Wa r''shi HMS Hesperus/ by Captain Sop ex-Brazilian 'H'-class destroyer Peter Dickens, DSO, MBE, DSC, RN FRONT COVER: Commander Donald G. F. W. Macintyre DSO** DSC, Senior Officer Escort Group B-Two and Commanding Officer I-/MS Hesperus, on his bridge in May 1943 (/WM) Hesperus'spresumed score at the end of May 1943-U 93, U357, U191, U223, U186. U223 was not, in fact, sunk butHesperusdid complete her five with U242in 1945. (/ WM) A Mark Vll Depth-charge exploding at 50ft (/WM) Entering Gladstone Dock, Liverpool, after ramming U357 (/ WM) Havant, the first of the c/ass, asoriginally completed in December 1939 with tall funnels, three boats and minesweeping gearaft. Like Hesperus, she lacked herDCT but was fitted with eight depth-charge throwers and three traps (MOD) HMS Hesperus by Captain Peter Dickens DSO, MBE, DSC FOREWORD by Captain Donald G. F. W. builders, give great good service to the Royal Navy Macintyre DSO** DSC, Royal Navy who and follow a splendidly successful career throughout commanded'HMS HESPERUS'from 15.1.40- the Battle of the Atlantic. 13.3.41 and from 28.8.42-22.3.44. When the torpedoing and sinking of the liner THE SHIP AND HER VITAL ROLE Athenia without warning by a German U-boat on The Battle of the Atlantic was as critical for us as the the first day of World War II led to the immediate Battle of Britain. On our ability to keep our merchant institution of a convoy system, the Admiralty became ships and their cargoes at sea depended our very a victim of its own lack of foresight as well as the survival and, having assured that, our ability to wage nation's parsimony in the provision of money for war. defence and found itself woefully short of ships The Flag-Officer U-boats, Admiral Doenitz, knew suitable for escort duties. Covetous eyes were this perhaps better than we did ourselves; and he turned on the six destroyers similar to the British went even further by stating clearly that the only 'H' Class which were being built, two of each by way Germany, despite her massive armies, could Thornycroft, Samuel White and Vickers, for the hope to defeat Britain was by cutting her sea Brazilian Navy. They were quickly requisitioned and lifelines. The drive, courage and persistence behind completed with equipment limited to what was the U-boats' attack reflected this single-minded essential for anti-submarine warfare. conviction and it very nearly succeeded. One of these, launched by Thornycroft on 1 August Only Hesperus and her small, rust-streaked, storm- 1939, was given the name Hearty. The phonetic battered, much-modified and perhaps not very risk of confusion with the flotilla leader Hardy, beautiful sisters, together with the aircraft of Coastal already in commission, caused this to be changed to Command and the Fleet Air Arm, held the enemy at Hesperus soon after commissioning under my the eleventh hour and then routed him. It is command in January 1940. important to recognize this stark, simple truth so as Her debut was far from auspicious. Hurried to sea at not to fall into the common error of assessing these Winston Churchill's insistence, her upper deck had ships as ancillary to the mighty battleships and been incompletely caulked and she leaked like a carriers. They were the front line itself against the sieve in a seaway and had to be taken in hand for only menace that really frightened Winston Churchill. this to be remedied. She had no gun-director nor any Hesperus is particularly interesting as representing form of gun-control. Her only anti-aircraft weapons in microcosm every stage of the Battle from initial were two four-barrelled 0.5 inch machine guns. Her unpreparedness, through frantic improvisation, to gyro compass was a Brown's, designed for the fully-specialised Anti-Submarine (A/S) Escort. She gentle motion and absense of shock to be expected was always in action at the key phases and used in a passenger liner; only in the calmest weather did every weapon and equipment with deadly effect. it function under the rough treatment provided by a destroyer. The Launching Nevertheless, as Captain Peter Dickens' narrative Senhora Heitor Galliez launched the Brazilian shows, the Hesperus was to be a credit to her destroyer Juruena at Thornycroft's Yard on 1 73 Hurricane as completed in the summer of 1940. She has her OCT (MOD) Right: Asdic. showing dome, oscillator and housing arrangements 1 August 1939 but by 9 September her owners had submitted gracefully to the inevitable and she became one of His Majesty's Ships. The name Hesperus, the Greek's Evening Star, was the first of the name in the Royal Navy and unquestionably attractive; that it was also well-known as the Wreck of Longfellow's poem seems to have been over- looked by the Ships' Names Committee, usually so anxious not to upset the sailors' morale, in its search for anything beginning with 'H', but no harm was done for she was happy, lucky and very successful. Built to the plans of the well-tried British 'H' Class with insignificant alterations she and her sisters, Havelock, Havant, Hurricane, Highlander and Harvester, were Fleet Destroyers designed as adjuncts to the battlefleet in attack and defence against a surface enemy. Four low-angle 4.7in guns and eight torpedoes were to be their main armament and although they would have asdic and a few depth-charges they had virtually no defence against aircraft. Except for their sturdy hulls and high speed they were thus thoroughly ill-adapted to modern war. However, the first important improvement was ordered before completion. This was a massive depth-charge armament in place of 'Y' gun which was unique to the class and set it firmly on the A typical range recorder trace of an attack on a submarine A/S road. More innovations followed until the ships with an ahead-throwing weapon. were fully equipped for the climax of the Battle in the The iodised paper slowly descends. A 'stylus' at the top spring of 1943 and it is important therefore to know starts from the left simultaneously with each transmission what the modifications all were. and moves across, marking the paper with any signal detected by the receiving circuit. The transmission itself is Asdic not recorded as it would be too loud, but then are seen This means of detecting a submerged submarine by the sea-reverberations gradually diminishing in intensity emitting a sound beam into the water and hearing the until the echo stands out clearly. The echo marks are firm when the oscillator points echo was already generally fitted in small ships at the directly at the submarine but the operator deliberately outbreak of war; much credit is due to the small band stepsacross it to ensure that he always knows the centre of dedicated scientists and naval officers who bearing and is not misled into losing contact if the target's developed it with little official encouragement. bearing changes rapidly. There are therefore faint echoes The component parts were: between the firm ones; on two occasions he has stepped The Oscillator, a quartz crystal disc suspended off the submarine on to its wake, but the trace has perhaps beneath the ship which converted an electrical helped him to see his error. impulse into sound and, if an echo was returned, The slope of the line of echoes gives the rate of approach vice versa. The instrument could also hear other and the bar, adjusted for own ships speed, estimated depth and weapon data, is aligned with it. When the under-water noises which was most useful but all moving paper brings the two together the weapon is fired. would be drowned by the rush of water past one's (MOD) own ship were it not for: 174 HT-CA-GLF PATT 2125 HT CONNECTOR LUBRICATOR -"ALIGNMENT INDICATOR PATT A833 BALL BEARING (HOFFMANN .0 22) --LIFTING SCREWS. PATT. A760, PILLAR. (AFTER) _-SCREW OPERATING SHAFT TRAINING UNIT A/53D PATT. A759, PILLAR ASSEMBLY (FORWARD) PORTABLE COVER LIFTING MOTOR 2B.H.P.2000 RP.M PATT. 9961-I1OV PATT.9962.2200 WORM WHEEL LIFTING NUT OCTAGONAL SPANNER TOMMY BAR. -GROOVES TO DRAIN WASTE OIL. GROOVE TO DRAIN WASTE OIL. TRUNK. -- STUFFING BOX WITH PATT. A662 PACKING. LIFTING TUBE GUIDE BAR - GUIDE ROLLER. RAFT,PATT. A762. LOCKING TOES. FAIRING PLATE - --BRASS STRIP. COLLAR. STEADY BEARING DERMATINE JOINT PATT. 2282. TOP CASTING ZINC PROTECTORS. OSCILLATOR STUFFING BOX RUBBER SHEET - STEEL BAND STAY BRIGHT STEEL WINDOW ALPAX BODY - BOTTOM CASING' OSLILLA TOR 175 The Dome, a streamlined container which enclosed the oscillator in still water and allowed operation up to speeds of about 20kts in calm weather. At full speed or in heavy seas the dome could be housed snugly inside the hull to avoid damage. The Controls were near the Captain in a tiny hut on the bridge and were operated by one man, directed and assisted by the A/S Control Officer. A knob at the centre of a gyro compass repeater rotated the oscillator; and the Range Recorder initiated the short, sharp transmissions, displayed visually any noise or answering echo, computed the relative approach speed and indicated the moment of weapon release. The receiving circuit was also amplified aurally and this was essential to allow the greatest chance of hearing the first suspicion of an echo and then to classify it as wake, rock, wreck, tide-rip, fish or, when sharp and clear, a possible submarine. A difference in note between sea reverberations and echo indicated target movement and there were many other esoteric subtleties; operating skill was an art superimposed on science and Hesperus 's Petty Officer Coster was a master, The Controls. This exercise mock-up shows: Control Depth Charge Mark VII Training Unit (bottom left) with which the operator The first and, until 1942, the only weapon, this was a directed the oscillator. Range Recorder (with sloping bar) simple drum of high explosive which could be set to which displayed all underwater noises visually. Plotting detonate at varying depths by hydrostatic pressure. table. Own ship's track was drawn automatically and on to this was superimposed ranges and bearings of an echo The standard equipment for small ships in 1939 was which revealed any movement. An important use of the a trap from which charges were rolled over the stern plot was to suggest a new direction of sweep when and two mortars, or Throwers, which projected them contact was lost. In Hesperus it was sited below the 1 20ft on either beam. bridge and could be viewed through an aperture. The Captain guessed the submarine's depth, for the Not shown are the operator's earphones and a loudspeaker. asdic could not help him there, and steered to put An echo was first detected almost invariably by ear, and the ship's stern over her future position. Contact much could be deduced by its sharpness and pitch (MOD) would be lost in the final stages as the U-boat passed below the beam, but the recorder trace would give him the moment to fire and this was done in the sequence: three traps and eight throwers giving a pattern of 1. Trap and throwers; the trap charge would sink 17; but even so, and although this terrifying series straight down but those from the throwers would of explosions might well cover the submarine in carry forward through the air to splash abreast the plan, there could be no likelihood of a kill unless some 2. Second trap charge, which was followed at the latitude was also allowed in depth. The answer was same interval by the to bolt heavy weights to half the charges which 3. Third trap charge. then sank faster and exploded deeper. The pattern thus produced was a centred diamond The final pattern to emerge after many trials and and allowed some margin for error but experience much experience consisted of 10 from two traps and soon showed that this was rarely enough. In 1940 four throwers of improved marks. This might be the ex-Brazilians were fitted with no fewer than called the killer pattern for use against a probable or certain U-boat; for urgent attacks on newly detected and possibly unidentified targets it was A Mark VIl Depth-charge ^ ling at 50ft (IWM) usual to fire a five-charge pattern, while for the massive 'creep' attack on a slow, deep enemy as many as 26 would be sent down. Depth Charge Mark X-One Ton A logical addition to the Mark VII, but not a replace- ment, since a shallow burst could sink the firing ship, this contained as much explosive as a 10-charge normal pattern and was discharged from a torpedo tube. Little faith and a good deal of awewas evidently given to it, for each ship was allowed only one and even that was rarely used, but with Hesperusthe aim of sinking U-boats took precedence over all else and she could have used more had she carried them. 176 Hedgehog Even Coster's skill could not induce his asdic to keep contact with a submarine at close range when it had passed under the beam, and an ahead-throwing weapon was a clear need. Hesperus's hedgehog replaced 'A' gun in early 1943 and fired an elliptical pattern of 24 bombs over the bow at a U-boat still in firm contact; detonation was triggered by impact and one hit was lethal. The only snag was, 'no hit, no bang' and consequently no secondary damage or morale effect; but it was a great advance and when teething and familiarity problems had been over- come, the percentage of successful attacks rose from six to thirty. German Counter-Measures Above: The Hedgehog Ahead- Throwing Anti-Submarine Weapon. Before 1943 there was little a U-boat could do to The spigot bombs are mounted in four rows, rising towards engage an escort. To fire a torpedo with only the rear. Each has its propellant charge in the stalk and hydrophone data had small chance of success and an arming vane to allow detonation only when it is would identify her for certain, while to surface and sinking. Firing was in a ripple (MOD) fight it out, though done, was a last ditch throw. Her Each spigot was angled differently to produce the main asset was the ability to lose herself and success elliptical pattern and the rows were mounted on spindles in this depended on the courage, wit and patience which could tilt to allow 20' of training either side of the of both her Captain and his opponent. Macintyre of bow and compensate forship's roll (11,40D) the Hesperus had an uncanny gift of apparently looking into his unseen enemy's mind and divining his next move. There was however one ingenious gadget available to a U-boat, the Pi//enwerfer, a chemical discharged into the sea which effervesced like a monstrous Alka-Seltzer and returned a convincing echo to the asdic. Even Coster was misled when he first encountered one and temporarily lost contact with the submarine, gliding away silently and end-on, G Left : The 24 bombs in the air (MOD) and right: The pattern fell 200 yards ahead of the ship in an ellipse 120ft by 140ft (wide). Each bomb contained 351b of Torpex, sufficient by itself to hole and sink a U-Boat (MOD) 177 beyond it. Once known however, this ruse was build and would, if unchecked, eventually become much less effective. overwhelming. It was often difficult for an Escort As allied fighting ability and strength increased and Commander to decide whether to leave the convoy the U-boat casualty rate rose, a weapon became a to destroy a U-boat or to stay in close company. vital need.The Zaunkonig (we called it'Gnat'-and a nasty sting it inflicted) was the answer: an electric The Wolf Packs torpedo that could hear an escort's propellers and Doenitz's answer to the convoy was to mass as many home towards them. From mid-1943 ships began, at U-boats as practicable and attack on the surface at first unaccountably, to have their sterns blown off night, thus retaining flexibility, speed and vision and A/S action became a two-sided affair. which were lost when dived. To bring this about, he Our Intelligence however was not unprepared and would station lines of U-boats across likely routes counter-measures, material and tactical, were soon and, when one sighted a convoy, she would surface in operation. The 'Foxer' was a pair of towed and report by high frequency (H/F) radio; the rest noisemakers, each consisting of two, loosely fitting would then close, moving on the surface except steel bars which 'chattered' at speeds over 1Okts when necessary to avoid detection, until the many times more loudly than the propellers and 'Wolf pack' was formed and poised. On the next effectively decoyed the gnat. But they also made a night the U-boats, trimmed down to their conning- hideous racket in the asdic which often drowned the towers and appallingly difficult to see, would dash echo; so we compromised with one, 'Unifoxer', in between the escorts to sink and burn, leaving whose noise it was found possible, after much pathetic groups of survivors to the coldly merciless training, to operate through, albeit still with reduced ocean; and a steeper downward slope on the efficiency. critical graph of available merchant shipping. On approaching a U-boat, ships had to 'step aside' Until 1942 we could not detect the enemy during with 60° zig-zags so that a gnat would follow the any of these phases but this we had to do or lose the unifoxer clear of the ship and not catch her 'down war. Aircraft were the answer to the surfaced the throat'; or approach indirectly, faster than the U-boat but that aspect, though vital, is not gnat's 25kts. At close quarters, there was the option appropriate to this Profile. Sighting reports and of slowing to silent speed of about seven knots if the surfaced U-boats at close quarters at night were unifoxer's noise made contact-holding difficult. however Hesperus's direct concern and both these More skill and courage were needed to sink a U-boat were mastered in the nick of time by equipped with gnats and we suffered many casual- devoted scientific effort at the Admiralty Signals ties : even the ship commanded by the wily Macintyre Establishment. after leaving Hesperus, HMS Bickerton, fell victim in 1944. High Frequency Direction Finding (H/F D/F) Usually called 'Huff-Duff', the aerial did not revolve THE ELECTRONIC WAR but achieved its directional sensitivity by measuring So much for close action, but how was the escort's the signal strength received by each of the several asdic, with its range of little over a mile, to be brought loops. It was remarkably accurate and, like the asdic, into contact with a U-boat in the vast Atlantic ? The could be induced to yield far more than just the secret lay in convoys which, being few in number, bearing by an operator with a real flair: Lieutenant were hard to find, but when found, forced the Harold Walker of the Hesperus could tell one U-boat attacker to brave the escorts. Two aims were thus from another, whether the aerial was wet or dry, and achieved : protection was afforded to the merchant the range, often to within a mile. ships and U-boats could be sunk. Both were Completely dedicated, Walker rarely left his set and necessary since, although it might seem sufficient to sooner or later the bridge would be alerted by the protect a particular convoy passively, U-boat report, 'B-Bar', a German operating signal indicating strength was growing as fast as Germany could that a U-boat had a sighting to report urgently. Then, The purpose of it all, The safe and timely arrival of the convoy'. The box shape was standard, the leading edge being the longer, to give a U-Boat the most difficult interception problem. In this case the mean course of advance is to the right, with the Commodore's ship in the centre of the leading edge. He is probably exercising his ships in emergency turns which they may have to carry out to avoid wolf-packs at any time, at night orin foul weather (IWM) 178 The aerials ofsome of the sets fitted in Hesperus which if the range was close, Hesperus would race down started what subsequently became known as Electronic the bearing at 30kts with every sense alert, both Warfare. human and scientific. Even if the U-boat was not Left: RDF Warning Combined, first fitted in late 1941. heard or seen again, she was at least forced to dive Primarily for air warning, but with a surface capability and become blind, so that the convoy could be (it detected U93), this set was a great advance in diverted away from the threat; but the team of performance and flexibility over the earlier, fixed aerial, type. At first aerial rotation was by hand and echoes were Macintyre, Walker and Coster, supported by a displayed on an 'A' scan (a line of light displaced in a supremely happy and efficient ship, was so 'blip' at the scale distance of the echo) but, in about 1943, formidable that Hesperus sank no fewer than three power rotation and Plan Position Indicator (PPI), as in U-boats directly from H/F D/F reports. The Huff- modern radars, were fitted giving an all-round presentation Duff was at least as important as the more of everything within range. Also at this time the term glamorised radar since, when that was called into 'radar' was introduced. play, the enemy was already dangerously close. The interrogator was part of a device (IFF) for identifying a contact electronically as friend or foe in association Radar with the radar (MOD) Developed initially for what turned out to be the Battle of Britain, in which it succeeded dramatically, radar was first fitted in ships primarily for air warning. Hesperus's first set had fixed forward- Centre: RDF Warning Surface. The battle-winning set looking aerials and was soon replaced by one whose evolved by the Naval Signal School and Admiralty Signals aerial rotated ; but these could not be relied upon to Establishment expressly to detect the trimmed-down, surfaced U-Boat; it was fitted in Hesperusin 1942. detect the surfaced U-boat at close range, for which With a frequency of 3000mc/s and a 14micro-second it was realised that a much higher frequency in the pulse, the aerial was designed to give a very directional 10cm band must be developed. The RAF's invention beam in azimuth while being broad in elevation to allow of the Resonant Cavity Magnetron permitted this, for the roll of a small ship. This meant two dipole aerials and a surface warning (SW) set was evolved and with cheese-shaped reflectors, one transmitter and one fitted in the first escorts in 1942. Its conspicuous receiver, mounted one on top of the other. The first hooded lantern evoked a sense of awe in the magnetron only allowed a power output of 5kW and to uninitiated beholder and also, no doubt, the enemy; avoid anylosses through cables, part of the circuitry was as well indeed it might, for it could detect a trimmed- mounted on the aerials and had to be protected from the down submarine at 21, miles or more. Not much weather by a perspex lantern. Like the warning combined set it developed from hand-rotation and 'A'scan to power perhaps, but enough to tip the tactical balance and it and PPI (MOD) is a measure of its importance that the Director Control Tower (DCT) was removed to make space for it, thus relegating the guns to a very secondary role. Right: High Frequency Direction Finder (H/F DIF or Huff-Duff'). Two aspects of the same aerial, showing how Shore Support the strut arrangement altered the apparent shape when By the spring of 1943 Hesperus had become wholly viewed from different angles. This was the set with which specialised for A/S warfare but improvements to Harold Walker extracted detailed information about asdic, weapons and electronics continued until the U-Boats without their knowing. war's end. A U-Boat's sighting report on H/F travelled in an approx- From this regrettably over-simplified account of imately straight line at a tangent to the earth's curvature Hesperus's development, it will be appreciated that and achieved the long distance to base by being reflected the Battle was not waged only at sea. To compensate by the ionosphere. This was the 'sky wave' but if the 'ground wave' were detected the U-Boat could not be for our peacetime failure to understand where our more than 15-20 miles distant and the set could sensethis real security lay, enormous effort had to be devoted : vital difference (MOD, CourtesyA. Raven) in the Admiralty (Staff, Intelligence and Technical 179 departments), in drawing offices, on trial ranges, in Depth-charge attack (lower right) Tactical Schools, the Anti-Submarine School, the The ship has a firm echo, the characteristics of which imply Signal School, the Admiralty Signals Establishment, that the contact is 'probable submarine'. As she ap- the Commander-in-Chief Western Approaches' proaches, the echo pitch is clearly lower than the rever- berations, indicating movement away, which is further Headquarters and many less likely places such as evidence that the contact is a submarine and which also Gilbert's deserted garage at Waterlooville. The effort provides useful attack data. was applied and the Battle won. A 10-charge standard pattern is ordered and the ship's speed steadied at 15kts. As she nears her target, the echo 'HESPERUS'S' STORY is held almost to the time when they become instant with She commissioned on 15 January 1940 under the transmission which indicates that the submarine has probably been surprised and is very shallow, since other- Commander Donald Macintyre into the 9th wise she would havepassedbelow the asdic beam much Destroyer Flotilla which comprised all six ships of earlier. A mean depth setting of 75ft is ordered. the ex-Brazilian Class. By a long stretch of official The submarine now becomes aware of her danger having imagination she was pronounced ready for sea in heard both the asdic and propellers and increases speed, early April ; but her DCT was not available so that turns to port and dives; the ship however cannot detect her three 4.7s had to be controlled locally and their or allo w for these alterations. target indicated by the Captain waving his cap in The range recorder, using information by now 30 seconds its general direction; her torpedoes were a stale, initiates the firing sequence. First to go is one heavy commercial type which could not be run for charge, set to explode below the target's assesseddepth at 100ft, from the midship trap; three seconds later (so practice and were reputed to blow up if hit; and that neither charge should damage the other) comes a she was defenceless against air attack. Her engines light set to 50ft from the starboard trap and two heavies were good, however, and she did possess her large from the forward throwers which carry forward with the A/S armament which proved in the end to be what ship's speed while in the air. At eight seconds the after mattered most. Indeed she seemed inexorably throwers fire two lights and the trap releases another impelled towards this role through being, by heavy. chance, virtually useless for anything else and also The 10-second point is depicted above and it can be by her bond of union with Macintyre whose seen that in theory the submarine has escaped damage, even though three more trap charges have yet to be dedicated ambition was to sink U-boats, a rare dropped. The ship then strives to regain contact, but desire in a Navy dominated by thundering guns and against the noise of exploding charges and her own wake gunnery officers. it is improbable that she will do so until she has run out to about 1200 yards, turned, and started a new asdic Faroes Take-over sweep by which time the submarine will have moved Hesperus and Havant were first assigned to the considerably A/S defence of Scapa Flow, but soon after the Germans invaded Norway on 8 April, they were sent to the Farces to advise the Danish Governor that we intended to occupy the islands and forestall the Hedgehog attack (upper right) enemy doing so; a likely move which would have The initial situation is the same but now the ship has greatly facilitated the passage of German ships and been fitted with Hedgehog. The submarine takes similar submarines into the Atlantic. This was accomplished avoiding action but since she is in firm contact right up to in an atmosphere of civilised courtesy. Then to the moment of firing her movements are assessedand the Norway, and real war. weapon aimed accordingly. An indication of depth is important to the calculation of time to fire but extreme Norway accuracy is unnecessary as the bombs explode only on It was almost enjoyable at first, when she found impact. Immediately after firing the ship turns sharply to avoid running over the submarine andso maintains contact herself patrolling Narvik Fiord with orders to fire on any enemy troops or vehicles that appeared, even though her gunnery, as might be expected, was not spectacular. Air attack started painlessly, too, with high level bombing which was not accurate against aircraft with its menacingly crooked wings, then the small ships who would use the long time of fall to bomb, perfectly circular and growing larger, e get out of the way; and Macintyre, a former Fleet shrieking in a crescendo as it fell, until the time came Air Arm pilot, achieved a reputation among his men to hurl themselves to the deck and pray. as an artful dodger. Hesperus was damaged aft by two near-misses and It was a different matter further south off Mo where sent home with the next convoy. Perhaps she was Hesperus supported a troop landing on 15 May, lucky; to have survived Norway intact would have hastily mounted to delay the enemy's advance on made her available for Dunkirk where, with her Narvik. Here she was within range of Stuka dive- useless guns against even fiercer air attack, she bombers whose close approach, which could not be might well have been sunk like the poor Havantafter prevented by the wholly inadequate 0 5in machine- a very brief career. guns, allowed no time for manoeuvre. She twisted and turned at high speed-one technique was to Western Approaches steer towards an approaching enemy to force him In addition to repairs at Dundee, the after torpedo- into an uncomfortably steep dive. It was not long tubes were removed and a 3in high-angle gun of before those on the upper deck had to steel them- ancient vintage substituted. AA gunnery was a selves to watch, first the end-on view of the vastly complex technology which defied improvisa- 180