Hannah Arendt and Moral Evil: Connecting the Radical and the Banal Student: Dignée Brandt Begeleider: dr. Johan de Jong Tweede Beoordelaar: dr. Maarten van Houte Datum: 23.06.2016 Bachelor Wijsbegeerte, UU 7,5 ECTs To my mother, who, out of all the goodness in her heart, taught me about the dark side of humanity. 2 Table of contents Introduction 4 Chapter 1: Radical Evil 5 1.1 Situating Hannah Arendt’s conception of evil 5 1.2 Defining radical evil 6 1.3 Three steps to dehumanization 7 Chapter 2: The Banality of Evil 11 2.1 ‘The Banality of Evil’ 11 2.2 Controversy 13 Chapter 3: The Fusion of the Radical and the Banal 15 3.1 Radical alongside banal 15 3.2 The width of evil 17 Conclusion 20 Bibliography 22 3 Introduction Evil has been present throughout the entire history of humanity: be it a war in the Roman empire or the war against terrorism. Philosophy naturally always has been investigating evil and morality. How can we understand the role of evil in the world, and even come to accept its existence? In this thesis, I will zoom in on one specific topic in the spectrum of the investigations into evil: Hannah Arendt’s theory of evil. The fascinating aspect of Arendt’s theory of evil is that it is clearly divided into two conceptions. Up until the famous trial of Nazi leader Adolf Eichmann, Arendt defended a theory of radical evil, with the Holocaust as a horribly accurate example. After the trial, however, she proposed the banality of evil, a concept that (at first) seems to contrast the concept of radical evil. This seemingly contrasting shift of thought caught the interest of the academic world: some argue that Arendt indeed made a radical turn, while others think that the difference is only superficial, not fundamental. This discussion is still relevant today, as Arendt is one of the leading philosophers in the contemporary debate about secular theories of evil. The ongoing discussion has led me to the main question of this thesis: how should we understand Hannah Arendt’s two conceptions of evil, and how do they relate to each other? Before anything else, I want to limit the kind of evil I will be discussing. I will exclusively be talking about moral evil, the kind of evil that is caused by human beings. This thus does not include natural evil such as natural disasters or diseases. Although Arendt proposed her conceptions of evil in the context of World War II, they are still relevant today. Current evil might differ in form from the evil Arendt described; current phenomena like the war on terror still constitute evil on a large scale. A thorough conception of how Arendt’s evil would help us understand these phenomena is beyond the scope of this thesis, but they still are the contemporary issues that make research into Arendt’s conceptions of evil important. Any such analysis, however, will need clarity about how Arendt’s conception of radical evil and banality relate. Therefore, this thesis aims to provide the preparation for such an investigation. I will return to the contemporary relevance briefly in my conclusions. I will start the thesis by discussing the concept of radical evil in chapter 1. After showing that radical evil essentially revolves around dehumanization of human beings, I will turn to the subject of the banality of evil in chapter 2. I will argue that banality in this context should be understood as a new level on which we should comprehend moral evil, after which I will address the controversy that arose regarding the term ‘banality of evil’. In the last chapter, I will compare both Arendt’s notions of evil, and argue that we should understand these concepts in a different way: with this interpretation, radical evil and the banality of evil can be compatible. I will then briefly discuss the possible applications of this compatibility, focusing on the question whether both conceptions of evil are applicable outside of a totalitarian context. This will lead to the conclusion of the thesis, where I will answer the main question and briefly get back to its value for understanding contemporary evil. 4 Chapter 1: Radical Evil The first clear conception of evil to be found in Hannah Arendt’s work, is that of radical evil. She proposed the term in her 1951 book The Origins of Totalitarianism (hereafter: Origins), explaining it in the context of totalitarianism in Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia. In the first editions of the Origins she sometimes refers to it as ‘absolute evil’, something that disappears in her later works. It follows from studying the Origins that the two terms seem to be commutable, which is acknowledged by the main secondary literature.1 I will interpret Arendt’s conception of radical evil by mainly following the last chapters of the Origins and some of her correspondence with Karl Jaspers. I will first situate Arendt’s conception of evil in a historical context. Then I will address the nature of radical evil, and follow Arendt’s analysis of the three-step-process that radical evil entails. Hereafter I will question the relation between radical evil and totalitarianism, and close the chapter with a short discussion of the evil-doers involved. 1.1 Situating Hannah Arendt’s conception of evil Conceptions of moral evil can be roughly divided into two categories: religious conceptions and secular conceptions. Up until now, the former category has had a much bigger role in history. Moral evil was explained by claiming that evil is the existence of a devilish counterpart to God, or by claiming that evil is a privation of the good. The latter claim was popular among religious nations and philosophers, because it is compatible with the claim that God creates no evil, which is obviously of fundamental importance in traditional religion. However, neither of the claims have been completely satisfactory: why would God allow a privation of good to exist in the world, and how are we supposed to understand concepts like pain in this context? This, and the rising secularity of society, eventually led to purely secular theories of evil.2 Conventionally, we say that completely secular theories of evil are relatively new: Immanuel Kant was the first to propose such a theory in 1793.3 This was still a rather broad theory about both evil on a larger scale, the kind Arendt discusses, as well as merely bad- doing. In short, Kant argues that evil-doing is choosing self-love over the moral law.4 This moral law is the categorical imperative: actions are morally correct only if the actor in all fairness can want the maxim under which he performed the action to be raised as a universal law. Kant claimed that human beings always act according to their individual fundamental maxim, which is either morally right (according to the moral law) or morally wrong. Although human beings are free to choose this fundamental law, and therefore are not 1 See for example Richard J. Bernstein, “Did Hannah Arendt Change Her Mind?”, in Hannah Arendt: Twenty Years Later, ed. Larry May and Jerome Kohn (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1996), 127-146. 2 Todd Calder, “The Concept of Evil,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2015 edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/concept-evil/ (retrieved June 8, 2016), 2.1. 3 Ibid., 2.2. 4 Immanuel Kant, “Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone,” in Religion and Rational Theology, ed. and trans. Allen Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 39-216. 5 innately good or evil, Kant claims that evil is rooted in mankind, and therefore radical.5 Evil thus is a necessary aspect of mankind as a whole, not of individual human beings. Although heavily influenced by Kant, Arendt was among the first to propose a theory exclusively on “narrow evil, [...] the most morally despicable sorts of actions, characters, events, etc.”6 Arendt borrows the term ‘radical evil’ from Kant, but fundamentally changes it. Whereas she follows Kant in reasoning the human condition is somehow poisoned with evil, she does not follow the Kantian view that radical evil is somehow rooted in human nature. This led her to develop a theory opposed to the historical religious conceptions of evil and focused on the narrow conception of evil. 1.2 Defining radical evil Arendt argues that radical evil is the kind of evil that is beyond any moral evil that we have ever experienced in the history of human nature. Whereas the evil that we have experienced up until the Holocaust involved sadistic monsters, revengeful motives or a hunger for power, radical evil goes beyond these familiar causes. Radical evil has two important aspects. In a letter to Karl Jaspers, Arendt writes that “we know that the greatest evils or radical evil has nothing to do anymore with such humanly understandable, sinful motives.”7 This reveals the first important aspect of radical evil: it goes beyond human comprehension, and “could no longer be understood and explained by the evil motives of self-interest.”8 It is in that sense “absolute because it can no longer be deduced from humanly comprehensible motives,”9 being the aforementioned motives like power or revenge. Arendt argues that we have long been mistaken in our conception of evil: the classic image of some malicious red devil who tortures people is an image that has expired.10,11 The newest, most dangerous kind of evil in the first half of the twentieth century (and in the years after), is this radical evil, which not only has a different way to express itself in a three-step- process which I will discuss below, but a significantly different essence. This is the second important aspect of radical evil: “individual human beings did not kill other individual human beings for human reasons, but [...] an organized attempt was made to eradicate the concept of the human being.”12 It is only possible to give an interpretation of the concept of radical evil, as Arendt has never been explicitly clear on the definition. In the same letter to Jaspers, she writes: “What radical evil really is I don't know, but it seems to me it somehow has to do with the following 5 Kant, “Religion,” 6:33. 6 Calder, “The Concept of Evil,” introduction. 7 L. Kohler and H. Saner, ed., Hannah Arendt-Karl Jaspers Correspondence 1926-1969 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992), 166. 8 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, renewed edition (New York: Harcourt Inc., 1973), 459. 9 Ibid., ix. 10 Kohler and Saner, Hannah Arendt-Karl Jaspers, 54/62/69. 11 Susan Neiman, “Banality Reconsidered,” in Politics in Dark Times: Encounters with Hannah Arendt, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 305-315, 306-308. 12 Kohler and Saner, Hannah Arendt-Karl Jaspers, 69, my emphasis. 6 phenomenon: making human beings as human beings superfluous.”13 This ‘superfluousness’ she mentions, has later become the definition of Arendt’s radical evil. It seems that it does not only have “something to do” with making human beings superfluous, but that this is its essence: secondary literature tends to make these concepts almost interchangeable.14 Radical evil tries to get rid of the human being qua human being, that is, leaving nothing but living corpses – beings who are “at once human and non-human.”15 Arendt notes that this evil showed itself most clearly in the extermination camps that were present during the Holocaust. In these camps, human beings (although dehumanized in a psychological sense) were not only superfluous but also completely arbitrary. After the process of dehumanization, it did not matter anymore if the victims had ever existed at all. In the camps, the world stood “outside of life and death.”16 The dehumanization erased the individual human being as well as the universal or overall importance of men. It not only did not matter anymore if a human being was alive or dead, it did not matter if he ever was. 1.3 Three steps to dehumanization In the Origins, Arendt explains that this process of dehumanization (and thus the process of radical evil) involves three steps, which can be found in the systematic extermination of the Jewish society during the Holocaust. It is important to note that with ‘total domination’ in this context, she means the total domination needed to make human beings superfluous. Regarding the three steps, Arendt writes: “The first essential step on the road to total domination is to kill the juridical person in man.”17 What does she mean when she says this? To do such a thing, one has to make sure that the victim lives in an environment where there is no system of law to be found. Protection and punishment hereby become arbitrary. Arendt underlines in this context the necessity of “the element of the innocent” in the concentration camps: the camps were filled with criminals (murderers or opponents of the regime) as well as with people who did not do anything wrong their entire life.18 This broke the causal relationship between behaviour and punishment: it did not matter if you chose to cooperate or disobey. This “arbitrary arrest which chooses among innocent people destroys the validity of free consent, just as torture […] destroys the possibility of opposition.”19 The victim’s juridical person must be eliminated by taking away the state-like environment in terms of laws and justice qua punishment. Behaviour will thus have no causal relationship with protection and punishment anymore - justice will become some complete arbitrary and empty concept. 13 Kohler and Saner, Hannah Arendt-Karl Jaspers, 69, my emphasis. 14 See for example Richard J. Bernstein, Kees van Hattem, etc. 15 Richard J. Bernstein, “Are Arendt’s Reflections on Evil Still Relevant?”, in Politics in Dark Times: Encounters with Hannah Arendt, ed. Seyla Behabib (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 293-304, 297. 16 Arendt, Origins, 444. 17 Ibid., 447. 18 Ibid., 433-435/448-449. 19 Ibid., 451. 7 The second step is “the murder of the moral person in man.”20 By this, Arendt means the total eradication of the possibility to make a (moral) difference as an individual. Apart from the fact that, as explained in the first step, it did not matter for your fate if you cooperated or disobeyed, any protesting against the regime was of complete usefulness; it would never reach other members of the society. Individuals were being anonymized: “the concentration camps, by making death itself anonymous (making it impossible to find out whether a prisoner is dead or alive) robbed death of its meaning as the end of a fulfilled life.”21 A victim could protest and disagree as much as he would like, it did not make any difference. There was no way of his protest ever reaching the outside world. Another way of achieving the eradication of the moral person, is to force him to commit some evil act, with no way out: “when even suicide would mean the immediate murder of his own family-how is he to decide? The alternative is no longer between good and evil, but between murder and murder.”22 The final step is to eliminate “the one thing that still prevents men from being made into living corpses […] the differentiation of the individual, his unique identity.”23 This began with the anonymizing of the victims by making their exteriors look exactly the same, and was completed with the most essential step of dehumanization: the eradication of the spontaneity of the human being. Once its freedom, its juridical and moral judgement is erased, a human being is no longer spontaneous. Its behaviour is of that moment completely predictable, thereby erasing a core concept of the human being, namely its individuality. The only thing that is left is a living corpse, nothing but a small cog in a dehumanized system. Even though World War II motivated Arendt to theorize this concept of radical evil, it is not entirely clear if the radical evil emerged out of the totalitarianism, or was uncovered by it. Although Arendt claims it to be the greatest evil in the history of humanity, it does not follow that this kind of evil was conceived by totalitarianism: it could also be the case that the twentieth century totalitarianism was the first occasion for the radical evil to exist in its pure form. In the preface of the Origins, Arendt argues that “if it is true that in the final stages of totalitarianism an absolute evil appears […] it is also true that without it we might never have known the truly radical nature of Evil."24 This implies the latter: moral evil has always had a potential deep and radical layer, but had yet never showed itself earlier in history. Until now, I have only spoken of the undergoing of the radical evil, but not yet of the executers of radical evil. It is important to understand the complete concept of radical evil, not only the process and the results, but also the evildoers: in the end, they are the ones that start the actual process of making human beings superfluous. I will interpret some of the passages in Arendt’s work that reflect on this subject, and discuss how we should understand this. 20 Arendt, Origins, 451. 21 Ibid., 452. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid., 453. 24 Ibid., ix. 8 Arendt rejects the concept of devil-like monsters - Margaret Canovan states she even “never had thought in terms of ‘monsters and demons’.”25 In the context of radical evil, Arendt rejects men who do evil because they have some sort of bad will, because, as said, radical evil goes beyond evil motives like selfishness or corrupted will – “what meaning has the concept of murder when we are confronted with the mass production of corpses?”26 The men who execute such an evil must therefore also be on some sort of level of ‘inhumanity’. In her 1963 book Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt briefly mentions the executioners in the camps: “the murderers were not sadists or killers by nature; on the contrary, a systematic effort was made to weed out all those who derived physical pleasure from what they did.”27 Previously, in the Origins, she had already made a similar comment: “The manipulators of this system believe in their own superfluousness as much as in that of all others, and the totalitarian murderers are all the more dangerous because they do not care if they themselves are alive or dead, if they ever lived or never were born.”28 This implies that the evil-doers, the executioners in the camps, are also somehow influenced by the radical evil – they do not have understandable evil motives like hunger for power, they are some level of inhuman and superfluous themselves. This shows that the system of radical evil affects all people involved, and thus has an even larger victim-count than one might intuitively think.29 This is an aspect of Arendt’s theory where she distinguishes herself from common evil theories. The suggestion of evil without evil motives “also indicates an object that has no intention whatsoever. This, we saw, was Arendt’s greatest break with modern philosophical tradition.”30 The evil-doer is no longer portrayed as a satanic monster, or as someone with a flawed moral will. Evil is no longer elevated, and evil-doers are no longer fundamentally different from morally just people. Conclusion In conclusion, the best way to define Hannah Arendt’s concept of radical evil, is in my opinion to understand it as an evil that goes beyond humanly understandable motives like revenge or power and human imagination. The main phenomenon occurring within radical evil is at the same time its goal: to dehumanize human beings, thereby making them superfluous and completely arbitrary. This is a first step towards answering the main question: how do the concepts of radical evil and the banality of evil relate to each other? The next step will be the analysis of the banality of evil. The main aspects of radical evil to take with us to the next chapter are the fact that its motives go beyond human understanding, and that its ultimate goal is to make 25 Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 24, n. 30. 26 Arendt, Origins, 441. 27 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 5th edition (New York: Penguin Books, 1963), 105. 28 Arendt, Origins, 459. 29 However, it seems that in these passages Arendt only speaks about the actual murderers in the camp, and not about the leading figures like Adolf Hitler was in the Holocaust. There is still an open question on how we should understand his position in the system of incomprehensible evil. 30 Susan Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 301. 9 human beings superfluous. What then, are goals and motives in the context of the banality of evil? This question is, among others, the subject of chapter 2. 10