Santa Clara University Scholar Commons Philosophy College of Arts & Sciences 2002 Hegel, Antigone, and Women Philip J. Kain Santa Clara University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at:http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/phi Part of thePhilosophy Commons Recommended Citation Kain, P. J. “Hegel, Antigone, and Women,” Owl of Minerva, 33 (2002): 157-177. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Kain, P. J. “Hegel, Antigone, and Women,” Owl of Minerva, 33 (2002): 157-177, which has been published in final form athttp://doi.org/10.5840/owl20023328. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Arts & Sciences at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please [email protected]. Hegel, Antigone, and Women Philip J. Kain Santa Clara University -I- When Hegel turns to a treatment of culture in Chapter VI of the Phenomenology— as anyone who has read his early writings would expect[1]—he begins with the ancient Greek polis. There the human spirit first fully emancipated itself from nature as it had not, in Hegel’s opinion, in Egypt; yet it was still in perfect harmony and balance with the natural. In Hegel’s view, this was an age of beauty that produced a social community and an ethical life where citizens were free and at home. What is a bit surprising, though, is that in the Phenomenology Hegel does not begin his treatment of the ancient world with the heroes of Homer, the philosophers of Athens, or even with the general cultural perspective of men. He starts, in the section entitled “The Ethical Order,” with Antigone and the perspective of women. It is quite true that the perspective of Antigone and of Greek women is constructed from the perspective of men, the perspective of Sophocles and of Hegel himself, nevertheless, it is still rather surprising that Hegel begins with Antigone. What does this mean? Could it mean that when we arrive at Greece, quintessentially the land of the master, Hegel insists on beginning with the slave? Is it fair to see Antigone as like the Hegelian slave? Many scholars—for example, Mills, Ravven, O’Brien, and Oliver—reject such a notion.[2] Nevertheless, Antigone is subordinate to Creon and does end up subverting him—much as the slave does the master. If we admit that women are like the slave, this would tend to suggest that while dominated and oppressed they will ultimately subvert the master, emerge as an equally significant principle, and move us toward a higher development of culture.[3] Could Hegel really be suggesting this sort of thing about women? We will be pushed toward such a conclusion if we decide that Antigone is like the slave. But the question as to why we begin with Antigone is even more complicated than this. Oliver argues that, after the section on the Ethical Order, women are simply left behind in the Phenomenology— they are never resuscitated and are not preserved in later stages of the dialectical movement.[4] I think that without a doubt women are not preserved or resuscitated adequately in the later stages of the Phenomenology, or in Hegel’s thought in general, but I do not think that they are simply and completely left behind. Earlier, in Chapter V of the Phenomenology, Hegel took up a discussion of the Sittlichkeit of the ancient polis in order to contrast it to the sort of Moralität that had developed in the modern world. Moralität begins with Socrates[5] and reaches its high point in Kant. Moralität is rational and reflective morality. Individuals must themselves rationally decide what is moral and do it because reason tells them that it is the right thing to do. On the other hand, Sittlichkeit is best represented, for Hegel, in the Greek polis before the rise of Socratic Moralität. Sittlichkeit is ethical behavior grounded in custom and tradition and developed through habit and imitation in accordance with the laws, religion, and practices of the community. For Sittlichkeit, morality is not something we ought to realize, or something we ought to be, as it is for Moralität. For Sittlichkeit, morality exists—it is. It is already embedded in our customs, traditions, practices, character, attitudes, and feelings. The objective ethical order already exists in, is continuously practiced by, is actualized in, the individual. What we see as we proceed in Chapter VI, however, is that ancient Sittlichkeit left little room for individuality and that, as individuality began to arise, it caused the collapse of the ancient community and its ethical life. Moreover, it is Hegel’s view that the individuality connected with Moralität, as it develops in the modern world, produces a rational, autonomous, and enlightened individualism, an individualism that sets out to remake its world in accordance with its rational principles, but an individualism that in the French Revolution goes too far and becomes radically destructive. Hegel wants to overcome this extreme form of individualism, but not simply by returning to ancient, undeveloped Sittlichkeit. He wants for the modern world a synthesis of ancient Sittlichkeit and modern Moralität— of community and individuality. At any rate, Antigone represents the principle of individuality which in Hegel’s view subverted the undeveloped Sittlichkeit of the ancient community and led to its collapse. In so far as Antigone is associated with this principle of subversion and the development of individualism, then, it will be difficult to deny her contribution to cultural development. Nevertheless, Hegel is not after a destructive form of individualism for the modern world, certainly not of the sort that caused the French Revolution. He is after an individualism that is compatible, and can be synthesized, with Sittlichkeit. While Antigone does represent the sort of individualism that subverted the inadequate Sittlichkeit of the ancient world, nevertheless, her individualism is not like the destructive individualism that Hegel wants to overcome in the modern world. Her individualism, I suggest, at least prefigures and would be resuscitated in the sort of individualism that would make possible a modern synthesis of Sittlichkeit and Moralität— and that is why Antigone is so important for Hegel. We must notice from the start that Hegel’s conception of individualism is quite different from the individualism of the liberal tradition. Individuals, for Hegel, are not natural, they are not just given, they do not come ready-made, we do not just find them there in a state of nature as for Hobbes or Locke. Individuals are constructed by their sociocultural world. Nevertheless, this construction may involve conflict—individualism may even cause the collapse of culture as it did in the ancient world and again in the French Revolution. Hegel’s goal is to get beyond this destructive form of individualism to an individualism formed by, in harmony with, and reinforcing the institutions of our sociocultural world. Thus we must distinguish between two important forms of individualism. Moreover, I would like to suggest that both of these forms of individualism are at least prefigured in the section on the Ethical Order; they are prefigured in the two principles that are the foundation of the ancient world: the Human Law and the Divine Law. The first has to do with citizens, males, and their public activity in society for the community and its government. This individualism centers around warfare, wealth, property, economic interest, and so forth. Hegel says, “The acquisition and maintenance of power and wealth” that is involved here “belongs to the sphere of appetite…”[6] This is the form of individualism that Antigone’s brothers possess. I do not want to suggest that this is already liberal individualism. It is still embedded in Sittlichkeit and thus quite the opposite of liberal individualism. Nevertheless, it involves an appetite for and an interest in power and wealth, and, as the ancient Sittlichkeit of which it is part collapses and as it develops in the modern world, it will come to be centered in civil society and thus develop as a part of liberal individualism.[7] Moreover, there is a certain tension between this form of individualism and the family, both in modern civil society[8] as well as, we shall see, here already in the ancient polis. Hegel does not want to eliminate this form of individualism, he wants to allow it a place, but it must be contained so as not to be destructive. The second form of individualism is prefigured in the Divine Law and Antigone represents this form of individualism. It does not involve a radical standing alone, apart, in a state of nature. It is true that the individualism of her brothers, still embedded in Sittlichkeit, does not involve such standing alone either. But Antigone’s individualism does not even involve individual appetite for power, wealth, or personal glory in warfare. Her individualism, rather, is manifested in and through acting in perfect solidarity with the family, religion, and tradition. This is the key, I think, to why Hegel is so interested in Antigone and why Antigone is so important. The modern Sittlichkeit that Hegel is after stands in need of a form of individualism very much like Antigone’s. Her individualism is the sort that allows a self embedded in a context of cultural relations, institutions, and common customs, traditions, and practices to develop an individual identity. Since we are all formed and shaped by our culture, if we are to become individuals and at the same time avoid the sorts of vagaries associated with what we have come to call cultural relativism, we need a solid identity, in Hegel’s view, an absolute identity. Individuals must have the sense that they are right, that while they act within a particular community, tradition, or culture they do more than simply act in accord with personal appetites, private interests, or with whatever their particular community, tradition, or culture happens to value. They must be able to think (as all Europeans have been able to think) that they as individuals are contributing to something objectively important, that the Divine or the Absolute is acting through them, or at least that they are acting in accord with the Divine or the Absolute, that it is their destiny to realize some objective truth or good, or something of the sort. This is the form of identity that Antigone has and represents. It is an identity embedded in the local and particular, within which, however, the individual is able to find an absolute reality, importance, and truth. It is a form of individualism that is not only compatible with religion, culture, and Sittlichkeit, but derives from them. At any rate, Hegel wants a balance here. Too much liberal individualism in the modern world gave us the French Revolution, chaos, destruction, and the loss of an absolute identity. Not enough liberal individualism in the ancient world gave us the closed world of immediacy found in the Greek polis. Hegel wants a balance and harmony between ancient Sittlichkeit and modern Moralität, a balance that was at least prefigured in the balance between Divine Law and Human Law, and, we must also see, in the balance between male and female. For Hegel, the latter are two essences. And the authentication of one occurs through the other (PhG 278/250). This is to say that neither “of the two is by itself absolutely valid.…This equilibrium can, it is true, only be a living one by inequality arising in it, and being brought back to equilibrium by Justice” (PhG 276-7/248-9). What are we to make of this rather obscure statement? I think it does indicate that at least in this section of the Phenomenology Hegel is not engaged, as O’Brien suggests, in history’s most ambitious attempt to define humanity as simply masculine.[9] But, on the other hand, it does not seem to me either that Hegel is simply arguing for equality between the sexes, as Ravven seems to suggest.[10] Let us begin to examine this section in detail. -II- The two main institutions of ancient Greece were the family and the community (or polis )—and they were intimately related in a self-reinforcing circle. The family provides men to the community. They serve in the political and governmental sphere and most importantly in war. The family raises children who as young men go off to fight war to defend the community. Reciprocally, the community, for its part, protects and preserves the family. It protects individuals and their families from the enemy, and in peacetime it organizes and fosters property which makes possible the substance and subsistence of families.[11] Each institution serves the other and each would be impossible without the other. The community owes its very existence to families and its fundamental purpose is to defend and make the good life possible for members of families. And families, for their part, could not defend themselves or prosper without the community which they must in turn serve. However, warfare is not engaged in solely as a means to protection. For young men it is also an escape from the confines of the family and an arena in which to achieve virtue and gain public honor. And from its perspective the city must see to it that citizens do not get too deeply rooted and isolated in their concerns for property. From time to time the citizens must be shaken to their roots by war. They must be made to serve the highest concerns of the community. As Hegel puts it, they must be “made to feel in the task laid on them their lord and master, death” (PhG 272-3/246). On the one hand, the family is protected by warfare; on the other hand, it loses its members to the community and they die in war—the family is both preserved by the community and destroyed by it. Even this death, however, links the family and the community. Death is the highest service the individual undertakes for the community, and the individual’s burial is the highest duty of the family (PhG 271/245). Individuals die for the community and are buried by the family—they are honored by the community and mourned by the family. Proper burial is most important in Greek culture. In the Odyssey, we see that Odysseus had to return to bury one of his men who otherwise could not have entered the underworld and found peace.[12] Moreover, the individual cannot simply be abandoned to the natural and to decay. The burial ceremony is caught up with the need to preserve, remember, and recognize heroic virtue—Patroclos’s burial ceremony lasts for 12 days in the Iliad. [13] The individual must be made to live on in the memory of the family and the community. In this ideal Sittlichkeit, then, these two fundamental institutions, the family and the community, each preserve and produce the other—each confirms and substantiates the other.[14] The spiritual or cultural world is a product created by the action of each and constitutes their unity (PhG 264/239). Human Law and Divine Law, in this ideal, are supposed to reinforce each other harmoniously. As we have seen, however, Hegel says, “This equilibrium can, it is true, only be a living one by inequality arising in it, and being brought back to equilibrium by Justice” (PhG 276-7/248-9). And, indeed, these two laws soon come into disequilibrium—a disequilibrium that needs to be restored by justice. Hegel takes up two classic examples that he finds in Sophocles. The first is Oedipus, who saves the city of Thebes, becomes its ruler, and rules well. His actions are in perfect accord with the Human Law. However, he violates the law of the family, the Divine Law, in the worst possible way, by murdering his father and marrying his mother. He does this in ignorance, but he does it nevertheless (PhG 283/255). Divine Law takes its vengeance on Human Law by producing a plague in Thebes. The second case is that of Antigone. This time we get a conflict between the two laws that is intentional. Antigone has two brothers—Eteocles and Polyneices. As would be typical, at a certain age they leave the home for the community, for politics and government, while their sister remains in the home. Eteocles, it turns out, becomes ruler of the city and Polyneices attacks it. Both die. The city recognizes Eteocles, its ruler, and condemns Polyneices, who attacked the city, as an enemy and a traitor —which seems to be in perfect agreement with Human Law. Creon, the new ruler, accords burial honors to Eteocles and refuses them to Polyneices. This is not acceptable, however, to Divine Law. Divine Law does not recognize such distinctions; both brothers are equally members of the family and Antigone must bury both—even the one who attacked the city (PhG 285-6/257). Here, the community and the family are no longer in harmony. Why does this occur? How does the conflict arise?[15] From the beginning there has been a basic tension between the community and the family. The community, after all, draws the family member out to war and to death, thus destroying the family and breaking its happiness.[16] We have here a living equilibrium that will inevitably give rise to such inequalities, inequalities that must be brought back to equilibrium by justice. Thus it is bad enough that the community draws the family member out to war and to death, but for Creon to refuse to bury Polyneices is to go too far. For Antigone, Creon’s action on behalf of the city is not justice, it is not the restoration of equilibrium, it certainly cannot represent a universal moral principle, it is an outrage. It can only be, in her view, the perverse decision of this particular individual (her uncle Creon) against another particular individual (her beloved brother Polyneices). So Antigone attacks, derides, ridicules Creon’s action, and asserts that the commitment to her brother demanded by Divine Law is more important than the Human Law of the community, all of which seems in perfect agreement with Divine Law. The community, for its part, naturally tries to suppress Antigone and what it sees as her individualism, but in doing so only feeds it and creates an enemy in women (PhG 288/259). Antigone’s action fractures the substantial unity of the ethical order. -III- What, then, can we say about Hegel’s attitude toward Antigone, women, and their equality with men? It is certainly the case that women are excluded from political life in the polis. Moreover, the role of women certainly seems to be established by nature or as part of a fixed essence. And furthermore, the possibility that women might have interests other than the family never even arises.[17] At the same time, though, it is just not the case that Antigone is locked away out of the real order of things. She is excluded from the realm of Human Law, but the Divine Law is every bit as real, significant, and important. In fact it is more primordial and ultimately more powerful—indeed, it finally triumphs (PhG 273/246). While there is no way that Hegel is going to cut a figure as an acceptable modern feminist, nevertheless, we would be wrong, I think, to assume that he simply sides with Creon, the community, government, and Human Law against Antigone. Furthermore, we cannot let our reading of the Philosophy of Right, written 15 years after the Phenomenology, lead us to project things back into the Phenomenology that are not there. I do not wish to argue that in all respects the two texts differ—or that there are two Hegel’s—but the texts clearly do differ on some issues. For example, Hegel has been called the official philosopher of the Prussian state for his supposed glorification of the state in the Philosophy of Right. [18] While I think this is an incorrect reading even of that text, nevertheless, we should notice that the Phenomenology is notably free from anything resembling such glorification of the state.[19] There is certainly no glorification of the Greek state. If anything, I would say that Hegel sides with the subversive Antigone against Creon. Moreover, we find that much of this same negative or critical attitude toward the state will continue throughout the rest of Chapter VI of the Phenomenology. We see this in the way that Hegel treats State Power, Noble and Base Consciousness, and the Heroism of Flattery, all of which lead up to the French Revolution’s overthrow of State Power, a process with which Hegel has a certain sympathy despite his opposition to the destructive individualism involved. If it is impossible in the Phenomenology to saddle Hegel with the view of the state that he will supposedly hold in the Philosophy of Right, if Hegel is more critical of the state than he will be in the Philosophy of Right, there should be nothing wrong with being very careful before we attribute to the Phenomenology the negative views of women that we will find in the Philosophy of Right. Quite clearly, the Philosophy of Right holds a more conservative view of women than does the Phenomenology. In the Philosophy of Right, the family must have as its head the husband (PR 116/249).[20] Moreover, Hegel holds that while women are capable of education they are not made for the advanced sciences which demand a universal faculty. Also when women hold the helm of government, the state is in jeopardy, since women are not regulated by the demands of universality but by arbitrary inclinations and opinions (PR 263-4/247). In the Phenomenology, on the other hand, it is explicitly the case that the man is not the head of the household, “the wife remains, the head of the household and the guardian of the divine law” (PhG 275/248). Moreover, in the Phenomenology, men and women, at least as brother and sister, are equal (PhG 288/259). It is true, though, that husband and wife are not equal. From this fact, however, we cannot conclude—as Tuana does—that the community and the Human Law, to which the husband belongs, is superior to the Divine Law and the family, of which the wife is guardian and head.[21] That is not Hegel’s view. For Hegel, neither has any advantage over the other—they are equally essential (PhG 285/256). While it is true that women are confined to the family, it is also true that the Greek family, unlike the modern family, was the fundamental economic unit of society—it was the basic unit of production and produced for itself all that it needed. To be the head of such an institution could not be, and was not considered, insignificant.[22] The view of women found in the Phenomenology is definitely not as objectionable as that found in the Philosophy of Right. Nevertheless, I do not at all want to suggest that the Phenomenology treats women as sufficiently equal—or that it even approaches what would be acceptable. In fact, I want to argue against an interpretation of Hegel that would tend in that direction. Some commentators seem to think that Hegel’s conception of love implies equality between men and women. One certainly cannot deny that love and recognition are central and important categories of Hegel’s thought. If it can be shown that love requires, necessitates, or even pushes toward equality, then my claim that Hegel does not believe in equality between men and women would be in question. Thus we must consider Hegel’s view of love. In Chapter VI, Hegel says, “the relationship of husband and wife is…the primary and immediate form in which one consciousness recognizes itself in another, and in which each knows that reciprocal recognition.”[23] In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel also says, Love means in general terms the consciousness of my unity with another, so that I am not in selfish isolation but win my self-consciousness only as the renunciation of my independence and through knowing myself as the unity of myself with another and of the other with me.…The first moment in love is that I do not wish to be a self-subsistent and independent person and that, if I were, then I would feel defective and incomplete. The second moment is that I find myself in another person, that I count for something in the other, while the other in turn comes to count for something in me.…love is unity of an ethical type (PR 261/237-8). In love I am confirmed and recognized by the other. I am real and significant in so far as I exist for- another. In an earlier text, Hegel said that each intuits themselves in the being of the other consciousness and thus has a communal existence with the other.[24] Indeed, Baillie suggests that in Chapter VI of the Phenomenology Hegel is following Aristotle’s treatment of friendship in Books VIII and IX of the Nicomachean Ethics (PhM 465). It is clearly Aristotle’s view that friendship or love is what holds the polis together. In fact, friendship is more important than justice in this respect, since friends treat each other better than justice would demand and it would be far worse to harm a friend than someone else.[25] I want to be quite clear, then, that I do not ignore love or dismiss it. In fact, I agree with commentators like Williams and Westphal about the importance and centrality of love for Hegel’s thought. On the other hand, though, I am not convince that love will give us the equality that these commentators seem to think it will. According to Williams, “Love seeks a union with its other, in which domination and subordination are out of place. Love allows the other to be, i.e., it seeks the freedom of the other.”[26] While love is quite compatible with equality, as between brother and sister, love certainly does not require equality. Love is perfectly compatible with inequality. Let me be as clear about this as possible —so as not to be misunderstood. I certainly think that in a relationship between a man and a woman equality is desirable. I also think that the relationship will be a better relationship if it is one of equality. I also think that love is a valuable and desirable thing. But I simply do not think that there is anything about love which demands, requires, or necessarily works for equality in a relationship. I do not think that love and equality are necessarily related. I think it desirable that a loving relationship also be one of equality, but just as a relationship of equality need not involve love, so we can perfectly well have love without having equality. To think that love and equality necessarily or normally go together is to romanticize love—to expect something of it which it is not. We can easily love someone we consider our inferior or our superior—God, our dog, the King or the Queen, our children, our parents. For centuries, men have been loving their wives while thinking them their inferiors—and I have no reason to believe that many of these men did not really love their wives—certainly not because there is any incompatibility between love and inequality. Certainly those relationships would have been improved by equality; but I see no reason to think that the love as love would necessarily have been deepened or made truer. Love and equality are just different things. There is nothing about loving someone that one considers an inferior that necessarily distorts the love. Love can be perfectly true love when it is love of an equal, a superior, or an inferior. Certainly, Aristotle did not think that love implied equality when he claimed that it was what held the city together. Friendship, on the other hand, is a bit different. It does not require complete and perfect equality. It is possible to be friends with someone from a very different social class or economic level, or with someone with a very different level of intelligence or athletic ability. But these inequalities will rub