light of' a higher science: thus the science of' perspective proceeds from principles established by arithmetic. So it is that sacred doctrine is a science, because it proceeds from principles established by the light of' a higher science, namely, the science of God and the blessed. Hence, just as the musician accepts on authority the principles taught him by the mathematician, so sacred science is estab lished on principles revealed by God. v Such is the fundamental cause of the coeXistence of a same domain, of a philosophy simply rational, and of a theology constructed on data revealed supernaturally. But for the elect of intellects, that domain remains none the less the proper ground of philosophy. Philosophy has the right and the duty to cultivate it, in its own manner, according to the method belonging to it, and With its own instruments.3 But then it would seem contradictory to have at the same time on one given subject, faith and natural knowledge. Indeed, faith supposes the will to believe a truth revealed by God, but not directly demonstrated by reason. It is divine authority and not the evidence of the object proposed to the mind, which imposes the belief, while it is the luminous evidence of the object, which by means of the scientific proof, impels conviction in philosophy. That does not mean that man is not brought to faith by reasons of believing, but those reasons are decisive only because they establish that God has revealed, and not because they prove the dogma.4 3rbid., q. 1, art. 1, ad. 2: Sciences are differentiated according to the variOus means through which knowledge is obtained. For the astronomer and the physicist both may prove the same conclusion--that the earth, for instance, is round: the astronomer by means of mathematics ( i. e., abstracting from matter), but the physicist by means of matter itself. Hence there is no reason why those things which may be learnt from philo sophical science, so far as they can be known by natural reason, may not also be taught us by another science so far as they fall within revelation. Hence theology included in sacred doctrine differs in kind from that theology which is part of philosophy. 4Ibid., II, II, q. 2, art. 1, ad. 1: Faith has not that research of natura.T"'reason which demonstrates which is believed, but a research into those things whereby a man is induced to believe, for instance, that such things have been uttered by God and con:tirmed by miracles. vi In philosophy, on the contrary, authority is not a sufficient founda- tion--a clearness coming from the thing itself, is necessary. Therefore, a man cannot, by a simultaneous act , believe and know (in the strict sense), the same doctrine.5 If he believes it, it is be~ause he has not actually the knowledge--understanding of it; if he knows it, it is because, he has not on that point the actual faith by the submission of the mind to divine authority.6 Of course, St. Thomas, though faithfUl., would not believe if he did not see that it is necessary to believe, or on account of the evidence of the signs, or for some other.reason of the same order. But to see what one might believe is not to see what one believes-- at least--it is to see it, as believeable, but it is not to see it, as scientifically demonstrated. A dogma which is the object of faith for one intelligence, can be the object of science--of philosophy--for another.7 The same man can for a 5Ibid., II, II, q. 1, art. 5: All science is derived from self-evident and th~ore seen principles; wherefore all objects of science must needs be, in a fash~seen. 6 Ibid., II, II, q. 1, art. 4: Faith implies assent of the intellect to tha"t'Wilich is believed. Now the intellect assents to a thing in two ways. First, through being moved to assent by its very object, which is known either by itself {as in the case of first principles, which are held by the habit of understanding}, or through something else already known (as in the case of conclusions which are held by the habit of science}. Secondly the intellect assents to something, not through being sufficiently moved to this assent by its proper object, but through an act of choice, whereby it turns voluntarily to one side rather than to the other: and if this be accompanied by doubt and fear of the opposite side, there will be opinion, while, if there be certainty and no fear of the other side, there will be faith. 7Ibid., II, II, q. 1, art. 5, ad. 3: Things which can be proved by demons~ion are reckoned among the articles of faith, not because they are believed simply by all, but because they are a necessary presupposition to matters of faith, so that those who do not know them by demonstration must know them first of all by faith. vii moment make an act of faith--then turn towards the reasons for knowing, and be convinced by a scientific insight. He multiplies himself thus in two intellectual acts of different essences--he sees the same thing from two points of view. Therefore, faith and knowledge have not the same f'omal. object. If' we were all equally able to develop our natures, and if we had the time and the will to do it, we would reach a knowledge by scientific principles, ot the truths considered by philosophy. It would be tor us a natural preamble to faith, and thus widen and elevate our knowledge. Such might be the logical order, that is, to know from the philosophic~ truth, the spirituality and the immortality of the soul, the existence and perfection of God, then, to believe in the superior dogmas that God reveals to man, and that human reason is radically powerless to demonstrate by its own light. But would it not be better to satisfy oneself' with faith and to apply one's entire mind to believe, and not to know, even in the realm where sci entific demonstration is possible? The light ot evidence dominates reason and forces its assent: it would not seem to be very meritorious to give so necessary an adherence. On the contrary, the partial obscurity of revelation leaves the will f'ree to force the intelligence to faith or to maintain it in its independence. Therefore, belief' is more voluntary and consequently more meritorious. But it is worthy of praise and of reward to seek voluntarily to acquire the knowledge which is suitable to our nature. viii If a dominant light is the result of our rational investigations, think of the work and the perseverance required to move toward that term. That work is well and good: well directed, inspired by an elevated intention, it has its merit, its value, and elevates our soul. After all, faith has nothing to fear, in its purity, from a philosophy wisely understood. Of course; it would ruin belie:t in its foundation i:t one would believe only through reasons strictly demonstrative. One must not coni'use things: the supernatural truths are imposed on us, by the authority of God, and the influence of grace. The motives of credibility invite us to faith, make it reasonable, without, however, provil:lg the dogma.S But he who is disposed with all his soul, to believe everything which is o:t faith, keeps all the merit of his belie:t, even when he sees the truth, by evidence of reason, of that intermixture--as the existence o:t God~ He adheres with love to everything which is divinely revealed. That is the source of his merit: he loves truth under all its forms and at all its degrees. be it known voluntarily or by supernatural means. 8Ibid., II, II, q. 2, art. 9, ad. 3: The believer has sufficient motive :tor beii'EiVing, :tor he is moved by the authority of Divine teaching confirmed by miracles, and what is more, by the inward instinct o:t the Divine invita tion: hence he does not believe lightly. He has not, however, sufficient reason :tor scientific knowledge, hence he does not lose the merit. 9Ibid., II, II, q. 2, art. 10. The act of faith can be meritorious, in so far as it is subject to the will, not only as to the use, but also as to the assent. Now h'l.llDB.D. reason in support of what we believe, may stand in a twofold relation to the will o:t the believer--First, as preceding the act o:t the will; as, :tor instance, when a man either has not the will, or not a prompt will, to believe, unless he be moved by human reasons; and in this way human reason diminishes the merit o:t faith. Thus it is, that the nature of man, although as the object of faith, is clearly set forth by revelation, can be the object of knowledge, from the point of view of philosophy. The nature of man is a proper object of the intellect of man. SubmittiDg to God, in what he can understand, man is satisfied, when he reveals the truth, by that intelligence he has from God, and pays to Him the homage of his unfolded faculties by exercising that prerogative which is the noblest thiDg in man--that image and likeness of His Maker. St. Thomas constantly gives a magnificent example of reason allied to faith. His theology is always accompanied by philosophy. He demonstrates everything which is demonstrable. He exposes all probability, in the light of reason, of what is not susceptible of integral proof. Here we will endeavor to show his truly philosophical explanation of the Nature of Man.