religions Article Thank God We Are Creatures: Hannah Arendt’s Cryptotheology RafaelZawisza FacultyofArtesLiberales,UniversityofWarsaw,ul.NowyS´wiat69,00-046Warszawa,Poland; [email protected] (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:1)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:1) (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7) Received:1October2018;Accepted:13November2018;Published:19November2018 Abstract: Main concern of this article is to grasp the interpretative matrix of Hannah Arendt’s doctorate, which, I claim, is the central organising net for her other writings. I call this matrix “cryptotheologicaldefenceofthesecularworld”.Inordertoshowitsfunctionality,Ihavetodetermine thecharacterofArendt’sdiscourseinrelationtotheologyandphilosophyonthebasisofherdoctoral thesisfrom1929. Themainattentionwillbefocusedonthefigureoftheneighbourasasingularand theconceptofnatality. Iwillshowhowthecritiqueoftheology,oftenveryironic,servesArendtto contesttheparadigmofthepoliticaltheology. Keywords: Hannah Arendt; Augustine of Hippo; creatureliness; neighbour; post-secularism; cryptotheology;marrano;transcendence;singularity DieWeltwarschlechthinunabsolutgeworden. NichtbloßderMensch,neinauchGottkonnteaußer ihrenGrenzen,wennanderserwollte,Platzfinden. DiesemetalogischeWeltbotaber,geradeweilsie gottloswar,keinenSchutzgegenGott. FranzRosenzweig,DerSternderErlösung(Rosenzweig1921,p. 23) AfterhavingreadnumeroustextsaboutHannahArendt’sdoctoralthesisDerLiebesbegriffbeiAugustin, Icametoaconclusionthatweneedanewinterpretationofit. Itisarulethatscholarsinsistingon Arendt’ssecularismdonothaveanideahowtointegratetheconfusingdissertationintoheroeuvre. Thereisatemptationtoavoidthisinconveniencebystatingthatbetweenthedoctorateandhernext majorwork,TheOriginsofTotalitarianism—whichmeansbetween1929and1951—therewasadecisive break. Iamnotgoingtocontestthefactsandclaimthattherewasnochange,thatthehorrifictime oftotalitarianrulership,exile,andwardidnotputanimprintonHannahArendt. Buttoannounce thebreakandneglectherfirstworkwouldbenothingbutanexcuse. Anexcusethatmakesherwork easiertounderstand,eventouseorwidespread,nonethelessitwouldmeanthatagalvanisedimageof Arendtaspoliticaltheoristwillbecomemoreandmoreaclichéandanobstacletoreviveherthought forfuturegenerations. There is no historical evidence of what motivated Hannah Arendt to choose the topic of the dissertation. Laure Adler claims that it was meeting Rudolf Bultmann at his seminar on the New Testament, which coloured Arendt decision. It was apparently thanks to him that she discovered Augustine for herself (Adler 2008, p. 62). However, other scholars insist on the primary role of Heidegger. Jacques Taminiaux intended to show that Heidegger’s lectures on Aristotle made animpressionontheyoungArendt(Taminiaux1997). LucaSavarinoattemptedtounderlineanimpact of Heidegger’s lectures from 1920 to 1921 (introduction to the phenomenology of religion as well asthelectureaboutAugustineandNeo-Platonism),althoughSavarinoemphasisesthatthereisno certaintywhetherArendtwasfamiliarwiththecontentofthoselectures,whichshedidnotattend (Savarino1999, pp. 251–61). Variousinfluencesdonotexcludeeachother, whichiswhyonemay Religions2018,9,371;doi:10.3390/rel9110371 www.mdpi.com/journal/religions Religions2018,9,371 2of24 alsomentionHansJonas,whoasaverygoodfriendofArendt’swaselaboratinghisthesisAugustin unddaspaulinischeFreiheitsproblem: EinphilosophischerBeitragzurGenesisderchristlich-abendländischen Freiheitsidee,finishedin1930. HannahArendt’sdoctoraldissertationwasdefendedinautumn1928inFreiburgandpublishedby JuliusSpringerinBerlinin1929underthetitleDerLiebesbegriffbeiAugustin:Versucheinerphilosophischen Interpretation. It was part of a series which was soon to be closed and where Karl Jaspers helped his students to publish their thesis. Scarcity of time, which Arendt complained to Jaspers about, couldexplainthedenseandinconclusivecharacterofthethirdpart: Vitasocialis. However,therewere graverproblemsthattheyoungauthorencounteredandsomehowleftunresolved,whilestillbeing abletodrawupamap,whichwoulddelineateherlaterconcerns. For hermeneutical reasons, there is one decisive issue I have to explain at the start. Hannah ArendtworkedonthetranslationofherdissertationintoEnglishinthelate1950sandearly1960s. ItwasatranslationbyErnstBaschAshton,whichshereceivedtoapproveandwhichshecorrected alot,goingasfarastoamendthewholetext,exceptthelastpart,Vitasocialis,whichsheleftunchanged. Again,itisnotcertainwhyArendtgaveupatcertainpoint,asaresultofwhichthetranslationneeded towaitforpublicationuntil1996. Inaletterfrom20October1965toMaryMcCarthy,Arendtgave animpressionofhowshefeltabouttheencounterwithherprewartext: I got myself into something absurd—Macmillan had asked me years ago for my dissertation on Augustine. Ineededthemoney(notreally,butcoulduseit)andsaidyes. Thetranslationarrivedtwo yearsagoandnowIranoutofexcusesandhavetogooverit. Itiskindofatraumaticexperience. Iamre-writingthewholedarnedbusiness,tryingnottodoanythingnew,butonlytoexplainin English(andnotinLatin)whatIthoughtwhenIwastwenty. ItisprobablynotworthitandIshould simplyreturnthemoney—butbynowIamstrangelyfascinatedinthisrencontre. Ihadnotreadthe thingfornearlyfortyyears. (ArendtandMcCarthy1995,p. 190) ThedifferencesbetweentheGermanoriginalfrom1929andArendt’samendmentsfromthe1950s and1960stotheEnglishtranslationofherdissertationconstituteatopicinitself. HereIanalysethe finalshapeofherdoctorate,claimingthatitscomplexdevelopmentonlyconfirmedthatwhatArendt hadwritteninthelate1920sthenbecamethecryptotheologicalmatrix,whereinitialintuitiononly crystallisedandfromwhichitwaswidespreadthroughouthervariouswritings. Iampersuadedthat scrupulous, “Talmudic” work on the comparison of the German and English editions, all existing correctionsincluded,isnecessaryandthatitisaworkwaitingforitsauthor. Yet,asfortheaimand structureofmythesis,thisisnotofhighimportance.Firstofall,themostessentialpartofArendt’s dissertation,namelythethirdchapterentitledVitasocialis,waspublishedinEnglisheditionasadirect translation of the original from 1929, because Arendt did not introduce any changes to this part. Asforthetwopreviouschapters,Ianalyseoriginalaswellasaddedfragments,treatingthemasone migratingentity. WhatImeanbythatisthattheideaspresentinthefirsteditionwereonlydeveloped morefullyinthe1950sand1960s,thusthereisnobreakorshiftthatcouldmakethishistoricalprocess ofmigrationofideasproblematicformyreconstruction. Whatconstitutesthegenuineshiftalreadyin the1920sisVitasocialis. Tosummarize,Iwasconsideringdividingthematerialbycommentingonthe originalandontheamendmentsseparately,butIdecidedthattheadvantagesofthisoptionarefewand theriskofproducingchaos—quitepredictable(duetonecessityofconstantlyclarifyingwhichversion ofArendt’sdissertationIreferto—andthentointegratesomecomplexlinesofargumentation). Inmy opinion,natalismistheundercurrentofArendt’sthought,originatinginherdoctoralthesis,thatis whyitisnotcontroversialtoseethisinholisticperspective. Whatwouldbeofhighimportanceisto graspthemomentsinhertextswrittenafterpublicationofTheOrigins(1951),whichwereinfluenced byherreturntoherdissertationsincethe1950s. Ionlymarkthisfacthereinordertodemonstrate theprocessesoftranslationsandtransmissions. ThespecifictextsatstakearethelastchapterofThe Origins—IdeologyandTerror—addedtothesecondedition(1958)butwritteninthemiddleinthe1950s aswellasTheHumanCondition(1958). OnRevolution(1963)inthisperspectiveappearsastheelaborate responsetothedilemmasandaporiaswhichhauntedArendtwhenshewaspreparingVitasocialis. Religions2018,9,371 3of24 Richard Wolin calls Arendt’s dissertation “a strikingly un-Arendtian document ( ... ) [in which—RZ] the inflections of her mature philosophical voice are barely audible. It is a work of adisciple,narrowlytextualinorientationandfocus,devoidoftheoriginalitythatwouldcharacterize hersubsequentwork”(Wolin2001,pp. 42–43). WolindisregardsthefactthatthewholeArendtian anthropologywasgerminatinginherfirstbook. Heusesschematicexplanation,whichshowshow littleheunderstoodfromDerLiebesbegriff;WolinthinksthatbecauseofAugustine’sotherworldliness, youngArendt—aslostinAugustinianworldview—couldnotbereconciledwithherlaterinsistence on worldliness. In sum, he overlooks that it was precisely in Augustine that Arendt intended to find commitment to the world despite having declared rejection of it. His second argument, that transcendence contradicts plurality, also shows rather Wolin’s own misconception and in consequence it obnubilates Arendt’s dialectic attitude towards theological tradition. Only on the basisofhisinterpretativefailurecouldWolinnotonlyseparateDerLiebesbegriff fromherlaterthought, but he could also claim that in Rahel Varnhagen Arendt rejected her first work as concentrated on introspection(Wolin2001,p. 44). Iwouldratherinsistthatdespiteherscepticismabouttheforceof inwardness,shedidnotdismissitsrolealtogether. KurtSontheimerfoundDerLiebesbegriff morepromising,callingit“thefirstimportant,butnot particularly original step towards intellectual independence” (Sontheimer 2005, p. 31). It is characteristicthatthedissertationisunderestimatedeitherbythesecularinterpreters,orbytheological ones,whohaveatendencytoascribeeverythingvaluabletoAugustineandseeArendtinaminor positionof,forexample,Heidegger’s“child”orAugustine’s“daughter”. JohnKiess,asoneofthefew commentatorsrepresentingtheology,feltcompelledtoprotestagainstthoseattemptsatdiminishment: “aswithHeidegger,ArendtappropriatedandcriticizedelementsofAugustine’sworkwiththesame spiritofindependencethatwillmarkherengagementwithmanyotherthinkers”(Kiess2016,p. 21). ItisevenmorethantosaythatArendtwas“aqualifiedAugustinian”(ClarkeandQuill2009,p. 254). It is not unimportant how we understand Arendt’s stance towards the Augustinian legacy, andlater,howweestimatewhathappenedafterWorldWarIIatherfirstencounterwithAugustine’s thought. IagreewithJoannaVecchiarelliScott,whostatesthatArendt’sperseveratingreferencesto Augustine“arecentraltoherargumentandcannotbeeasilydismissedasscholasticdecorationor theafterglowofanearlyflirtationwithidealismforthemostpartoutgrown”(VecchiarelliScott1988, p.398). Aswewillsee,Arendtbuiltonacertainlogicofthoughtalreadyinscribedinherdoctoral thesis. “This text—Étienne Tassin writes—is seminal: it fecundates [irrigue] all the future works, includingcapturingthedistancewhichitinduces”(TassinandAlbanel2010,p. 11). Itwas,however, not only the logic of argumentation, but also the set of problems she found in Augustine which sheregardedaspressingonherowncontemporaneity. Thequestionswerenotsomuchoriginally Augustinian,butratherrevivedindifferentthematicconstellations. ThatiswhyIabstainfromcalling Arendt an Augustinian of any sort. She deeply distorted his reflections and did not read him as atheologian. ThosewhoregardDerLiebesbegriff asaworkdependentonAugustineandtheologyare probablyconfusedbyitsform,un-Arendtianindeed. Ifonedoesnotfollowthelinesofargumentation rigorously and does not pay attention to the details, it seems that the author of the dissertation is a commentator of the great thinker of the past. By quoting Augustine extensively, Arendt made theimpressionthatshewastotallyimmersedintotheanalysedmaterial. Butthiswaspreciselyher strategy: to show, through close reading, inconsequences and aporias. They would not appear as problematicpointswithoutHannahArendt’suniquepositionofspeaking,whichgaveherfreedomto composeAugustine’sthoughtinthewayshediditandnototherwise. Arendt’sseemingly“humble” roleofcommentatorsubmergedherextremelycriticalvoice. Yet,again,thisvoiceissosubtlyironic andhercriticismsoembeddedinthestructureofthebook,thatitiseasytodisregardit. ApartfromtheproblemofinventivenessofearlyArendt,therearetwootherissues:herpotentially politicalstanceandherattitudetotheology. RonaldBeinerwrites: “WhattheAugustinebookmay indicateisthatArendtwasapoliticalphilosopherbeforesheknewthatshewasone”(Beiner1997, p. 270). Mytaskistoradicalisethisstatementbyshowinghowdeeplypoliticalherearliestconcerns Religions2018,9,371 4of24 abouttheloveoftheneighbourandrelationsoftheindividualtornbetweenGodandworldwere.1 IamnotgoingtocontestthethesisthatRahelVarnhagen’sbiographywasArendt’sfirstpoliticalbook, properlyspeaking(Armenteros1999,p. 86),andindicatedtheperiodwhenshebecamepolitically consciousandbegantodealseriouslywithhistory, law, andpolitics. Yet, Istronglydisagreewith CarolinaArmenteros’unjustqualificationsofDerLiebesbegriff asa“highlyabstractexistentialexercise” (Armenteros1999,p. 87). Arendt’sdoctoralthesishasmuchtoofferwhenitcomestoananthropologyofpoliticaltheory,i.e., more“pre-political”or“meta-political”reflections;however,thisdoesnotmeanthatitislessrelevant inthatregard. Conversely,whatIcall“pre-political”iswhatwasreflectedbyArendtherselfunderthe term“pre-theologicalsphere”(dievortheologischeSphäre;Arendt1929,p. 3). Thespherepriortoany religionanditstheologicalself-understandingconstitutesabattlefieldwiththeparadigmofpolitical theology,whichmakespoliticsdependentoncertaintheologicalorigin. It is probably not astonishing that Arendt’s dissertation has not found its full recognition. AmongbothreligiousandsecularcommentatorsthereisnoagreementwhetheryoungArendtwas moretheologicalorphilosophical. Ifoundsomeparadoxasindicative,namelythataJesuitclaimsthat “HannahArendtneverwritestheology”(Boyle1987,p. 96),whileasecularscholardoesnothesitateto reportabout“Arendt’syouthfulflirtationwiththeology”(Moyn2008,p. 71). Someresolutionwould betocountArendtamong“nontheologianspracticingtheology”(Biale2011, p. 9), asDavidBiale shortenedAmosFunkenstein’sdefinitionofthe“seculartheology”. However,whatinterestsmethe mostis“herconsequentabilitytolivewithcreativeconfusion”(Neiman2001,p. 72). ThatiswhyIam inclinedtothinkaboutHannahArendtasarepresentativeofthegroupnamedbyAgataBielik-Robson “thephilosophicalMarranos”(Bielik-Robson2014). OnlybyreferringtothiscomplexapproachitwouldbepossibletoreintegrateDerLiebesbegriff withinthecontextofpolitico-theologicaldebatesoftheWeimarperiod.2 Inordertodothat,however, amovebackwardsisnecessary,whichgraspsthedissertationinitsmicrocosm. Thesubtletynecessary to decipher Arendtian cryptotheological secularism usually escapes theological interpretations.3 Even though secular interpretations are closer to the point, they remain incomplete without acknowledgementthat,indefendingsecularity,Arendtsoughthelpbybothsecularandtheological means. That is why Samuel Moyn in his otherwise excellent article about Arendt and the secular marvels over the fact that she acceded biblical provenance for the model of political promise and callsthisidea“rathershocking”(Moyn2008,p. 86). Theconceptofnatalityposesasimilardifficulty forMoyn,ashethinksthatitistooreligiouslyburdenedandbecauseofthatitincursariskofthe Schmittiancritique(Moyn2008,p. 96). Iclaimexactlytheopposite: thatArendt’sfamiliaritywith theologyandherphilosophyofbirthmakestheattackonthepoliticaltheologyallthemorecrushing. Politicaltheologyisdeconstructedbytheintroductionofthethirdelement,precedingboththeology andpolitics: anthropology. Whatismore,theappreciationofthehumanbirthinitsanti-naturalist specificity serves to contest the political implications of the doctrine of the original sin, on which Christianpoliticaltheologyrelied. 1 ForthepictureofthetensionsinWeimarGermanyduetoreligiousdivisions,seethesociological-historicalsummaryof ToddH.Weir(Weir2015).Hedepictedintrareligiousbattles,butalsoacampaignagainstsecularism,whichhelpedHitler cometopower. TheauthoralsodescribedtheCatholicambivalentreactiontoNazismandviceversa,thereasonswhy ProtestantssupportedHitlermorethanCatholics,orhowCatholicsmimedcommunistorganisationsinordertocombat them.WhatismissinginWeir’sarticleistheroleoftheJews. 2 Thefirststepinthisdirectionwasalreadytaken,see(Chacón2012). 3 ThediscussionaboutArendtandtheologydidnotreachfull-scaleuntilJesuitsfromBostoneditedthevolumeAmormundi (Bernauer1987a). Nevertheless,therewasnofurtherresonance,probablybecausethisvolume,containingmanydeep insightsnotwithstanding,ischargedbyapologeticintentions. Religions2018,9,371 5of24 1. PretheologicalSphere Arendt’sdissertationwas“guidedbythequestionofthemeaningandimportanceofneighbourly loveinparticular”(Arendt1996,p. 3). Knowinghersenseofirony,thiscouldimplicitlyindicatethat despitethefactthatthiswasoneofAugustine’scentralconcerns,histheologicalvisionofGodand itsphilosophicalantecedenceshadoverriddenessentialityoftheneighbour. ThefactthatArendt’s recapitulation of Augustine’s views was intended to be an accompanying critique from the very beginningisreinforcedbythefollowingstatement: Augustine’severyperceptionandeveryremarkaboutlovereferatleastinparttothisloveofneighbor. Thusthequestionabouttheneighbor’srelevancealwaysturnsintoasimultaneouscritiqueofthe prevailingconceptofloveandofman’sattitudetowardhimselfandtowardGod. (Arendt1996,p. 3) TakingintoaccountheroveralldeconstructionoftheAugustinianconcepts,Arendtcouldnothave beenmuchmoreovertaboutherintentionsintheintroduction. Otherwise,itwouldhavebeenseenas agrosseffrontery—afterall,shewasjustadoctoralstudentatthattime.4 Arendt’sinitialremarksconcealapolemicalapproach,withoutthedetectionofwhichthewhole interpretationofherworkwouldbogdown. Sheveryoftenpretendedthatshewasjustsummarizing Augustine’s ideas, while in fact she adopted his views in order to turn them against themselves. For instance, when she said: “This critique will never be an absolute critique from some fixed philosophicalortheologicalstandpoint. Itisacritiqueonlybecausetherespectiveconceptoflove claimstobeaChristianone”(Arendt1996,p. 3). Inotherwords,Arendt’sintentionistochecktowhat extentAugustine’sargumentationstickstotheteachingsofChristianity. SheestimatedthatAugustinehadbeen“trulyreligiousratherthandeterminedbyNeoplatonic Greekinfluences”(Arendt1996,p. 4). BysayingthatArendtonlypayedoffadebttobiographical truth,toAugustine’sinnerintentions,5 which,however,didnotfinditsroadtofulfilmentthroughout Greekcategories.6 Heterogeneousinfluencestogetherwith“heterogeneousintentions”broughtabout theeffectof“disjointedness”,andforthatreasonArendtappliedher“systematicapproachindetail” so that “a substantially common base” (Arendt 1996, p. 4) could be grasped. In no case did she intend to synthetize Augustine’s divergent trains of thought—on the contrary, she made crevices on this common surface perfectly visible, without any attempt to reconcile them in antithetical or dialecticalform. TheironicimpetusofArendt’sanalysisemployswhatwecouldcall“doublenegative dialectics”,7 which is able to maintain contradictions in motion, following life’s own rhythm that defendsitselffromstopping,ending,anddispersing. Nonetheless, irony does not exclude seriousness, related to this so far quite mysterious “substantiallycommonbase”locatedwithin“pretheologicalsphere”. Ironicimpulsesservetouncover it,yetnotallowingtodetermineitastheultimateground. Ontheotherhand,aswewillseelater, itisjustbecauseofthisultimate, driftinggroundthatthecommonbasecouldappearascommon. Arendt’sinterpretativestrategyrelieson“makingexplicitwhatAugustinehimselfhasmerelyimplied”, meaningthatinordertotreathimmoreseriously,oneneedsadetachmentfrom“Augustine’sdogmatic 4 Iwouldnot,however,gosofarasRichardWolindid,whosays:“Incertainrespects,theworkstandoutasanembarrassing testimonialtothedelusionsofassimilationism.ItwaswrittenatapointinArendt’slifewhenshestillentertainedhopesof auniversitycareeramidthewoefullyconservativemilieuofGermanacademicmandarins”(Wolin2001,p.43).Asreflected inherprewarletterswithJaspers,Arendtwasverystraightforwardandfierceinhercritique.ShequarrelledwithJaspers abouthispoliticalstancetowardsJewsinthe1930s.Moreover,HansJonaspreservedamemoryofheraudaciousbehaviour attheuniversity:beforejoiningRudolfBultmann’sseminarontheNewTestament,sheasaJewwantedtomakesurethat shewouldnotlistentoanti-Semiticremarks.JoannaVecchiarelliScottposesarhetoricalquestion,askingwhoamongthe WeimarerastudentsdaredbehavesoboldlytowardsthemandarinsofGermanacademia(VecchiarelliScott2010,p.16)? 5 “ForAugustinethisrelevance[oftheneighbour—RZ]wassimplyamatterofcourse”(Arendt1996,p.4). 6 Arendtexplainedoneoftheaporiasfoundintheanalysedtextsbysayingthat“thereasonforthisincongruityliesin Augustine’sterminology,whichhetookfromthetraditionofGreekphilosophyevenwhenhewishedtoexpressexperiences thatwerequitealientoit”(Arendt1996,p.12). 7 Derivedfromsimultaneousabsorptionandnegationoflife’s“notyet”and“nomore”:“Thisquestioningbeyondtheworld restsonthedoublenegativeintowhichlifeisplaced”(Arendt1996,p.70). Religions2018,9,371 6of24 subserviencetoscripturalandecclesiasticalauthority”(Arendt1996, p. 4). Thethingwhichfrom a dogmatic position seems to be ironic, blasphemous, and heretic, could actually be a polemical strugglefortrueseriousness(inthiscase: intreatingone’sownneighbour). Nevertheless,Arendt didnotdefendanypolemicswithorthodoxyassimplyjustifiedinitselfthankstobeantidogmatic. Thisis crucial, becauseit ishardto attackherstance assimple reversal, revaluation ofvalues, etc. Instead,sheadmittedthat“suchintentionaldetachmentfromalldogmaticelementsmaydoomthe interpretationofareligiousauthor,butisrelativelyeasytojustifyinAugustine’scase”(Arendt1996, p. 4). The way that Arendt emphasized autonomy of the secular realm against the divine one is so subversivethatonecanprobablyunderstandthefollowingconclusiononlyasanexcusethatcould have left a naïve reader mistaken: “Of course, these presentations will not prove whether, in fact, such a pretheological sphere is to be justified as all, or whether the possible being or not being of humanexistenceistrulysettledinGod’spresence”(Arendt1996,p. 6). Partially,thisstatementcould signifythatArendt’s“attemptataninquiryofpurelyphilosophicalinterest”(Arendt1996,p. 6)—as she called her dissertation—does not encroach upon territory reserved for theology. But it is not clearhowArendtcouldmaintainthepurityofthisdivision, sincesheacknowledgedthatevenin hismostreligiouswritingsAugustine“neverwhollylosttheimpulseofphilosophicalquestioning” (Arendt 1996, p. 6). Moreover, in Der Liebesbegriff the essential theoretical battles were conducted preciselyinthemidstoftheology, usingtheologicalreasoning, drawingconclusionsfromittothe pointofabsurdity. That Arendt manoeuvred between secular and religious reading of theological discourse, provoking its destabilisation, becomes visible in her introduction of the term the “pretheological sphere”. It is not only that she assumed that theological edifice rests on philosophy, but—more profoundly—thatitalwaysrestsonacertainanthropology,asitderivesfromanthropologicalsources, and finally from the time out of mind. That is why, according to the double negative dialectics, shesecularisedtheology,andgrantedreligionapositionhigherthanearthlyauthority,atthesame timedismantlingthetheocraticstalematewiththissingularmove. BythisImeanthatsheextracted themostpreciouselementfromtheologyinordertocatapultitinto“heavens”ofideals. Thereligious experienceandtheologicaldiscoursearenotexcluded,butseparated. Theformerconcernsstrictly innerreality,thelatterwouldinspiretheworldifitonlycouldilluminateexistencewithoutdemanding acertaincredo. Sincethesecondoptionisbarelypossible,Arendtchoseaphilosophical“contraband” insteadofareversaloftheology. ThoserestrictionsexplainwhyArendt’simmediatereactiontoany possibilityoftheabsolutetoappearconsistedofstrengtheningdivisionsandbufferzones. Arendt quotedAugustine: Theyhavenotunderstoodthat‘Donotdotoanotherwhatyoudonotwishtohavedonetoyou’,cannot bevariedinanywaybyanynationaldiversityofcustoms. WhenthisruleisappliedtotheloveofGod, allvicesdie;whenitisappliedtotheloveofourneighbor,allcrimesvanish.(Arendt1996,pp. 4–5) However,Arendt’scommentdistortedtheAugustiniantextbeyondrecognition. Shewrote: Precedingtheexpresscommandmentofneighborlyloveisanotherthatisindependentofanysuch explicit divine revelation that has become real in Christ. This is the ‘law written in our hearts.’ TheChristiancommandmentsharpensthis‘natural’law,andthusenhancesthehumancommunity toitshighestrealityinwhichallcrimesareextinguished. Therefore,weshallbeabletolimitthescope ofinterpretationintwowayswithoutbeingdogmatic. First,weshallaskaboutthispretheological sphere. Second,weshallseektograspwhatAugustine’sexegesiswouldregardasthespecificnovelty intheChristianelaboration. (Arendt1996,p. 5) Here,herreadingofAugustine,theanti-Pelagianauthor,isthoroughlyPelagian. Inthefirstquotation, thatfromAugustine,divinelawimplantsitselfonthecommonmoralbasis,freefromculturalcontexts; it is a narrative conducted by the demands of the economy of salvation, which explains how the Religions2018,9,371 7of24 Christianfaithonlystrengthenswhatwasalreadypreparedwithinpaganethics,waitingforthedivine message. Arendtdidnotunderminethisnarrative,shejustchangedperspective: ifa“lawwritten inourhearts”lastedforcenturieswithoutChristianrevelation,thisundoubtedlymeansthatitwas independentfromanyrevelation. “Throughphilosophicalworkwithideastheauthorwantstojustify herfreedomfromChristianpossibilities,whichalsoattracther”(ArendtandJaspers1992,p. 690)—as KarlJasperswroteinareview,beingthesupervisorofArendt’sthesis. Thatiswhysheemphasised the element as autonomous from excessively demanding Christian ethics, not calling it “pagan” or “Jewish”, but rather—“the pretheological”, prior to any institutionalized religion, the “natural, prereligious,andsecularlaw”(Arendt1996,p. 39). HerreservationregardingChristianityisfullof respectandjustifiedonlyfromthepointofviewofaMarraniccryptotheologythatArendtsecretly activatedinherdissertation. TheChristianmessageisrenouncednotbecauseitisfalse,butbecauseit isalltoosoon.8 Doublenegativedialecticsallowstokeepdivinityatdistance9,whichisnotnecessarily anatheisticgesture,butamorepiousonethanthatwhichisusuallytakenasreligious. TokeepGodat distanceimpliespreventionofanydivinisationofearthlyreality. ThisisthereasonwhyArendttook “natural”inquotes,usingtheterm“’natural’law”(Arendt1996,p. 5)10(eventhoughinthisparticular context this natural law would be in tune with her defence of secularity). However, secularity in thisversionisdevoidofsanctity: consequently,secularisationcouldnotbeequalledwitharobbery, usurpation,orinheritanceofanysacral“property”. Thus,a“substitutionaldilemma”(Moyn2008, p.77)couldbeavoidedandnotneglected. 2. Nature De-divinizationofnaturebymeansofthenotionoftranscendentGodgovernsthethinkingof FranzRosenzweig,whowasthegreatestunmentionedprecursorofArendtwhenshewaspreparing DerLiebesbegriff. ForRosenzweig,nonidentityof“world”and“nature”11 (Rosenzweig2005,p. 23) protectsahumanbeing’sfreedom,ultimatelyguaranteedintheanalogous,paradigmaticseparationof Godfromtheworld: Theconditionofcreature,whichwehaveclaimedfortheworldinordertosavetheselfnessofman, thereforeletGod,too,escapefromtheworld. Metaethicalmanisthefermentationthatbreaksdown thelogicalandphysicalunityofthecosmosintothemetalogicalworldandthemetaphysicalGod. (Rosenzweig2005,p. 22) Formanconfrontedfacetofacewithnaturerenderstobe“notacreature,butapart”(Arendt1996, p. 69),apartofnaturewhosetotalityobtrudesascrushingifthereisnothingtocounterbalanceit. It obtrudes itself upon individuality to the extent that it hollows inwardness out, resulting in the denigrationofthesubject.Onthecontrary,Arendtemptiedindividualityoutofnaturalcontent,leaving freespaceforethicallife. “Ifhe[man—RZ]couldbesaidtohaveanessentialnatureatall,itwould belackofself-sufficiency”(Arendt1996,p. 19). Itmeansthatthehumanconditionisundetermined, 8 Iwilldemonstratethevalidityoftheterms“Marranic”and“Judeochristian”later.HereImayaddahypothesis,whichIam unabletoprovewithinthescopeofthistext,butwhich,nonetheless,inspiredmyinterpretation,namelythatthemodelof Arendt’shiddentheologicalimaginationcouldbefoundintheideaofawithdrawnGod(tzimtzum)asitisknownfromthe LurianicKabbalah.ThehypothesisisverifiabletextuallythroughArendt’sintellectualexchangewithGershomScholem, whichstartedinthelate1930s.AsfortheearlierpossiblesourcesofthisinfluenceonecouldindicateFranzRosenzweig. ItisalsonotexcludedthatArendtmighthaveinheritedcertainheterodoxideasthroughGermanidealism,especiallyvia dialecticaltheology,andifso,theterm“Judeochristian”wouldgainadditionallegitimisationininterpretationofArendt’s oeuvre. Allinall,whatiscrucialforthecurrentpresentationisthataccordingtothe20thcenturyre-appropriationsof theLurianictheologicalnarrativebytheGerman-Jewishthinkers,thesecularcharacterofsecularityseemstobetheonly traceofdivinechosenness. AsfortheimportanceoftheArendt–ScholemcorrespondencefortheLurianichypothesis, seeamarvellousstudyofVivianLiska(Liska2017). 9 Ielaboratedthisideaforthefirsttimeinanarticlefrom2012,see(Zawisza2012). 10 CatholicscholarslamentonArendtandblameherofbeingignorantwhenitcomestothenaturallaw,justlikeiftheywere unabletounderstandthatsomeintelligentpeoplecanrejectahypothesisofnaturallaw,havinginmindalternativetheories ofhumanself-constitution.(SeeWinters1987,pp.197,203,217;Kampowski2008,p.265). 11 JustlikeinTruthandPolitics,Arendtmadeadistinctionbetween“politics”and“world”,seeingthelatterasmorevoluminous. Religions2018,9,371 8of24 unknown,butnotinasensethatweneedmoreknowledgetocaptureitfullyoneday;itisunknown becauseitisendlessly,irreversiblydeepenedandcomplicatedbylanguageandenigmaticinscriptions intoinwardness. Humanbeingisbornasastrangerintonature,andforthatreasonshecannever returntoafictivenaturalharmony,neithercouldsherecognisea“naturallaw”emanatingfromthe cosmos, which lost its sacral status after the Gnostic tendency of the “Jewish-Christian teaching” (Arendt1996,p. 52)hadbanishedcosmotheism. Fromthenon,anynormativeproposalbasedonthe Greeknotionof“nature”(physis)andits“pseudo-Christian”(Arendt1996,p. 30)adaptationunderthe nameof“order”(ordo)asan“everlasting,foreverlawfulstructure”(Arendt1996,p. 61)—isinvalid. Paradiseremainsforeverlost. This problematic finds its realisation in the section of Arendt’s dissertation entitled Ordinata dilectio. It is the most unpersuasive part of the whole book—not so much because Arendt had no idea how to play it out, but because she was not convinced at all by Augustine’s argumentation, andexposedherdeepreservationperformatively;sheseeminglytriedtoproceedthisargumentation, but the way she did so rendered it thin. It is a parody. At first glance, ordered love seems to be anantidoteforpreviouslypresented,unpredictableburstsofpassiontowardstheOtherwhichended withself-destruction. Itisaperfect“regulatorypointofreference”(Arendt1996,p. 37)providing toolsforregulations,adaptations,andordering,appliedaccordingtothe“generalorderofeverything thatis”(Arendt1996,p. 39);inotherwords,accordingtothevisionofapagangodunderstoodas immutablewholenessoreverlastingnature. Arendt’stalentforwrongheadedrecapitulationsmade herdescriptionoforderedloveturnintoadversepublicity,withbarelypent-uprevulsion,sinceitis “unconcernedobjectivity”thatdetermines: whatoughttobeloved. Loveitselfisaconsequenceofthisdetermination. Thesameistrueforthe degreeofintensitythatlovewillspendonitsobject,dependingupontheorderthatassignseachtoits properplace. Everyoneislovedasmuchasheoughttobe,nomoreandnoless. (Arendt1996,p. 38) Natureputspeopleintheirplace. Noprotest, nocomplaint, nolamentisallowed. Onecouldask towhatendsuchaloveispromotedwhichtreatsahumanbeingas“amere‘thing’tobeusedfor the true life to come” (Arendt 1996, p. 38)? The bitter truth is that there is no other answer than that: “the‘highestgood’isdrawnintothepresentandcandominateandregulatelifeinthisworld” (Arendt 1996, p. 41). It means that the Christian theological concepts of providence, natural law, andordocaritatisareinterrelated,formingadangerousmixturebyhelpofwhichsomepeoplecould gainpoweroveranotherandrepressthem,“forthegoodofsomebody”. Thosewhocommandand order,pretendingthattheyknowthis“good”,donotrespectenigmaofhumansingularity,fragility, andinimitablenessgroundedingroundlessabyssofthemysteryofcreationepitomisedbyeachbirth. AsArendtconcluded,orderedlovestays“inflagrantcontradictiontotheveryessenceofloveinall itsforms”(Arendt1996,p. 42),becauseitdepersonalisestheneighbourwhoisnotrecognisedinhis “concreteuniqueness”,but“insublimeindifferenceregardlessofwhatorwhoheis”(Arendt1996, p.43).12 ChristianpassionnettedbycategoriesoftheGreekphilosophysquirmsinconvulsivemotion ragingfromself-sacrificetoindifference—perversionofsufferingatitszenith. ItisobviouslynotonlybecauseofthedemandsoftheGreekphilosophy,butfirstofallbecauseof “life’sinstability”(Arendt1996,p. 17)thatmancouldnotfinditsfinaldestination. ButwhatArendt recommendsforhumancondition’sinstabilitybynomeansresemblestraditionalistordo. Sinceitis acreaturelylife,finiteandthusfarfromabsolute,itneedsaproperperspective,whichwouldrespect the“limitationsofearthlylife”(Arendt1996,p.27).Therefore,thesenseofmeasureiscrucial—measure notderivedfromextraterrestrialpatterns,bymeansofwhichlife“islookeduponfromtheoutside (from outside the living person)” (Arendt 1996, p. 16), but elaborated on the basis of life’s own limitations,tobeginwithbirthanddeath. Arendtkeptpersuadingthat“meetinglifefromtheoutside” 12 OnthatbasisshecriticizedevocationofloveforhumankindasabstractinOnRevolution. Religions2018,9,371 9of24 (Arendt1996,p. 12)resultsinblaminghumanlifeforitsfinitude,treatingitlikeamaladyorcalamity, intheend—asevil. Ifonecomparesfinitelifewithdurabilityofthings,nottomentionprevailing forcesofnature,humanconditionalitymustlookmiserableandincurablytragic. (... )uponallthismisery,philosophysmilesitsemptysmileand,withitsoutstretchedindexfinger, showsthecreature,whoselimbsaretremblinginfearforitslifeinthisworld,aworldbeyond,ofwhich itwantstoknownothingatall. Formandoesnotatallwanttoescapefromsomechain;hewantsto stay,hewants—tolive. (Rosenzweig2005,p. 9) Influenced by Rosenzweig, Arendt continued his neues Denken, especially when she rotated the perspectivestofavoursingularityagainstWholeness. Todoso,shesometimestooklibertiesmocking sanctity: “For man, eternity is the future, and this fact, seen from the viewpoint of eternity, is of course a contradiction in terms” (Arendt 1996, p. 16). Absurdity helps to show how absurd is to forcehumanbeingstoimitateidealisedprojectionsofabsoluteness. Forinstance,Arendtcriticized purethinkingabstractedfromalivingsubjectivity: “Fromtheviewpointoflifethisstateinwhich man’s spirit relates to itself is a kind of death. For to the extent that we are alive and active (and desire is a form of action), we necessarily are involved in things outside ourselves and cannot be free”(Arendt1996,p.21). Cannotbefreeinanabsolutesense,Ishouldadd. Ourfreedomispossible onlyintheabsenceofabsolute. Ifinlieuofcelebrationofthisconditionedfreedom,manstartsto desireeternity,akindoftimewithoutspace,thenitpoisonsfinitudewithnostalgiaforanexistence freedfromanymovementandinterminglingwithmatter. TothatArendtrespondedwithahighly polemicalsentenceinterwovenasacounterpointbetweenverses,inwhichshedepictedtrancesof PlotinusandAugustineabouteternity: “Whatpreventsmanfrom‘living’inthetimelesspresentislife itself,whichnever‘standsstill’”(Arendt1996,p. 16).13 Arendt protected the exceptionality of human condition so that it would not dissipate into shapelesseddyingofcosmicbecoming.Thisdoesnotmeanthatsheavoidedtranscendinglife,crossing theboundariesofbirthanddeathintotwotypesofnothingness. However,aswewillsee,theclinching iswheretheobservationpostwillbelocated: whetherwelookatthecoldcosmos,oritlooksatusand chillstheblood. 3. DamnedCreatures Althoughthecentralquestionofthedissertationisneighbourlylove,thefirstpartdealswith solipsism of the subject desiring God, while the second part concerns inversion of this longing, namely a path that an individual follows backwards, looking through his origin for the Creator. ThiscompositionitselfoutlinesArendt’scriticalstance: sinceonlythethirdpartopensthepossibility oflovingone’sneighbours,inthepreviousonesareaderfindsnothingbutaporias,obstacles,impasses, andcontradictions.Happinessturnsouttobeunreachable,lifeisbitter,God’sgracefades—alienation in full swing. “Can life be said to exist at all?” (Arendt 1996, p. 14)—asked Arendt, leading Augustine’s doubts to completion. In her mouth this “doubt” concerning life turns almost into akindofDoceticheresy: Augustineisaccusedofhamperingtherecognitionofthecarnal,earthly presenceofhisneighbours. The problem resides in the ideal of self-sufficiency, das Autarkieideal (Arendt 1929, p. 27).14 Philosophical vision of the absolute inherited by Augustine—immovable, omnipotent, omniscient—hangsovermenasasignthattheyarealwaysinferior. Consequently,desireofeternal life,withitsaspirationofbeinginGod,withGod,likeGod,bringsaboutthat“man’spresentlifeis beingneglectedforthesakeofitsfuture,andlosesitsmeaningfulnessandweightincomparisonwith thattruelife”(Arendt1996,p. 27). Cravingfortimelessdelight“proceedstostriptheworldandall 13 ThatiswhyArendtwascriticalaboutnuncstansalsoinherlastwork,Willing. 14 InthetextIuse“autarchic”asderivativefrom“autarchy”,althoughitsmeaningas“absolute”producesadditionalaftersound. Religions2018,9,371 10of24 temporalthingsoftheirvalueandtomakethemrelative. (... )Sincetheywillnotlast,theydonot reallyexist”(Arendt1996,p. 14). The root of the problem lies deeper. Self-sufficiency meets its limits everywhere. Because of the dialectics of life, which continues its development due to changes, to live means to move, neverstandingstill.15 Thisprovokesfrustration. AndsinceGodinAugustineisbydefinitionthe highestgood,theonlyobjecttobeblamedislifeorhumanbeing,or—inarefinedversion—fallen humannature. Thus,Arendt’sintuitionleadshertolocatethesourceoftheproblemsarticulatedby Augustineinhisveryattitudetowardslife: “Onceweassumetheperspectivethatwenolongerview lifeas‘beforedeath’butas‘afterdeath,’deathequalizesbydevaluinglifeassuch”(Arendt1996,p.76). Although Arendt discussed many influences which shaped Augustinian thought, she never mentionedManichaeism,neitherGnosticismingeneral. Buthereitwouldbeverymuchaccurate toseenotonlyStoicandNeoplatonicdimensionsintheidealofautarchy, butalsotheManichean backgroundofsomemotives,likeregressionandwithdrawalfromtheworldnolessthantheshiftfrom totalconcentrationofinwardnesstothesacrificeoftheself,whichArendtcalled“pseudo-Christian” (Arendt1996,p.30).Lateron,shenotedtheexistenceofsomeChristiantypeofself-denial,butwithout detail.16 Nevertheless,ArendtenumeratedessentialfeaturesofloveaccordingtoPaulofTarsus,who, unlikeAugustine,hadclaimed: thatperfectionispossiblealreadyinfinitelife,notonlyinheaven; thatlovewon’tceaseineternity;thatintheafterlifeGodwillbelovedbythesamelovethroughwhich s/heisloved(Arendt1996,pp. 30–32). Onthecontrary,forAugustinetheManichean,worldand creaturesremaininsuchadeepdebasementthattheydonotdeservetobeloved. “Manshouldnot loveinthislife”(Arendt1996,p. 30),becauseanypossibleobjectoflovecannotcomparewithGod. Accordingly,loveinanycaseshouldnotbeaccompaniedbyenjoyment(frui). Theonlycharacteristic ofcaritasthatprovidespeoplewithaforetasteofeternityisfearlessness. Butdisappearanceofthe fearofdeathresultsinforgettingaboutmortality(Arendt1996,p. 29),abandonmentofthehuman conditionandachievementofataraxicindifference.17 Thisindifferencetoone’sowndeath,however, could affect attitude towards others. Fleeing from evil nature and avoiding intense relations with people,solipsistsubjectivityseeksitsonlyrefugeinGod. Butthisgod,whomtheisolatedindividual worshipssoferventlyinalanguageofphilosophy,istheancientcosmosindisguise. 4. Indifferencevs. Singularity Loath reference to life comes from a certain vision of the cosmos treated as a pattern and afundamentwhichhumanfinitudeshoulddependon. Worse,iftheHebrewGod—philosophically dissectedbytheologians—adoptstheattributesfromthecosmicWholeness,whichwasthecasein theChristiantheology. “Ithink,andhopetoshow,thatitispreciselythenotionofGodassummum bonumthatcreatesthedifficulty”(Arendt1996,p. 44)—withthisstatementwhichleavesnodoubt aboutherintentions,Arendtclosedthefirstpartofthedissertation. Inthesecond,“natalist”part, the quest for one’s origin plays the main role. Despite the obvious fact that its appearance seems tobecontradistinctivelyinfinitesimalincomparisontothemagnitudeofcosmos,birthbecomesthe Archimedeanpointforadefenceofafragileprocessofindividuation. IntheworldconstructedbyAugustine,nobodyisinterestedinourhappiness,everyonelives alone facing death and meanwhile experiencing disillusionment because of desires. “The Creator remainsforeveridenticallythesame,independentofhiscreationandwhatevermayhappenwithinit” 15 GiorgioAgambencannotbealegitimatecontinuatorofArendt’sforthisreasonalonethathisdeconstructionofWestern metaphysicscontainsaversiontowardsmovementandmoving(Agamben2013,p. 95). ForArendt“calmquietude” (Arendt1996,p.19)isasrareaslove,nottomentiontheabsolutecalmnesswhichsimplyequalsdeath(Arendt1996,p.13). 16 Arendt’sgeneralstancetowardsChristianityonecouldexplainthisway:whenshewrotethat“contemptfortheworldand itsgoodsisnotChristianinorigin”(Arendt1996,p.20),shedidnotclaimthatneitherChristiantraditionsnorecclesiastical lawsaredeprivedofthisGrundbefindlichkeit. 17 ThesearecryptotheologicalmotivesinheritedbyAgambenfromMartinHeidegger; Agamben’selaborationoflimbo containstheminanutshell.