Case: 15-60205 Document: 00513477858 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/23/2016 No. 15-60205 U S C A NITED TATES OURT OF PPEALS F C FOR THE IFTH IRCUIT GOOGLE INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES M. HOOD, III, Attorney General of the State of Mississippi, in his official capacity, Defendant-Appellant. On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi No. 3:14-CV-981 Before the Honorable Henry T. Wingate PETITION FOR PANEL REHEARING FRED KRUTZ PETER G. NEIMAN DANIEL J. MULHOLLAND CHRISTOPHER J. BOUCHOUX FORMAN WATKINS WILMER CUTLER PICKERING & KRUTZ LLP HALE AND DORR LLP 200 South Lamar Street, Suite 100 7 World Trade Center City Centre 250 Greenwich Street Jackson, MS 39201 New York, NY 10007 (601) 960-8600 (212) 230-8800 CHRISTOPHER W. JOHNSTONE JAMIE S. GORELICK WILMER CUTLER PICKERING PATRICK J. CAROME HALE AND DORR LLP BLAKE C. ROBERTS 950 Page Mill Road WILMER CUTLER PICKERING Palo Alto, CA 94304 HALE AND DORR LLP (650) 858-6000 1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20006 (202) 663-6000 April 22, 2016 Case: 15-60205 Document: 00513477858 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/23/2016 CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS No. 15-60205 GOOGLE INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES M. HOOD, III, Attorney General of the State of Mississippi, in his official capacity, Defendant-Appellant. The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the following listed persons and entities as described in the fourth sentence of 5th Cir. R. 28.2.1 have an interest in the outcome of this case. These representations are made in order that the Judges of this Court may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal. 1. The Hon. Henry T. Wingate, United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi 2. Google Inc., Plaintiff-Appellee Google Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Alphabet Inc., a publicly held corporation. Accordingly, Alphabet Inc. has more than 10% ownership of Google Inc. 3. Alphabet Inc. Google Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Alphabet Inc., a publicly held corporation. Accordingly, Alphabet Inc. has more than 10% ownership of Google Inc. 4. Fred H. Krutz and Daniel J. Mulholland, with the firm Forman Watkins & Krutz LLP, Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellee i Case: 15-60205 Document: 00513477858 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/23/2016 5. Jamie S. Gorelick, Patrick J. Carome, Blake C. Roberts, Peter G. Neiman, Christopher Bouchoux, and Christopher W. Johnstone, with the firm Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellee 6. James M. Hood, III, Attorney General of the State of Mississippi, Defendant-Appellant 7. Douglas T. Miracle, Bridgette Williams Wiggins, Alison O’Neal McMinn, and Krissy Casey Nobile, with the Office of the Mississippi Attorney General, Counsel for Defendant-Appellant 8. F. Jerome Tapley and Hirlye Ryan Lutz, with the firm Cory Watson, PC, Counsel for Defendant-Appellant 9. James Clark Wyly and Sean F. Rommel, with the firm Wyly- Rommell, PLLC, Counsel for Defendant-Appellant 10. John Wimberly Kitchens, with the firm Kitchens Law Firm, PA, Counsel for Defendant-Appellant 11. Carolyn Glass Anderson and Patricia A. Bloodgood, with the firm Zimmerman Reed, PLLP, Counsel for Defendant-Appellant /s/ Peter Neiman PETER NEIMAN Attorney of record for Plaintiff-Appellee Google Inc. ii Case: 15-60205 Document: 00513477858 Page: 4 Date Filed: 04/23/2016 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS .......................................................... i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................... iv THE PANEL ERRED IN ORDERING DISMISSAL OF GOOGLE’S CLAIMS FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF REGARDING HOOD’S THREATENED ENFORCEMENT ACTION ............................................................................................... 1 A. Google Brought Declaratory And Injunctive Claims, But The Panel’s Decision Addressed Only Google’s Injunctive Claims .................................................................................. 1 B. The Panel’s Ruling That Google’s Declaratory Claims Regarding Threatened Enforcement Action Are Unripe For Lack Of An “Imminent Threat Of Irreparable Injury” Contravenes Supreme Court And Fifth Circuit Precedent .................... 3 C. A Declaratory Claim Is Ripe When There Is A Genuine Threat Of Prosecution ........................................................................... 7 D. Hood Has Threatened Enforcement Action ........................................ 10 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 15 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE iii Case: 15-60205 Document: 00513477858 Page: 5 Date Filed: 04/23/2016 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Page(s) 520 Michigan Avenue Associates v. Devine, 433 F.3d 961 (7th Cir. 2006) ............................................................. 5, 6, 9, 13 Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979)................................................................................... 8, 14 Brister v. Faulkner, 214 F.3d 675 (5th Cir. 2000) ................................................................... 4, 5, 8 Center for Individual Freedom v. Carmouche, 449 F.3d 655 (5th Cir. 2006) ..................................................................... 8, 13 Cooksey v. Futrell, 721 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2013) ..................................................................... 9, 13 Culinary Workers Union, Local 226 v. Del Papa, 200 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 1999) ........................................................................... 9 Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 544 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1976) ........................................................................... 5 Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1980) ........................................................................... 5 First Gibraltar Bank, FSB v. Morales, 19 F.3d 1032 (5th Cir. 1994) ......................................................................... 13 Florida Right to Life, Inc. v. Lamar, 273 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2001) ....................................................................... 9 Harrell v. The Florida Bar, 608 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2010) ....................................................................... 9 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) ............................................................................................. 8 International Society for Krishna Consciousness of Atlanta v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1979) ................................................................... 1, 8, 9 iv Case: 15-60205 Document: 00513477858 Page: 6 Date Filed: 04/23/2016 International Tape Manufacturers Ass’n v. Gerstein, 494 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1974) ........................................................................... 14 Kiser v. Reitz, 765 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 2014) ..................................................................... 9, 13 KVUE, Inc. v. Moore, 709 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1983) ......................................................................... 13 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007)........................................................................... 4, 7, 8, 14 Morial v. Judiciary Commission of State of Louisiana, 565 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1977) ........................................................................... 9 National Organization for Marriage, Inc. v. Walsh, 714 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 2013) ............................................................................ 9 New Mexicans for Bill Richardson v. Gonzales, 64 F.3d 1495 (10th Cir. 1995) ......................................................................... 9 Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian School, 477 U.S. 619 (1986)......................................................................................... 8 Peachlum v. City of York, 333 F.3d 429 (3d Cir. 2003) ............................................................................ 9 Pustell v. Lynn Public Schools, 18 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 1994) ................................................................................ 6 Septum, Inc. v. Keller, 614 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1980) ......................................................................... 14 St. Paul Area Chamber of Commerce v. Gaertner, 439 F.3d 481 (8th Cir. 2006) ........................................................................... 9 Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974)............................................................................. 3, 4, 7, 9 Sullivan v. City of Augusta, 511 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2007) .............................................................................. 9 v Case: 15-60205 Document: 00513477858 Page: 7 Date Filed: 04/23/2016 Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014) ............................................................................... 7, 12 United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1986) ............................................................................ 6 Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383 (1988)................................................................................... 8, 10 Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2010) ......................................................................... 9 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) ........................................................................................... 8 OTHER AUTHORITIES Bray, Samuel L., The Myth of the Mild Declaratory Judgment, 63 Duke L.J. 1091(2014) ................................................................................. 6 Rendleman, Doug, Prospective Remedies in Constitutional Adjudication, 78 W. Va. L. Rev. 155 (1976) ......................................................................... 7 Ritchie de Larena, Lorelei, Re-evaluating Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction in Intellectual Property Disputes, 83 Ind. L.J. 957 (2008) .................................................................................... 6 Wright, Charles, The Law of Federal Courts § 100 (4th ed. 1983) ........................... 6 13B Wright, Charles et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3532.3 ........................................................................................................... 9 § 3532.5 ........................................................................................................... 7 vi Case: 15-60205 Document: 00513477858 Page: 8 Date Filed: 04/23/2016 Google respectfully petitions the Court for rehearing on a narrow issue related to the scope of the panel’s ruling. The panel directed the district court to dismiss the entire case as unripe because Google had not shown an “imminent threat of irreparable injury.” Op.22. But that standard does not apply to Google’s claims for declaratory relief regarding threatened enforcement action. Under settled law, such claims “need cross only a low threshold; the Supreme Court requires no more than a ‘credible threat of prosecution,’ one that is not ‘chimerical,’ or ‘imaginary or speculative.’” International Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness of Atlanta v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809, 821 (5th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted). Google met that standard. Accordingly, Google requests that the panel amend its decision to permit Google’s claims for declaratory relief regarding threatened enforcement action to proceed. THE PANEL ERRED IN ORDERING DISMISSAL OF GOOGLE’S CLAIMS FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF REGARDING HOOD’S THREATENED ENFORCEMENT ACTION A. Google Brought Declaratory And Injunctive Claims, But The Panel’s Decision Addressed Only Google’s Injunctive Claims The Complaint seeks both declaratory and injunctive relief.1 The district court preliminarily enjoined Attorney General Jim Hood from enforcing the 1 Paragraph five of the Complaint seeks a “declar[ation]” of “Google’s rights under federal statutory and constitutional law.” ROA.31. Count Five of the Complaint (paragraphs 106-107), captioned “Declaration of the Parties’ Respective Case: 15-60205 Document: 00513477858 Page: 9 Date Filed: 04/23/2016 subpoena he had issued and from “bringing a civil or criminal charge against Google under Mississippi law for making accessible third-party content to Internet users (as [he had] threatened).” ROA.2025.2 It also denied Hood’s motion to dismiss Google’s claims for declaratory relief, ROA.2091-2095, 2107, but has not yet ruled on the merits of those claims, ROA.2107. Hood filed an interlocutory appeal of “the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction.” AOB.1. Hood did not seek leave to appeal the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, and he did not reference the declaratory judgment claims in his statement of issues on appeal. AOB.1. Neither party briefed the separate ripeness standards applicable to declaratory judgment actions. In accordance with that framing of the issues, the panel’s decision addressing threatened enforcement action focused on Google’s requests for injunctive relief—not Google’s claims for declaratory relief. Op.19-22. The panel Rights Under [the Declaratory Judgment Act],” incorporates that request, and adds specific requests for declarations that (1) “Section 230 of the [Communications Decency Act (CDA)] and the First and Fourteenth Amendment[s]” preclude threatened charges under the Mississippi Consumer Protection Act (MCPA); (2) that a charge under the MCPA for “copyright infringement or importation of prescription drugs is preempted by the Copyright Act, including the [Digital Millennium Copyright Act], and/or the [Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act]; and (3) that “enforcement of the Subpoena, as presently drafted … is impermissible” under the CDA, the Constitution, and certain federal statutes. ROA.61. 2 By letter of April 22, 2016, Hood withdrew the subpoena that Google had challenged. 2 Case: 15-60205 Document: 00513477858 Page: 10 Date Filed: 04/23/2016 explained: “Mindful that an injunction is an ‘extraordinary remedy’ that should not issue absent a substantial threat that the movant will suffer irreparable injury without one, we are persuaded that the district court should not have granted this relief at this juncture.” Op.19 (citation omitted; emphasis added). The panel stated that an “imminent, non-speculative irreparable injury” was required. Op.22. And the panel “conclude[d] that the district court erred in granting injunctive relief because neither the issuance of the non-self-executing administrative subpoena nor the possibility of some future enforcement action created an imminent threat of irreparable injury ripe for adjudication.” Op.22 (emphasis added). Based on the absence of an imminent threat of irreparable injury, the panel ordered dismissal of Google’s entire case on ripeness grounds—a ruling encompassing both Google’s claims for injunctive relief and Google’s claims for declaratory relief. Op.22-23. Dismissal of the declaratory claims regarding Hood’s threats of enforcement action went beyond what was necessary to resolve the appeal. And it was erroneous to apply the “imminent threat of irreparable injury” standard to those claims. B. The Panel’s Ruling That Google’s Declaratory Claims Regarding Threatened Enforcement Action Are Unripe For Lack Of An “Imminent Threat Of Irreparable Injury” Contravenes Supreme Court And Fifth Circuit Precedent As the Supreme Court explained in Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), “requir[ing] that all of the traditional equitable prerequisites to the issuance 3