Historical Review of Developments relating to Aggression United Nations New York, 2003 UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION Sales No. E.03.V10 ISBN 92-1-133538-8 Copyright 0 United Nations, 2003 All rights reserved Contents Paragraphs Page Preface xvii Introduction 1. The Nuremberg Tribunal 1-117 A. Establishment 1 B. Jurisdiction 2 C. The indictment 3-14 1. The defendants 4 2. Count one: The common plan or conspiracy to commit crimes against peace 5-8 3 3. Count two: Planning, preparing, initiating and waging war as crimes against peace 9-10 4. The specific charges against the defendants 11-14 (a) Count one 12 (b) Counts one and two 13 (c) Count two 14 D. The judgement 15-117 1. The charges contained in counts one and two 15-16 2. The factual background of the aggressive war 17-21 3. Measures of rearmament 22-23 4. Preparing and planning for aggression 24-26 5. Acts of aggression and aggressive wars 27-53 (a) The seizure of Austria 28-31 (b) The seizure of Czechoslovakia 32-33 (c) The invasion of Poland 34-35 (d) The invasion of Denmark and Norway 36-43 Paragraphs Page (e) The invasion of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg 44-45 (f) The invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece 46-48 (g) The invasion of the Soviet Union 49-51 (h) The declaration of war against the United States 52-53 28 6. Wars in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances 54 7. The Law of the Charter 55-57 The crime of aggressive war 56-57 8. The common plan or conspiracy 58-62 9. Individual criminal responsibility 63-117 (a) Defendants convicted of counts one and two 64-80 (i) Goring 64-66 a. High-level positions, influence and knowledge 65 b. Conclusion 66 (ii) Hess 67-70 a. Knowledge andp articipation 68 b. Defence claim ofp eaceful aims 69-70 (iii) von Ribbentrop 71 (iv) Keitel 72 (v) Rosenberg 73 (vi) Raeder 74-75 (vii)J odl 76-78 a. Defence claim. superior orders 77 b. Conclusion 78 Paragraphs Page (viii) von Neurath 79-80 46 Knowledge 80 47 (b) Defendants acquitted of count one and convicted of count two 81-89 47 (i) Frick 81-82 47 (ii) Funk 83-84 49 (iii) Ddnitz 85-87 51 High-levelp osition,p articipationa nd significantc ontribution 87 52 (iv) Seyss-Inquart 88-89 53 (c) Defendants acquitted of counts one and two 90-103 54 (i) Schacht 90-97 54 a. Rearmament as a crime against peace 93-95 56 b. Knowledge andp articipation 96-97 57 (ii) Sauckel 98 58 Sufficient connection and involvement 98 58 (iii) von Papen 99-101 59 Support,p articipationa ndp urpose 101 61 (iv) Speer 102-103 61 Rearmament as a crime against peace 103 62 (d) Defendants acquitted of count one and not charged with count two 104-117 62 (i) Kaltenbrunner 104-105 62 Directp articipation 105 63 (ii) Frank 106-108 63 Paragraphs Page Sufficient connection with the common plan 107-108 (iii) Streicher 109-110 Connection with the common plan 110 (iv) von Schirach 111-112 Involvement andp articipation 112 (v) Fritzsche 113-115 a. Subordinatep osition 114 b. Knowledge andp articipation 115 (vi) Bormann 116-117 Knowledge 117 Tribunals established pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10 118-266 A. Establishment 118-120 B. Jurisdiction 121-125 C. Indictments 126-127 D. United States ofAmerica v. CarlK rauch et al. (the I G. Farbenc ase) 128-141 1. The charges of crimes against peace 128 2. Judgement 129-141 (a) The Nuremberg precedent: cautious approach requires conclusive evidence of knowledge and participation 129 73 (b) The requirements for individual criminal responsibility 130 74 (c) Knowledge 131-134 75 (i) Common knowledge 133 75 (ii) Imputedp ersonal knowledge 134 76 Paragraphs Page (d) High-level position and degree of participation 135-138 (e) Conclusion 139-141 E. United States ofAmerica v. Alred Felir Altn Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach et al. (the Krupp case) 142-148 82 1. The charges of crimes against peace 142 82 2. The motion for dismissal 143-148 82 (a) The Nuremberg precedent 144-147 82 (i) The aggressive wars 144 83 (ii) Knowledge 145-146 83 (iii) Rearmament as af orm of participationi n the crime of aggression 147 83 148 84 (b) Conclusion F. UnitedS tates ofAmerica v. Wilhelm von Leeb et al. (the High Command case) 149-165 1. The charges of crimes against peace 149 2. Judgement 150-165 (a) The nature and characteristics of aggressive wars and invasions 150-155 85 (b) The elements required for individual criminal responsibility 156-164 88 (i) Knowledge 157 89 (ii) High-level policy position 158-162 90 (iii) Participation 163-164 92 165 93 (c) Conclusion G. United States ofAmerica v. Ernst von Weizsaicker et al. (the Ministries case) 166-259 93 Paragraphs Page 1. The charges of crimes against peace 166 93 2. Judgement 167-259 94 (a) The law relating to aggressive wars and invasions 168 94 (b) The question of individual criminal responsibility for aggressive wars and invasions 169 (c) The tu quoque doctrine 170 (d) The alleged acts of aggression 171-195 (i) The claim that Germany acted in self- defence and the alleged invalidity of the Treaty of Versailles 172-176 99 (ii) The invasion ofAustria and Czechoslovakia 177-182 (iii) The invasion ofP oland 183 (iv) The invasion ofD enmark and Norway: the claims of self-defence and military necessity 184-186 107 (v) The aggression against Belgium, the Netherlands andL uxembourg 187-188 108 (vi) The aggression against Greece and Yugoslavia: the aggressorS tate's inability to claim self-defence and military necessity 189-192 (vii) The aggression againstR ussia 193 (viii)T he aggressiona gainst the United States 194 112 (ix) Conclusions regardingt he alleged acts of aggression 195 (e) Individual criminal responsibility I96-199 (i) High-levelp osition 196 P-argraq) Page (ii) The essentiale lement of knowledge 197-198 113 (iii) The claims ofc oercion andd uress 199 115 (f) von Weizsaiker 200-216 115 (i) Generalc onsiderationo fc riminal responsibility and defence claims 200-203 115 (ii) The invasion ofAustria 204 118 (iii) The annexation of the Sudetenland by the Munich Pact and the subsequent invasion of Czechoslovakia 205-209 119 (iv) The aggressiona gainst Poland 210 122 (v) The aggressiona gainstD enmark and Norway 211 123 (vi) The aggressiona gainstB elgium, the Netherlands and Lwxemboug 212 124 (vii) The aggression againstG reece and Yugoslavia 213-214 126 (viii)T he aggression againstR ussia 215 126 (ix) The aggressiona gainstt he United States 216 128 (g) Keppler 217-221 129 (i) Generalc onsiderations 217 129 (ii) The aggression againstAustria 218-219 129 (iii) The aggression against Czechoslovakia 220-221 131 (h) Woermann 222-231 132 (i) Generalc onsiderations:h igh-level position and wide discretionary powers 222-223 133 (ii) The aggression againstP oland 224-225 134 Paragraphs Page (iii) The aggression against Czechoslovakia 226 136 (iv) The aggression againstD enmark and Norway 227 137 (v) The aggression against Belgium, the Netherlands andL uxembourg 228 137 (vi) The aggression against Greece 229 137 (vii) The aggression against Yugoslavia 230 138 (viii)T he aggressiona gainst Russia 231 139 (i) Lammers 232-242 139 (i) General considerations:h igh-level position, knowledge andp articipation 232 139 (ii) The aggressiona gainst Austria 233 140 (iii) The aggressiona gainst Czechoslovakia 234 141 (iv) The aggression against Poland 235 141 (v) The aggression against Norway and Denmark 236 142 (vi) The aggression againstB elgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg 237 142 (vii) The aggression againstR ussia 238 143 (viii) Conclusion 239-242 143 (j) Koemer 243-250 144 (i) Generalc onsiderations:h igh-level position andk nowledge 243-244 145 (H) The aggression againstA ustria 245 146 (iii) The aggression against Czechoslovakia 246 146 (iv) The aggression againstP oland 247 147 (v) The aggression againstR ussia 248-249 147 X