Reinhard R. Doerries Hitler’s Intelligence Chief Walter Schellenberg Introduction by Gerhard L. Weinberg Includes the original Autobiography by Walter Schellenberg and Annexe by Franz Göring Enigma Books All rights reserved under the International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. Published by Enigma Books, New York Copyright © 2009 by Reinhard R. Doerries First Edition No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the written permission of Enigma Books. Printed in the United States of America ISBN 978-1-929631-77-3 Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data Doerries, Reinhard R. Hitler’s intelligence chief : Walter Schellenberg / Reinhard R. Doerries ; introduction by Gerhard L. Weinberg. -- 1st ed. p. : ill. ; cm. Includes the original “Autobiography” by Walter Schellenberg and “Annexe” by Franz Goring. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN: 978-1-929631-77-3 1. Schellenberg, Walter, 1910-1952. 2. World War, 1939-1945--Secret service-- Germany. 3. Military intelligence--Germany--History--20th century. 4. Nazis-- Biography. 5. Intelligence officers--Germany--Biography. I. Weinberg, Gerhard L. II. Title. DD247.S338 D63 2009 940.54/8743/092 For E Also published by Enigma Books Hitler’s Table Talk: 1941–1944 In Stalin’s Secret Service Hitler and Mussolini: The Secret Meetings The Jews in Fascist Italy: A History The Man Behind the Rosenbergs Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History Diary 1937–1943 (Galeazzo Ciano) Secret Affairs: FDR, Cordell Hull, and Sumner Welles Hitler and His Generals: Military Conferences 1942–1945 Stalin and the Jews: The Red Book The Secret Front: Nazi Political Espionage Fighting the Nazis: French Intelligence and Counterintelligence A Death in Washington: Walter G. 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Weinberg ix Preface xiii I. Years of Apprenticeship 3 II. Chief of Amt VI Foreign Intelligence 43 III. Twilight of the Gods 111 IV. Postlude to Hitler’s Germany 219 Appendices Editor’s Comment 293 Appendix I Brigadefuehrer Schellenberg. Amtschef VI, Autobiography, Compiled During His Stay in Stockholm 296 Appendix II Annexe Written by Hauptsturmfuehrer Göring to Schellen- berg’s Report on His Transactions with Count Bernadotte and Events in the Last Weeks of the German Reich 350 Appendix III Annexe Written by Hauptsturmfuehrer Göring to Schellen- berg’s Report on His Transactions with Count Bernadotte and Events in the Last Weeks of the German Reich. Part II 357 Abbreviations, Acronyms, Cover Names 363 Glossary. German Intelligence Services 367 Bibliography 374 Index 381 Introduction by Gerhard L. Weinberg T he leadership of National Socialist Germany included a large number of individuals who might well be called peculiar. The term applies not only to a lack of moral sense. It also can be applied to someone who does not quite fit in because of considerable intelligence on the one hand and a special personal relationship to one of the most important and highest leaders on the other. Walter Schellenberg certainly fits this characterization. Decades ago the scholar Robert Koehl called attention to what he called the feudal aspects of National Socialism. Personal allegiances and alignments, rivalries and jurisdictional disputes were so endemic to the system that they effectively displaced what formal structures of state and Party there were. It was in the context of such a personal relationship with the head of the whole German police apparatus, Heinrich Himmler, that Walter Schellenberg rose to prominence. And he was able to do so and retain his position to the end of the regime in spite of having a clearer and earlier perception of the likelihood of German defeat than such allegedly smart men like Albert Speer who did not come to this recognition until the end of January 1945. What tied Himmler and Schellenberg together cannot be explained precisely; but there cannot be any doubt that a special personal tie existed and that Himmler allowed Schellenberg a degree of latitude that was unique in the higher reaches of Nazi Germany. It is in the context of a man of considerable ability and vast ambition rising to prominence in an evil regime that this study of Schellenberg sheds light on the regime he served. Participating in its horrors, engaging in endless organizational rivalries, inheriting growing responsibilities in the field of intelligence, Schellenberg is seen here as a person who enjoyed a degree of x Hitler’s Intelligence Chief what the Germans call “Narrenfreiheit,” the loose reins of the mentally incompetent. The problem of sources is especially complicated in this case, and Professor Reinhard Doerries has tackled it in a systematic way like no one else. The interrogations by the British after the war—which Doerries has himself carefully edited for publication—the recently declassified records of British and American intelligence agencies, the very confused status of Schellenberg’s memoirs, and a host of other materials have all been carefully searched and evaluated. Whether it is Schellenberg’s ascent in the hierarchy of the Third Reich, his efforts to sound Allies and neutrals for a way out of Germany’s losing war, his hopes of a future for himself by saving Jews destined for death in the final days of fighting—all these and related issues are recounted here in a manner unmatched in the existing literature. The inclusion in this book of Schellenberg’s original autobiography written in Sweden in 1945 and a report by Schellenberg’s adjutant, Franz Göring, offers the reader a sense of how these two men saw themselves acting in the last hectic days of Nazi Germany. That as participants in a regime that had engaged in murder on a colossal scale they would emphasize their own efforts at rescuing Jews and others from the death planned for them is hardly surprising. It is, however, not entirely false because it is self-exculpatory. Those saved are unlikely to have been troubled at the time by the prior activities of those who kept them from being slaughtered. This portion of the story is also of interest for understanding the activities of Swedish Count Folke Bernadotte and Jewish organizations trying to rescue victims of the Nazis. There is in this a further important insight into the extraordinary society that was Nazi Germany. The careers and actions of the regime’s leading figures can more easily be seen as to a large extent self-determined. As long as loyalty to Hitler, or to whoever one’s immediate superior might be, could safely be assumed, there was a very great degree of latitude. Individual initiative was allowed far greater leeway than one might have expected from a state that prided itself on the “Führerprinzip,” the leadership principle. This principle was frequently interpreted to mean unquestioning adherence to whatever was prescribed from above. In practice, however, as long as there was no doubt about personal loyalty, one could voice views and suggest courses of action that at first sight might appear to contradict official policy. This has important implications for an understanding of the whole system because it sheds important light on those who never thought to take advantage of this opportunity. The point is that whatever the endless jurisdictional disputes, there was far more consensus among those in positions of authority Introduction xi than the postwar memoirs and protestations might lead one to expect. The disputes have left behind masses of records; tacit agreement on policies and objectives did not. It is this combination of a broad consensus with a considerable degree of latitude for any in the system who actually wanted to take advantage of it that contributed to the system’s coherence and strength as well as to its ability to maintain itself operating relatively effectively until the bitter end. In this way, the account offered here of one figure of real significance in the political and military system that was Nazi Germany can provide insight into the vanished world of Hitler’s government as a whole even as it concentrates on the life and activities of a single individual. Gerhard L. Weinberg Efland, North Carolina April 2009