WWiilllliiaamm && MMaarryy BBuussiinneessss LLaaww RReevviieeww Volume 8 (2016-2017) Article 3 Issue 3 May 2017 HHooww AAbbssoolluuttee IIss tthhee AAbbssoolluuttee PPrriioorriittyy RRuullee iinn BBaannkkrruuppttccyy?? TThhee CCaassee ffoorr SSttrruuccttuurreedd DDiissmmiissssaallss Bruce Grohsgal Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons RReeppoossiittoorryy CCiittaattiioonn Bruce Grohsgal, How Absolute Is the Absolute Priority Rule in Bankruptcy? The Case for Structured Dismissals, 8 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 439 (2017), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/ wmblr/vol8/iss3/3 Copyright c 2017 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr HOW ABSOLUTE IS THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE IN BANKRUPTCY? THE CASE FOR STRUCTURED DISMISSALS BRUCE GROHSGAL* ABSTRACT This Article challenges the view that the absolute priority rule applies to a “structured dismissal” in a chapter 11 bankruptcy case, namely a court-approved settlement of certain claims by or against the debtor followed by the dismissal of the case. Under that view, the bankruptcy court cannot approve a settlement that makes a distribution to holders of junior claims unless it also provides for payment of all senior claims in full. The Supreme Court considered the question in the fall of 2016 in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.). The question before the Court is: “Whether a bankruptcy court may authorize the distribution of settlement proceeds in a manner that violates the statutory priority scheme.” The argument that a structured dismissal always must follow the absolute priority rule, even when a chapter 11 plan is not con- firmable, overstates the current statutory reach of the rule. In 1939, the rule reached its zenith by judicial launch in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co., when the Court construed the statutory term “fair and equitable” as synonymous with “absolute priority.” Con- gress has circumscribed the rule repeatedly since: in 1952 by amending the Bankruptcy Act, in 1978 with enactment of the Code, and in 1986 and 2005 by amending the Code. * Helen S. Balick Visiting Professor in Business Bankruptcy Law, Delaware Law School, Widener University, Wilmington, Delaware. The author, prior to joining the full-time faculty of the Delaware Law School in July 2014 and while at his former firm, participated in the In re Jevic Holding Corp. case cited in this Article. The author resigned from his former firm on June 30, 2014. He gratefully acknowledges the insightful comments of the Honorable Thomas L. Ambro, the Honorable Laurie Selber Silverstein, Professor Lawrence A. Hamermesh, and Michael L. Temin, who read a draft of this Article. The author also thanks Janet Lindenmuth at the Delaware Law School library for her valu- able research assistance. The views expressed and any errors are solely those of the author. 439 440 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:439 As a result of these statutes, the absolute priority rule is a spe- cial, limited rule that does not pervade the current Code. Indeed, the very reorganization plan—a consensual chapter 11 plan—that the Court held was not confirmable in Los Angeles Lumber Co. would be confirmable under the current Code. This Article concludes that Congress has authorized a bank- ruptcy court to approve a structured dismissal in chapter 11 when it is in the best interest of creditors—such as when a plan is not confirmable—even if distributions do not follow the absolute pri- ority rule. Accordingly, the Court should resolve the current circuit split by affirming Jevic. 2017] STRUCTURED DISMISSALS 441 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION: STRUCTURED DISMISSALS AND THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE ..................... 444 I. WHY STRUCTURED DISMISSALS? .............................................. 454 II. THE ORIGINS OF THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE AND CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSES TO JUDICIAL EXTENSIONS AND UNDESIRABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RULE .......................... 457 A. The Origins of the Absolute Priority Rule ......................... 459 B. “Fair and Equitable” Under the Chandler Act ................. 467 C. The Supreme Court in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Defines “Fair and Equitable” to Require Absolute Distributional Priority in a Plan ................................................................ 469 D. The Courts Extend the Absolute Priority Rule to Plans Under Chapters X, XI, and XII of the Chandler Act .......... 472 E. 1952—Congress Removes the Absolute Priority Rule from Chapters XI, XII, and XIII of the Bankruptcy Act ............. 475 F. 1978—Congress Enacts the Code and Removes the Absolute Priority Rule from the Requirements for Confirmation of a Consensual Chapter 11 Plan .............................................. 476 G. 1986 and 2005—Congress Rolls Back the Absolute Priority Rule with Respect to Certain Family-Owned Businesses .. 479 H. Summary—Congress Persistently and Severely Has Contracted the Absolute Priority Rule Since Its Judicial Expansion in Los Angeles Lumber .................................... 481 III. THE RESULTING LIMITED TEXTUAL REACH OF THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE UNDER THE CODE ........................................... 482 A. Chapter 7 (Liquidation)—The Absolute Priority Rule Applies ................................................................................. 484 B. Chapter 9 (Adjustment of Debts of a Municipality)— The Absolute Priority Rule Does Not Apply ....................... 486 C. Chapter 11 (Reorganization)—The Absolute Priority Rule Applies to Holders in Dissenting Class in a Cramdown Plan; The Absolute Priority Rule Does Not Apply to Consensual Plans or to Dissenters in Any Accepting Class; The Best Interest of Creditors Test Protects Dissenters ..................... 488 1. The Absolute Priority Rule Applies to Holders in a Dissenting Class in a Cramdown Plan ........................... 489 442 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:439 2. The Absolute Priority Rule Does Not Apply to Consensual Plans or to Dissenters in Any Accepting Class in a Cramdown Plan ............................................................... 490 3. The Best Interest of Creditors Test Protects Dissenters in Chapter 11 ....................................................................... 492 D. Chapter 12 (Adjustment of Debts of a Family Farmer or Fisherman with a Regular Annual Income)—The Absolute Priority Rule Does Not Apply.............................................. 493 E. Chapter 13 (Adjustment of Debts of an Individual with Regular Income)—The Absolute Priority Rule Does Not Apply .................................................................................... 494 F. Chapter 15 (Ancillary and Other Cross-Border Cases)— The Absolute Priority Rule Does Not Apply ....................... 495 G. Summary—The Absolute Priority Rule and the Bankruptcy Code ..................................................................................... 496 IV. SETTLEMENTS AND COMPROMISES UNDER THE CODE ........... 497 A. Settlements and Compromises Under TMT ...................... 497 B. Settlements and Compromises Under the Bankruptcy Code ..................................................................................... 504 C. Summary—Settlements Under the Bankruptcy Code Do Not Require Adherence to the Absolute Priority Rule ............... 506 V. DISMISSAL OF A CHAPTER 11 CASE AND OF CASES UNDER OTHER CHAPTERS OF THE CODE .......................................................... 507 A. The Code Does Not Limit Chapter 11 Resolution to a Confirmed Plan, a Chapter 7 Liquidation, or a Plain Vanilla Dismissal Order ..................................................... 508 B. The Dismissal of a Chapter 11 Case Revests Only the Property in the Estate at the Time of the Dismissal .......... 510 C. Congress Has Expressly Authorized the Bankruptcy Court “For Cause” to Order Otherwise ......................................... 513 D. Summary—Congress Has Directed Bankruptcy Courts to Pursue the Best Interest of Creditors and Not Absolute Distributional Priority in Determining to Dismiss a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Case .............................................. 517 VI. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: JEVIC, IRIDIUM, AND AWECO ............... 518 A. In re Jevic Holding Corp. .................................................. 518 B. In re Iridium Operating LLC ............................................ 523 C. In re AWECO, Inc. ............................................................. 524 2017] STRUCTURED DISMISSALS 443 VII. THE CASE FOR STRUCTURED DISMISSALS ............................ 525 CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 531 EPILOGUE—THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN JEVIC ............ 534 444 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:439 INTRODUCTION: STRUCTURED DISMISSALS AND THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE The Supreme Court will soon decide whether the absolute pri- ority rule applies to the “structured dismissal” of a chapter 11 case.1 The bankruptcy court in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.) approved a structured dismissal that was not in accordance with the absolute priority rule because it provided for payments to holders of junior claims without full payment of senior claims. The district court and the court of appeals affirmed.2 The losing creditors in Jevic sought certiorari based on a cir- cuit court split on the issue.3 The Second Circuit in In re Iridium Operating LLC held that a court could authorize a structured dis- missal that does not make distributions to unsecured creditors in accordance with the absolute priority rule if there are specific and credible grounds to justify the deviation.4 The Fifth Circuit in In re AWECO, Inc., by contrast, stated a per se rule under which all settlements outside of a plan, reached at any time in the case, must comply with the absolute priority rule.5 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Jevic and will resolve the issue.6 A structured dismissal of a chapter 11 case is a settlement of certain claims asserted by or against the debtor that the bankruptcy court approves contemporaneously with its dismissal of the case pursuant to the applicable sections of the Bankruptcy Code.7 Un- like an “old-fashioned,” one sentence dismissal order, an order ap- proving a structured dismissal typically contains or incorporates 1 The Supreme Court heard arguments for this case on Dec. 7, 2016. See Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corporation, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com /case-files/cases/czyzewski-v-jevic-holding-corporation/ [https://perma.cc/VU5M -LP9Z]. 2 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 175 (3d Cir. 2015), aff’g, Bank. No. 08-11006, 2014 WL 268613 (D. Del. 2014). 3 See id. at 186. 4 In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 466 (2d Cir. 2007). 5 See In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1984). 6 See Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. 136 S. Ct. 2541 (2016). 7 See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1) (2012); id. § 349. The term the “Bankruptcy Code,” or the “Code” when used in this Article, refers to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, as amended, which is the current bankruptcy law in the United States and is codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532. 2017] STRUCTURED DISMISSALS 445 the substantive settlement terms agreed to by the parties.8 Those terms may include releases of the claims settled, an agreed “gifting” of the funding for the settlement by one or more secured creditors from the proceeds of their collateral, and procedures for reconcil- ing and paying certain claims.9 A structured dismissal resolves a chapter 11 case, typically one in which a plan is not confirmable.10 At the heart of a structured dismissal is the court’s approval of the settlement that will not always adhere to the absolute pri- ority rule. Parties settle numerous claims and disputes over the course of a chapter 11 bankruptcy case. Bankruptcy Rule 9019 authorizes the bankruptcy court to approve settlements and com- promises in chapter 11 and in cases filed under other chapters of the Code.11 The Rule provides no standard by which a court should grant or deny its approval of a settlement. Rather, Rule 9019(a) provides simply: “On motion by the trustee and after notice and a hearing, the court may approve a compromise or settlement.”12 The Supreme Court requires a bankruptcy court to take a multi- faceted approach when deciding whether to approve a compromise or settlement.13 This method focuses on the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation as well as the probability of success and collection—weighing the terms of the settlement 8 The grounds for dismissal of a chapter 11 case are set forth in section 1112. See 11 U.S.C. § 1112. The ordinary effects of the dismissal and the court’s au- thority to alter those effects “for cause” are set forth in section 349. See § 349. 9 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 177 (citing In re Strategic Labor, Inc., 467 B.R. 11, 17, n.10 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012)). 10 See id. 11 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019. Bankruptcy Rule 9019 is one of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, which are the procedural rules applicable in bankruptcy cases (the “Rules” or the “Bankruptcy Rules”). The Supreme Court prescribes the Bankruptcy Rules, pursuant to the power given to it under 28 U.S.C. § 2075. The Rules are regularly revised even if there have been no interven- ing amendments to the Bankruptcy Code. The current Rules became effective on December 1, 2016. 12 Id. 9019(a). 13 Id. 9019. In addition, the Code contains provisions for settlements made as part of a plan of reorganization or liquidation. Code section 1123(b) (“Con- tents of plan”) states that a proposed plan may provide for “the settlement or adjustment of any claim or interest belonging to the debtor or to the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3) (2012). 446 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:439 against the risks and the possible rewards of the litigation.14 The Supreme Court set forth this doctrine in the TMT case in 1968,15 prior to enactment of the Code and the adoption of the current Rule 9019.16 The courts continue to apply this rule today.17 The absolute priority rule in present parlance requires that the holders of junior claims and interests receive no payment until all senior claims and interests receive payment in full—in those cir- cumstances to which the rule applies.18 Thus, for example, if a class of unsecured creditors has voted to reject a chapter 11 plan, the shareholders cannot retain or receive shares in the reor- ganized entity or receive other value on account of their shares, unless the plan pays the creditors in the rejecting class in full.19 The question before the Supreme Court in Jevic is: “Whether a bankruptcy court may authorize the distribution of settlement proceeds in a manner that violates the statutory priority scheme.”20 The petitioners in Jevic and the detractors of struc- tured dismissals say “no,” and they make several arguments in support of their position. Critics of structured dismissals assert that the absolute prior- ity rule is “considered sacrosanct,”21 and that any reordering of the 14 Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson (TMT), 390 U.S. 414, 424 (1968). 15 Id. at 424–25 (discussing the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, as amended, setting forth the multifactor test for evaluating settlements). 16 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019. 17 See, e.g., In re Martin, 91 F.3d 389, 393 (3d Cir. 1996) (setting forth the multifactor test for evaluating settlements under Bankruptcy Rule 9019 fol- lowing TMT). 18 See, e.g., § 1129(b) (applying this rule to a chapter 11 “cramdown” plan). A cramdown plan is a plan in which one or more impaired classes have voted to reject, and at least one impaired class has voted to accept. See George W. Kuney, Cram Down: An Impaired Class of Claims Says “No” but the Plan is Confirmed Anyway, COM. BANKR. LITIG. (Mar. 12, 2014), https://www.daily dac.com/commercialbankruptcy/litigation/articles/cram-down-an-impaired-class -of-claims-says-no-but-the-plan-is-confirmed-anyway [https://perma.cc/5N7G -D4FW]. A cramdown plan is confirmable if it complies with the absolute pri- ority rule. § 1129(b). 19 § 1129(b). 20 Brief for Petitioner at i, In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2015) (No. 15-649). 21 JAYNA PARTAIN LAMAR, THE CONTINUING EVOLUTION OF CHAPTER 11 IN CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY AND RESTRUCTURING STRATEGIES, 87 (Thomas Reuters ed. 2016). 2017] STRUCTURED DISMISSALS 447 priorities listed in section 507 through “the alchemy of a ‘structured dismissal’” lacks textual support in the Code.22 These detractors argue that “Congress has set out a detailed framework of dispute resolution in bankruptcy, coupled with substantive rules—princi- pally the absolute priority rule and the best interest test—that gov- ern decision making in cases in which consent cannot be obtained.”23 Under this view, a settlement in a chapter 11 case must adhere to the absolute priority rule, as the court held in In re AWECO. These commentators contend that the resolution reached in Jevic “provides yet one more way to circumvent the Code’s priority structure, upon justifications that do not stand under close scru- tiny.”24 The American Bankruptcy Institute Commission on Bank- ruptcy Reform appears to have leaned toward this position without completely embracing it. The Commission recently recommended, in its carefully drafted section on structured dismissals, that bank- ruptcy courts require “strict compliance with the Bankruptcy Code in terms of orders ending the chapter 11 case,” and that a “requested dismissal and the dismissal order satisfy the applica- ble provisions of, and do not permit the parties to work around, the Bankruptcy Code.”25 Detractors make several arguments closely related to this core issue. Chapter 11, they assert, “does not specifically provide for dismissals that include orders that conclude a case.”26 A structured dismissal, they continue, is not a “traditional” exit strategy. In- stead, it “seem[s] to fall outside the three paths for concluding a chapter 11 case under the Bankruptcy Code—confirming a plan, converting to chapter 7 or dismissing without ‘bells and whistles.’”27 22 Frederick F. Rudzik, A Priority is a Priority—Except When It Isn’t, 34 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 16, 16 (2015). 23 Christopher W. Frost, Structured Dismissals: Smooth Off-Ramp or Artful Dodge?, 35 BANKR. L. LETTER 1 (2015). 24 Id. 25 American Bankruptcy Institute Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11: 2012–2014 Final Report and Recommendations, 23 AM. BANKR. L. REV. 1, 296 (2015). This Article argues that a structured dismissal of a chapter 11 case that is in the best interest of creditors, in which a plan is not confirmable, does strictly com- ply with and is not a “work around” the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, including the absolute priority rule, the reach of which Congress purposively contracted since Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co. 308 U.S. 106, 117, 123 (1939). 26 Frost, supra note 23. 27 Nan Roberts Eitel et al., Structured Dismissals, or Cases Dismissed Out- side of Code’s Structure?, 30 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20, 20 (2011).